Threshold of War

by Heinrichs, Waldo;

  The United States had two frameworks of policy in 1941: one internationalist looking toward cooperation with other nations great and small, free and occupied, in destroying the Nazi scourge; the other nationalist, focusing directly on the safety and survival of the United States and protection of the Western Hemisphere. In the spring, when the German threat seemed so stark and terrible, the nationalist framework predominated. Now as the balance righted and coalition opportunities beckoned, the internationalist framework moved to the fore. Roosevelt recognized that in order to protect his position he would have to collaborate more actively with the belligerents and especially with Britain; the makeweight to the new Russian factor would be greater Anglo-American political intimacy. On July 11 the president dispatched Harry Hopkins to London to arrange a meeting with Churchill.38

  Churchill was probably not unhappy that Anglo-Soviet diplomacy was drawing the Americans closer. With Hopkins in personal consultation by July 17, the British worked to ease American concerns. Eden assured the House of Commons that the Anglo-Soviet agreement of July 14 contained no territorial guarantees or recognition of territorial changes. The Poles were distressed by their failure to secure explicit Soviet recognition of their prewar boundary, but they gained the solatium of a note from Eden that Britain would not recognize territorial changes resulting from the Nazi-Soviet Pact and which pledged that Britain had given no territorial guarantees in its own agreement with the Soviets. The Department of State would have preferred a response by the prime minister to the president’s message of July 14 but professed itself satisfied with the assurance to the Poles. The general issue of postwar territorial guarantees remained on the agenda for a meeting of the principals.39

  Just as the problem of adjusting American policy to the shifting political relations of Europe prompted closer collaboration with Great Britain, so developments in the Battle of the Atlantic drew the two nations deeper into a working partnership. Both broad avenues of policy pointed toward a summit.

  As German armies began their drive eastward, the naval reinforcements from the Pacific were preparing to enter service on the Atlantic. The battleships and cruisers transited the Canal by June 9 and filtered into fleet missions as they readied over the course of the next six weeks. The Idaho, New Mexico, and Mississippi joined the Texas, New York, and Arkansas so that by the end of July two battleships were always on the mid-Atlantic sentry line, steaming to and fro between a point southeast of the Grand Banks and the southern extremity of the German blockade zone around Iceland. Three carriers operated out of Bermuda—the Yorktown, Wasp, and, while the Ranger was under overhaul, the escort carrier Long Island — but their light cruiser escorts from the Pacific were waylaid for troopship escort and did not all join the carriers until August. Only then could all the heavy cruisers join the battleships in their assigned positions near the convoy routes.40 Steaming back and forth across the Atlantic these summer days was pleasant enough, the ship lit up at night with a searchlight on the flag. So far as the records show, no German raiders or supply ships were encountered.

  In fact the patrols made a substantial contribution just by their presence. On June 19 the Texas reached the northern extremity of its patrol at the edge of the blockade zone and turned back. Unknowingly it was hunted that day and the next by U-boat 203 which never gained a good firing position because of the battleship’s speed and zig-zag course.41 German submarines had been under orders not to attack American merchant or naval vessels except in the blockade zone. On the eve of BARBAROSSA, Admiral Karl Doenitz issued orders first allowing, then disallowing, attacks in the blockade zone. The near-incident with the Texas settled the matter: stringent orders from the Fuehrer forbade any and all attacks on American men-of-war. Hitler was determined to avoid war with the United States until victory in Russia was assured. U-boats were to confine their attacks, inside and outside the blockade area, to cruisers, battleships, and aircraft carriers clearly identified as enemy. “{E}very incident involving the USA is to be avoided.” On July 9, Hitler informed the navy that he wished to avoid war with the United States for another month or two.42 Thus the intervention of American warships had the effect of making the North Atlantic more problematical and less profitable for U-boats.

  The carrier searches from Bermuda toward the Azores and the patrols by four-stack cruisers into the gap between Africa and Brazil may have had a similar effect on German supply vessels. Close coordination of the two navies was easily effected at Bermuda. On June 4, in the midst of a widespread search for supply ships sent out for the Bismarck, the Yorktown took aboard a British naval officer, presumably to communicate any sightings to a British cruiser lying in wait as a “killing force,” to use Churchill’s words. The carrier found nothing, but northwest of the Azores, outside the Yorktown’s reach, lay two German supply ships which the British sank June 5 and 6.43 At the same time the Milwaukee cruising near the equator passed near two German tankers without locating them. Again, the British sank these June 5 and 6. Undoubtedly American patrols made untraveled pockets of the North Atlantic less secure for German ships, but credit for the clean sweep of German supply ships in the Atlantic during June is due ULTRA, which made it possible for the British, beginning in May 1941, to read German naval communications currently.44 With precise locations of German ships already in hand, the British cruisers did not need American eyes.

  By July 1941 the United States and Germany had reached a standoff in the Atlantic, though a tenuous one entirely dependent on the progress of German arms in Russia. On June 14, Roosevelt learned of the sinking in May of the American merchant ship Robin Moor. He toyed with the idea of asking Brazil to release a German vessel it was holding so it could be seized in retaliation, but the sinking was several weeks old, so it undoubtedly seemed wiser to let sleeping dogs lie, at least until American troops had arrived safely in Iceland.45

  On July 1, agreement was finally reached with the government of Iceland for the United States to assume responsibility for defense of that island. While Iceland was by no means averse to American protection, it was anxious to avoid the ambiguity of joint Anglo-American defense, especially since one was a belligerent, the other not. On the other hand, President Roosevelt, who had originally spoken of relief rather than reinforcement of the British garrison, by June 28 shied away from taking sole responsibility. The complexities of the Iceland expedition were becoming apparent: the shortage of troop transports, the precious few American divisions ready or near-ready for active service, the legislative restriction against use of draftees outside the Western Hemisphere, and the likely storm of criticism if he sought to lift it. He simply could not afford to assume sole responsibility. The issue was resolved by agreement that the American forces would supplement and “eventually” replace the British. But the president was determined that Iceland be more secure than before, so he pressed his reluctant advisers to increase the American contingent from 7,500 to 10,000 and insisted on sending a squadron of fighter planes.46 In spite of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Roosevelt in early July remained primarily concerned with guarding the Atlantic line. In fact his first reaction was to seize the opportunity to enhance the immediate physical safety of the nation.

  Iceland was a new departure as well. More than the Azores it was the turntable of the Atlantic, sitting astride broad avenues of entry into that ocean from German-controlled waters and convoy routes to Britain and possibly the Soviet Union. This was the first American military expedition outside the hemisphere since World War I. With it the nation ventured into deeper waters of great power combination and quasi-war. Task Force 19 carrying the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, waiting at Argentia for completion of the agreement with Iceland, sailed at once. On this mission the Atlantic Fleet was not patrolling on the margins of U-boat operations but cutting directly through the convoy lanes. To ensure safety the troop transports were escorted by two battleships, two cruisers, and thirteen des trovers.47 The task force arrived at Reykjavik on July 7 after an uncontested p
assage.

  The president was thrilled, “just riding on the waves.” Three days later word came that the brand-new Tirpitz was loose and headed for Iceland or Greenland. What the Bismarck had done to the Hood seemed destined for the World War I battleships Texas and New York at Reykjavik. The disparity in maximum range of the big guns was at least 4,000 yards, to say nothing of the German advantage in modern fire control. All heaved a big sigh of relief when the German monster was found to be still at Kiel.48

  In the course of July, Atlantic jitters subsided. Accompanying the next contingent to Iceland were the modernized battleship Mississippi, two heavy cruisers, and the Wasp. Heavy bombing severely damaged the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau at Brest. Reports of the establishment of German U-boat bases in West African ports proved false; chances of an attack on Gibraltar or Spain declined as the Germans extended themselves in Russia. On June 3 at Vichy, General Weygand had launched a “scathing attack” on Darlan’s collaborationist policy and by June 6 had forced a reconsideration of the Paris Protocols. Murphy reported that French North African policy had suffered no change after all.49 Hitler on the eve of BARBAROSSA was in no position to bring Vichy to heel. Meanwhile war in the desert was at a stalemate: a British offensive in June had stalled but it had sufficiently damaged Rommel’s forces, which were denied reinforcement, to immobilize him. Further east the British put down the revolt in Iraq and defeated the Vichy French in Syria. A German thrust through Turkey no longer seemed imminent: American military intelligence considered danger to the Middle East to be materially reduced by the war on Russia.

  This stabilization occurring in June and July, after months of crisis and disaster, enabled the American government to come to grips with the problem it had been forced to sidestep since April: the central strategic question of protection of convoys against the U-boat. Indeed, with troops on Iceland, it would have to begin running and protecting convoys in the western Atlantic. Early in July, probably July 1 by phone from Hyde Park, the president authorized the navy to begin planning for escort of convoy.50

  By June 1941, convoy and escort in the North Atlantic had evolved substantially into the system that continued through the war. Merchant ships now received protection all the way from North America to the Western Approaches of Great Britain, divided into slow (SC) convoys averaging six and one-half knots and fast (HX) convoys averaging nine. Escort groups, at this time composed of a destroyer and several corvettes, changed hands at a Mid-Ocean Meeting Point (MOMP), the relieved group continuing to Iceland for refueling and the relievers shepherding the fifty or sixty merchantmen onward. The convoy route depended on the season and the location of U-boats. In summer, with drift ice receding, the best route lay to the north close to Greenland and Iceland and as far as possible from German aircraft, though no route was ideal and this one entailed laboring through heavy beam seas. At any time the convoy might be diverted to avoid U-boats. The Royal Canadian Navy operated the western leg from St. John’s, Newfoundland, and the Royal Navy the eastern.51

  In formulating a plan for the president the navy found itself divided on Atlantic strategy. In mid-June, the Admiralty, picking up on Roosevelt’s suggestion of using Iceland as a transshipment point, suggested that, given the westerly drift of the Battle of the Atlantic, the ABC-1 agreement be changed to assign the Support Force destroyers to St. John’s, Newfoundland, home base for convoy escorts in the western Atlantic, instead of to the United Kingdom. American assumption of escort responsibility from North America to Iceland would release British and Canadian escorts for thicker protection in the eastern Atlantic and on other routes.52 Now skeptical of an American declaration of war implementing ABC-1, the hard-pressed Royal Navy preferred a bird in hand to two in the bush.

  With this recommendation Admiral King agreed, but for different reasons. He faced a task of growing difficulty in husbanding the Support Force destroyers for service in British waters while allowing for necessary yard work, “working up,” and providing escort for his own warships. This was not all. King had been chief of staff to Vice Admiral Henry T. Mayo, commander of the Atlantic Fleet in World War I. Mayo had strongly objected to the establishment in Britain of an independent naval command under Admiral William Sims subordinated to overall British direction. Stark had been on Sims’ staff and history seemed to be repeating itself.53 On July 2, King wrote Stark that in his view the dispatch of American forces to Europe under existing war plans was outdated by extension of the escort system to North America and American occupation of Iceland. Following the cardinal principle that coordination of naval forces depended on each having its own defined sphere of operation, the British and American navies should switch tasks, the Americans taking over escort in the western Atlantic and the British the American war assignments in the eastern.54 King had opportunities of presenting his views to the president, who was by now accustomed to dealing directly and alone with the admiral. King, who wore the Navy Cross and Distinguished Service Medal with Gold Star, and harbored “a storm within him,” was not one easily to acquiesce in withdrawal of ships from his command.55

  Admiral Stark and his staff disagreed with King and the Admiralty. British survival, they believed, depended on the earliest possible American entry into the war and implementation rather than change of the ABC-1 agreement. Iceland was strategically significant primarily as it related to Britain, Stark insisted, and to antisubmarine warfare conducted in the Western Approaches, which remained the area of greatest danger and where the Support Force belonged. This was a view to which Churchill and Stimson, in their anxiety for American entry into the war, heartily subscribed.56 Stark and Turner now opposed establishing a base and garrison on Iceland.57 The island looked to them like a dead end. Escort in the western Atlantic would be useful only so far as it promptly produced an incident—and war—which propelled the navy into British waters.

  Admiral Stark warned the president that “every day of delay” in getting into the war was dangerous. Only a “war psychology” in America would lift production to necessary levels. He urged Roosevelt to “seize the psychological opportunity presented by the German-Russian clash and announce and start escorting immediately and protecting the Western Atlantic on a large scale.” Western Hemisphere Defense Plan Three, formulated while the president vacationed at Hyde Park and vetted by the Admiralty and Churchill, embodied this all-out approach. According to the draft plan, the United States would escort all shipping—American, Icelandic, and British—as far as Iceland and destroy Axis forces encountered anywhere in the Western Hemisphere. Suspected Axis supply ships would be searched. British escorts would be withdrawn except for five merchant cruisers and twenty Canadian escorts. To these would be added twenty-seven old and twenty-seven new American destroyers (six squadrons) organized in escort units of five or six each. The six battleships and five heavy cruisers of the Atlantic Fleet would be available for convoy protection when raiders were loose. Action along these lines, Admiral Stark believed, “would almost certainly involve us in war.”58

  The Atlantic Fleet was not prepared to go into action in any such numbers immediately. The twenty-seven destroyers of the Support Force were ready to fight, but at the moment thirteen of them were escorting the marines to Iceland, not returning until July 21, and one was under repair. A third of the Atlantic Fleet destroyers, including all but two of the Pacific reinforcements, were required just to escort carriers, battleships, and cruisers. Newly completed destroyers of Squadron 11 were assigned to the Support Force but some were filling in as carrier escorts for destroyers undergoing overhaul. Destroyer Squadron 13, also assigned to the Support Force, was still completing; its first ship would be ready July 20 and all vessels would need weeks for trials and “working up.” Squadron 27, old destroyers in the Caribbean, the last addition to the Support Force, required extended refit. One division (four ships) would be ready early in September, the other in October. On July 9 fifteen destroyers were immediately available. By August the fleet could call on twenty-nine, by Septemb
er forty-three, and by October fifty. The force contemplated for merchant convoy escort would not reach its promised strength of fifty-four until the end of October.59

  The Atlantic Fleet was still in transition, absorbing vessels from the Pacific Fleet, reshuffling ships, divisions, and squadrons for compatibility and suitability to assignment, overhauling, refitting, and repairing. Most of the fleet now operated from Newport, Rhode Island. Argentia in Newfoundland opened as a naval base July 15, but Iceland still lacked American base facilities. None of the logistical services and only part of the elaborate communications networks necessary for an international trade escort system were in place. Planning was just beginning.

  The immediate capabilities of the Atlantic Fleet were not of critical concern to Stark and his staff because they did not envisage a sustained independent role for it, but rather a transitional one, triggering war and leading to combined operations with the British. Their preferred course was Western Hemisphere Defense Plan Three with its all-out escort and hemisphere-wide state of belligerency. On July 9, Stark presented the president with three alternatives. Roosevelt may have requested options or the navy deemed it prudent to offer them. In any case he could choose Plan Three or one of two less drastic schemes: first, escort limited to American and Icelandic ships bound for Iceland with attack on German submarines and raiders which sought to interfere; and, second, the same limited escort with attack on German forces anywhere in the Western Hemisphere.60