Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War

by Andrew Stewart

  By far the greatest problem, despite what the memorandum had to say, was trying to say what would happen in South Africa. There were similar economic, defensive and emotional factors to those which had influenced Australia and New Zealand. As with Canada, there was also a substantial Nationalist group to be considered which counted amongst its ranks the South African leader, General J. B. M. Hertzog. This largely Afrikaans section of the population was similar to the Quebecois of French-Canada in having no great love for the government in London.43 The DO's fears about what all of this might mean had, however, finally spread. Within the FO there existed the 'Dominions Intelligence Department' (DID), established in 1926 to prepare information on foreign affairs to be passed to the Dominion governments. It had a small staff comprising a head supported by an assistant and three juniors who produced daily 'Intels' surveying the international situation. With the worsening European position this service had been substantially stepped up, so that by 1939 huge numbers of documents were being generated for Dominion consumption.44 Sir Alexander Cadogan was listed as being in charge but operating at the centre of British foreign affairs he had many other more important responsibilities, and much of the daily work fell to Robert Hadow. He and the South African high commissioner's private secretary had discussed what might happen in April, and this had left him sufficiently confident to declare afterwards that South Africa would 'most certainly come in should we be involved in war'. Similar statements had been made by a number of his FO colleagues during the previous months but, following the announcement that negotiations would take place with the Soviets, Hadow began to receive information from the Dominions that made his earlier confidence evaporate.45 He warned Cadogan that there was a risk of South African neutrality at the outset of war, 'perhaps only for a while but with dangerous possibilities'. This was dismissed as being overly dramatic and nothing more was said within the FO of the Dominion and its likely stance.46

  The reality was that the memorandum had been broadly accepted within Whitehall as being accurate in its conclusions and an ominous lack of any discussion about what the near future might hold now settled upon the corridors of British power. During the summer months, aside from a few messages from the Tasman governments, the Dominions also had little to say about the deteriorating international situation.47 The high commissioners working in London were similarly restrained and appeared to have run out of angry observations to make.48 The volume of communications passing between London and the Dominion capitals had not slowed, it was just that it had little to do with how this political alliance might function if the worst happened and the newly agreed security guarantees were tested. As the 'July rush' abated many officials in the DO went on leave but the lull was quickly shattered by the surprise announcement that Germany and the Soviet Union had concluded their non-aggression pact.49 With the notable exception of the New Zealand representative Bill Jordan, the Dominion high commissioners found this news difficult to accept, and they were roused once again to demand that every effort be made to hold further negotiations with the German leader Adolf Hitler.50 Even the mention of 'appeasement' remains a source of intense emotion to some historians, but in these daily meetings there was no shortage of support for the idea that the Führer should be given whatever was needed to induce him not to go to war. Any chance of securing support for this was destroyed by Stanley Bruce, and his clumsy attempts orchestrated from Australia House to apply pressure on the Polish authorities and make them accept Germany's demands. All this did was to much reduce the British prime minister's confidence in the Australian, something which was apparently 'never very high' to begin with.51

  South Africa's support was, however, now at last a subject of very real discussion and there were serious doubts. Fortunately Clark had not shared in the general sense of stupor that had blighted the spring and summer's consideration of this potentially calamitous matter. Since the memorandum's publication his comments made to London had actually given little reason to suppose that it could be assumed automatically that the government in the Union would blithely follow the British lead. In a telegram sent during the last week of August, the DO was again warned, only now even more urgently, that this was most definitely the case, particularly as support for the Nationalists had gained ground in the preceding weeks. The Nazi-Soviet pact, it was reported, could also have a considerable impact, creating the feeling that there had been 'mismanagement' on the part of the British government, and encouraging people into the arms of those who favoured neutrality.52 Clark's information had been consistently clear; under Hertzog's leadership there was no sense of 'common belligerency' among sizeable elements of local opinion. Many within the large Nationalist Afrikaans-speaking minority, of which the South African leader was one of the more moderate members, were openly sympathetic to German actions in Europe.53 Hertzog had stated his position publicly at the 1937 Imperial Conference and afterwards when he had rejected the idea of his country's involvement in any future European war but such warnings had not been heeded in London. Even in the hitherto all-confident FO, there were now those willing to admit that the situation had 'suddenly' become worrying.54

  As Smuts remained a firm supporter of the need to oppose Hitler all was not lost, however, and he quickly became the central figure in events that unfolded in Cape Town during the first days of September. Despite considerable tensions and even the apparent risk of civil war, he was able to force a parliamentary debate to resolve the impasse that had formed between him and Hertzog. Subsequently he would be criticized by the country's Nationalists for what they described as his ambiguity; he had actually been just as consistent as Hertzog in saying, from at least mid-1938 onwards, that it would be in the South African parliament where the matter would be decided, whether there would be war or neutrality. This view, as quickly became clear, was entirely at odds with that held by the prime minister, who believed that he did not need to consult parliament if he decided not to go to war.55 The English-speaking section of the population in any case strongly supported Smuts and his endorsement of Britain's new warnings to Germany and Hitler's obvious coveting of South West Africa, the neighbouring former German colony which South Africa had administered since 1915, helped weaken the Nationalists a little.56 What proved critical though was an administrative oversight whereby the South African Senate's life had inadvertently expired and a formal assembly was required for it to be renewed.

  Clark also supported and encouraged Smuts as much as he could but this essentially took the form of moral support and the message that Britain would back him all the way. Immediately following Britain's declaration of war he had received an urgent telegram listing the minimum British requirements from South Africa. This asked that there should be no declaration of neutrality and for an expression of general readiness to cooperate in practical measures and was an indication of just how worried Chamberlain was that Hertzog would keep out of the fight.57 Had this happened it would have been a huge propaganda victory for Hitler, one which could have had a potentially enormous adverse effect not just on the other Dominions and France but also on the United States and neutrals in general. Smuts neatly summed up the dilemma that faced him writing to a close friend afterwards: 'With us there is no enthusiasm for Poland, and less for Danzig and the corridor. Moreover neutrality is even more firmly held as faith than in the Middle West of USA. And on the other side (which happens to be my own) there is the difficulty to understand how in the long run we could possibly keep out of the fight.'58 Hadow had noted that 'in the end—with some hesitation—I expect Smuts' view to prevail', and events ultimately proved him to be correct.59 It was not moral ties that mattered, so much as strength of character and political experience and the South African was not found wanting when it counted most.60 In the highly charged atmosphere that surrounded the parliament building in Cape Town, it was Hertzog who made the critical mistake. Having failed to secure a majority in favour of remaining neutral he approached the Governor-General, Sir Patrick Duncan, himself a for
mer leading South Africa politician, and asked that he dissolve parliament. This Duncan refused to do as he believed Smuts had a majority of support still and he asked that he form a new government which he did.61 Although pleased that he had prevailed, the newly appointed South African prime minister was clearly also saddened by the outcome of the crisis and the implications it had for the country at large. For on the other side of the political spectrum, there remained an equally entrenched view that Smuts had betrayed the country and this meant the support he could offer Britain, at least in the opening stages of the war, would be of a highly limited nature.62

  Thus the Imperial coalition was complete once more and the Dominions again went to war in support of the British Empire and the policies of the government in London. None had been signatories to the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty or to the renewed guarantee of Belgian neutrality in the same year. Nor were any of them directly involved in the negotiations at Munich two years later. Still more recently, it has been seen that no Dominion minister had put his name to the Polish guarantee in March 1939 or to those given to Roumania and Greece in April 1939 and the later alliance with Turkey. Despite this the Dominions chose to fight and at the forefront was New Zealand.63 Because of the time difference the war telegram from the British government did not arrive until 11.45 pm, as a result of which confirmation of its support was not announced publicly until the early hours of the following day. It was therefore decided by the Cabinet in Wellington to time the proclamation so that retrospectively it should be deemed to have had effect from the exact moment when Britain had declared war. When it reached the House of Representatives, the motion approving and confirming the declaration of a state of war was passed without a dissenting voice and immediately afterwards everybody rose to sing the national anthem. In a public address the New Zealand Prime Minister Michael Joseph Savage famously confirmed that, 'we range ourselves without fear besides Britain. Where she goes, we go; where she stands, we stand.' Robert Menzies, the Australian prime minister, also pledged his unconditional support in similarly jingoistic fashion: 'one King, one cause, one flag' was the cry from Canberra. Canada followed a few days later after having discussed the matter within the parliament in Ottawa, although Mackenzie King had formally guaranteed Canada's support even before the British declaration of war. It is alleged Hitler burst out laughing when he heard South Africa had declared war against him and if he had known the full facts about political tensions in Cape Town he may well have laughed a little harder.64 Nonetheless it was an important fillip, and allowed for the creation of what could now be termed the Anglo-Dominion alliance.

  Despite its bland and often non-urgent tone, the conclusions of the often overlooked review of the Dominion's probable reaction to another European war were, in the event, almost entirely correct. The politicians and civil servants within Whitehall could therefore offer public expressions of relief that the sanctity of the Empire had remained intact in spite of the fact that, in many cases and only up until a few weeks beforehand, they had never anticipated the level of tension that would actually occur. Probably typical of the reaction of many was that of Batterbee, now ensconced in his official role in New Zealand. When he heard the announcement that war had been declared, one of those in the room with him described how he 'slumped sideways in his armchair, with his head bent and his hand over his eyes ... a broken man overwhelmed by the tragedy'.65 Like many of those in Whitehall, also hearing the news that British policy had failed, he had apparently remained hopeful to the last that there would not be another European war. Walking home at three in the morning in the knowledge that the British Empire was once again at war, he recalled how, at the outbreak of the First World War, it had been his responsibility to send the telegram to the Dominions advising them that the King had declared war on their behalf.66 They were all in the fight again but the manner in which the self-governing members had shown their support had in some cases been very different to how it had been done 25 years beforehand. Although Batterbee did not say so, the omens for the alliance's future unity already did not appear entirely optimistic.

  Controlling the Alliance

  The first week of September 1939 was a tumultuous and often hectic one within Whitehall.1 For the only recently confirmed Anglo-Dominion alliance the most significant development was the appointment of a new wartime secretary of state. Having sat on the back-benches since he resigned as foreign secretary the previous year, Anthony Eden was asked to replace Inskip. Chamberlain viewed the DO as a not 'very absorbing' department, but 'Honest Tom', as he was known by his barrister colleagues, had proven to be an almost entirely ineffective minister.2 Eden's decision to agree to take over from him and head what was clearly held to be a lowly political department was viewed, both at the time and subsequently, as a surprise.3 Even the new minister described his position as 'highly anomalous not to say humiliating' but he prospered in the role. Although it did not warrant a permanent seat in the War Cabinet, it was quickly announced that Eden would attend the majority of meetings of the 'inner sanctum' in order to ensure that the Dominions were properly supplied with information. Eden would even be allowed to raise Dominions related-issues when he saw fit. This understanding, confirmed at the very first War Cabinet meeting was no doubt, at least in part, designed to counter fears within official circles that to not do so would be 'a political mistake of the first order'.4

  There was no shortage of things to do for the new Dominions secretary. The war was the most obvious and pressing question and the practical challenge of how to turn this new alliance into an effective fighting force. Germany's attack on Poland quickly demonstrated the effectiveness of a new kind of warfare as the Blitzkrieg shattered the Poles' resistance in a matter of only weeks. During the autumn months much of Eden's time, and that of his departmental colleagues, was therefore spent talking with the British chiefs of staff about military matters. The situation was undeniably pretty dire: the Dominions had little to offer. The best contribution they could make was on the naval side with some destroyers, cruisers and a few other smaller vessels but there were no more than 20 of these in total. There were also a number of squadrons of fighters and bombers but these were largely obsolete in design and, once again, were relatively limited in number. Finally there were troops, although these were mostly in the form of local militias designed for rudimentary self-defence rather than the professional forces needed to deter the Wehrmacht juggernaut.5

  Nonetheless the Dominion governments were not short on enthusiasm and London was quickly approached for guidance; Canberra had asked the DO as early as the third day of the war what it could do to help.6 South Africa's involvement was still considered too uncertain to gauge at this stage, so the chiefs of staff in Whitehall ordered the readying of three separate papers outlining the assistance that would be welcomed from each of the other fighting Dominions. There were separate sections for Maritime, Air and Land, and each paper was broadly the same. It was asked that, if possible, major vessels should be turned over to the Admiralty, naval bases readied as Fleet harbours and steps taken to commence ship building, especially of smaller escorts and minesweepers. The chiefs of staff anticipated there would be difficulties in finding sufficient pilots and aircrews if intensive air operations developed in Western Europe.7 It was therefore suggested that instead of forming and training complete units for despatch overseas, the Dominions should concentrate solely on training to provide a pool of aircrew which could be incorporated into British units and then formed into national bodies when sufficient officers and personnel were ready. Finally, each Dominion was encouraged to provide an Expeditionary Force, although it was acknowledged that this might not be possible politically at the outset. This last point was critical as would become even more apparent just weeks later when the War Cabinet agreed to the Land Forces Committee's proposals that the British Army be built up to 55 divisions within two years. With the Dominions earmarked to provide a total of 14 divisions, this represented an enormous burden on their manpowe
r and resources.8 Speaking in the House of Representatives in Canberra, Menzies had announced that Australia would raise a force of 100,000 men but there was no date on when they would be sent.9 New Zealand also was training troops, albeit a much smaller force and, once again, it was not clear when they might embark.10

  Both announcements were, in fact, entirely in line with the advice issued by the chiefs of staff in London. While the Japanese position remained unclear Anzac troops were not to be despatched abroad, but should instead proceed with training within their own shores. This was not, however, what certain politicians in Westminster wanted to hear. The problem Eden faced was that a number of his colleagues seemed either ignorant or unwilling to face facts about just how little the Dominions could offer. Even when the information was put before them in considerable detail—a memorandum was presented to the War Cabinet in mid-October outlining the progress each was making—there remained a belief that more could be done. This was a view most prominently held by the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War. Drawing attention to how quickly similar contingents had reached Europe during the previous war, Winston Churchill argued that Dominion troops had to be in France by the opening of the anticipated 1940 spring campaign. Leslie Hore-Belisha concurred that there needed to be a much greater land contribution from the Dominions than they appeared to contemplate as there was a critical psychological value in getting Imperial manpower to the frontline. Both ministers felt strong pressure should be exerted on the governments concerned to encourage a greater response.11