Obama’s Wars

by Bob Woodward

  I laughed as well. We shook hands as we entered the small anteroom off the Oval Office. He was wearing informal Saturday clothes—dark olive chinos and a checkered blue shirt with an open collar.

  I said I had one more question and handed him a quotation from the World War II history book The Day of Battle by Rick Atkinson, a former colleague at The Washington Post. I keep a photocopy of the passage in my home office.

  Obama stood and read:

  “For war was not just a military campaign but also a parable. There were lessons of camaraderie and duty and inscrutable fate. There were lessons of honor and courage, of compassion and sacrifice. And then there was the saddest lesson, to be learned again and again … that war is corrupting, that it corrodes the soul and tarnishes the spirit, that even the excellent and the superior can be defiled, and that no heart would remain unstained.”

  I wanted to ask, Did war corrupt everyone? Did no heart go unstained? But the president was obviously in a hurry.

  “I sympathize with this view,” he said, returning the quote to me. “See my Nobel Prize acceptance speech.” The president disappeared back into the Oval Office. No more questions.

  I went home and dug out the speech he delivered in the Oslo City Hall on December 10, 2009.

  And there it was:

  “The instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace. And yet this truth must coexist with another—that no matter how justified, war promises human tragedy. The soldier’s courage and sacrifice is full of glory, expressing devotion to country, to cause, to comrades in arms. But war itself is never glorious, and we must never trumpet it as such. So part of our challenge is reconciling these two seemingly irreconcilable truths—that war is sometimes necessary and war at some level is an expression of human folly.”

  • • •

  The Afghanistan War was now in General Petraeus’s hands. Jones, for one, knew how bad the situation was and thought Petraeus was probably saying to himself, “What have I gotten myself into?”

  If Jones had the job as the new commander, he knew exactly what he would say to Obama after making an assessment: “Mr. President, I think the strategy is correct. But it was predicated on the fact that Pakistan would be coerced into moving more than they have been, particularly with regard to the Haqqani network and Quetta Shura.” The Taliban war in Afghanistan was being run from these safe havens. And hundreds, if not thousands, of fighters were pouring across the border. The Taliban was taking full advantage of the safe havens to rest and train fighters before rotating them into Afghanistan for combat. In those circumstances, “You can’t win. You can’t do counterinsurgency. It is a cancer in the plan.”

  Petraeus also worried about the sanctuaries in Pakistan, but he saw them as more of a challenge than as insurmountable obstacles. “This is slow, hard, frustrating,” he acknowledged to his staff. He said it was “a roller coaster existence.” He recalled that President Obama had remarked at one of the strategy review sessions, “I’ve got political capital I can invest here. I’m going to do it. But it’s not a renewable resource.”

  The general disagreed. He thought that political capital was somewhat renewable. It all depended on progress and everyone—Americans, the NATO allies, the Afghans—having a sense that the mission was doable. “That’s the central issue.” Endurance and persistence were what mattered.

  “It’s results, boy,” he said in front of one of his colonels. “Stay rucked up, keep putting your left foot in front of your right foot.”

  But history had its cycles and ironies, he knew all too well. He thought back almost four years to the fall of 2006, when Rumsfeld had called him in to discuss his future. Petraeus had commanded the 101st Division during the Iraq invasion in 2003, then headed the training command there in 2004.

  What did Rumsfeld want to talk about? Not Iraq but Afghanistan. At the time, many thought it was the war the United States was winning. What about Petraeus going to be commander there?

  Petraeus resisted, and they didn’t work it out. Several months later in early 2007, he was, of course, in command in Iraq. When he arrived there, he was shocked at the level of violence and instability. Those were the darkest, most awful days with Iraq on the verge of civil war. He went out on patrol into the neighborhoods of Baghdad. They were like ghost towns. It was so bad that at one point he went back to his quarters, and with nobody else around, put his head down on his desk in despair. “What in the world?” he thought to himself that day in 2007 and on a number of occasions later. “Why didn’t I just take that Afghanistan job?”

  GLOSSARY

  AfPak Afghanistan-Pakistan, term used to demonstrate that the war in Afghanistan and the al Qaeda and Taliban presence in Pakistan must be addressed with one policy.

  ANA Afghan National Army, the army of Afghanistan.

  ANSF Afghan National Security Forces, umbrella term for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.

  AQAP Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, a branch of al Qaeda whose members include those active in Yemen.

  CentCom United States Central Command, the combatant command located in Tampa, Florida, responsible for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

  COIN Counterinsurgency, the doctrine for using military force to protect a local population.

  CT Counterterrorism, the operations to capture or kill terrorists, often with small quick-reaction military or intelligence units.

  CTPT Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams, 3,000-man paramilitary force of highly experienced and skilled Afghans paid, trained and controlled by the CIA.

  DNI Director of National Intelligence, oversees the U.S. intelligence community.

  FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas, seven Pakistani provinces along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border ruled by tribal chiefs and extremist groups that provide a safe haven for al Qaeda and Taliban extremists.

  Haqqani network A prominent Taliban insurgent group, active in southeastern Afghanistan.

  IED Improvised explosive device, a makeshift bomb often used by insurgents alongside roads.

  ISAF International Security Assistance Force, coalition of forces in Afghanistan from 42 nations, led by the United States.

  ISI Inter-Services Intelligence, powerful Pakistani intelligence agency that simultaneously assists the United States in fighting the Taliban extremists while at the same time supporting and funding some Taliban groups.

  ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.

  JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff, the top uniformed military officers in the United States, including the chairman, vice chairman and heads of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.

  JSOC Joint Special Operations Command, counterterrorism force responsible for planning, preparing and executing rapid and targeted missions to kill or capture high value targets.

  LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure), terrorist group affiliated with al Qaeda responsible for the November 26 attacks on Mumbai. It was created and continues to be supported by the Pakistani ISI.

  NSC National Security Council, composed of the president and his senior foreign policy team, including the vice president, the secretaries of state and defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of national intelligence and at times the director of the CIA. The NSC staff is headed by the national security adviser.

  PDB President’s Daily Brief, TOP SECRET/CODEWORD intelligence briefing presented to the president each morning.

  POTUS President of the United States.

  Quetta Shura The main Taliban insurgent group, headed by Mullah Omar, based in the Pakistani city of Quetta.

  RC Regional Command (e.g., RC South, RC East), areas of Afghanistan under the military responsibility of various nations in the ISAF.

  RDI Rendition, Detention and Interrogation, controversial covert counterterrorist programs run by the CIA including the transport of suspected terrorists to the U.S. or other countries, CIA detention of terrorists, and interrogation methods employed by the CIA.
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br />   SCIF Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility, secure area or isolated room in a building designed to prevent surveillance during sensitive discussions.

  SIP Strategic Implementation Plan, a 40-page classified document sent by the White House to the Pentagon on July 17, 2009, stating that a key element of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan was to “defeat the extremist insurgency.”

  TTP Tehrik-e-Taliban, Pakistani branch of the Taliban that threatens the Pakistani government and the security of its nuclear arsenal. Intelligence showed that the would-be Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, was trained by the TTP.

  PRESIDENT OBAMA’S FINAL ORDERS FOR AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN STR ATEGY, OR TERMS SHEET

  SECRET/NOFORN

  November 29, 2009

  MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRINCIPALS

  From: National Security Adviser

  AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN STRATEGY

  This memorandum summarizes the Afghan option discussed among the principals and with the president, sending significant additional U.S. troops in early 2010 in order to degrade the Taliban and set the conditions for accelerated transition to Afghan authorities beginning in July 2011.

  New implementation guidance for Afghanistan

  In support of our core goal, new implementation guidance for Afghanistan follows:

  United States goal in Afghanistan is to deny safe haven to al Qaeda and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government.

  The strategic concept for the United States, along with our international partners and the Afghans, is to degrade the Taliban insurgency while building sufficient Afghan capacity to secure and govern their country, creating conditions for the United States to begin reducing its forces by July 2011.

  • The military mission in Afghanistan will focus on six operational objectives and will be limited in scope and scale to only what is necessary to attain the U.S. goal. These objectives are:

  • Reversing the Taliban’s momentum.

  • Denying the Taliban access to and control of key population and production centers and lines of communication.

  • Disrupting the Taliban in areas outside the secure area and preventing al Qaeda from gaining sanctuary in Afghanistan.

  • Degrading the Taliban to levels manageable by the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF).

  • Increasing the size of the ANSF and leveraging the potential for local security forces so we can transition responsibility for security to the Afghan government on a timeline that will permit us to begin to decrease our troop presence by July 2011.

  • Selectively building the capacity of the Afghan government with military focused on the ministries of defense and interior.

  Civilian assistance

  • Our military efforts and civilian assistance will be closely coordinated.

  • Given the profound problems of legitimacy and effectiveness with the Karzai government, we must focus on what is realistic. Our plan includes the way forward in dealing with the Karzai government has four elements: Working with Karzai when we can, working around him when we must; enhancing sub-national governance; strengthening corruption reduction efforts; and implementing a post-election compact.

  • Afghan-led reintegration and reconciliation are essential pillars of our strategy.

  • Principals will ensure appropriate authorities, programs and resources are in place to support a prioritized comprehensive approach.

  • We must improve coordination of international political and economic assistance to build Afghan capacity.

  • Afghan-led reintegration. We must improve coordination.

  This approach is not fully resourced counterinsurgency or nation building, but a narrower approach tied more tightly to the core goal of disrupting, dismantling and eventually defeating al Qaeda and preventing al Qaeda’s return to safe haven in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

  Achieving the new implementation guidance for Afghanistan

  Based on Defense’s Option 2A and our discussions with the president, we describe below an approach to enable General McChrystal and ISAF to carry out our implementation guidance and set the conditions for accelerated transition to Afghan authorities.

  The key elements of this option, described in detail below, are:

  • An additional 30,000 U.S. troops will be deployed immediately in an extended surge of 18 to 24 months to arrive in Afghanistan in the first half of 2010, along with counterpart civilian personnel and funding.

  • The secretary of defense is authorized if necessary to commit a limited number of additional enablers to support emerging needs in the range of 10 percent above the 30,000 U.S. troops.

  • December 2010, an NSC-led assessment of the security situation and other conditions, including improvements in Afghan governance, development of ANSF, Pakistani actions and international support.

  • July 2011, U.S. forces begin transferring lead security responsibility from our forces deployed to the ANSF and begin reducing U.S. forces. Based on progress on the ground, the president will consider the timing for a shift from combat operations to an advise and assist mission and assess the levels at which our military and civilian support will be sustained.

  December 2010 is selected as the next assessment point because it is one year after the additional 33,000 U.S. troops committed in 2009 arrived in Afghanistan, providing sufficient time to assess progress and proof of the operational concept.

  Concept

  In each area secured by U.S. forces, the agreed concept and goal are to accelerate transition to Afghan authorities in 18 to 24 months from July 2009, then to adjust the mission and thin out U.S. forces in that area.

  In July 2011, we will assess progress nationwide and the president will consider the timing of changing the military mission.

  By July 2011, the 68,000 U.S. forces deployed by 2009 will have been in place for nearly 24 months at least, and in some cases for years longer.

  By then we will expect to begin transferring lead security responsibility from these forces to the ANSF and begin reducing U.S. forces to the levels below the extended surge.

  The fundamental distinctions between the approach in Option 2 and 2A are the narrower mission and the express tighter timeline in which to show progress and transfer responsibility.

  International and Afghan contributions

  In effect, this approach provides General McChrystal more troops earlier than his recommended option.

  In 2010, the Afghan army intends to reinforce its units in the capital, south and east region with 44 infantry companies above 4,400.

  Assessment criteria

  The NSC will monitor progress on a monthly basis.

  Afghan governance:

  • Has Karzai made progress enacting the compact and fulfilling our specific requests in the private message? Specifically has he made merit-based appointments in the ministries, provinces and districts that are most critical to our mission?

  • Have we demonstrated that we can assist the Afghans in promoting effective sub-national governance based on our civil/military campaign plan despite the limits of the national government? Specifically, have we and the Afghans generated sufficient civilian capacity to partner with our military forces in the hold, build, transfer phases? And are these resources beginning to take effect?

  • Has the Afghan government begun to implement an effective reintegration/reconciliation program?

  Pakistan:

  • Are there indicators that we have begun to shift Pakistan’s strategic calculus and eventually end their active and passive support for extremists?

  • Has Pakistan approved our specific request for assistance against al Qaeda and other extremists, including the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network?

  ANSF development:

  • Are we meeting our program for accelerated ANSF growth while improving quality? Is the 2010 program to reinforce the ANA by 44 companies on track?

  • Have we established with the government of Afghanistan a program to transfer
security responsibility from ISAF to ANSF province by province?

  International support:

  • Have international partners demonstrated substantial support for the mission in Afghanistan? Specifically has NATO sustained current commitments and generated for 2010 additional troops and trainers (about 5,000 troops) and funded sufficiently the various trust funds? Have international partners contributed substantial additional civilian resources?

  • Do we have in place a civilian counterpart to General McChrystal responsible for coordinating the ISAF assistance effort?

  Of these four conditions, the one on which we could objectively expect to show best progress in the next several months is in building international support. To line up immediate support (by the December 3/4 NATO foreign ministerial meeting), principals have been engaging their counterparts. The president has spoken to Berlusconi and is scheduled to speak to key allied leaders including Brown, Sarkozy and Merkel in advance of his speech. Leaders must make decisions to stand with the president at this crucial time and only they can make the call on committing additional troops. At a minimum, we expect a strong political statement in support of the president’s decision at the ministerial.

  Cost

  The total cost for this option in Afghanistan is about $113 billion per year for those years in which we sustain nearly 100,000 troops in Afghanistan. Major annual cost factors include: $100 billion for military operations and maintenance; up to $8 billion for the ANSF, depending on annual targets and allied contributions; $5.2 billion for civilian operations and assistance.

  CHAPTER NOTES

  CHAPTER ONE

  The information in this chapter comes primarily from background interviews with seven firsthand sources.

  1 On Thursday, November 6, 2008: American Morning, CNN, November 6, 2008, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS.

  3 In September 2006, Pakistan: “Government, Militants ‘Ink’ NWA Peace Pact,” The Nation (Pakistan), September 2, 2006.