Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War

by Andrew Stewart

  The Private Anzac Club

  It has been highlighted the degree to which 1944 was the year when both Australia and New Zealand made it clear that, while they still believed strongly in the idea of Commonwealth unity, they would no longer blithely accept the British view of the post-war security system.1 The Australian-New Zealand Agreement signed at Canberra in January of that year was certainly the first visible indication of some sense of devolution towards greater regional control. The first Cairo Conference, held the November before and attended by Churchill, Roosevelt and the Nationalist Chinese leader Chaing Kai-shek, is often pointed to as the catalyst for the Tasman Dominions thinking on post-war organization. Neither was consulted about decisions that were reached and each of them only learned from the official communiqué that Japan was to be stripped of all of the islands it had seized in the Pacific. This and other decisions such as the announcement that Korea would become free and independent in due course led them both to worry that post-war settlements would be concluded without them, despite their military contributions and their interests in the region.2 From the High Commission in Canberra, Ronnie Cross, had written back to London in December 1942 warning that he was hearing 'ambitious ideas' about Australia's future role in the South-West Pacific and South Asia.3 At this stage this even extended to the Commonwealth being involved in the post-war administration of the Netherlands East Indies but the Dutch reaction had been such that this was dropped. This had not stopped Evatt from developing similar themes throughout the year. His goal was that Australia would take a far greater role up to and including the development of security zones which would involve the trusteeship of Pacific islands. Within the British High Commission this was seen as an attempt by Evatt to 'achieve something of historical significance and value with which his name would be particularly identified'. But, at the same time, it was wondered whether the minister's ambition 'had not somewhat overwhelmed his sense of proportion'. Highlighting the junior nature of Australia in terms of its political development there were said to be advantages that could be reaped by 'boys' which 'would prove impossible if the maternal partner were consulted'. Evatt was known to want to take over the administration of the British Solomons and it was not doubted that he had 'a predatory eye towards other islands not in British possession'.

  As Cross had warned shortly after his arrival in Canberra, while there were few real doubts about the strength of the cultural bonds, it remained more difficult to judge wartime political ties with Australia. One post-war view held that it needed to be regarded not so much as an alliance as 'a multi-purpose and adjustable but enduring entente cordial' in which shared sentiments, common culture and personal affection each had a part to play.4 At the time though, these were not always that transparent on both sides. A long-serving member of the DO, Walter Hankinson, had been in Australia on two previous occasions, first in a fairly junior capacity in 1931 and then again four years later as acting high commissioner before returning once more in a wartime deputy role. He found himself asked on numerous occasions, as a self-avowed 'Aussie-phile', what he thought of his friends and their sometimes apparently petulant attitude towards Britain and the Empire. Although he had actually been back in London during the angriest exchanges he had more than enough knowledge of the relationship to offer an informed opinion. As he wrote some years later, his response was, apparently, always the same, answering the leading question with a question of his own. 'Had my questioner ever met a man who had suddenly had all the things he fervently believed in and on which he based his life, swept away one by one in exorable succession? Such a man said many things in his bitterness which he did not really mean and which, in due time when his hurt was healed, he regretted.'5 Some of the difficulties were put down to the high commissioner who often struggled ever since his initial gaffe. Within the nascent Department of External Affairs there was a hostile view towards him; Cross saw his role to be not just an ordinary diplomat but 'a guide and mentor with whom the colonials should seek to have consultation'.6 In the process, however, he managed to develop a previously unimagined level of cordiality with Curtin based on 'intimacy, understanding and friendship' and a long despatch sent back to the DO in December 1943 contained a glowing account of the recent parliamentary session and his performance. This led Cranborne, who had been re-appointed as Dominions secretary a few months before, to reaffirm his growing respect for the Australian leader, 'a man of character and good sense', and he was clear that everything possible should be done to work with him and better gain his confidence.7 There continued to be some disagreements but Cross considered these largely a thing of the past. The triumph at El Alamein had helped greatly, 'a victory for British arms' that he believed now enabled the Australian public to 'exalt the fair name of United Kingdom forces'.

  The relationship with New Zealand was much more uncomplicated, particularly once it became clear that there was no actual military threat from the Japanese.8 Batterbee's great fear, from shortly after his arrival in Wellington in February 1939, was American motives in the Pacific region. Remote from the European war, he continued to see the invidious growth of American influence all around him. He even felt one reason why New Zealand had not been fully geared for war when Japan attacked was the belief that existed locally that Washington would come to its aid in the event of an invasion. His anxiety had remained throughout 1943, warning the DO that there was a growing sentiment in the local press that responsibility for the defence of Australia and New Zealand had been 'abdicated' in favour of the United States.9 His fears waned soon thereafter as it became more obvious that the initial 'outburst of emotion' that had greeted the arrival of American troops had been replaced by something else. It was the visitors themselves who were responsible with their 'natural habit of bragging and, I am sorry to have to add, the anti-British talk of many of their officers and men'. In spite of an apparently reckless habit of 'flinging their money about' they soon began to alienate the staunchly pro-Empire locals. The high commissioner also remained a little concerned about the effort and application being shown by his Dominion. He still noted that Christmas 1943 had seen 'Wellington close down for a fortnight and there was a holiday air everywhere'. As he went on: 'It is generally the habit to regard New Zealand as the good boy of the Commonwealth family, but even the best of boys is not perfect and it may well be that from time to time visitors from the United Kingdom report when they get home that New Zealand is not making as much of a total war effort as is commonly understood.'10 He put this in context, however, as the general tone of his long report was almost entirely supportive of the New Zealand effort and he was full of praise for the Dominion's fighting record. That parliament in Wellington had unanimously declined to press for the return of the New Zealand Division from the Middle East the previous year, when Australian forces had all been withdrawn to the Pacific, had been just another instance of the resolute support; out of a total of 43,500 men sent to the Middle East by the late autumn of 1942, 18,500 were dead, wounded or captured.11

  The British government had first heard, indirectly, at the end of November 1943 that there were Australian plans afoot to hold some form of a conference, and that an invitation had been sent to Wellington. The following month saw an official announcement by Evatt confirming that Fraser would visit Canberra in the near future and discussions would be held between the two countries. Still, however, the authorities in London were given little idea as to what it was intended to discuss. It had been suggested to Cross that the conference was not being organized with serious policy goals in mind. Curtin told him in early December that there were local matters that required settlement, such as New Zealand's making of Army boots for American troops and the resulting shortage of hides this was creating across the Tasman. This proved to be 'misleading' yet, as the high commissioner concluded, 'it was quite possible that the prime minister in mid-December knew next to nothing of what Evatt was planning'. It was also clear that firm instructions had been given by someone in Canberra that Briti
sh officials were to be given no prior information about what was to be discussed. This order, it was concluded, had been down to Evatt in the first instance with Curtin supporting the strategy once he had discovered the extent of the conference's remit.12 As a result, Cross and his staff in Canberra proved unable to discover even the broad subjects that it was intended to discuss. Attending meetings Britain's token observer remained entirely in the dark, so much so that he did not even know there was to be a formal agreement signed until two days before it took place.

  The reality was that Curtin saw it as a far-reaching gathering, to consider wartime lessons and plan strategies for the future. There were two primary goals to be achieved by those present: demonstrate that it would be Australia and New Zealand who would take the lead in guaranteeing regional security and in the process enhance the international standing of both of them. Fraser agreed but clearly viewed it far more as an opportunity to demonstrate that the two Dominions would have agreed permanent principles of cooperation in the post-war world thereby avoiding repetitions of the instances during the war where the Canberra government had 'squealed'. A joint statement recorded that both countries saw their future security based around an island screen which would need to be suitably developed to make full use of sea and air power. It was recognized that this could only be done in concert with other regional powers; aside from the resources of the British Empire, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United States and France were all mentioned at some stage.13

  The outcome of the meeting was the Anzac Pact, signed at the same table at which, in 1900, Queen Victoria had given her royal assent to a Constitution for Australia. The Time correspondent saw this new document as a possible 'Charter of the Southwest Pacific', a common foreign policy produced while London 'dallied' which offered a translation of the proposed Smuts doctrine into 'a dynamic program [sic]'.14 It certainly appeared to provide for closer consultation on matters of common interest, with a proposed full exchange of information and measures to develop cooperation for defence. These included joint planning and the organization of equipment as well as training of the Dominions' armed forces based on a common doctrine. In short, the two governments were agreeing to speak with one voice in the Pacific and to coordinate both their war effort and, implicitly, their post-war security. They reaffirmed their desire to be involved in the membership and planning of the proposed United Nations organization, reference to which had been made in the October 1943 Moscow Declaration. Within this framework it was proposed that there would be a regional defence zone comprising the South and South West Pacific Areas. Until such time as this could be established they were willing to take on its management.15 The two were also opposed to any final settlement until hostilities with all the Axis powers had been concluded. Their requested representation on all armistice planning was meant not just for those discussions relating to Japan but to all the other Axis powers as well. Nor would they accept any change in the control or sovereignty of Pacific islands or enemy held territory in the Pacific without their involvement in the negotiations. The two governments declared that the wartime construction of bases by another power—in other words the United States—gave no basis for territorial claims after the war. In a meeting with Cross on the first night of the conference, Evatt indicated that it had been vital for the two Dominions to hold talks in the face of potential American expansion into the Pacific.16 This anxiety was again repeated a week later as being the primary motivation.17 Added to this was the remark that the British government tended to concede too easily to proposals made in Washington; the comments made at the meeting were intended to forestall anything similar taking place which might have an effect on the Pacific region. In short, as Evatt told Cross, 'it needed saying. You couldn't say it. We could.' And with this in mind Australia took the initiative in calling for an all-power conference to be held in Canberra to discuss Pacific security, post-war development and native welfare, after the gathering of the Dominion prime ministers in London.

  Although there had been no British delegate present at the Canberra meetings one of the members of the New Zealand Department of External Affairs gave a fulsome account of what had happened to his friend in the High Commission in Wellington.18 His record noted that

  the conditions in which the conference opened were typical of the un-businesslike atmosphere that pervaded the whole proceedings. Mr Curtin, after keeping the representatives waiting for some time in the appointed committee room, thought on his arrival that the room was too small and insisted on the company adjourning to the House of Representatives, where, however, it was found that the lights had been removed for cleaning. The lights could not be restored for some time and the conference began an hour later. From that point onwards the proceedings were extremely rushed, and many of the subjects received practically no consideration. Dr Evatt dominated his colleagues, who took little part, and the agreement may be regarded as his handiwork.

  According to this Curtin was apparently not much interested, his mind focused on domestic matters, while Evatt was looking 'to make a splash' that would bring glory both to him and the department he led. The British official, having heard the account, thought Evatt's main idea was 'the putting of Australia on the map as an independent power'. He also thought that relations between these two most senior figures were not good, 'there is a tendency for them to work in watertight compartments', and this, in his view, was an important factor in explaining recent events. This view was apparently shared by other British officials based in the Australian capital. They were reported by another New Zealand observer as affecting to be amused by the agreement: 'two of the children playing amongst themselves' requiring 'adult supervision'.19 As Cross put it, writing to London in January 1944, 'it was Dr Evatt who developed and led the chorus of snarls that emanated daily to the papers from ministers' press conferences, which in time became accompanied by another note, a note of superior wisdom—after the event'.20 Batterbee also had been able to report back to London the results of a 'long and frank talk' with Fraser that had taken place immediately following his return back to Wellington. This confirmed that the New Zealand ministers had been rushed by Evatt and Fraser had been uncomfortable with, and even reluctant to agree to, the language used in the final document. The official secretary in the High Commission had dubbed it 'the Anzaxis' but his boss had concluded that there was in fact no anti-British intention, 'if it was anti-anything, it was anti-American'.21 And while the apparent American determination to retain New Caledonia at the end of the war was the basis for many of the shared concerns that existed within the two Dominions the New Zealand leader was worried in terms of how Washington might react.

  Using these accounts, Cranborne was able to produce a detailed summary for his Cabinet colleagues of the background to the agreement and the main terms it entailed. He also outlined his concerns. He reiterated the degree to which there had been little prior knowledge of the conference. Indeed it had been thought that it was the Dominions' intention merely to hold 'mutual consultation' of a preliminary character prior to talking with the British authorities more formally. In fact there had been no references at all to there being future discussions with the British government on these subjects. There were, however, potentially 'some useful results'. The fact that there should now have been a public statement made by the Dominions highlighting the significance of Pacific defence was valuable as it could have implications for post-war arrangements. In addition, the idea of regional collaboration in the Pacific was one that had been already raised publicly in Whitehall. And, of course, the fact that Australia and New Zealand were seen to be enjoying closer cooperation was 'all to the good'. Aside from the other positives and negatives he also drew his colleagues' attention to another section of the agreement in which the two governments asked for representation at the highest level on all armistice planning and executive bodies. This, he thought, might lead to problems as recognizing such claims could have an 'awkward' effect in regard to discussions over the United N
ations.22 London was also particularly disturbed at the suggestion that an early conference should be called, termed as a South Pacific Regional Commission, to discuss Pacific security issues involving all those countries with territorial interests in the region.

  The official response sent by the DO to both the Dominion governments contained mixed messages. On the one hand there was some praise for the strengthening of relations between the two and platitudes about them having taken such a bold step. There were also lots of concerned references about the United States which was clearly central to most of the matters raised.23 In essence it was asked that all of the matters of substance, particularly the call for the creation of a South Seas Regional Council, be held in abeyance to be discussed at the prime ministers' conference which was due to be held in London in a few months’ time. In the DO's eyes this meant Canada and South Africa could be included in the discussions and they could probably be counted upon to scupper the worst elements of the Australian plan. Evatt was disappointed at the reaction. He felt that there was collusion between Washington and London in their rejections of his call for an international conference and hoped that the British view might come to recognize that time was of the essence.24 He told Cross that it was necessary to 'stake a claim' and argued that it might have been embarrassing to Britain to have been consulted in advance. Of course what he did not say was what both parties knew full well, that if London had been told of the plan in advance, considerable embarrassment would have come from its almost certainly negative reaction. Evatt's anger still seems to have been based as much on the outcome of the Cairo Conference, Cross reporting that the concessions made to China at this meeting between the Allied leaders the previous year still 'rankled'; whether it was the nature of the concessions or the fact that there had been no prior consultation with Canberra was not so clear.