Proceedings began on the first day of November 1939, with a description by Lord Halifax of the foreign political situation. His main points were that Britain should stand solidly behind France, defend key strategic positions in the East such as Aden and Singapore, while pursuing friendly relations with the Mediterranean countries and the United States of America. Questions followed and the British attempted to provide answers. Seven further meetings, each on a different theme, were conducted in exactly the same way. There were discussions on strategic policy during which British ministers encouraged the Dominions to despatch expeditionary forces. How to best conduct economic warfare against Germany, and the difficulties to be faced in maintaining current levels of merchant shipping involved in non-essential transportation provided other topics. The Chancellor chaired another in which the Dominions were asked to give all they could to help Britain overcome 'the terrible financial strain' it faced. There was also the meeting in which Churchill gave the Far Eastern security guarantee which followed on from a visit to inspect the Allied forces in France. The prevailing atmosphere throughout was generally good and no formal suggestions were offered by the delegates that there should be any change to existing arrangements.58 There were differing interpretations as to what this meant. Harold Nicolson, the renowned diplomat, politician and author, could only lament that the visiting ministers had 'come expecting to find the Mother of Parliaments armed like Britannia, [but] merely saw an old lady dozing over her knitting while her husband read the evening paper out loud'.59 The DO, however, was generally happy about the outcome. There was particular satisfaction gained from the fact that it had taken years during the First World War to convene a similar meeting, but on this occasion only two-and-a-half months had passed.
This is not to say that the experience was entirely free of alliance strains. Comments had been made within Whitehall prior to their arrival that each Dominion would come to the meeting not solely intent on listening passively to the lectures. This proved to be the case, the question of Britain's wheat purchases from Canada being one of the most contentious issues to be discussed on the fringes. The government in Ottawa insisted that all of its wheat be bought and at a price it set in order, it claimed, to protect both producers and consumers. This was interpreted in London as being based on purely commercial considerations and it would create an impression of 'hard bargaining between two parts of the Commonwealth'. It was consequently decided that the issue would be resolved at a special meeting involving the visiting Canadian delegation to discuss the wartime financial relationship. When this finally took place in the first week of December it was highly acrimonious. Simon, who was in the chair, found the Canadian argument to be totally unacceptable, so much so that any progress proved impossible.60 Similar problems existed with Australia, the Commonwealth representatives making it clear they were relying on considerable financial assistance from the United Kingdom government to fund their war effort.61 Simon saw this as being nothing more than subterfuge for Britain taking on Australia's pre-war debts. The British government ultimately would comply with both these sets of demands because it was felt there was little other option, but there was an all-too-obvious sense of shock at the tactics they had encountered. Chamberlain's experiences with the Dominion high commissioners during the first months of the war had left him 'very upset' and it can only be imagined what he felt now.62 Nonetheless, at least publicly, after this gathering the coalition was still publicly seen to be strong, indeed the spirit of the Empire was being extolled as stronger than ever. MacDonald, speaking now as colonial secretary, told his parliamentary colleagues as the meetings drew to a close that the Dominions 'clothed with every right and privilege of the sovereign nations which they are' had chosen freely to offer their support to Britain. They had leapt into the war not as 'slaves within the British Commonwealth' but as 'free men' with the evolutionary process of gaining their freedom now complete.63
It was against this backdrop that the First Canadian Division began to disembark at Scottish ports, the first contingent of Dominion troops to arrive on British shores. Within weeks both the First Echelon of the Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force and Australia's Sixth Division had also sailed from their respective home ports heading for the European war theatre. With the commitment of these troops, it was widely hoped within Whitehall that the Dominions would now develop a far greater interest in the war. The reality was that, preoccupied by domestic concerns and what some London-based commentators referred to as 'strong inferiority complexes', there still remained a clear lack of willingness to actively participate in the war's direction.64 Typical of this was Canada where, in January 1940, Mackenzie King had sensed the moment was propitious to capitalize on his earlier hard-worked intrigues and had called a general election. Privately Whitehall was alive with speculation that his defeat would be no bad thing, this in part fuelled by reports from the British high commissioner that the Canadian leader had 'dug his own [political] grave'.65 The authorities in South Africa were also still struggling to 'come into the war' as the bitterness created by the previous September's political crisis continued to prove divisive.66 Despite this, key figures in London had yet to grasp that their alliance partners' attention lay elsewhere. The War Cabinet was now focused on British strategy in Scandinavia, Churchill persisting with his long-standing proposals to send an Allied Expeditionary Force to secure the Norwegian port of Narvik. The Dominions' response when asked for their views about this idea and, specifically, whether a more vigorous approach was required, was guarded. Indeed they offered little other than the standard rejection of any move which might lead to a worsening of the existing situation.67 The high commissioners were much more openly critical; Bruce had long regarded any move into Norway or its surrounding waters to be 'extremely dangerous' and instead suggested a much more vigorous propaganda campaign be conducted.68 Eden said little to this, his attentions focused on proposals for a summer visit to Canada, but elsewhere in Whitehall there was widespread scorn among those who heard this particular contribution to the debate.69
The German invasion of Norway, in the first week of April 1940, surprised the War Cabinet and the Dominions who were mentally unprepared and still fixed largely on domestic concerns.70 Menzies, who was keenest that some form of direct assistance should be provided, had recently announced the successful conclusion of negotiations with Sir Earle Page putting to an end a spat that has soured relations between the two. As a result Page's Country Party would now join in a coalition with his Australia Party. This was obviously a positive step but the political situation nonetheless still remained fragile.71 In Canada Mackenzie King's general election victory had been assessed by the FO as leaving a leader in charge in Ottawa who would 'remain lukewarm about war measures which cannot be shown to be to [his] advantage'.72 Sydney Waterson, at South Africa House, was almost alone therefore in responding optimistically to the recent turn of events and he felt more cheerful because the coalition needed 'a kick in the pants before we really get down to a war'.73 As a military catastrophe unfolded on the far side of the North Sea, the most important question for him was the position of the Dominions in relation to the Supreme War Council. When this had been reconstituted in September 1939, as part of the machinery to coordinate the war effort, Eden's committee had recommended that the Dominion governments should not be invited to join. This decision had been initially accepted without complaint and this position might well have remained unchallenged. With representatives from both Poland and Norway admitted to a Council meeting in the last week of April, Waterson now pressed for a greater Dominion involvement. Naval and air units were actively engaged in operations and a small Canadian contingent had even been earmarked for despatch to Norway, albeit without Ottawa's knowledge. This made it difficult for the South African's request to be dismissed out of hand. The response, an invitation for the Dominion leaders to visit London later in the year, was a well-calculated move which effectively deferred any further discussion for the time being.74
As the situation worsened further, much of the apparent stupor that in recent weeks had affected those around the South African high commissioner, now vanished. In its place was a new sense of enthusiasm as the daily meetings chaired by Eden during the first days of May 1940 once again became the venue for tense discussion about the war's progress.75 This renewed interest was no bad thing for, if the German success against Norway had come as a shock to the Dominion governments, there was much worse to follow with the Blitzkrieg against the Low Countries and France. A major German attack was underway on the Continent and, with the Dominion leaders still seemingly as indecisive as ever, certainly in terms of their communications with London, it was left to the high commissioners much as had been the case the year before to question the British response. The Dominions secretary was asked to involve them much more closely in devising new policies to deal with the revised situation facing the Allies.76 While not unreceptive to their appeals, he was, however, himself distracted by the mounting speculation about changes at the highest level of the British Empire's political machine. The implications of the Norwegian disaster were now beginning to be felt in London and, as news of the worsening military situation grew, Waterson was certain that Chamberlain would have to be replaced. Like Massey he believed that Lord Halifax was the most likely next leader of the country.77 They were soon proven correct about a change taking place but the announcement of the identity of who would take charge was something of a surprise to the high commissioners and the Dominion prime ministers alike.
Standing Alone
48The German attack through the Low Countries and into France struck like a hammer at the Empire's heart, and with Britain's security now clearly imperilled a major overhaul of the government was unavoidable; and the man for the hour was Winston Churchill. His appointment, against the backdrop of May 1940's darkest days, was welcomed by the distant Dominion statesmen, although not in an always entirely convincing tone. This was a reflection of the complex nature of his relationship with the British Empire which, as with most aspects of his remarkable life, has been well examined. A sort of 'romantic Disraelianism' according to one view, at the age of just 22, while serving on the North West Frontier, he had pledged that he would devote his life to the maintenance 'of this great Empire of ours'. Some of his earliest political responsibilities had been within the CO where he opposed proposals that the Colonies should be given a voice in Imperial foreign policy-making.1 The possibility that he might return to the department in 1915 had left a fellow parliamentarian aghast, imploring the then prime minister not to agree to the move as the 'effect on the Dominions would be lamentable and possibly disastrous'. Churchill, he argued, had 'neither the temperament nor the manners to fit him for the post'.2 A frustrated Leopold Amery agreed, noting that his standard approach to conducting diplomacy within the Empire was to make sure that 'the Colonial PMs should be given a good time and sent away well banqueted, but empty-handed'.3
With his preference for the term 'British Empire' as opposed to 'British Commonwealth', his approach to the Dominion idea was entirely consistent with his wider Imperial beliefs. Pre-war he had written a regular column for The Sunday Despatch and in March 1940 an old piece he had written some time before was published. This appeared to detail his views neatly on the Empire:
Then there are the great questions of peace and war. In the main, in these matters the Dominions trust the Mother Country, which lies so close to Central Europe and bears the brunt of Imperial Defence. But still they do not mean to take orders from anyone. They mean to judge for themselves and join in any war of the Empire as volunteers and not pressed men. What then is the new Constitution of the Empire, written and unwritten alike? It is that the self-governing Dominions are in every respect equal partners with Great Britain and that they have the same direct relation to the Crown as we have. We have in fact a seven-fold monarchy, and King George VI is seven constitutional sovereigns rolled into one. Ministers of Great Britain are his advisers in no sense superior to those of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the others. Complete equality of status has been established. If the British Empire holds together it is only because it wants to hold together.4
Such apparently liberal views seemed at odds with some of his previous actions and comments. Despite a second term at the CO, this time as secretary of state, he had opposed the DO's creation from the outset, arguing that Dominion affairs required, at most 'the deliberate and reflective study of two or three selected and experienced officials'.5 He had subsequently gone on to raise serious objections about the Statute of Westminster, 'a clumsy attempt to remove imaginary grievances', which he feared would provide an undesirable precedent for India and Eire.6 In a letter to Lord Linlithgow a few years before the war, Churchill recognized the limits of his approach. 'Of course my ideal is narrow and limited. I want to see the British Empire preserved for a few more generations in its strength and splendour. Only the most prodigious exertions of British genius will achieve this result.'7 For one official within the DO these were 'quaint notions about the Commonwealth' and harked back to an Empire Churchill had known in his youth.8 One of the prime minister's wartime military advisers agreed, noting that he often forgot that his Dominion counterparts 'required handling rather differently ... from the way in which they were handled thirty years before'.9
Personal experience was always critical in terms of how Churchill viewed those around him, and his contact with the Dominions and their leaders had been sparse. South Africa was best placed as he had gained first-hand knowledge of the country and its people from his soldiering days during the Boer War. He had also subsequently developed a good relationship with Jan Smuts which endured to the latter's death and meant that Churchill was perhaps freer with his time and information with his fellow prime minister in Pretoria than with any other Dominion figure.10 The South African was a regular wartime correspondent and an important confidante, but he was not blind to the strengths and limitations that were a feature of his old friend's character. Hence his advice to Waterson that, 'Winston is an actor, an artist, and in this war he is playing his part and no one can stop him.'11 New Zealand was also generally well thought of, although he had never met any of its key politicians prior to the war. Aside from its staunch backing of Britain much of the reason for this can perhaps be put down to his admiration for General Bernard Freyberg who commanded the Dominion's forces. As with Smuts, here was another individual whose exploits during the First World War, when he had been awarded a Victoria Cross, ensured Churchill's lasting respect.12 The fact that he was British by birth might also have had some subliminal impact; as a Baron he would act post-war as the governor-general of his country.
As for the other Dominions, although he had first met Mackenzie King in London in November 1906 and had been a regular visitor to the North American continent, Churchill had little real knowledge of Canada. MacDonald, who would later go to Ottawa as wartime high commissioner, wrote that the prime minister's 'lingering Imperialist prejudices inclined him to regard Canada and the other Dominions as still partly dependent colonies, whose Ministers should accept their old British suzerain's views on all problems as the last word in wisdom'. They were no great friends, but whatever objectivity MacDonald might have lacked his assessment was based largely on what he saw. 'None of his personal messages to Mackenzie King were issued as actual orders to the Canadian prime minister, but sometimes the phraseology was couched in language which could imply some bidding.' This left Australia and with nothing else on which to base an assessment, Churchill's enduring belief in the Dominion's troops being 'brave men', which he had first gained during the Boer War and maintained, almost without exception, to his death, proved decisive. His only pre-war political contacts had come with Australian censure lambasting his Dardanelles strategy and later protests against his decision when Chancellor of the Exchequer to return Britain to the Gold Standard. This did little to endear the authorities in Canberra to him and he never really came close to grasping ju
st how different Australian politics was to that which he experienced daily in London. He had first noted Menzies when he had supported the Munich settlement and, although post-1945 the two would profess great friendship for one another, it was often conditional at best during those war years that they worked together.13
The London-based high commissioners had little to say about Churchill's appointment but the same was not true about the choice as new secretary of state. Eden had been something of a mixed bag in terms of impact and effect. His profile had brought with it regular press coverage and he was an undoubted dynamic force, taking every opportunity to visit the arriving Dominion troops, first in Scotland and then in Egypt. He had also been especially keen to get out to Canada where he could better consider Mackenzie King but the plans came to nothing.14 Waterson for one appears to have remained undecided about Eden's talents. After attending an April 1940 meeting of the Constitutional Club at which Eden spoke about Imperialism he confided to his diary: 'His delivery is poor—strangely boyish and likeable but greatly unlike what [Benjamin] Disraeli could have done with the subject ... But he is the stuff of which Englishmen like their political leaders to be made: modest, sincere and well-bred. He couldn't do a rotten thing if he tried and he has courage and an indignation of which he is half ashamed.' Nonetheless his conclusion had been that he was 'not ruthless or tough enough for war', a view generally shared by his Australian counterpart.15 The Dominions secretary's subsequent departure brought with it a more generous private epitaph from South Africa House, expressions of sorrow and the confidence that they were saying farewell to a future peacetime leader of the country. Eden himself, despite his initial reluctance at being sent to what he had feared would be a backwater, claimed to be 'genuinely sorry to leave' for the WO, although he was grateful that he no longer would have to endure 'Bruce's daily catechism'.16
Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War Page 7