Rear-Admiral Burnett, with Force ‘R’, proposed, for reasons similar to those expressed by Vice-Admiral Kummetz, to cross the convoy’s wake, take position to the north and shadow from some 40–50 miles (75–92 km) astern so that he would have the advantage of any available light[55] should an attack develop. Additionally, in that position his cruisers would be less likely to attract the attention of any air reconnaissance which might then be drawn on to the convoy. He had several problems to contend with in arriving at his intended covering position by 31 December, however. Rear-Admiral Burnett considered this to be the crucial time given the expected position of the convoy at that point, and the fact that any attacking German surface ships would almost certainly sortie from Altenfjord (see map, p. 52).
Since leaving the Kola Inlet the weather had been so overcast that it had not been possible to take sightings from the stars, obliging navigating officers to calculate their position using ‘dead reckoning’. To complicate matters further Rear-Admiral Burnett had no sightings of the convoy, the only report he had of its position being a message received from C-in-C Home Fleet, Admiral Tovey, timed at 11.21 on 27 December. This estimated that JW51B would pass the longitude of Bear Island at 16.00 on the 29th, whereas in fact this point was passed at around 12.00 the following day, the convoy being some 150 miles (276 km) further west, and as already noted, some way south of its intended position (see map, p. 52).[56] Having no option but to assume that C-in-C Home Fleet’s message was accurate, at 18.00 on the 30th Rear-Admiral Burnett gave orders for Force ‘R’ to come around to course 320° and proceed so as to be in a covering position to the north and astern of the convoy by dawn. In fact, as can be seen from the map, the cruisers passed ahead of the convoy and by 08.30 on the 31st were some 30 miles (55 km) due north of the merchantmen.
—♦—
Admiral Kluber in Narvik passed U354’s sightings to Vice-Admiral Kummetz on 30 December, and ordered him to bring his battle group to three-hour stand-by. Consequently early that afternoon Kummetz summoned his captains aboard Admiral Hipper to outline his plan of attack; those present represented Hipper (Kapitän zur See Hans Hartmann), Lützow, (Kapitän zur See Rudolf Stange) and the destroyers Friedrich Eckholdt (Capt. Alfred Schemmel, Commander 5th Destroyer Flotilla, doubling as captain of Eckholdt as her own captain, Lt-Cdr Lutz Gerstung, had died a few days earlier), Richard Beitzen (Lt-Cdr Hans von Davidson), Theodor Riedel (Lt-Cdr Walter Riede), Z29 (Lt-Cdr Curt Rechel), Z30 (Lt-Cdr Heinrich Kaiser) and Z31 (Lt-Cdr Hermann Alberts).
Having ensured that his senior officers fully understood his strategy, Vice-Admiral Kummetz closed the meeting with a summary of his intended battle tactics:
At night I cannot attack the convoy… for on principle our own ships should not be exposed to nocturnal attack from destroyers… The only thing left is to make use of the few hours of polar twilight that in these latitudes count for daylight… By dawn we should have closed the enemy. The main objective then is first the destruction of the security force, and after that the merchantmen, with special emphasis on immobilising as many as possible by gunfire in the shortest possible time…[57]
Force ‘R’ 12.00 hrs, 30 December to 08.30 hrs 31 December (PRO. ADM. 234/369)
At 14.10 that afternoon Kummetz received a radio message from Narvik requesting the time of departure of the battle group and giving the estimated position of ‘PQ20 ’ (German intelligence had not yet picked up the prefix switch from PQ to JW), the following day. Paragraph 4 of this message reads:
A. Bringing in of single steamers very desirable.
B. No loss of time due to rescuing… enemy crews.
C. Only some prisoner captains and crew for interrogation of value.
D. Rescue of enemy crews by enemy forces not desirable.[58]
Neither Allied or Axis ships would stop for rescue missions, of friend or foe, if it was thought that by so doing they would put themselves in danger; however an order not to rescue enemy crews under any circumstances highlights the low value placed on human life by the Nazi High Command, ultimately that of their own population as well as those of their enemies.
By 30 December U626 (Oberleutnant Hans-Helmuth Bugs) had also made contact with JW51B and good intelligence as to the convoy’s movements was therefore anticipated. In fact at this time Kummetz almost certainly had a better idea of the convoy’s location than Rear-Admiral Burnett; however to compensate for this to some degree Burnett’s cruisers had still not been located, the balance of probability for the German command being that they were homeward-bound with convoy RA51.
With the German battle group making preparations for sea, down the chain of command came the first note of caution, contained in a radio message from Narvik: ‘Conduct towards the enemy: Avoid superior enemy, otherwise destroy if in [advantageous] tactical situation.’[59]
The German chain of command for most naval operations was cumbersome in the extreme, and for Regenbogen comprised the following, who were all directly involved:
Adolf Hitler at Wolfschanze to:
the Kriegsmarine representative at Führer Headquarters Admiral
Theodore Krancke to:
Grand Admiral Raeder, Berlin, to:
Admiral Rolf Carls, C-in-C Gruppe Nord, Kiel, to:
Admiral Otto Kluber, Admiral Commanding Northern Waters,
Narvik to:
Vice-Admiral Oskar Kummetz at Altenfjord.
With the estimated time of departure for the battle group initially set at 17.00, Admiral Hipper’s perennial engine problems (see Appendix I), struck again when a flange on the starboard condenser pump was found to be blowing, risking failure of the starboard engine should it worsen. Following an inspection Kummetz decided that repairs would be possible while at sea (their estimated duration was twelve hours), and a departure time of 18.00 was fixed.
At 16.37 U354 had reported to Narvik: ‘Convoy Qu. 4189 AC has spread out, large jags [zigzags] around 80°, approximately 10 steamers, several destroyers, 1 cruiser doubtful… Weather good except for short squalls of snow.’[60]
This information was passed to Vice-Admiral Kummetz, followed at 16.48 by another exhortation to exercise caution from Admiral Kluber: ‘Commander: Contrary to op.-command [see message above] conduct towards the enemy: Exercise restraint even when enemy is equally matched as cruisers should not take big risks.’[61]
If the German high command had deliberately set out to hamstring Vice-Admiral Kummetz they could not have done a better job – and they were not finished yet! The battle group departed Altenfjord via Lopphavet Sound and set course to clear the coast, and British submarine patrols,[62] at 24 knots, the maximum speed of Lützow. A short time into the voyage mechanical problems struck again as destroyer Z31 developed a fault with her port engine, and speed was reduced to 18 knots to enable her to maintain contact. By 22.55 the battle group had reached position 71°01’ N, 21°25’ E, and course was altered to 060° to intercept the convoy. Shortly thereafter Z31 reported her engine problem solved, and speed increased to 24 knots.
By 02.00 on New Year’s Eve dead reckoning placed the German battle group at 71°36’ N, 24°38’ E, at which point Kummetz deployed his attack formation (see diagram p. 32). His reconnaissance screen of six destroyers was to sweep eastwards 15 miles (28 km) apart, with Hipper 15 miles astern the northern wing destroyer, and Lützow 15 miles astern the southern wing destroyer. Lützow had orders to be 75 miles (138 km) and 180° from Hipper at 08.00, by which time the flagship would be at position 73°40’ N, 28° E.
The vice-admiral’s appreciation of the position at this point was as follows:
1. I consider the most recent location report of the submarine in contact at 16.37 to be reliable, as it can easily be connected to the previous location reports. I therefore take it as a starting point for the approach to the reconnaissance formation.
2. The escort convoy is fast but moves jaggedly, so I assume general course to be no faster than approx. 8 nm [knots]. If the enemy goes in a straight line for a lon
ger period of time, their advancing speed will increase accordingly. I reckon the enemy is trying to gain space to the east. I also have to take a slow rotation into a southern direction into account. I think, though, that due to his respect for the German air force he will not get too close to the coastline. He will try to shake off the covering submarines by going jaggedly, supported by the weather conditions, which are unfavourable for submarines.
3. The reconnaissance formation has to cover the most probable voyage speeds of between 7 and approximately 11 nm, and the most probable courses between 85 to approximately 110°.
4. I want to run into the escort convoy with… favourable lookout conditions and the enemy… visible against the light horizon as dawn breaks. I therefore put up with the unfavourable torpedo tactic situation.[63]
At 05.00 Hipper picked up a radio message dispatched by U354 to Narvik which read, ‘From 20.30 forced under water, bombed. Last location escort Qu. 4513 AC, [course] around 120° 13 nm, weather conditions very good, advancing…’[64]
This showed a more southerly course for the convoy than anticipated, and although he was sceptical of its accuracy, Kummetz could not afford to ignore it since if his target now held to 120° he would miss it completely if he made no adjustment. He therefore shifted the destroyer screen 20 miles (37 km) to the south. Being less sure of the enemy position, and despite the possibility that the transmissions might betray the battle group’s location, Kummetz ordered that from 06.00 onwards, whenever visibility dropped below 6 miles (11.5 km), all ships should use FuMG radar every ten minutes for two minutes at a time in order to avoid running into the convoy unexpectedly.
—♦—
Bearing in mind that this was Kapitän zur See Stange’s first operational command, the higher echelons of German naval authority had prepared something of a surprise for him and Lützow at this late stage in the proceedings. At 05.45 he received the following from Admiral Kluber in Narvik (copied to Hipper):
FT 01.53 from North Sea Commander SSD to B.d.K and Lützow:
After completion Regenbogen intending to release Lützow within the North Sea northwards 70 degrees north between 5 degrees east and 35 degrees east.
Mission: cruiser-war, detect enemy shipping traffic, attack single cruisers and poorly secured escorts. Cue for release Aurora…
Development of Regenbogen is crucial for release… Proceed only if Lützow has at least half of artillery and torpedo ammunition left.
Break off Lützow’s being at sea independently as soon as enemy units can be recognised from heavy cruiser upwards or after collection of enemy forces becomes probable following considerable success… Further information later.[65]
It is probably fair to say that Rudolf Stange was not the most resourceful captain in the Kriegsmarine, but it is not difficult to understand his consternation on receipt of this radio communication on the point of engaging the convoy, particularly as the message contains its fair share of ‘ifs’, ‘buts’, and ‘maybes’. As Stange himself commented: ‘The receipt of this FT creates a new situation for me in so far as contrary to the original plans… it is now no longer possible to talk the operation through with B.d.K in detail, neither can I request documents about the enemy from him…’[66]
Whether Vice-Admiral Kummetz knew that this operation within an operation was in the wind is open to question, but, crucially, it appears that Stange did not, which may go some way towards explaining his performance in the engagement which followed.
At 07.18 two shadows bearing 060° were sighted by Admiral Hipper, and Friedrich Eckholdt was sent to investigate. At 07.47 a large shadow was sighted and Hipper turned towards it on course 110°. This may have been one of the tankers straggling astern of the convoy, and may initially have been mistaken for a cruiser by the approaching German force. As Kummetz and Kapitän zur See Hartmann considered their options six more shadows were identified, and both officers were now certain that this must be the convoy. By 08.00 Lützow was in position and reporting a moderate swell, clouds and occasional snow showers. In Kapitän zur See Stange’s estimation the convoy was some 80 miles (148 km) to the north, caught between the jaws of the German ‘pincers’ – which he now prepared to close.
Despite the apparent complexities of his plan Vice-Admiral Kummetz had placed his forces perfectly, and at 07.58 he signalled his sighting to the battle group: ‘Alarm Square 4395.’[67]
—♦—
As darkness struggled toward twilight that 31 December, JW51B consisted of twelve merchantmen (two stragglers still absent), accompanied by five destroyers, two corvettes and a trawler. The convoy’s course was easterly, position approximately 220 miles (408 km) north-west of the Kola Inlet. Some 45 miles (82 km) to the north the trawler Vizalma with the freighter Chester Valley in company attempted to rejoin the main body, while some 15 miles (28 km) to the north-east the minesweeper Bramble still looked for stragglers. Rear-Admiral Burnett with Force ‘R’ was approximately 30 miles (55 km) north of the convoy and 15 miles south of Vizalma. None of these four groups had any idea of the positions of the others, and there was also another straggler somewhere in the area.[68]
The weather was for the most part clear, the twilight visibility being around 7 miles (13 km) to the north, 10 miles (18.5 km) to the south. At intervals however, visibility was much reduced by snow squalls. There was low cloud cover, wind west-north-west force 3, sea slight, 16 degrees of frost, and ice on all ships.[69]
At about 08.20 Hyderabad, astern the convoy on the starboard wing (see diagram, p. 58), sighted two unidentified ships crossing the convoy’s wake. She had previously picked up a coded radio message notifying the convoy to expect two Russian aircraft, an incorrect decode unfortunately substituting ‘destroyers’ for ‘aircraft’. The corvette took these to be the Russian ships, and did not pass the information on. At 08.30 Obdurate, on the convoy’s starboard beam, reported to Onslow: ‘Bearing 210 2 destroyers.’[70]
It was at first considered that these might be Oribi and Bramble, but Obdurate was sent to investigate. A sixth sense seems to have warned Captain Sherbrooke that this might be trouble, for as Obdurate commenced her sweep astern of the convoy he ordered Onslow’s complement sent to breakfast and to change into clean underwear – a naval tradition dating back to the days of the wooden wall sailing ships to help guard against infection in the event of wounding. A tense hour passed, until at 09.29 gun flashes were seen by Onslow in the direction taken by Obdurate. Sherbrooke ordered Orwell and Obedient to join him, the latter having to come around and astern of the convoy. The two destroyers spotted by Obdurate turned out to be three, and were in fact Friedrich Eckholdt, Richard Beitzen and Z29, the three destroyers which completed Hipper’s squadron, opening from Lützow’s group to the south. The three German destroyers turned to the north-west away from Obdurate, but when she closed to 8000 yds (7300 m), Eckholdt opened fire. The British destroyer turned away to rejoin the convoy, while the German trio continued on to the north-west to close on Hipper.
As Onslow and Orwell sped to investigate the gunfire and Obedient hurried to catch up, Achates, complying with Captain Sherbrooke’s instructions, assisted the three smaller escorts to lay smoke covering the convoy.
Escort dispositions, morning, 31 December 1942 (Rodney L. Start, MBE, reproduced with the kind permission of Mrs Moira Start)
Anticipating engaging an enemy destroyer force, at 09.39 Onslow’s first officer, Lieutenant-Commander Thomas Marchant, drew Sherbrooke’s attention to an altogether more formidable opponent bearing 325° (fine on Onslow’s starboard bow), distance 8 miles (15 km), on a course of 140°. As this large warship turned to port to bring all her main armament to bear, Marchant recognised her as the Admiral Hipper, and at 09.41 the German cruiser opened fire on Achates, clearly visible to the south. Sherbrooke decided to attack with the two destroyers present and opened fire at an approximate range of 9000 yards (8229 m).
At this point the problems of fighting a ship in the Arctic became uncomfortably apparent, a
s only the flotilla leader’s ‘B’ turret was firing; ‘Y’ turret was not yet bearing and ‘A’ and ‘X’ turrets were out of action due to a thin film of ice having formed in the recesses behind the extractor.[71] Fortunately for the British destroyers it was assumed by Hipper that they were making a torpedo attack, and she sheered away to port. The two escorts positioned themselves to keep between Hipper and the convoy.
—♦—
The big German cruiser had been firing for a matter of minutes only, but she had been effective. Onboard Achates gun flashes could be seen to the north, and Hipper’s shells began to fall uncomfortably close, throwing up great fountains of water as they exploded on impact. Lieutenant-Commander Johns ordered speed increased, and Achates heeled over under the helm, zigzagging in an attempt to throw off the enemy’s gunnery. Despite this the next salvo was closer, huge geysers of water erupting on either side of the ship. Two more salvos were equally close, one near-miss exploding on the port side abreast of the bridge of the speeding destroyer, drenching gun crews in icy spray and sending showers of splinters scything across the deck. As Hipper turned away she ceased firing, and Achates’ crew was left to assess the damage.[72]
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