It took three days to find his replacement. Churchill's political position was far from secure and it meant that he had to produce a balanced Cabinet acceptable to those figures within his party who continued to doubt his abilities. Eden's post was first therefore offered to Oliver Stanley, but in such a way that it was clear the country's new leader doubted his political abilities. As the unfortunate Stanley responded, it would be better for all concerned if he declined the offer, and this he duly did.17 Later he confided to a fellow MP that he had in any case seen how Churchill had treated Eden and concluded that it would be impossible to work with him.18 The prime minister's second choice was Inskip, now titled Lord Caldecote. Even to some of the staff at No. 10 he was a figure of fun, comparable to the barrage balloon now parked on Horse Guards Parade which, because of its rotund nature, was quickly christened 'Tinskip'.19 His approach to ministerial life apparently even provoked some consternation among his own staff who found it generally impossible to know what he was going to say until he had actually stood up and spoken. This was because his speeches were generally dictated about an hour previous to delivery but it was not always possible to disturb him then, presumably, from his slumbers.20
Neither Bruce nor Massey saw any cause for amusement and they educated Waterson, who had not been there to witness it first-hand, on his pre-war performance. Among the worst incidents they highlighted was in April 1939 during the Prague crisis when 'the door mouse [sic]', as he was known, had apparently fallen asleep while sitting next to Chamberlain at a meeting. The South African was a quick leaner and developed a special dislike for the returning minister, 'a charming old man, brave and tenacious of character but legal minded and stereotyped to a degree' who delivered bad news 'like a newspaper reporter'. He was 'fatuous' and 'ineffective' and 'an insult to the Dominions as Secretary of State'. The Canadian high commissioner claimed not to dislike Caldecote personally, but he was also not happy that the senior DO role should be given as 'a consolation prize' to 'a second rate politician' but 'a good Party man'. Massey was prepared to admit, following the first meeting that 'he was more alert and more on the job than we had feared', so much so that he was willing to give him another chance. His deputy, Pearson, nonetheless remained sure that the appointment was the clearest of indications as to how the Dominions' portfolio was viewed within the Cabinet. Bruce was generally much angrier, complaining to Canberra that 'a discarded Lord Chancellor' had been appointed, a politician who 'did not possess the personality or drive necessary to put over Dominion views' and did not have 'a receptive or constructive mind'. MacDonald or the elderly Lloyd George would both have been much better appointments in his view.21
The business of war, now a very real one in which the German menace was no longer merely a matter of speculation, brought with it remarkably few changes in terms of how the administrative machinery of the alliance functioned. There was still considerable concern among the more junior partners about the paucity of information they were receiving and demands that improvements be made. The high commissioners complained about the 'volume and quality of the DW telegrams' but the FO remained resistant to letting them see more arguing that it would be folly to send the Dominions 'every alarmist rumour that we may receive' but the DO was strident with its view that more needed to be done.22 There was a growing feeling, both within the department and in the overseas high commissions, that too little rather than too much was being sent, and that more was needed both of a better quality and not out of date.23 Soothing words were soon exchanged between the two departments but it was regretfully understood within the DO's ranks that the FO would continue to tightly control the distribution of information.24 Simply put, Cadogan could not be moved from his view that nothing should be sent that might perplex the Dominions or, much worse, 'leave them to infer that we are perplexed'.25
Menzies' complaints about the lack of detail contained within the reviews of Allied operations and strategy being sent to him showed that there clearly remained obvious shortcomings.26 News that the French position might soon collapse led the Australian leader to conclude this must have been a sudden development as he had received nothing beforehand to suggest that this could happen. Churchill did now warn his Dominion counterparts of the possibility of 'an early heavy attack' but he still remained reluctant to inform them of the seriousness of the situation in France.27 And even this was only done after Chamberlain, now Lord President of the Council, had explicitly raised the point, enquiring in front of the entire War Cabinet what information could be given to the Dominion governments. The news brought renewed messages of Dominion support. Menzies pledged 'the whole of the Commonwealth's resources to victory'. New Zealand's leader, Peter Fraser, who had replaced Savage following his recent death, also telegraphed to London with a commitment to fight to the last 'come what may'. Mackenzie King authorised the despatch of four destroyers to Britain and in another sign of support for the cause the Canadian Communist Party was outlawed 'amid a rush of Dominion feeling against Red quislings'. The South African response was more reflective, Smuts recognizing France's likely denouement would mean that the British Commonwealth would be left alone.28
Within Whitehall the increased tempo of the war was beginning to tell, most noticeably in the DO. Aside from its general day-to-day responsibilities and almost hourly requests from the Antipodean Dominions for strategic appreciations of the situation, there were new tasks for the department to handle, such as finalizing what might happen were an invasion to take place.29 For at least one of the British high commissioners serving in the Dominions, the 'badly overworked department' seemed to be suffering from 'a want of correlation'.30 With Lord Halifax continuing to extol the merits of a possible negotiated settlement with Germany, Menzies joined in beginning what would prove to be the first of three attempts made by him to initiate a 'peace' initiative involving the United States.31 The position was further complicated by the WO's confirmation that Italy would soon enter the war on Germany's side.32 This carried wide strategic considerations both for Britain's Middle East and Far East positions.33 Constitutional concerns also had to be taken into account in light of the brush with neutrality in Cape Town the previous year with the DO's legal experts rushing to revise the procedure by which the Dominions might declare war.34
For the Dominions' representatives based in London, their attention remained firmly focused on the implications of France's demise. Their anger had not abated nor had their belief that they were being ignored and under-utilized. So meagre did they believe the information from the official channels to be that they had even taken to attending the Canadian Military Headquarters on a daily basis where it was believed they could better track developments. Bruce thought it 'criminal' that the War Cabinet had failed to fully consider the implications of a possible French collapse, leaving him with 'a most gloomy view of British prospects'. The seven-page note which he produced and sent to the already over-worked Churchill proposing an international conference to arrange a peace settlement was, not surprisingly, very poorly received.35 Following the British prime minister's visit to the front in mid-June and his report back that the French had fallen back on 'what must be regarded as their last line', the Australian high commissioner and his colleagues emboldened themselves to make a daring move.36 They had become aware that the chiefs of staff had in fact prepared reports on how to respond to France's surrender and the request was made that they be allowed to read them. It was Caldecote who delivered this to the War Cabinet, warning his colleagues that the Dominion governments 'must be treated as full partners and their assent must not be taken for granted'. Two days later the documents were made available for inspection, but they did not make for pleasant reading as within them the degree to which British forces could be sent to the Far East immediately following a Japanese attack was questioned. Churchill was also clearly unhappy about having been made to release the reports and his displeasure would be made clear in his subsequent dealings with the high commissioners.
Menzies a
ppeared to be badly unnerved by the knowledge of the revised British military position. Earlier in the year Britain's official figure in Canberra had told the DO the Australian had 'no more backbone than a jellyfish' and this now seemed to be much more obvious to those watching from London. His insistence that, should Hitler suggest terms on which he would be prepared to conclude peace with the Allies the United States be approached for guidance, 'no matter what form it might take', was a cause of some dismay. Twenty-four hours later, however, in a note to his high commissioner in London, he stated that he was willing to follow Britain 'whatever sacrifice victory may demand'. The news that in any Franco-German peace agreement French possessions in the Pacific might be allotted to Japan had him once again desperately looking towards Washington for assistance. The DO could do little to calm him beyond thank him for his comments and pass on a report prepared by the FO which discounted the idea that the German leader would submit a renewed peace proposal at this time. A message, written in Churchill's name, was also prepared which was intended to instil in the Australian leader some greater measure of resolve.37 Canberra's reaction was all in marked contrast to the reassurances coming out of Wellington where the government officially renewed its pledge of 'every form of assistance within our power'. The authorities in London were informed discretely, however, that there had been considerable political dismay that the long-standing premise of British assistance was now no longer guaranteed. The DO promised that there would be a review were the position in the Far East to become 'threatening' and this seemed to provide some measure of comfort.38 Indeed the New Zealanders now seemed determined on a public display of its loyalty to Britain. An offer to send a special mission to Washington to try and secure support was politely declined in the face of FO concerns that this would be seized upon by isolationists on the other side of the Atlantic.39
Smuts' encouraging comments also continued to provide considerable comfort to Churchill.40 With preparations to repel the now anticipated German invasion intensifying, he felt that there were pressing matters to be considered elsewhere. This included Operation Catapult, the 'necessary' attack against the French fleet anchored at Oran. Carried out by the Royal Navy in the first week of July, it was welcome by the South African leader as being both an end to France's agony and the beginning of efforts to restore it and its 'sick people' through some much-needed and no doubt British-administered 'moral nursing'.41 This significant military operation and Churchill's offer of a union with France made the month before were not revealed to the respective Dominion governments in advance, despite the much wider political ramifications both held. The prime minister, during his celebrated 'Finest Hour' speech had told the House of Commons the opposite. The self-governing Dominions were 'absolutely devoted to the ancient Motherland' but more to the point, he claimed that they were being kept fully informed of events.42 In both cases it had been true that very few British officials had been informed in advance but the incredulity over these claims within the DO was serious and Inskip allegedly threatened to resign in protest.43 The reason behind his anger was well put by one of the department's most capable members.
It would be impossible for any of the Dominions to hide the fact that they had not been contacted in advance, leaving them insulted and humiliated in their home parliaments, as such omissions offered the clearest proof 'that so called Dominion autonomy was a mockery'.44 These decisions were in fact for the most part accepted within the Dominion capitals with good grace, it being understood that the speed at which events were developing had not always allowed for any prior forewarning of British action.
Anxieties worsened either side of the Tasman, however, with closer study of the chiefs of staff 'certain eventuality' reports assessing the impact of France's surrender. Adding to the mounting tension were the reports of Japanese demands made at the end of June 1940 for the closure of the Burma Road, the only route still open to supply the Chinese government in Chungking. Sir Robert Craigie, Britain's ambassador in Tokyo, warned that war was probable unless this was carried out. The British military's chiefs concurred that failure to comply could only result in further disaster at this point and Menzies vehemently agreed.45 Batterbee, reading the correspondence in Wellington, found it tragic that 'egged on by Bruce' Australia's leader should adopt 'so weak and defeatist an attitude'; his counterpart in Canberra could meanwhile only despair that 'Australia was still fast asleep' in terms of its war effort.46 The high commissioners in London were, however, of a similar mind to Menzies, urging 'retreat and concessions' from the DO and making daily representations to Inskip that some form of settlement should be reached. Bruce even argued that there could be 'full and frank negotiations' with the Soviets but Whitehall's assurances that the Japanese authorities were likely to accept a proposal of a three month closure appeared to calm some of the worst fears.47
During the summer of 1940 the Dominion representatives—Jordan noticeable by his continuing absences—had continued to make every effort to secure a more prominent role in the direction of policy.48 Only hours after Marshal Petain, France's third leader in as many months, had signed the armistice with Germany, Halifax had been obliged to apologize for not being able to see two of them.49 Caldecote had, at the same time, put in a request that Churchill himself might discuss recent events with them.50 This was approved but in almost the same breath the prime minister informed his Dominions secretary that he would subsequently only be required to attend the War Cabinet on just two days a week, when the chiefs of staff also visited. This drew an astonished Waterson to bitterly complain that 'the PM clearly did not understand the part the high commissioners were playing'.51 In late July Churchill finally met with the group for an hour-long discussion devoted entirely to events in the Far East. He told them that the agreement over the Burma Road had been made to gain time in the hope that a stronger American stance would emerge in the Pacific in the interim. He could also refer to Catapult which had freed British ships to proceed east for the protection of Australian waters should they be needed.52 The South African attendee seemed sufficiently impressed by the encounter to note privately that their host was 'the man for the moment', his approach 'reflecting the purpose and spirit of the people'; it was clear though that he still did not really like him.53 The Dominion leaders were less easily persuaded, and Churchill was warned that neither Australia nor New Zealand would permit the imminent despatch of troop convoys intended for the Middle East unless they were first supplied with a detailed Far Eastern appreciation.54 The next day Halifax met again with the Dominion high commissioners to talk at length about the War Cabinet's most recent discussions, outlining what alternatives he felt existed in the Far East.55 Following this and the promise that an appreciation of the situation would be sent to the Dominion capitals in early August, even Bruce was willing to say that Australia would now be prepared to support 'a policy of standing up to Japan', a remarkable change in light of some of his earlier comments.56
Standing in front of the House of Lords in mid-August 1940, Caldecote outlined how the war was progressing just three days after the first Imperial defeat and the evacuation of the garrison of British Somaliland in the face of an overwhelming Italian invading force.57 He told his peers that there had been many uncertainties at the start of the conflict but one of them was not the 'solidarity of the free peoples of the British Empire'. Referring to Churchill's reference to blood and toil, tears and sweat, the same, he said, was true of the Commonwealth which had 'counted the cost and already paid part of the price'. With the prime minister travelling to meet with President Franklin Roosevelt, he also took this opportunity to inform the high commissioners that he intended to be more forceful in the future where the Dominions' interests were concerned. Churchill had recently formed a 'Ministerial Committee on the Middle East' chaired by Eden, the secretary of state for war, and assisted by Amery, now secretary of state for India, and Lord Lloyd, the secretary of states for the colonies.58 At the end of July this had invited Australia and New Zealand to
deploy any forces they could spare to the Middle East, but Inskip resolved that more needed to be done. Doubts persisted about whether their respective governments had been informed in advance or not about the formation of the committee and what priority would be applied to deciding upon requirements for equipment. But it was with an almost self-congratulatory tone that the high commissioners subsequently noted that Egypt was going to become the focus of attention for Australian and New Zealand forces.59 What they did not know was that the debate about whether Australian troops already garrisoned in Britain should be despatched to the Middle East or not would actually continue at the highest levels long into the following month.60
Events surrounding Operation Menace, the attempt to seize the West African port of Dakar from Vichy French control, gave a good indication of how the alliance was actually operating. With this announcement all of the Dominions were deeply concerned about the lack of information they had received; the first reference given to them only came after the raid had failed.61 Churchill would later admit that he had kept Smuts alone informed and even this only amounted to a single personal telegram containing a few details.62 When the other prime ministers were finally told of the full events and, specifically, the degree to which the enterprise had proven to be a great failure, there was a strong reaction. This was most pointed from Menzies even though the political ramifications of the aborted raid appearing to be less damaging for him than for his counterparts in Canada or the Union of South Africa. While Ottawa feared what reaction the attack on French territory and shipping would produce in Quebec and Smuts was worried about emphasizing the strategic value of Dakar to the enemy, Australia could claim few such strategic concerns. The cruiser HMAS Australia had, however, been used without his being informed in advance and this was sufficient cause for him to at once fly into a fury, issuing criticisms which Churchill took as being a personal attack.63 Waterson recorded that the raid had been 'an even more grisly failure than one thought', noting that 'the whole thing bears the stamp of WSC, a good idea badly executed'.64 Fortunately there was a good deal of 'damage control' administered by the DO, supported in this instance by Bruce, and this helped ensure that the recriminations quickly subsided.65 By the beginning of October the matter appeared forgotten, the final note from Churchill to his Australian counterpart asking that he be forgiven 'if I responded too controversially to what I thought was somewhat severe criticism'.66
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