Threshold of War
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46. Daily briefing charts, 1941, NOA. On the Operational Intelligence Center: Patrick Beesly, Very Special Intelligence: The Story of the Admiralty’s Operational Intelligence Centre, 1939–1945 (New York, 1978).
47. Sources cited in fn. 26, chap. 2 above as well as: escort orders, vol. 1, operational planning materials, Support Force box, SOPD, NOA; “Convoy, In” file, reel 2586, navy message files, RG 38; Aug. and Sept. messages, box 1, CINCLANT message files, NHOB, FRS; Predicted List of Ship Locations, 24 Sept. 1941, A4–3(l)#3, Schedules of Employment, COMDESLANT GAF, RG 313, FRS; U.S. Atlantic Fleet Task Forces, 10 Sept. 1941, A4–3/FF13, CNO Secret, RG 80; CINCLANT to CNO, 26 Aug. 1941, A4-T/PC, CNO confidential, RG 80.
48. Director of Fleet Training to CNO, 19 Sept. 1941, A5-A5/1, CNO confidential, RG 80; Commander Task Unit 4.1.3 to Commander Task Force 4, 26 Nov. 1941, A4–3/FF13–9, CNO secret, ibid.; COMDESRON 27 to Commander Support Force, 29 Aug. 1941, box 25, CINCLANT message files, NHOB, FRS; COMDESRON 27 to CINCLANT, 9 Sept. 1941, ibid.; COMDESLANT to CNO (director of Fleet Training), 6 Aug. 1941, box 3280, COMDESLANT GAF, RG 313, FRS; A. S. Carpender to CNO (director of Fleet Training), 27 Dec. 1941, A5-!(2), box 3278, ibid.: COMDESRON 11 to CNO, 31 Oct, and CINCLANT to CNO., 21 Aug. 1941, A5–1(5), box 3297, ibid.
49. Daily briefing charts, 1941, NOA; Hinsley, British Intelligence, 173–74; Roskill, War at Sea, 1:467; J. Rohwer and G. Hummelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945, tr. Derek Masters (2 vols.; London, 1972), 1:130; Douglas and Rohwer, ‘“Most Thankless Task’,” Boutilier, ed. The RCN in Retrospect, 197; Rohwer, Critical Convoy Battles, 24.
50. Obetleutnant Georg-Werner Fraatz to Commander Submarines, 5, 11 Sept. 1941, SRGN 2720, 2832, box 4, German navy U-boat messages, RG 457; Abbazia, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy, chap. 20; daily briefing charts, 3–11 Sept. 1941, NOA; Milner, North Atlantic Run, chap. 3; Douglas and Rohwer, ‘“Most Thankless Task’,” Boutelier, ed. The RCN in Retrospect, 193–207.
51. New York Times, 6 Sept. 1941; Commander Task Force 15 to COMDESDIV 4, 4 Sept. 1941, box 1, CINCLANT message files, NHOB, FRS.
52. CINCLANT to Senior Officer Present Afloat (SOPA), Iceland, 12 Sept. 1941, box 1, CINCLANT message files, NHOB, FRS; CINCLANT to SOPA Iceland, 6 Sept. 1941, ibid.; CINCLANT to OPNAV, 7 Sept. 1941, ibid.; OPNAV to CINCLANT, 14 Sept. 1941, ibid.; CINCLANT to holders of Operations Plan 7–41, 22 Sept. 1941, A4–3/FF13 (Sept. 1941), CNO Secret, RG 80.
53. 11 Sept. 1941 speech drafts, Berle diary, Sept. 1941; New York Times, 8 Sept. 1941; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 370–72.
54. State Department official text of 11 Sept. 1941 speech in Berle diary, Sept. 1941; New York Times, 12, 16, 17, 18 Sept. 1941; Stimson diary, 30 Sept. 1941; Gallup, Gallup Poll, 1:299.
55. As quoted in Reynolds, Anglo-American Alliance, 169.
56. North Atlantic daily briefing charts, 27–30 Aug. 1941, NOA; notes on conferences, Aug. 1941, box 889, Army-COS secretariat files, 1941–42, RG 165; Jürgen Rohwer to author, 2 April, 24 June 1987.
57. CNO to distribution list, 13 Sept. 1941, SPDR, microfilm SPD-19, NOA; FDR to Stimson and Knox, 28 Aug. 1941, WPD 4493–9, RG 165.
58. Admiralty to British naval delegation, Washington, 17 Sept. 1941, SPDR, microfilm SPD-19, NOA; Playfair, Mediterranean and Middle East, 2:274.
59. Ghormley to Pound, 19 Sept. 1941, ADM 205/9, PRO. The movement of ships to Argentia and Hvalfjordur: messages of 18–27 Sept. 1941, box 1, CINCLANT message files, NHOB, FRS; Atlantic Fleet Weekly Operational Sheet, 20 Sept. 1941, A4–3/FF13, CNO confidential, RG 80; CNO to CINCLANT, 5 Sept. 1941, A4–3/BB55–56, ibid.; Little to Pound, 26 Sept. 1941, ADM 205/9, PRO.
60. Commander Task Force 7.5 to CINCLANT, 27 Sept. 1941, box 1, CINCLANT message files, NHOB, FRS; Capt. F. W. Pennoyer, Jr., report, 10 Oct. 1941, of meeting aboard King George V, A14-l/Convoy, box 108, CINCLANT GAF, RG 313, FRS,
61. Churchill to FDR, 1 Sept. 1941, C-113x, Kimball ed, Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence, 1:235–36; Gwyer, Grand Strategy, 3 (part 1):173–75, 183–91, 197–203, 206–11.
62. Clark, Barbarossa, chap. 7; Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, chap. 7; Leach, Barbarossa, chap. 9.
63. Steinhardt to SecState. 17, 19, 22, 23 Aug. and 3 Sept. 1941, 740.0011 EW/14025, 14127, 14226, 14276, 14651, RG 59; Harrison (Switzerland) to SecState, 22 Aug. 1941, ibid./l4248; military attaché London, report of 2 Sept. 1941, ibid./14964; #2693, box 14, OSS records, RG 226; Hinsley, British Intelligence, 72.
64. Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 211; Winant to SecState, 5 Sept. 1941, 740.0011 EW/14752 1/6, RG 59.
65. Churchill to FDR, 5 Sept. 1941, C-114x, Kimball ed, Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence, 1:238; Biddle to SecState, 10 Aug. 1941, 740.0011 EW/14427, RG 59.
66. Churchill to Stalin, 4 Sept. 1941, Grand Alliance, 458–60.
67. FDR to Churchill, 5 Sept. 1941, R-55x, Kimball, ed., Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence, 1:237; Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, 111.
68. Press conference of 19 Aug. 1941, #762, Presidential Press Conferences, 18:91; FDR to Stimson, 30 Aug. 1941, FR 1941, 1:826.
69. Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 94; “Special Air Corps Report, FY 1941,” box 1, RG 107.
70. Record of meeting of Churchill and COS committee with Hopkins, Harriman, et al., 24 July 1941, miscellaneous papers (1), box 122, SPDR; Kirk to SecState, 18 Sept. 1941, 740.0011 EW/15218, RG 59; FDR to Stimson, 13 Sept. 1941, WPD 4402, RG 165.
71. FDR to Churchill, 8 Sept. 1941, R-56x, draft, not sent, and editorial note, Kimball, ed., Roosevelt-Churchill Correspondence, 1:239–40.
72. Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 104.
73. Ibid, 135–36, 602; Morgenthau to FDR, 14 Aug. 1941, and enclosure, PSF: Treasury (charts folder), FDRL; Stimson diary, 14 Aug. 1941; Stimson to FDR, 29 Aug. 1941, PSF: War Department: Stimson, FDRL; Stimson to FDR, 23 Sept. 1941, ibid.
74. Exec. #4, item 6, box 20, OPD, RG 165; Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 99–101.
75. Raymond H. Dawson, The Decision To Aid Russia, 1941: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics (Chapel Hill, 1959), chaps. 8, 10; FR 1941, 1:841–51.
76. “Information used by COS at conference with President, 22 Sept. 1941,” box 885, COS secretariat, RG 165; exec. #4, item 8, box 20, OPD, ibid.; Stimson diary, 22–25 Sept. 1941; Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 139–40; military attaché London, report of 15 Sept. 1941, 740.0011 EW/15528, RG 59.
77. FDR to Stimson, 18 Sept. 1941, box 15, RG 107; Lovett to Stimson, 12 Sept. 1941, box 1, ibid.; Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 101; Craven and Gate, Army Air Forces in World War II, 1:145–50, 178.
78. Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz to Maj. Gen. G. H. Brett, 26 Aug. 1941, 381. E War Plans, box 206, office of the Air Adjutant General general correspondence, 1939–42, entry 301, U.S. Army Air Forces records, RG 18, NA; Stimson diary, 25 Aug. 1941; Lovett to Stimson, 22 July 1941, box 1, RG 107; Martin Caidin, Flying Forts (New York, 1968), chap. 8.
79. Robert W. Morse to R. K. Turner, 25 Aug. 1941, box 82, SPDR, NOA; Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces in World War II, 1:178–79.
80. “Information Used by COS at Conference with President, 22 Sept. 1941,” box 885, COS secretariat files, RG 165; W. T. Scobey memo of meeting in COS office, 20 Sept. 1941, exec. #4, item 8, box 20, OPD, ibid.; Churchill to Stalin, 28 Aug. 1941, CAB 120/681, PRO; Stimson diary, 12, 16 Sept. 1941.
81. Memo on B-17 bombing radii, n.a., n.d. {10 Oct. 1941}, box 1, RG 2, Mac-Arthur papers (I am indebted to Daniel Harrington for providing me this memo, which probably deals with the B-17C, from his own researches and files). See also Tab K, WPD 4510, RG 165, which gives a combat radius of 750 miles from northern Luzon, reaching as far as Okinawa. According to authorities on the subject (Gordon Swanborough and Peter M. Barnes, United States Aircraft Since 1908 (London, 1971), 96), the B-17E had a range of 2,000 miles (combat radius of 1,000) with a bomb load of 4,000 pounds. A full bomb load was 4,800. Kyushu is approximately 1,000 miles from Luzon, Tokyo another 500 miles farther. According to Harrington (letter to author, 9 Jun
e 1987), a note in box 7 of the papers of General Carl Spaatz gives an 890-mile radius with a 4,200-pound payload. This was probably the B-17E. Stimson diary, 16 Sept. 1941.
82. Col. E. L. Naiden memo, 12 Sept. 1941, telephone conversations, Sept.-Dec. 1941, box 185, Arnold papers; Spaatz memo for COS, 12 Sept. 1941, 320.1 Phil, box 88, ibid.; Adjutant General to CG Philippines Dept., 12 Aug. 1941, 320.1 Phil, box 88, ibid.; Gerow to Chief of Air Corps, 18 Aug. 1941, 452.1 Phil, box 129, ibid.; Stimson to FDR, 22 Sept. 1941, in Stimson diary, 23 Sept. 1941; Gerow memo for COS, 14 Aug. 1941, WPD 3251, RG 165; Marshall to MacArthur, 5 Sept. 1941, Larry Bland et al, eds. The Papers of George Catlert Marshall (2 vols.; Baltimore, 1986), 2:599 (infantry reinforcement).
83. On the stalling tactics: Utley, “Upstairs, Downstairs,” 24–28; Anderson, Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, 177–89.
84. Sir R. Campbell to FO, 27 Sept. 1941, FO 371/27982, F9976/1299/23, PRO.
85. Acheson to Welles, 16 Aug. 1941, FR 1941, 4:858–60.
86. FDR appointment diaries, box 166, PPF 1–0(1), FDRL.
87. Memo by Herbert Gaston, 20 Aug. 1941, Morgenthau diary, 22 Aug. 1941; Campbell to FO, 27 Sept. 1941, FO 371/27982, F9976/1299/23, PRO.
88. Campbell to FO, 21 Aug. 1941, FO 371/27977, F8303/1299/23, PRO; Nomura to Tokyo, 19, 20 Sept, 31 Oct. 1941, SRDJ 15041, 15087, 16272, RG 457; Edward G. Miller, Jr., to Acheson, 5 Sept, 1941, FR 1941, 4:869–70; Nomura to Hull, 3 Oct. 1941, ibid, 892; 840.51 Frozen Credits/3714–3805, RG 59; “Japan-Oil Shipments” folder, box 513, RG 131, U.S. Treasury; memo by B. Bernstein, 29 Oct. 1941, ibid, (“gathering oysters”).
89. Acheson memo, 1 Aug. 1941, FR Japan, 1:271; Acheson to Hull, 22 Sept. 1941, 4:881–84; SecState to Grew, 27 Sept, 1941, ibid, 890–91.
90. Alger Hiss and Acheson memos, 26, 27 Sept. 1941, ibid. 886–88; FO 371/27982, F9976 and F9794 and F9966/1299/23, PRO; FO 371/27980, F9322 and F9324/1299/23, PRO.
Chapter 7. Oct.-Nov.: Race Against Time
1. Hosoya, “Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact,” Morley, ed., Fateful Choice, 104–14; Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 237–38.
2. F. C. Jones, Japan’s New Order in Fast Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937–45 (London, 1954), 279.
3. On Japan’s decision of 6 Sept. for a diplomatic solution or war, with a time limit: Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, chap. 13.
4. Robert J. C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Princeton, 1961), 245 (from figure of speech by Satō Kenryō).
5. “Magic” Background, #285–301, #325, #332, #340, #350, #1033–35, 6 Aug.-3 Oct. 1941, 3A:164–70, 178, 182, 184, 187, 523–24.
6. Butow, Tojo, 223, 225.
7. On the Japanese navy’s position regarding a decision for war: Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War, chap. 13; Asada, “Japanese Navy and the U.S.,” 254–58; Stephen E. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II (Cambridge, MA, 1974), 220–24.
8. Oka, Konoe.
9. Ibid., 146–47.
10. Hull memos, 23, 27, 28 Aug., 3 Sept. 1941, and attached documents, Ballantine memos, 28 Aug., 1, 4 Sept. 1941, FR Japan, 2:565–96; Washington to Tokyo 23, 28, 29 Aug., 3 Sept. #65, #89, #90, #91, #92, #118, “Magic” Background, 3A: 39–40, 52–54, 67–68.
11. #77, #96, #97, #98, #99, #100, #104, ibid, 45, 57–60. The name of the correspondent, described in the printed version only as “a reporter for the New York Herald Tribune” (Washington to Tokyo, 28 Aug. 1941, #96, ibid, 57), is given in the original intercept as Fleischer (SRDJ 14489, RG 457, NA). Also: FR 1941, 4:395–96, 421–22; Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War, 703.
12. FR Japan, 2:568–70, 581–82.
13. Washington to Tokyo, 4-Sept. 1941, #129, “Magic” Background, 3A:73.
14. Grew memo, 6 Sept. 1941, FR Japan, 2:604–6; Heinrichs, Grew, 346.
15. Grew to SecState, 18 Aug., 29 Sept. 1941, FR Japan, 2:565, 645–50; comment by Grew, 5 Sept. 1941, ibid, 601–3; Grew to SecState, 30 Aug., 29 Sept. 1941, FR 1941, 4:416–18, 483–89; Grew to FDR, 29 Sept. 1941, ibid, 468–69; Heinrichs, Grew, 339–47.
16. Ibid, 348–50.
17. FR Japan, 2:595–661. The key Japanese proposal is the draft of 6 Sept. 1941, ibid, 608, and the American response is Hull memo and enclosure, 2 Oct. 1941, ibid, 654–61. On “propinquity”: proposed instructions to Nomura handed by Toyoda to Grew, 13 Sept. 1941, ibid, 623–24.
18. Stimson diary, 6 Oct. 1941.
19. Japanese draft proposal, 6 Sept. 1941, FR Japan, 2:608; Hull memo and enclosure, 2 Oct. 1941, ibid, 660.
20. Ibid.; FDR to Churchill, 15 Oct. 1941, R-63x, Kimball, ed. Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence, 1:250. Roosevelt’s words were: “The Jap situation is definitely worse and I think they are headed North—however in spite of this you and I have two months of respite in the Far East.” Editor Kimball takes this to mean that Roosevelt anticipated two months beyond 15 October before a crisis occurred. Roosevelt’s language is open to that interpretation but surely he was writing retrospectively. It was just two months since he had told Churchill that he hoped to gain thirty to sixty days by continuing talks with the Japanese. Further, no evidence has been found that would indicate any particular period of respite from a northward advance.
21. Clark, Barbarossa, 147. On the German offensive against Moscow: ibid, chaps. 8, 9; Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 212–51.
22. New York Times, 16 Oct. 1941.
23. Ibid.; Lt. Gen. Fritz Bayerlein as quoted in Clark, Barbarossa, 160.
24. Stimson diary, 29 Sept. 1941; military attaché London, report of 1 Oct. 1941, 740.0011 EW/15656, RG 59; Schoenfeld to SecState, 6 Oct. 1941, ibid./15643; New York Times, 4 Oct. 1941; Hinsley, British Intelligence, 2:73.
25. Military attaché London, reports of 6, 8 (with G-2 comment), 12, 13, 15 Oct. 1941, 740.0011 EW/15939, 16155, RG 59; Churchill to director of Military Intelligence, 24 Oct. 1941, CAB 120/681, PRO; Stimson diary, 10 Oct. 1941; Berle diary, 10 Oct. 1941.
26. Hull memo, 3 Oct. 1941, 740.0011 EW/15650, RG 59.
27. Steinhardt to SecState, 28 Oct. 1941, ibid./16213, 16074; Leahy to SecState, 12, 16 Oct. 1941, ibid/15773, 15876.
28. Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 238–39; Chalmers Johnson, An Instance of Treason: Ozaki Hotsumi and the Sorge Spy Ring (Stanford, 1964), 158.
29. 740.0011 EW/13930, 14566, 14589, 14770, 14775, 15626, RG 59.
30. Sherman Miles memo for Marshall, 17 Oct. 1941, PHA, 14:1359.
31. Gauss to SecState, 740.0011 EW/15886, RG 59.
32. Naval attaché report, Chungking, 4 Oct. 1941, #4655, box 21, RG 226; Hull memo, 29 Oct. 1941, 740.0011 EW/16293, RG 59; 17 Oct. 1941 conference, notes on conferences, box 889, Army-COS secretariat, 1941–1942, RG 165.
33. Miles to Marshall, 21 Oct. 1941, #2177, box 12, RG 226; CNO memo, 16 Oct. 1941, PHA, 14:1327; R. A. Boone to Turner, 25 Sept. 1941, director NWPD special file #1, box 20, Turner papers, NOA; Admiral Alan G. Kirk transcript, 1962, Columbia University Oral History Collection, p. 182; Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, 13166.
34. Halifax to FO, 11 Oct. 1941, FO 371/27910, F10330/86/23, PRO; FDR to Churchill, 15 Oct. 1941, R-63x, Kimball, ed. Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence, 1:250.
35. Reed (Hanoi) to SecState, 3 Oct. 1941, 740.0011 PW/551, RG 59; Grew to SecState, 10 Oct. 1941, ibid./559, 560; military attaché Chungking, reports of 21, 23 Oct. 1941, 740.0011 EW/16336. RG 59; Hull to Grew, 16 Oct. 1941, ibid./15889; Stimson diary, 16 Oct. 1941. Stimson seems to have meant the drawing of lines when he wrote: “{W}e face the delicate question of the diplomatic fencing {original word “touching”} to be done so as to be sure that Japan was {sic} put in the wrong and made the first bad move—-overt move.”
36. Military attaché London, reports of 20, 21 Oct. 1941, 740.0011 EW/16336, RG 59; R. A. Boone memo, 25 Sept. 1941, director NWPD special file #1, box 20, Turner papers, NOA.
37. #352, #751, #356, “Magic” Background, 3A:188, 372, 189–90.
38. Biddle to SecState, 10 Aug. 1941, 740.0011 EW/14427, RG 59.
40. FO to Sir Stafford Cripps, 2 Nov. 1941, FO 371/27987, F11727/1299/23, PRO.
41. Winant to SecState, 22 Oct. 1941, 740.0011 EW/16039, RG 59; Hull memo, 29 Oct. 1941, ibid./16293.
42. Richard Law minute, FO 371/27984, F10456/1299/23, PRO; Harvey, Diary, 40.
43. Ashley Clarke minute, 17 Sept. 1941, FO 371/27910, F9321/86/23, PRO; Clarke minute, 6 Oct. 1941, FO 371/27910, F10329/86/23, PRO; Sterndale Bennett minute, 1 Oct. 1941, FO 371/27883, F10117/12/23, PRO.
44. Stimson diary, 6 Oct. 1941; Col. Hayes A. Kroner to Marshall, 2 Oct. 1941, PHA, 14:1357–58.
45. WPD strategic estimate, Oct. 1941, WPD 4510, RG 165.
46. Transcript of telephone conversation between Marshall and Lt. Cmdr. W. R. Smedberg III (aide to Stark), 25 Sept. 1941, OPNAV telephone records, 1941–1942, NOA; Watson, Chief of Staff, 443.
47. Stimson diary, 23 Sept., 16, 20 Oct. 1941; Stimson to FDR, 22 Sept, 14 Oct. 1941, in Stimson diary; Harold Balfour memo, n.d, box 156, Hopkins papers, FDRL; FDR to Stimson 18 Sept, 14 Oct., 1941, box 15, RG 107.
48. A delivery schedule extending to October 1942 was in place as late as 3 Oct. The decision for an accelerated schedule was taken by 21 Oct., when details were sent to MacArthur. The 16 Oct. meeting was the only one the president had with all his principal military advisers between 3 and 21 Oct. Marshall to MacArthur, 3 Oct. 1941, Philippines folder, box 11, RG 107; Stimson diary, 16 Oct. 1941; president’s appointment diaries, box 166, PPF 1–0(1), FDRL; Adams to MacArthur, 21 Oct. 1941 and chief of air staff to commanding general, air force Combat Command, 22 Oct. 1941, 452.1 Phil., box 129, Arnold papers, A full-strength heavy bombardment group consisted of 68 planes (“U.S. Production Requirements, September 1941” {Victory Program}, 145.81–23, frame 1495, microfilm roll A1370, U.S. Air Force Historical Archives, Boiling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.).