Threshold of War

by Heinrichs, Waldo;

  13. Stark memo for Knox, 12 Nov. 1940, PSF (safe): Navy, FDRL. Also: CNO to Secretary of Navy, 17 Jan. 1941, A16–3/FF Warfare-U.S. Fleet, box 91, SPDR, NOA; Stark memo, 21 Dec. 1940 enclosing “Study of the Immediate Problems Concerning Involvement in War,” War Plans Division numerical files, 1920–41 (cited as WPD), 4561, RG 165; director, navy War Plans Division (cited as NWPD) to chairman, General Board, 2 April 1941, A16–1, CNO secret, RG 80. Until the adoption of the Rainbow 5, ABC-1 strategy in the spring of 1941, the dominant planning concept in the navy was Rainbow 3, which aimed at securing control of the western Pacific but only as rapidly as possible consistent with protection of the Western Hemisphere. Assuming defense in the Atlantic, Rainbow 3 was not far different from the initial stage of Rainbow 5. The various Rainbow plans are described in Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, The War Department: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942 (Washington, 1953), 7–8.

  14. G. C. Marshall memo, 17 Jan. 1941, of White House conference same day, exec. #4, item #11, box 21, executive files, Operations Division (cited as OPD), RG 165.

  15. Lt. Cdr. R. Mason, report on Singapore, 23 Nov. 1940, box 71, SPDR, NOA; statement by U.S. staff committee, “U.S. Military Position in the Far East,” box 118, ibid.; minutes, 7 Feb. 1941, minutes of U.S.-British staff conversations, box 119, ibid.; questionnaire submitted by U.K. delegation, 29 Jan. 1941, reports of U.S.-British staff conversations, ibid.; Maj. Gen. Stanley D. Embick et al. memo for COS, 12 Feb. 1941, exec. #4, item #11, OPD, RG 165; Stark to Hart, 12 Nov. 1940, correspondence of Rear Adm. Robert L. Ghormley, subject files, COMNAVFOREUR records, NOA; Ghormley memo of conversation with Adm. Sir Dudley Pound, 19 Nov. 1940, ibid.; Rear Adm. Roger Bellairs to British Chiefs of Staff, 11, 15, 23 Feb. 1941, FO 371/26147, A685/G and A875/11/45, FO 371/26219, A1134/384/45, PRO; James R. Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval Collaboration, 1937–1941 (Chapel Hill, 1977), chaps. 14, 15; Heinrichs, “Role of the U.S. Navy,” 221–23.

  16. FDR to Grew, 21 Jan. 1941, PSF:Japan, FDRL, also in Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904–1945, Walter Johnson, ed. (2 vols.; Boston, 1952), 2:1259–60. See also Hornbeck memo, 4 Dec. 1940, “Far East (Before Dec. 7, 1941)” folder, box 4, RG 107, NA.

  17. The key documents on the navy’s recommendations for intervening in the Battle of the Atlantic are: Knox to FDR, 21 March 1941, A16–1/FF13, CNO secret, RG 80; Knox to FDR, 20 March 1941, Navy Department folder, box 10, RG 107; memo {n.a.}, “Ocean Escort in the Western Atlantic,” PHA, 16:2162–63 (The date of this memo is probably 1 April 1941. See copy indexed to that date in Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner Papers, box 20, director NWPD special file #2, item 25, NOA). On the U.S. Navy and the Battle of the Atlantic: Samuel Eliot Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943 (Boston, 1947); Patrick Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy: The Private War of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 1939–1942 (Annapolis, 1975).

  18. Secretary of Navy Charles Edison to FDR, 24 June 1940, PSF: Navy Dept., FDRL.

  19. U.S. Atlantic Fleet Operating Plan 0–3, 23 March 1941, supplementary plan, A16/FF13, CNO secret, RG 80; “Are We Ready?” vol. 2, 1940–1941, box 90, SPDR, NOA; Bellairs to British Chiefs of Staff, 15 Feb. 1941, FO 371/26219, A827/384/45, PRO. On distribution of U.S. Atlantic Fleet and plans for it: British printed copy of ABC-1 and ABC-2, box 116, SPDR, NOA; minutes and reports of U.S.-British staff meetings, Jan.-March 1941, boxes 118, 119, ibid.; “Disposition and Location of U.S. Naval Forces,” 5 Feb. 1941, Annex A, box 118, SPDR, NOA. I am grateful to Vice Adm. Edwin B. Hooper, USN (Ret.), who was gunnery officer of the U.S.S. Washington in World War II, for his estimates of the relative power of American and German battleships.

  20. Bellairs to British Chiefs of Staff, 17 Feb. 1941, FO 371/26147, A939/11/45, PRO; CNO to directors of Ship Movements, Fleet Maintenance, Fleet Training, 15 Feb. 1941, box 81, SPDR, NOA; director NWPD to CNO, 3 April 1941, ibid.; Rear Adm. Mark Bristol to Turner, 28 March 1941, A16–3/FF, box 91, ibid.

  21. Churchill to FDR, 19 March 1941, C-69x, Kimball, ed, Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence, 1:149–50.

  22. Churchill to FDR, 9 Jan. 1941, C-53x, ibid., 126–27; memo (n.a, n.d.), exec. #4, item #11 (ABC file), box 21, OPD, RG 165; John McCloy to Knox, 27 March 1941 and enclosure, A16–1/EF13, CNO secret, RG 80; Stimson diary, 24, 25 March 1941; New York Times, 9, 16 March 1941; Washington Post, 22, 26 March 1941; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 257.

  23. Welles to FDR, 27 March 1941, 740.0011 EW/9201G, RG 59; Churchill to FDR, 6 April 1941, C-78x, Kimball ed., Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence, 1:164.

  24. Halifax to Churchill, 18 April 1941, and Churchill to Halifax, 12 May 1941, FO 371/26148, A3375/11/45, PRO; Long diary, 17 April 1941.

  25. Director NWPD to CNO, 14 March 1941, A3–1/DD, CNO secret, RG 80.

  26. COMDESRON 2 to CNO and director, Fleet Training, 10 May 1941, box 3278, Commander Destroyers Atlantic Fleet (cited as COMDESLANT) general administrative files, 1941–1944, RG 313, FRS; director NWPD to CNO, 23 April 1941, box 95, SPDR, NOA. Information on ship movements, schedules, and assignments here and elsewhere in this study, unless otherwise cited, comes from: Ship Movements, Daily Movement Series, World War II command files, NOA; Information Relating to Change of Status of Naval Vessels, A4–1, box 3272, RG 313, FRS; Availability for Operations, Schedules of Employment, A4–3#4, box 3273, ibid.; Atlantic Fleet Weekly Operations Sheets and Lists of Predicted Ship Locations, A4–3(1)#3, ibid.

  27. CNO to CINCLANT, 22 May 1941, A3–1/DD, CNO secret, RG 80; CNO to CINCLANT, 1 April 1941, “New Construction #2” folder, box 36, Ship Movements Division general correspondence, 1920–1942 (cited as SM), RG 38; CINCLANT to OPNAV, 25 April 1941, “CINCLANT” folder, box 61, ibid.; deck log of U.S.S. Texas, 9 May 1941, Ships’ Deck Logs, RG 24, NA.

  28. “Are We Ready?” vol. 2, box 90, SPDR, NOA; CNO to chiefs of Bureaus of Ships and Ordinance, 9, 30 April 1941, box 95, ibid. The tension is well illustrated in Admiral King’s memorandum to the fleet, “Making the Best with What We Have,” in Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, 52–53.

  29. J. M. Haines, “Anti-Submarine Warfare, 7 Dec. 1941–7 Dec. 1942,” antisubmarine ordinance and equipment folder, box 23, Tenth Fleet files, NOA; reports of Task Units, 4.1.5 and 4.1.8, A14–1, CNO secret, RG 80; Commander Destroyer Flotilla 1 to ships of Flotilla 1, 13 June 1941, box 6, Rear Adm. Paul R. Heineman Papers, NOA; COMDESRON 27 to commander Support Force, 29 Aug. 1941, box 25, CIN-CLANT message files, NHOB, FRS; director, Fleet Training, memo, 19 Sept. 1941, A5-A5/1, CNO confidential files, RG 80; memo for president {n.a.}, 21 March 1941, A16–1/EF13, CNO secret, RG 80; director NWPD to CNO, 10 Feb. 1941, A16–3/FF, box 91, SPDR, NOA. See reports of poor gunnery practice, boxes 3279, 3280, 3297, RG 313, FRS.

  30. Stimson diary, 2 April 1941.

  31. Berle diary, 16 March 1941; Washington Post, 16 March 1941; Butler, Grand Strategy, 2:457.

  32. Stimson diary, 27 March 1941; MacVeagh to FDR, 8 March 1941, PSF: Greece, FDRL (Eden).

  33. Washington Post, 29 March (Lippmann), 3 April, 1941; Engert, Beirut (Kirk) to SecState, 740.0011 EW/8865, RG 59; Berle diary, 6 Feb., 17 March 1941.

  34. FDR to Hull, 11, 20 Feb. 1941, PSF:Turkey and PSF: Hull, FDRL; military attaché Athens, report of 26 March 1941, MID 183–316/145, RG 165.

  35. “Ocean Escort in the Western Atlantic,” {1} April 1941, PHA 16:2162–63; CNO to CINCPAC, 7 April 1941, ibid., 11:5503; Morgenthau to FDR, 19 Feb. 1941, PSF: Charts Folder, FDRL; “U.S. Naval Shipbuilding Program—Combatant Vessels,” A1–3, CNO confidential, RG 80.

  36. Stimson diary, 4 April 1941; Ickes, Secret Diary, 3:473; 21 March, 7 April polls, George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935–1971 (3 vols.; New York, 1972), 1:270, 273.

  37. As quoted in William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation: The World Crisis of 1937–1941 and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1952), 597, based on authors’ conversation with Stark, 18 Feb. 1948.

  38. CNO to CINCPAC,
7 April 1941, PHA, 11:5503.

  39. Stimson diary, 10 April 1941.

  40. Roosevelt did not authorize escort of convoy and then change his mind; he did not authorize it in the first place. The source for historians on this point has been Kittredge, “U.S.-British Naval Cooperation,” 414. Kittredge correctly states that two Western Hemisphere defense plans were formulated at this time, but, apparently lacking a copy of the first, he identifies it with the navy’s proposals of 20 March and 1 April for escort of convoy. The correct Western Hemisphere Defense Plan One is: {n.a.} memo for Secretary of Navy, 14 April 1941, director NWPD folder, special file #1, box 20, Turner papers, NOA, with revisions by FDR, incorporated in memo for Secretary of Navy, 16 April 1941, ibid.; the document is also in A16/QG2, CNO secret, RG 80. On task force assignments: C1NCLANT Operation Plans 3–41, 4–41, 18, 21 April 1941, “CINCLANT (through May 1941)” box, strategical and operational planning documents (cited as SOPD), NOA; briefing charts for July 1941, briefing chart file, July-Dec. 1941, NOA; Stark to Kimmel, 19 April 1941, PHA, 16:2163.

  41. Press conference #758, 25 April 1941, Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (25 vols. in 12; New York, 1972), 17:285.

  42. FDR to Churchill, 29 March 1941, R-29x, R-30x, Kimball, ed., Roosevelt-Churchill Correspondence, 1:153–54.

  43. Halifax to FDR, 11 March 1941, PSF: Great Britain, FDRL; Hopkins memo for FDR, {n.d.} PSF:Hopkins, ibid.; Ingersoll memo for Capt. Daniel J. Callaghan, 21 Feb. 1941, PSF: Navy, ibid.; FDR to Knox, 1 April 1941, ibid.; (Illustrious) military attaché in Athens, report of 3 Feb. 1941, MID 183–316, RG 165; naval attaché London, reports, n.d. and 24 March 1941, file #2, series 1, COMNAVFOREUR records, NOA; C-70x, C-78x,, R-28x, R-29x, R-30x, Kimball, ed, Roosevelt-Churchill Correspondence, 1:150–51, 153, 157, 164; Kittredge, “U.S.-British Naval Cooperation,” 418.

  44. Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy, 258.

  45. Welles to FDR, 24 March 1941, 740.0011 EW/9201D, RG 59; Harriman to SecState, 24 March 1941, Harriman folder, box 8, RG 107; Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War, 433–34.

  46. Hull, Memoirs, 2:987; Hilary Conroy, “Nomura Kichisaburō,” Richard Dean Burns and Edward M. Bennett, eds., Diplomats in Crisis: United States-Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1919–1941 (Santa Barbara, 1974), 297–316; Heinrichs, Grew, 294–99.

  47. Hull memo of conversation, 14 March 1941, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan: 1931–1941 (2 vols.; Washington, 1943) (cited as FR Japan), 2:398; ibid, 387–96.

  48. R.J.C. Butow, The John Doe Associates: Backdoor Diplomacy for Peace, 1941 (Stanford, 1974), Parts 1–2; Hosoya Chihiro, “The Role of Japan’s Foreign Ministry and Its Embassy in Washington, 1940–1941,” in Borg and Okamoto, eds., Pearl Harbor as History, 150–51; Yoshitake Oka, Konoe Fumimaro: A Political Biography, tr. Shumpei Okamoto and Patricia Murray (Tokyo, 1983), 119–25. Awareness of the Walsh-Drought mission by the Japanese foreign ministry is evident from a MAGIC intercept: Tokyo (vice minister of foreign affairs) to Washington, 6 March 1941, tr. 12 March 1941, SRDJ 10331, RG 457. The names in this message had been withheld by the U.S. government, but were released 9 Feb. 1984. The vice minister stated: “Lately we have heard various sorts of rumors concerning Ikawa, and I fear that if Walsh’s and Drught’s {sic} work is not to get off to a bad start, you [Nomura] will have to give Ikawa some instructions.”

  49. Proposal presented 9 April 1941, FR Japan, 2:398–402; Steinhardt to SecState, 11 April 1941. FR 1941, 4:936–37.

  50. Berle diary, 15 April 1941; New York Times, 13 April 1941.

  51. Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy, chap. 17. Niblack in fact thought it was encountering a submarine on 11 April and dropped depth charges. However, it did not report the incident until returning to Newport 28 April. No U-boat reported an encounter.

  52. Hull desk diary, 12 April 1941, reel 39, Hull papers.

  53. Grew to SecState, 10 April 1941, FR 1941, 4:140; ibid, 128–29.

  54. Memos by Hornbeck and Hamilton, 11 April 1941, ibid, 142–47; Hull desk diary, 14 April 1941, reel 39, Hull papers. The appointment would not have been entered on Easter Sunday nor with a question about locale on Monday. Thus the appointment was made before word arrived of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact.

  55. Steinhardt to SecState, 11 April 1941, FR 1941, 4:937–38; SecState to Steinhardt, 15 April 1941, ibid, 948–49; Hosoya, “Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact,” 74–79; Halifax to FO, 14 April 1941, FO 371/27956, F2964/421/23, PRO (Welles); A. H. McCollum memo, 17 April 1941, with comments by Turner and Capt. Alan C. Kirk, PHA, 15:1853–55 (naval intelligence); FO 371/27957, F3581/421/23 and FO 371/27956, F3128/421/23, PRO; 740.0011 Pacific War (cited as PW)/196, 222, RG 59; FR 1941, 4:947–8, 961–65; New York Times, 13 April 1941.

  56. Hull memos, 14, 16 April 1941, FR Japan, 2:402–10; Hull desk diary, 15, 16 April 1941, reel 39, Hull papers; memo for Hull {n.a.} {15–16 April}, FR 1941, 4:15354.

  57. R.J.C. Butow, “The Hull-Nomura Conversations: A Fundamental Misconception,” American Historical Review (July 1960), 65:822–36; Nomura to Tokyo, 17 April 1941, tr. 19 April 1941, SRDJ 11118, RG 457.

  58. As quoted in Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, 725. On Soviet-American relations in 1939–40: ibid., 312–42, 638–51, 723–28.

  59. J. Edgar Hoover to Berle, 4 Dec. 1940, MID 2657–278, RG 165; Hoover to Berle, 12 March 1941, 740.0011 EW/9785, RG 59.

  60. FDR to Hull, 3 March 1941, PSF:Hull, FDRL; Steinhardt to SecState, 11, 20 Jan. 1941, FR 1941, 1:121, 126–28.

  61. Loy Henderson memo, 27 Feb. 1941, ibid. 708; Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War, 335–45.

  62. SecState to Steinhardt, 1 March 1941, FR 1941, 1:712–13.

  63. Sumner Welles, Time for Decision (New York, 1944), 171.

  64. Welles memos, 20 March 1941, FR 1941, 1:723 and fn. 25, 4:920.

  65. Steinhardt to SecState, 12 April 1941, 761.62/895, RG 59; FR 1941, 1:296, 301, 611–12.

  66. Memos by Henderson, 27 March, 18 April 1941, ibid., 728, 742; memo by Welles, 9 April 1941, ibid., 735–36.

  67. Peter Berton, “Introduction” to Hosoya, “Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact,” Morley, ed. Fateful Choice, 10; memo by Henderson, 18 April 1941, FR 1941, 1:741.

  68. Schulenberg to Foreign Ministry, 13 April 1941, #333, U.S. Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945 (12 vols.; Washington, 1962), Series D (cited as DGFP), 12:537; Herwarth, Against Two Evils, 190.

  69. Stark to Kimmel, 19 April 1941, PHA, 16:2163–64; CNO to CINCLANT, 17 April 1941, box 81, SPDR, NOA.

  70. Stimson diary, 24 April 1941; CINCLANT Operation Plan 4–41, 21 April 1941, “CINCLANT (through May 1941)” folder, SOPD, NOA; CINCLANT, “U.S. Naval Administration in World War II:CINCLANT,” 145–47, microfiche, NHC; Kittredge, “U.S.-British Naval Cooperation,” 414.

  Chapter 3. May: Guarding the Atlantic Line

  1. Van Creveld, Hitler’s Strategy, 153–66.

  2. Naval attaché Rome, report of 20 April 1941, 740.0011 EW/10426, RG 59; Phillips to SecState, 25 April 1941, ibid./10334; ibid./10426, 10506, 10524.

  3. Ibid./10288, 10345, 10493, 10961; military attaché Cairo, report of 25 April 1941, 370.2, box 486, Army Intelligence Project decimal file, 1941–45, RG 319, FRS.

  4. Military attaché Cairo, report of 30 April 1941, MID 2657–298/5, RG 165.

  5. Kirk to SecState, 27 April 1941, 740.0011 EW/10388, RG 59; military attache Ankara, report of 24 April 1941, ibid./10496; “Estimate of Future British Action in Middle East,” 23 April 1941, director NWPD special file #1, box 20, Turner papers, NOA; military attaché London, report of 13 April 1941, 740.0011 EW/10174, RG 59; Engert (Beirut) to SecState, 21 April 1941, ibid/10201; Miles to COS, 16, 20 April 1941, MID 2016–1297, RG 165.

  6. Stimson diary, 15, 17 April 1941; Churchill to FDR, 19 May 1941, C-88x, Kimball, ed, Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence, 1:190.

  7. Engert to SecState, 21 April 1941, 740.0011 EW/10201, RG 59 (“military colossus”)
; military attaché London, report of 20 April 1941, ibid/10513 (Dill); Phillips to FDR, 18 April 1941, PSF: Phillips, FDRL; Leahy to SecState, 16, 21 April 1941, 740.0011 EW/10022, 10196, RG 59; Weddell (Madrid) to SecState, 25 April 1941, ibid/10375; Sterling (Stockholm) to SecState, 19 April 1941, ibid/10107.

  8. Military attaché Berlin, report of 15 April 1941, received 7 May 1941, MID 2016–1077/183, RG 165.

  9. Gunther to SecState and military attaché reports, Budapest and Bucharest, 24 April 1941, 740.0011 EW/10377, 10428, 10516, RG 59; military attaché Bucharest, report of 6 May 1941, #6095, MID regional files, 1933–44, RG 165, FRS; military attaché Moscow, report of 12 May 1941, MID reports, Harry Hopkins papers, FDRL (Bratislava); 740.0011 EW/10466, 10625, 11077, 11078, RG 59; Van Creveld, Hitler’s Strategy, 171,

  10. Military attaché Berlin, reports of 17 April, 23 May 1941, 740.0011 EW/10345, 11269, RG 59; ibid., report of 21 April 1941, MID 2657–230/30, RG 165; Leach, German Strategy Against Russia, 169.

  11. Military attaché Berlin, report of 21 April 1941, MID 2657–230/30, RG 165; Miles to COS, 23 April 1941, MID 2657–229, I.B. 31–33, ibid.

  12. Assistant military attaché Berlin, order of battle report as of 15–20 March 1941, 740.0011 EW/10637, RG 59; Hinsley, British Intelligence, 1:466.

  13. Military attaché Berlin, report of 17 April 1941, 740.0011 EW/10345, RG 59; Leach, German Strategy Against Russia, 94, fn. 4. On deception operations by German intelligence: ibid, 169; directive of High Command of Wehrmacht, 1 May 1941, #431, DGFP, 12:685; Whaley, Codeword BARBAROSSA, 170–75, 247–51.

  14. Winant to SecState, 27 April 1941, 740.0011 EW/10405 1/3, RG 59; military attaché London, report of 17 April 1941, ibid/10272.

  15. Steinhardt to SecState, 5 May 1941, FR 1941, 1:141; Whaley Codeword BARBAROSSA, 175–82; Hinsley, British. Intelligence, 1:483. Hinsley argues that the story of an enforced diplomatic settlement could not have been a German deception device because it could not have fooled the Russians, whom the Germans needed to mystify most. Whaley argues persuasively that the story probably started as speculation in the diplomatic community and then was picked up and fed by the Germans to sow confusion. For the Russians, the fact that no negotiations were under way would not necessarily weaken the story because they would always expect, and indeed appear to have been always expecting, a German statement of terms or ultimatum.