Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War

by Andrew Stewart

  There was, however, some anger in Wellington at what was considered to be the high commissioner's unnecessary interfering and his efforts to change the wording of the final resolution.65 Alister McIntosh was secretary of the War Cabinet and also secretary of the new Department of External Affairs. He noted that New Zealand had been 'soundly slapped on the wrist'; a British friend who had been the official secretary in Wellington, but was now back at the DO, wrote to him referring to it as 'a fairly hefty clout on the ear'. The recipient did not, however, object as he thought the admonishment was deserving and told the same to his former boss Berendsen, who was just settling in as the New Zealand minister in Washington. As he told him, if Britain had published something similar without prior consultation, he was pretty certain that Australia, at the very least, 'would have up and left the Empire, and the scream would have been heard all the way to Whitehall without benefit of submarine cable or wireless aerial'. He thought the DO faced an 'impossible job' and that New Zealand was not entirely without blame in terms of what had happened.66

  The quarrel was ultimately resolved, but the message coming out of the discussions could not be so easily ignored, containing as it did an inexorable movement away from London and the pre-war Imperial system.67 One view, promoted by a renowned post-war Australian historian, saw it as 'not an aberration in Australian foreign policy but its logical outcome'. A former member of the Department of External Affairs described it as an 'explosive protest' challenging the Anglo-American domination of power.68 At the time two articles were printed in the London Evening Standard in January 1944 just after the initial announcement of the agreement that had been signed at Canberra. The author of these, the Rhodes Professor of Imperial History at London University, asked his readership whether the British Commonwealth could be kept together at the war's end. He provided a detailed review of how this grouping had historically operated, its basis being 'the principle of voluntary collaboration'. It went on to provide a critique of Curtin's proposals of the previous year for a standing Empire Council and offer a more detailed account of the Anzac Pact and what it meant for the Empire. His conclusion was to refer to Halifax's speech, given just days before, and the unavoidable fact that the in the post-war world only a Commonwealth speaking with one 'united, vital and coherent' voice could hope to be heard. Speaking to a meeting of the Royal Empire Society the learned Professor Harlow went still further. He told his audience that there existed 'a most appalling ignorance' about the Dominion, a level of ignorance which terrified him. He might not have said explicitly but it had become undeniably clear. As Whitehall's attention focused on a long-anticipated meeting of the Dominion leaders to be held in London, the British Commonwealth's unique development had reached a critical stage.69

  A Family Council

  In May 1944 the various prime ministers from the Dominions finally assembled at the centre of the British Empire to meet face-to-face, discuss the war's progress and begin considering how the post-war world might look. This was the first time in seven years that such an assembly had taken place and it would be the only time during the entire global conflict that all of them would be gathered together in one room. As has been seen, for a variety of reasons some of the central figures involved were previously unable or unwilling to attend such a formal event, one that carried memories of meetings of the last war and discussions not merely of Imperial unity but of sacrifice of power. The idea that such a meeting might take place had been put forward almost immediately the war had started but it had taken this long to organize and, in the process, proven to be one of the most contentious questions that had faced the Anglo-Dominion coalition. The first detailed proposal had come in the spring of 1940 but it contained a reference to it being an Imperial War Conference; Mackenzie King, the most suspicious of the group, objected and with Smuts, in any case, unable to attend the idea was dropped. Menzies' efforts in the summer of 1941 had seen the proposal revived, first in the June and then in the August, but these ultimately proved disastrous for the Australian.1 With each of the leaders preoccupied during the following year's military and political turmoil, it would not be until 1943 that any really serious discussion of the matter would once again resurface and, perhaps surprisingly, it was Churchill who took the lead.

  That he, Britain's magnificent wartime leader, should suggest the Dominions visit London to help formulate high strategy could have been anticipated at any stage during the war. It would have been a big idea from the colossus of the Empire's political world but, rhetoric aside, he had actually given every indication of loathing such a proposed gathering. Perhaps, in keeping with Amery's warning of many years before, he did not feel that he had the time spare to entertain his colleagues to tea when there was so much other pressing business to be managed. This did not prevent visiting Dominion ministers being welcomed to meetings of the War Cabinet, or some other suitably impressive gathering, as a visible manifestation of the greater access that they and the other members of the Commonwealth alliance were now said publicly to enjoy. In early April 1943, however, Churchill had written to his Canadian counterpart to say that more was needed, suggesting that an Imperial Conference should be held later that year. Mackenzie King, constantly suspicious of Whitehall orchestrated Machiavellian plots, was still unconvinced about something so formal but he did agree that a meeting involving the Dominion leaders would be sensible.2 With this approval, efforts to bring the various prime ministers together took on a greater sense of urgency and, mindful of Ottawa's caveats, Whitehall's intention was that it would only be the key men invited. Various dates when each could attend were submitted from the distant capitals: it was noted at this initial stage that Curtin was unlikely to be prepared to travel and Evatt would probably appear in his stead; Smuts also was unwilling to leave South Africa until the back end of the year. This meant that November was quick to emerge as the most obvious date but Churchill preferred something earlier although he indicated to the DO that there should be some margin given; September made the greatest sense in his mind.3 Despite his initial acceptance the difficulty still lay with Mackenzie King and his continuing hesitancy about publicly endorsing a date.

  The British leader was clearly angered at this, telling the DO that there was no reason to wait 'indefinitely' for a response from Ottawa and that the delay should not be allowed, effectively, to veto a meeting of the whole Imperial body.4 But, with no sign of consensus emerging, it was reluctantly decided to again, at least, temporarily curtail the planning. The eventual decision to hold the meeting in May 1944 can in fact though largely be attributed to Smuts. He told Cranborne that he could not travel any earlier and he thought it would be a more convenient date for his fellow Dominion leaders; also he believed, crucially, that the war would be within a few months of its end, allowing for more relevant talks about the future.5 As a basis for reaching a final consensus this seemed to do the job and proved the culmination of the long-running attempts to settle on a date.6 On this basis the British political class could now become more fully involved. Cranborne had first asked at the beginning of January 1944 that he be allowed to submit a short memorandum on the subject to the War Cabinet. A very tentative agenda for a meeting in London involving all of the Dominion prime ministers had first been set out in the summer of 1943; there were at this point two items for discussion, 'short term problems, mainly in Europe' and 'long term problems of world organization'. Inevitably the changing nature of the war had quickly made this redundant, but this gave the DO a start-point with which to sit down and produce a more comprehensive document. The Dominions secretary envisaged that the main subjects for discussion would be the immediate military situation, questions arising from the probable defeat of Germany prior to Japan's capitulation, outlines of the post-war settlement and cooperation within the Commonwealth following the war's end. There would also likely be special subjects such as colonial policy, migration and civil aviation. He did not want any 'elaborate preparation of documents', but felt that there would be advantage
s in giving certain material in advance to the Dominion leaders, noting that Smuts had asked that this might be done.7 With the desire being to stress that it was not an Imperial Conference, Cranborne was keen that the South Rhodesian prime minister should not be invited and the Indian representative in the War Cabinet should only attend if there were any special subjects affecting India.8

  This departmental study resulted in a Cabinet paper that was discussed at an evening meeting of the War Cabinet held later that month, although it was actually a much shortened and more general document than had been prepared by the Whitehall officials. Churchill concluded the very brief discussion with the comment 'we should be at pains to make it clear that the note of the meeting was to be an effort to establish still more strongly, closely and recognizably the unity of the structure of the Commonwealth and the Empire'.9 Privately he had let it be known among his senior colleagues in Westminster that the agenda for the meeting was to be reduced to a minimum. The senior official in the FO responsible for Dominion affairs recorded that he understood Churchill did not contemplate a series of formal meetings and that any agenda, if one was even prepared, would be extremely restricted.10 It was proposed that a Ministerial Committee be formed, headed by Cranborne, whose aim would be to scope out the parameters of the proposed conference, who would be attending, the views of other government departments—notably the FO—as to the suggested agenda and whether the political discussions might be followed by talks amongst the respective military chiefs about future cooperation post-war.11 To do this the Committee would need to have memoranda on various subjects commissioned from the departments concerned and then make recommendations to the War Cabinet about what line to take during the subsequent meetings. The memoranda could, if they were agreed upon, be communicated to the Dominions in advance.12

  From the first meeting of the Ministerial Committee there had been some argument over how best to proceed. At the centre of it all was a prolonged discussion about the best strategy for dealing with Curtin's proposal made the previous year. Cranborne felt that ignoring it and waiting was the best approach; if the Australian leader wanted to discuss his views he could do so in front of the other Dominion prime ministers and let them express their opinions back.13 The FO agreed that this was too complicated a subject and it would be best to leave the initiative to the visiting Dominion leaders. Any discussion on the subject would have to avoid the use of the word 'machinery' as this would likely lead to misgivings in Canada; 'methods' was the specific word to be adopted. There was also an argument from the FO that securing an understanding on how collaboration at the lower level might function was possibly more important than any other; discussions among civil servants, and any agreement that could be reached, was deemed to commit the respective Dominion governments to given courses of action. The proposal therefore was for a meeting of officials to take place after the conference had finished. Apparently taking the lead on the question, the FO recognized the need to improve the current position although with the considerable caveat 'as far as circumstances permit'. As the intra-Whitehall discussions gathered pace it even proposed that some form of discussion about improving methods should be encouraged among the Dominions themselves as this would 'help to overcome inertia'.14

  Despite this keen interest it was Cranborne who actually produced the memorandum which considered the question of future cooperation within the British Commonwealth. The Dominions secretary felt that Curtin would raise his proposals, but doubted whether they would find much support. The official policy so far from the British government had been to refrain from committing itself. While Australia wanted a more effective voice in the framing of policy, Mackenzie King, as he had made clear with public responses to the Curtin proposals and Halifax's Toronto speech, was satisfied with the existing system and was opposed to any alterations. He wanted to ensure that Canada could influence world policy and did not believe that this could be achieved by closer linkage with the Commonwealth. His preference was for a worldwide organization in which Canada could play a leading part. Smuts had indicated his support for the idea of another great Power to counter-balance the Soviet Union and United States and was prepared to see closer links, not just with the nations of the Commonwealth but also with other countries in North-Western Europe. New Zealand had made no public comment on the matter but it was likely that there would be some support for its Tasman neighbour. Changes in machinery would be considered with an open mind but would need to be approved by all. He proposed therefore that some compromise suggestions be offered. These entailed a regular annual meeting of ministers concerned with foreign policy, subject to three of the four Dominions splitting the portfolios of 'external relations' and prime minister, something that was thought likely to work more effectively in the post-war international political system. The other option was for some kind of formalization of the meetings with the Dominion high commissioners or expanding the number of liaison officers who could maintain stronger links within Whitehall.15

  Responding to Cranborne's paper at the next Ministerial Committee meeting, Amery was critical of this proposed permanent secretariat, 'an Empire post office' whose role would merely be to exchange and collate information and prepare the agenda for more formal meetings. He could not see anything wrong with Curtin's proposal. The FO's representative also stressed that the Australian leader's ideas should not be dismissed as impracticable. While Mackenzie King might be opposed to the idea he judged that the other Dominions were not and with 'the benevolent neutrality of His Majesty's Government' it was possible that Canada might drop some or all of its objections.16 Within the FO there was also little real support for any possibly higher profile for the London-based Dominion representatives who, it was considered, would be unlikely to 'add any weight to the Councils of the Empire'.17 J. D. Greenway who, pre-war, had served in the British Embassy in Moscow, giving him something of an established diplomatic pedigree, was prominent with his criticism. He thought that progress was 'disappointing and somewhat timid' and was certain some form of machinery could be devised that would not be hamstrung by Canada choosing not to join. Curtin's proposed permanent secretariat did not seem such a bad idea.

  If this was the most important issue to be addressed before the Dominion leaders arrived in London, the question of military cooperation was not far behind. From the Committee's earliest meeting the DO's argument was that it would be best to try and secure some form of approval for continued joint planning at the staff level in the hope that this might lead eventually to planning on the political or ministerial level. As Eric Machtig put it, 'we would be wise, particularly in view of Canadian idiosyncrasies, not to fly too high'. Proposals put forward by Bevin were, therefore, considerably more than had been envisaged. A letter from him to the Chairman recommended that the Empire be split into zones: Australia and New Zealand would be the Pacific Area; South Africa would be the nucleus of an area stretching as far north as Kenya; Canada would take responsibility with America for the Pacific and the Atlantic; Britain would accept responsibility for the defence of the Commonwealth in relation to Europe. Such a scheme, he argued, would also see benefits in terms of promoting trade and intra-Imperial immigration. The FO saw various potential issues with the suggested Canadian role—specifically how the US might respond and the danger that the government in Ottawa might choose not to be involved—but they appreciated its 'big' nature. The DO deemed this to be going much too far when it would be difficult enough simply to secure a continuance of the existing liaison machinery that had developed during the war. Amery also had written to Cranborne stressing that future defence collaboration needed to be considered as a matter of priority but many of his ideas were also a little too enthusiastic.18

  The determining answers would come from the experts and Cranborne had approached the chiefs of staff asking that they prepare papers on the main issues involved by the end of March. It was proposed that the immediate military situation, the war against Japan, the military aspect of the post-war
settlement and the coordination of defence within the post-war British Commonwealth would all be raised during the conference. As the meeting would be short they could only be tackled in a general fashion without any detailed arrangements, and the committee was anxious to avoid placing any 'cut-and-dried proposals' before the visitors.19 With papers submitted by the chiefs on 'Policing of Europe' and 'United Nations' Bases in Relation to General Security Organisation',20 the main memorandum reviewed the system of Imperial Defence and examined how it had worked before 1939 and the changes that had taken place as a result of the war. On the whole, the comments it had to make about future collaboration on defence were positive. Australia and New Zealand were felt to have recognized the need to strengthen their links with the centre, 'they see the advantages of securing that the whole weight of the British Commonwealth shall be applied in future situations in which they might be involved'. It was anticipated that the Tasman Dominions would require inclusion in the central formulation of any future world security system but, also, that they would be prepared 'to take their full share' of ensuing responsibilities. The South African view was less clear but was felt likely to be broadly similar. Canada, however, was recognized as being different because of its relationship with its southern neighbour and the corresponding desire to retain a more independent stance. One WO reviewer of a draft of this paper had complained that it did not really bring out the need for a strong British Commonwealth as part of the post-war system, what he saw as 'the big point' that needed to be made to the Dominion leaders when they visited. To him it was clear that Australia, New Zealand and South Africa could be counted upon to adopt closer ties and commitments within the British Commonwealth. The authorities in Ottawa could, perhaps, be persuaded to look favourably upon the existing system by being told that they would have no voice if they stood alone and telling them that they must choose between London and Washington. By a neat calculation it was assumed, therefore, that remaining within the Commonwealth would be recognized as the only solution 'if she is to make her voice heard'.