Sent to investigate, Lieutenant Loftus Peyton-Jones soon discovered that although no direct hits had been suffered, the damage was serious. Going below he found that numerous splinters from the big 8 in (203 mm) shells had cut through the thin plating of the destroyer’s hull, creating havoc between the decks. Electric leads were cut, and lockers and mess tables, broken loose from their fastenings, were crashing from side to side as the ship rolled. In the dim light it was difficult not to trip over the killed and wounded who lay in the passageways and messdecks, but the ship’s doctor, James MacFarlane, was already at work organising removal of the injured to first-aid posts, and quieting those more seriously hurt with shots of morphia.
On the forward messdeck repair parties attempted to plug the holes through which water spurted as the ship rolled to port, while on the stokers’ messdeck below a stream of water entered through a fractured hull plate. During Achates’s last refit insulation had been fitted to the messdecks to make life more tolerable in Arctic waters, and this now had to be torn away to get to the hull plating. It proved to be a difficult and time-consuming job. Finally it was decided to close the forward magazine, shell room and stokers’ messdeck, and shore up the bulkheads on either side. To ease the pressure on the damaged hull speed was reduced, but Achates continued with her principal task, and patrolled to and fro, covering the convoy with smoke.[73]
—♦—
At 09.45,[74] as Hipper and the two British destroyers skirmished, the convoy turned from east to south-east and maintained a speed of 9 knots. By 09.55 Obedient had joined Sherbrooke and Obdurate could be seen returning from her brush with Friedrich Eckholdt. The enemy destroyers concerned Sherbrooke as they had not been sighted in the engagement with Hipper, and he believed they might be attempting to attack the merchantmen; consequently he ordered Obedient and Obdurate to rejoin the convoy to cover such an eventuality, although in fact Kummetz had ordered his three consorts to maintain station with the flagship. The action was barely fifteen minutes old, but Kummetz had been suitably impressed by the tactics of the British destroyers, stating in his report:
The destroyers are… remarkably versatile. They push in between the convoy and Hipper in a way that it is not possible to get to the steamers. They are using a very effective artificial fog, trying to cover up the steamers. With evasive manoeuvres and by seeking shelter in the fog and smoke area they are cleverly trying to escape the artillery fire from Hipper. Their position to each other shows Hipper in danger from torpedoes, even when she moves towards them directly for a higher artillery effect and to use the artillery against the steamers.[75]
At 10.08 Obedient turned away to southward and signalled Obdurate to join her, the two laying smoke to screen the wake of the convoy before joining it. Sherbrooke’s force was now stretched very thin, but at 09.55 he had received very good news indeed from Sheffield: ‘Am approaching on course of 170°.[76]
—♦—
By 08.45 that morning Force ‘R’, with Rear-Admiral Burnett still under the impression that he was positioning his cruisers astern of the convoy, remained on a north-westerly heading at 17 knots, approximate position 73° 47’ N, 28° 54’ E.[77] At 08.58 a radio direction finder (RDF) contact was obtained bearing 320° (dead ahead), at a range of 14,900 yards, (13,624 m). Some minutes later a ship could dimly be made out on this bearing, her course and speed estimated to be 090° at 25 knots. It was necessary for Rear-Admiral Burnett to establish the identity of the contact so he altered course away to the south-east, coming around to a north-easterly bearing to close on the mystery ship in order to track her further (see map B, p. 146). By this time the original speed calculation for the target had proved to be incorrect and was now estimated to be 10 knots.[78] At around 09.30 gun flashes were seen to the south as the German destroyers opened on Obdurate; however aboard Sheffield it was thought that this might be anti-aircraft fire, and in any event it quickly died away. Rear-Admiral Burnett was still not satisfied with the identity of the radar contact, and continued to track it for another quarter of an hour until heavy gunfire was observed to the south, and a report of three enemy destroyers was received from Captain Sherbrooke.
It now appeared to Rear-Admiral Burnett that the mysterious radar contact must in all probability be stragglers from the convoy[79] and at 09.55 he ordered Force ‘R’ around to the south on a course of 170°, and in line ahead Sheffield and Jamaica worked up to their maximum 32 knots.
In some respects it does seem that Force ‘R’ might have made for the gunfire sooner. The mystery echo, a potential enemy, had to be checked; however the best part of an hour had been taken up with this endeavour. The confused situation on the day must of course be taken into consideration, particularly keeping in mind that the prime consideration was the safe arrival of the convoy, allied to Rear-Admiral Burnett’s belief that JW51B was 150 miles (277 km) or more east of the position from which the firing emanated.
—♦—
As Force ‘R’ headed southwards Admiral Hipper continued skirmishing with the British destroyers, running in to engage them with her secondary and anti-aircraft guns, while firing over them at the convoy with her main armament. Partly as a result of caution concerning torpedo attack and partly to try to draw the destroyers away from the convoy, with the range down to around 11,000 yards (10,000 m), Kummetz would swing away to the north, subsequently repeating the manoeuvre. Between the twilight visibility, snow squalls, and smoke laid by the British destroyers, the ‘fog of war’ had begun to take on a literal definition so whether Obedient and Obdurate were observed from the German flagship returning to the convoy is not certain. Perhaps Vice-Admiral Kummetz was aware that the convoy had turned away toward the Lützow squadron and he wished to be in at the kill, but whatever his reasoning, shortly after 10.00 he seems to have determined that as they would not be drawn away from the merchantmen, he would concentrate on the troublesome destroyers, and instructed Kapitän zur See Hartmann to clear them from his path once and for all.[80]
CHAPTER 5
‘THE WHOLE PLACE WAS ALIGHT’
Admiral Hipper’s first couple of salvos fell well over Onslow, which returned fire, and at 10.14 observers on the destroyers saw a faint flash on the cruiser amidships.[81] Hipper’s next salvo passed ‘uncomfortably close and over’ Onslow[82] followed in quick succession by two 150 yards over, and two more straddling the stern. The cruiser now had the range and the next salvo fell either side of the destroyer’s bridge, one shell exploding close to the port side, splinters peppering the torpedomen’s messdeck. At 10.18 Onslow was again straddled, one shell striking the top of the funnel. Both RDF sets and all her main radio telephone aerials were destroyed, and a hail of splinters sprayed across the bridge. Lieutenant-Commander Marchant remembered that ‘a splinter passed between me and Captain (D).’[83] The splinter hit Captain Sherbrooke in the face, badly wounding him and temporarily blinding his left eye. There was no let-up in the pounding as another salvo from Hipper immediately struck home with direct hits to the destroyer’s superstructure under ‘B’ turret, and the forecastle abreast ‘A’ turret.[84] Fires were now taking hold in the fore part of the stricken destroyer and Sherbrooke, refusing to leave the bridge until his ship was out of danger, ordered her to make smoke and turn to starboard. The turn upset Hipper’s gunnery and the next three salvos fell harmlessly some 30 yards (27 m) away. However Kummetz must have believed that the enemy flotilla leader was finished, as he shifted his fire to Orwell.
As the shells struck Onslow, Acting Stoker Walter Watkin had been making his way forward with Engineer Lieutenant Kevin Walton, both intending to assist the fire and repair party stationed in the after seamen’s messdeck located immediately below ‘A’ and ‘B’ turrets. Lieutenant Walton broke the glass front of a locker holding a fire hose and handed the hose to Watkin. A standpipe containing sea water under pressure was located close to the funnel, and Watkin dashed back to connect the hose. As he did so he saw the wounded chief stoker lying on the deck and sliding un
der the guardrail as the ship heeled over to starboard. Grabbing the injured man he dragged him inboard and propped him up by the funnel, then connecting the hose to the standpipe he opened the valve and dragged the hose back to fight the fires in the seamen’s messdeck. He recalls that ‘the whole place was alight, with fires burning fiercely. The steel structure was a mass of twisted metal, and dead bodies [were] lying around.’[85] As the two men played water on the fire it must have been apparent to Watkin that the entire fire and repair party had been wiped out when their repair station received a direct hit. It might also have occurred to him, as it certainly did later when he had time to reflect, that had he received the promotion he had wanted, he would have been a member of that party.
One fire in particular was proving difficult to get at. Handing the hose to another rating, Lieutenant Walton and Walter Watkin made their way to the main deck forward, where Walton believed he could get at the fire by going down through the shell hole in the forecastle. Dense smoke billowed from the hole and he had no way of knowing whether the deck below had been shot away. Nevertheless, with a handkerchief tied over his nose and mouth he lashed a rope around his chest and handed it to Watkin, who lowered him down. He had two hoses fed down to him and fought the fires there for twenty minutes before being relieved.
With Walton out of the forecastle, Watkin heard a shout that fires had spread to the engine room artificers’ (ERAs’) messdeck beneath the captain’s sea cabin and the bridge. Going back to the area he arranged for a bucket party to fill buckets from a lavatory and pass them to him as he stood at the top of a ladder and threw water over the bulkhead of the ERAs’ pantry, which blistered with heat from the fire on the other side. An ERA arrived with a fire hose, and opening the door to the messdeck played water on the red-hot bulkheads. Watkin was subsequently instructed to go below and take over watch-keeping duties in No.1 boiler room.[86]
—♦—
Having received damage reports and ensured that Onslow was out of immediate danger, Captain Sherbrooke transferred command of the 17th Destroyer Flotilla to Commander Kinloch of Obedient, remaining on the bridge until an acknowledgement was obtained confirming that his order had been received and was being acted upon. For his actions in command of the close escort, and remaining at his post despite his serious wound, he was subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross.
The situation facing Commander Kinloch as he took command at 10.35 was far from clear, (see map, below). The convoy now steered 180° (due south), with Obedient and Obdurate some 3 miles (5.5 km) to the north and overhauling the merchantmen. Orwell closed from somewhat to the north-east, while Onslow made her way toward the head of the convoy from where she could ‘home’ Force ‘R’ using the fleet waveband. As the flotilla leader passed close to Obedient, Paddy Donovan, in the gunnery director up behind the bridge, had a grandstand view of the fires raging aboard Onslow and remembered Obedient’s crew cheering the battered destroyer as she steered to the head of the convoy.[87] Achates remained on station astern of the convoy, a little to the west of Obedient and still laying smoke, while Hipper continued eastwards at 31 knots, although as a heavy snow squall now covered the area Kinloch had no real idea where the German cruiser was. To add to his problems Rhododendron, on the port quarter of the convoy, reported smoke to the south-west followed ten minutes later by a report of a large vessel bearing 160°, only 2 miles (3.2 km) off and steering north-east.[88] This was Lützow’s squadron, and had also been spotted by Lieutenant-Commander Marchant, now commanding Onslow:
At a range of about 6000 yards [5486 m], on a bearing of green 40 [off the destroyer’s starboard bow], silently slid into view the huge silhouette of the German pocket battleship Lützow. She was steering NNE. If, in our predicament, we could see her, surely she could see us and the… ships with us. So we simply stopped breathing and waited for the first broadside. But nothing happened! As quietly as she came into view she slid out – a ghost ship if ever there was. Many prayers winged aloft during those charged and tense minutes.[89]
The situation at 10.30 hrs (PRO. ADM. 234/369)
A sudden desire for quiet prayer and contemplation seems also to have gripped the crew of Rhododendron at this point – a feeling which apparently did not extend to her captain, Lieutenant-Commander Sayers who apparently, so the scuttlebutt goes, ordered her single 4 in (101 mm) gun to open fire! The first lieutenant is said to have quickly checked the order and had a quiet word with the captain to the effect that they might be biting off a bit more than they could chew! In the event Rhododendron did not open fire and Lützow disappeared quietly back into the murk. While one cannot help but admire Sayers’s spirit, it seems certain that letting sleeping battleships lie constituted the better part of valour on that occasion.
—♦—
That morning Lützow and her three destroyers, Theodor Riedel, Z30, and Z31, made good progress north-eastwards toward the convoy. The pocket battleship made a better-than-expected 26 knots, Kapitän zur See Stange having authorised the temporary circumvention of the engines’ operating limits.[90] At 09.30 muzzle flashes were seen from below the visible horizon, indicating the opening of Admiral Hipper’s attack, whereupon Stange considered launching the ship’s aircraft for reconnaissance but decided against it, since much time would be lost recovering it. During the course of the morning Lieutenant-Commander Kaiser and Z30, in company with Z31, had been despatched in an attempt to locate the convoy but without success, and by 10.35 they had rejoined Lützow. At 10.42 a ship believed to be an enemy was in sight to port but was almost immediately obscured by the snow squall, which also blotted Hipper off from Commander Kinloch’s view. By 10.45 Lützow’s radar picked up several targets within the snow squall, but still nothing was visible. Kapitän zur See Stange was now confronted by several problems. He presumed that the contacts in the squall would be the enemy convoy, but was not sure. Since he had no wish to get caught in the southward-moving squall himself it was necessary for him to manoeuvre his squadron into the best position to confirm the identity of the radar contacts, and if they turned out to be the merchantmen, make his attack. Stange opted to continue north-eastwards, pass ahead of the weather front, reduce speed to 15 knots and turn to run south eastwards along its edge, hoping for it to clear sufficiently to allow positive identification of the targets. As he manoeuvred for an attack position, in the back of his mind must have been the morning’s message detailing Lützow to a further solo mission on completion of the attack on the convoy. This mission could only take place if the pocket battleship had at least half her ammunition and torpedoes available; therefore Stange would not have wished to waste either on indistinct targets. He could despatch one or more of his consorts to close on what he suspected would be the convoy, but decided against this course of action believing that an attack by Lützow would be jeopardised should his destroyers be intermingled with the enemy (to the north Vice-Admiral Kummetz kept his destroyers in close contact with Hipper for much the same reason).
—♦—
Little had been heard from Bramble since departing the convoy on the 29th to search for stragglers, but she now made a dramatic but short-lived reappearance. Having no doubt seen the gunfire and set course for the convoy, she now approached from the north-east and at 10.39 sent her last message (received by Hyderabad only, and not passed on to the senior officer of the escort until some days later): ‘One cruiser bearing 300°.’[91]
After disengaging from Onslow, Admiral Hipper continued eastwards before swinging in an arc to starboard to bring her back into contact with the convoy. At 10.42 as she came around to the south-west a ship appeared out of the gloom to port and was identified as a destroyer or corvette (see map B, p. 146). Since no German ship could be approaching from that direction Hipper opened fire on what was in fact the unfortunate Bramble. Having crippled the minesweeper Kummetz despatched Friedrich Eckholdt to finish her off. Little is known of this episode, except that Obedient noted an engagement between a small ship firing a single gun and a
much larger ship, away to the north-east. Bramble was sunk with all hands, and evidently went down fighting.
—♦—
Approaching 11.00 Lützow was steering 120° at 12 knots[92] and was spotted by Obedient, in company with Obdurate and Orwell, as the destroyers passed southward down the port side of the convoy (see map B, p. 146). As the destroyers conformed to the enemy’s course and speed to keep themselves between the convoy and the pocket battleship, Commander Kinloch ordered Achates to join them. However, on being advised that Achates’ speed was reduced to 20 knots by previously inflicted battle damage, he rescinded the order and signalled her to ‘proceed to the head of the convoy and take Onslow under your orders.’[93] At 11.06 firing was heard and it was thought that Lützow had opened her attack, but no fall of shot could be seen. This was in fact Hipper racing back to the convoy at 31 knots on a course of 190° and a bearing almost exactly the same as Lützow, her approach therefore hidden from the British destroyers. What she had been firing at is something of a mystery as Kummetz reports her bombarding two destroyers to port,[94] yet there were no British ships in that area at the time. The only explanation appears to be that it may have been the luckless Bramble again, limping southwards.
—♦—
Ordered to the head of the convoy, Achates emerged from her own smokescreen at 11.15, just as her adversary from earlier in the day arrived back on the scene. Admiral Hipper opened fire and the destroyer was immediately straddled. Lieutenant-Commander Johns took evasive action, increased speed and zigzagged in an attempt to upset the cruiser’s gunnery.
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