Obama’s Wars

by Bob Woodward

  DNI Blair believed the Pakistani policy was deeply flawed because it was based entirely on carrots. There were no sticks.

  Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the safe havens were having a field day in his opinion. “Those tribes in that territory are trading ideology, leadership, explosives, logistics, money, suicide bombers,” Blair told a colleague. “And so Haqqani, TTP, even LeT, al Qaeda don’t much care if they blow up a bunch of people in Pakistan, India, Afghanistan or the United States. It’s all a touchdown, a good thing.”

  The Pakistani leadership had claimed their government was so weak that it might collapse if the U.S. used any sticks. They were basically saying, “You don’t want us falling apart, do you? Because then all hell will break loose.”

  Blair figured it would take about ten minutes of good, honest discussion at a National Security Council meeting to sort out what the real leverage was on Pakistan. Suppose the president asked in earnest, “What do you think you could do?”

  If asked, Blair maintained he would have said, “We could conduct some raids across the border, we could bomb” the extremist groups inside Pakistan.

  The president and others then would have asked, of course, “Denny, what would be the consequences of that?”

  “I think Pakistan would be completely, completely pissed off and they would probably take actions against us,” he would recommend, “but they would probably adjust. And depending on which raids, which things, I think we might be able to get away with it.”

  In Blair’s view, the Oval Office and Situation Room conversations were artificial. Obama, like all presidents, wanted harmony. If there was anything other than that, it would get out that there had been a knockdown, drag-out fight in the Situation Room and the president would look like he had lost control of his team. Blair believed the debate had a hollowness to it. The president asked good questions but quickly exhausted the wisdom of those in the room. Instead of a real in-depth discussion, there was a scripted feel. Prior to meetings, someone in the NSC trying to control the agenda would call Blair and say, “Denny, you have five minutes for the intel update.”

  Blair realized that Jones had no control over the place. Donilon and Brennan had direct access to the president, so they didn’t have to go through Jones. There were at least three national security advisers—Jones, Donilon and Brennan. But Denis McDonough also had his own turf, so he was a fourth. And Emanuel also tinkered in policy and acted at times as a fifth.

  “It’s the goddamnest thing I’ve ever seen,” Blair said.

  After meeting up with the rest of the presidential entourage in China, Jones requested permission from Obama to go back to Washington several days early to work on the strategy review.

  Obama had one important thought. He had realized that the key to holding the national security team together was Gates. My goal is to keep Gates, he told Jones. I do not want to break with the secretary of defense.

  The president told me this was not an exact quote, but it reflected his view. “What is absolutely true is that my relationship with Bob is sufficiently close,” he said, “and my respect for the job that he’s been doing is sufficiently high that I would take his views very heavily into account in any final decision that I made. Partly because I’m asking him to execute” the final decision.

  “I’m not sure if he considers this an insult or a compliment, but he and I actually think a lot alike, in broad terms.” The president said he understood that Gates had to be a voice for the military. “Now, he has a different job than I do. And part of the job of secretary of defense is tending to a particular constituency within the Pentagon.”

  After returning from Asia, Obama called his national security team together again at 8:15 P.M., Monday, November 23, for an unusual evening meeting.

  “Final decision in the next couple of days,” he promised.

  Gates had written a memo to Obama summarizing the six primary military objectives in Afghanistan that incorporated comments from the agencies.*

  Obama said he agreed with the less ambitious, more realistic objectives. Although the military leadership had previously argued that “defeating” the Taliban was necessary, the word was missing from the memo. The U.S. now planned on “disrupting” and “degrading” the Taliban.

  The president explained that these objectives should be met on a much shorter timeline than what the Pentagon initially recommended, saying the troops would start thinning out after July 2011—the time frame Gates had suggested in their last session.

  “If people don’t think this realistically can be done in this time frame, they need to speak now,” he challenged. Our goal is to stabilize population centers and then transition to Afghan forces. “It’s not perfection. If you don’t think we can do this, you need to speak up now. This is not going to be the five-year time frame that had originally come in.” You have to understand if this time frame is not realistic, one will be imposed on us, so we need to have a realistic time frame. We need to understand with precision what we’re trying to do. “If this two-year time frame for accomplishing these goals is not possible, I want to hear it now.”

  Obama wasn’t expecting a model outcome in Afghanistan, though he was demanding precision from his advisers and military leaders. There would be no extended surge that lasted long enough for the Afghan National Security Forces to reach 400,000 and fulfill the counterinsurgency ratios suggested by the Pentagon.

  “We do not need perfection,” Obama said. “Four hundred thousand is not going to be the number we were going to be at before we started thinning out.”

  Clinton seemed to be almost jumping in her seat, showing every sign she wanted to be called on. But Jones had determined the speaking order and the secretary would have to sit through Biden’s comments. Her desire to speak and disappointment at having to wait was noticeable to several on the back bench.

  Biden had issued a response memorandum that took the president up on his offer to question the strategy’s time frame and objectives.

  As he began, Petraeus felt the air go out of the room.

  First, Biden said once again, he wasn’t sure if the 40,000 was politically sustainable. I still have serious questions about the viability of the elements of a counterinsurgency strategy. Eikenberry’s cable raises questions. We should prove the concept before we go any further. What about competing needs for State Department personnel elsewhere? What about doing more for Pakistan? He said he thought the Pentagon’s plan was putting the counterinsurgency cart before the troop horse. Is the civilian surge going to be adequate? How much will it cost? This will limit flexibility in foreign and domestic policy, he said.

  Clinton then got her chance. “I wholeheartedly endorse the approach,” she said, “and think it can make a difference. We spent a year waiting for an election and new government. The international community and Karzai all know what the outcome will be if we don’t increase the commitment.”

  The status quo was totally unacceptable, she said. “What we’re doing now will not work.” The plan was not everything we all might have wanted. “But we won’t know if we don’t commit to it. The six operational objectives are good and linked.

  “I endorse this effort,” she said. “It comes with enormous cost, but if we go halfhearted we’ll achieve nothing. We must act like we’re going to win.”

  It was a version of one of her sayings from when she had been first lady in the White House that she still used regularly—“Fake it until you make it.”

  She continued, “If we don’t come with an approach close to this, we shouldn’t even try, because we’ll just be wasting time, lives and money.” The plan—Gates’s six objectives and McChrystal’s request for 40,000—meant they would “have a fighting chance to be successful.” She rapped her fist on the table.

  Petraeus was blown away. What a persuasive, powerful and magnificent performance, he thought.

  “This outcome really matters,” Gates said next. “We’re not winning. I endorse this.” But doing a full a
ssessment in six months, in July 2010, was too early. “Our forces will just be taking hold; international forces arriving; civilian surge is taking hold; Karzai’s appointments and recruiting of ANSF still taking hold. We should wait until December 2010” for the full assessment.

  That was an appealing date on the political calendar—one month after the November midterm elections. Postponing a formal assessment until then might keep Afghanistan out of the election debate. It was like throwing Emanuel, Axelrod, the political team and the president a bouquet of flowers.

  On the question of the third brigade, Gates said, “I believe we should approve it up front. It doesn’t give big leverage anyway. Holding it in abeyance will complicate Stan’s campaign planning. We’ll do everything we can to meet the timelines, getting the third brigade on the ground ASAP. That’s what’ll help get conditions for success. So, formal report in July 2010 on progress, major reassessment in December 2010. Approve three brigades.” He said he agreed with Clinton that July 2011 is when they could begin to make transitions and thin forces. Their tag team approach was evident and formidable to many in the room.

  Mullen, calling in from Geneva, Switzerland, by videoconference, strongly endorsed the plan, saying they needed the forces as rapidly as possible. He said he believed that counterinsurgency would work and agreed on the timelines presented by Gates. Mullen acknowledged that developing the Afghan security forces did have risk, but they had to get the trainers on the ground and do everything possible to get on with it. “I’ll know whether the strategy is working in July 2011,” if we’ll be winning or losing.

  At one point, facing the bloc lining up for the 40,000, the president interjected, “I don’t want to be in a situation here where we’re back here in six months talking about another 40,000.”

  “We won’t come back and ask for more troops again,” Mullen said, repeating his pledge from the October 30 meeting with the chiefs and making an important concession.

  “Mr. President,” Petraeus began, “we will support your decision.” The military was not self-employed, Petraeus noted, but was trained to take orders. Everyone in the military swore an oath to “obey the orders of the president of the United States.” It was an oath he knew by heart and repeated several times a week at soldiers’ reenlistment and promotion ceremonies.

  “We will support you at the end of the day,” Petraeus said. “We will also provide our best professional military judgment right up until the point that you make a final decision.”

  After declaring his unconditional loyalty, he said his military advice was that they couldn’t do it with less than 40,000.

  “You’ve got one bite at this apple,” Petraeus continued. “It ought to be a decisive one. I agree with the secretary and chairman that a two-part decision on the third brigade is unwise. Not sure what’s achieved by withholding the third brigade, but it does create issues for our military campaign plan.” July 2010 is probably too soon to conduct another review, he said. “Best course of action is a single-deployment decision with possible off-ramps rather than on-ramps.” In military terminology, this meant the president could decide later not to deploy some of the forces.

  Petraeus said he strongly supported an energetic effort to get more from NATO, but he said that 10,000 troops from the allies would not be as useful as 10,000 American troops.

  “Be careful how you characterize our NATO allies,” Obama said sharply. “We need them. They will be useful in this coalition.”

  “The objectives are good, as defined,” Petraeus said. The July 2011 goal is fine on the thinning of our forces, but the military advice, he said, would be for conditions-based transitions because that gives the president more flexibility.

  “Just as a point,” he added, “Pakistan is achieving progress. It is tough, but we need to keep pushing to support them.” Petraeus repeated for emphasis, “I will support your decision, be part of the unified effort.”

  Turning to the Afghan security forces development, he agreed with McChrystal that it would take time—“2013 at the earliest and it is high-risk, but we need the additional U.S. and ISAF forces to create space and time for ANSF development. It can be done with the right number of forces and resources. Have to convince the ANSF and people that it can be done, and to convince the Taliban they’ll lose.”

  Because Mullen was out of the country, General Cartwright was the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs and was relaying the opinion of the service chiefs. He got to the crux of things by addressing an issue that had yet to be discussed at the meeting.

  “We have to be flexible,” Cartwright said. “We’ve got to be prepared to listen to the commander on the ground.”

  In response to the president’s request for a speedier troop deployment, the Pentagon had sent SECRET backup documents to the White House and the principals that front-loaded the deployment schedule. The first round would be 18,000 troops, instead of the 10,000 in the original McChrystal plan.

  Cartwright said the last deployment was so small that it provided no additional leverage over Karzai, even though the four blocks of granite had essentially said that the troop number was a way for Obama to show resolve and influence the Afghan government.

  “It’s not the number of troops,” he said. “It is how quickly we can get our troops in.” The idea was to create a shock with so much force. “Getting troops in quickly and the 18-to-24-month time frame is leverage.” The length of the surge was what mattered in changing Karzai’s behavior.

  This was a sharp contradiction of what the president had heard so far and he seemed to agree with it.

  “Mr. President, I shared the option with the chiefs before I came over,” Cartwright said. “And the chiefs said to me that there’s leverage in your plan at the front and at the back. The fact that you get more in sooner and you’ve made clear that they’re coming out at the end increases your leverage on the Afghans.” It would send the message “I’m not an occupier—that there is a date certain that I’m going to start to change the character of my relationship here.” The message was that Afghans would have to assume more responsibilities.

  Cartwright realized that by disagreeing with the chairman and then invoking the rest of the JCS he was really sticking it to Admiral Mullen.

  Instantly, McDonough realized that this was the option that the president had been looking for. It was all about “leverage” on the Afghans, their leader, Karzai, and others. McDonough was struck that Cartwright was representing the consensus of the chiefs, and they clearly saw the heart of the matter—time frame not number of troops. In contrast, all Mullen did was channel the views of McChrystal.

  Axelrod and McDonough were convinced that this was a decisive moment in the debate, and they admired the way Cartwright seemed to blast through the smoke.

  “We should announce a total number of troops and not detail the force mix,” Cartwright continued. Instead of talking about brigades, the president should set a total number of troops and let McChrystal decide the makeup of the forces, he said.

  Budget director Peter Orszag, who had been invited to the meeting, said there was a significant chance of having to submit a supplemental funding request to Congress.

  Holbrooke said he supported Clinton’s view and agreed strongly that since July 2010 was only seven, eight months away, it was too soon for a big evaluation. He said they should be careful on topics like “eliminating” corruption because that was not possible. He said he didn’t think they had enough leverage over Karzai. They must maintain the focus on Pakistan, he said.

  Speaking from Pakistan, Ambassador Anne Patterson said the most important element was to show resolve and assure Pakistan that the U.S. would not leave a mess on its doorstep. They had to remove uncertainty about American intentions in order to deal with the negative press within Pakistan. “They’re making progress against the internal extremists, and we’re making progress against al Qaeda, but it will be frustrating. The sooner we get going, the better.”

  Eikenberr
y, by video from Kabul, said they needed to remember that the Taliban was going to continue to be a part of the political fabric. Second, he said it was a fact that “a lot of our risk comes from the governance side, not the security side.” And the governance issues needed to be dealt with no matter what was decided regarding troop numbers. While they did require more forces to build the ANSF, what was needed was a settlement within the Pashtun community. He pointed out that Karzai didn’t feel he was necessarily fighting a war against the Taliban.

  Brennan said, “The counterterrorist program will continue regardless of the decision on any of these military options.” Adding troops would be basically irrelevant. He was very skeptical of making a five-year investment in counterinsurgency, indicating he doubted it was worth the blood and treasure with respect to the goals. In his view, the focus should be on training the national army and police in order to turn the war over to the Afghans. They had the plans and platforms in place to carry out the counterterrorism mission. “It will take a generation to develop an Afghanistan that can achieve modest governmental goals and consolidate these gains.” He underscored the importance of the operations in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.

  As Petraeus heard Brennan’s argument that the focus should be on training the Afghan army and police, his thoughts went straight to what had happened in Iraq. There had to be a level of security and safety first—something provided by having more boots on the ground—before local security forces could take over.

  Donilon tried to summarize. “We are not accepting the argument in this discussion that to defeat al Qaeda means we would have to do a long-term counterinsurgency strategy to defeat the Taliban,” he said. “To do a counterinsurgency strategy to defeat the Taliban would take a trillion dollars and six to eight years.” The deputy national security adviser felt that Petraeus and his “ilk” had repeatedly argued for counterinsurgency during the past three months. But Donilon wanted to reiterate that the cost of this approach was not in the national interest. A nationwide counterinsurgency was a seam in the proposed strategy, a crack in the strategy that Donilon felt had to be continually addressed. The key difference between what had been proposed and what the strategy would ultimately be, Donilon believed, was that it would not be a full-scale counterinsurgency.