The part played by the Dominions during the Conference and their relationship with the British delegation can be gauged from a series of 'racy and interesting' letters that had been sent back to London by a member of the British delegation. In the summer of 1944 it had been proposed that Ben Cockram, who had been the Political Secretary to Lord Harlech in South Africa, should move to the Washington Embassy as the DO representative. With the rank of Counsellor, he would replace Stephen Holmes who was departing for the High Commission in Ottawa. He was to be considered a full member of the embassy staff with full diplomatic privileges and an impressive array of allowances.35 Cockram held an Oxford doctorate and had been part-educated at an American university. With nearly 20 years' experience of Dominion affairs he was well-respected and there was no opposition from the FO to his appointment. His role would be to act as the DO's 'eyes and ears', working within the Embassy to gather what information he could about specific issues that involved or affected the Dominions. Having previously prepared a detailed analysis of the Dominions' likely attitude to the Conference, he was well qualified to provide this new commentary. His letters arrived at the DO approximately a week after each was sent from San Francisco and provided an excellent and well received account of events as he experienced them.36
The British delegation only arrived the night before the Conference began and were, therefore, thrown in 'head first'. The opening days were spent squabbling over who would take the Chairmanship and listening to plenary speeches. Cockram judged the British delegation to be more efficient in organization and ahead in planning than any of the other delegations present and this had helped them to secure a leading position on the important Steering Committee. He was happy to report that, at the outset, relations with the Dominions' delegation were 'admirable', with all of them appearing to be 'as helpful and cooperative as possible'.37 Having delivered their initial speeches the delegations quickly settled down to business and the two weeks that followed proved 'unconscionably grim and earnest'. Problems were encountered due to a lack of experience amongst many of the smaller states and Cockram estimated that only one committee was effectively presided over, the 'success' being Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, the former Mayor of Madras and leader of the Indian delegation.
Much of Cockram's time was spent trying to reconcile the proposed amendments to the draft Charter that had been submitted by each of the various Dominion delegations. From a long initial list of concerns this was whittled down to just four questions that needed to be referred for further negotiation. The first of these, as had been widely predicted, was trusteeship.38 Ultimately, however, the solution proved much less intractable than had thought would prove to be the case. Discussions between Eden and his American counterpart, who had taken over from Cordell Hull the previous November as the American secretary of state, produced an accord that appeared to safeguard British interests and was also sufficient to overcome New Zealand reservations on the issue.39 With the other three outstanding issues, the adoption of regional agreements, the manner in which the Council might call upon any member to use armed forces and the respecting of domestic jurisdiction, it was agreed that the British delegation would try and seek amendments. Cockram felt that it should prove possible to secure the agreement of the sponsoring powers to make the changes required by the Dominions, leaving the prospects for a common British Commonwealth line not unfavourable. The greatest challenge, however, remained Evatt, 'the biggest thorn in the flesh of all the British Commonwealth delegates and officials'. He had already caused considerable offence to the Americans and an official from the State Department told the British delegate privately that so long as Evatt was a member of the government in Canberra there was not 'the slightest chance of Australia being elected to the Security Council'. In Cockram's view, he was probably 'the most generally disliked man at the Conference' and had been outmanoeuvred at every turn but, with his potential supporters alienated, he had come to realize that he would have to cooperate with the British rather than work against them.40
Cockram's hopes that an early conclusion to proceedings might prove possible proved overly optimistic, two weeks later the now 'Big Five' were still struggling on the issues of regionalism, trusteeship and domestic jurisdiction. At this point hopes of an early conclusion had collapsed and events had gone 'haywire' with all sides degenerating into squabbles over those issues closest to their own national interests. At the heart of the tumult remained Evatt who had become steadily more disgruntled. His many amendments had either been voted down or emasculated; the fact that those sponsored by the other members of the British Commonwealth were generally accepted seems to have increased his ire. The State Department prophecy had also reached his ear which only served to strengthen the vitriol and within a short space of time he succeeded in further offending the Americans, upsetting the French, and annoying both the Russians and Chinese, in short all of the major players. His explosion at Cockram late one evening was returned in kind and this was judged as having had something of a positive modifying effect on the Australian's attitude. Field Marshal Smuts had, in the meantime, also lost faith with the discussions and was threatening to go home. He had been appointed President of the General Assembly from where he grew steadily more impatient with proceedings, comparing them unfavourably to the 1919 Peace Conference.41 His departure would have been hugely embarrassing and only a personal intervention by Lord Halifax persuaded him to stay. Despite this Cockram thought that inter-Commonwealth relations were better than at any stage of the Conference.42 The bureaucrats from the respective Dominion foreign affairs departments tasked with organizing the management of their respective delegations seemed content with the manner in which the alliance functioned. A number of them were pleased that the Dominion delegations had demonstrated that they had their own ideas.
The Conference itself, however, remained in a state of flux as it proved impossible to move the Russian position on the fundamental idea that the United Nations Organization should first 'discuss and consider' disputes without the automatic application of the proposed veto which was to be offered to each of the Big Powers. This issue had proven particularly difficult, Evatt believing it was 'a negation of democracy'. Although the self-appointed champion of the smaller powers could no longer count on Fraser's support about trusteeship, the New Zealander would still listen to the 'poison' being 'distilled into his ears'. The rest of the Australian delegation remained generally moderate though and it was clearly hoped that its leader's dissenting voice could be controlled. South Africa and Canada had been 'helpful and cooperative throughout', and what votes they had registered against the British position had been well considered and served to demonstrate the degree to which the Commonwealth was not a single block. The finding of a successful resolution to the domestic jurisdiction dispute proved this to be the case but in a fashion that was acceptable to the British delegation as 'the battle was fought and won'.43
With the Conference now hopefully drawing to a close Cockram could look back at the analysis he had provided earlier in the year. He had been proven correct in most regards not least in his warning that the great difficulty would be the Australian delegation. He had worried that it would be likely to find itself 'disunited and split by personal ambitions and dislikes', leaving it 'an unpredictable factor' upon which the British could not necessarily count for support.44 Headed by the deputy prime minister, Frank Forde, soon to become the shortest serving leader in Australian history, he and almost all of the other officials had been anxious to cooperate. There had been fatal division, however, as Evatt had often been 'hasty and suspicious'. In the view of those who accompanied him from Canberra, in many ways the Conference was both the high and low point of the Australian minister's career. He had successfully lobbied at the outset for Australia's inclusion as a member of the Executive Committee, an opening which 'gave so many opportunities'.45 From this position he assaulted those aspects of the agreements at Dumbarton Oaks that were deemed the most reprehensible. For this the
small powers accorded him a vote of thanks at the Conference's end. What he had wanted, however, was the acclaim of the lead nations. His fruitless efforts to amend the Great Power veto in the Security Council did little more than extend the gathering's life by several weeks and ensure that he would be subsequently viewed with considerable suspicion by both the United States and Soviet Union.46 And in a clear sign that the Australian position had been weakened as a result of some of his antics it was noted that Stettinius had apparently deliberately kept the Australian off the list of speakers for the final session of the Conference. Cockram would subsequently note that Forde's visit to Washington to discuss supply difficulties had also apparently met with little success and he concluded that this was an indication of the likely nature of postwar relations between Canberra and Washington.47
The Conference had amply demonstrated that 'the Commonwealth countries breed independent and vigorous personalities' and, it was hoped, dispelled any lingering illusions that Dominions' representation actually meant six votes for Britain. Halifax was concerned as the end approached that there had been perhaps too much success in demonstrating the independence of each of those involved and that the dangerous impression might have been created that 'the British Commonwealth was less united than it really was'. The Dominions' delegation heads disagreed and thanked him for the support he and Cranborne had given them. There was, however, considerable criticism about many of the more junior British representatives who had treated their Dominion counterparts 'with lofty superiority'. The DO participants had been 'unfailingly helpful', but FO officials appeared to think that 'the Dominion delegations should be seen but not heard'. Halifax pointed, by way of a defence, to the general election that had been called in Britain and the impact that this had had. Eden and Attlee had been called home to defend their seats, leaving officials to sit on committees who lacked experience of parliamentary practice and procedure. Cranborne was also anxious to correct Evatt's claims that there had been a departure from conclusions that had been reached at the April meetings held in London. There had been no conclusions reached beforehand about what line might be taken, the pre-Conference gathering had taken the form of discussions that had been intended solely to gain a better understanding of each Dominion's point of view.48
At the end of this final meeting of Dominion representatives the Australian minister had gone out of his way to thank Cockram for the support that had been given to his delegation, a 'superb gesture' that had left its recipient 'slightly deflated'. He also felt that it would be wise to put this commendation on record just in case Evatt should 'at a later date, have second thoughts and come seeking our hides with a boomerang or whatever they use for scalping purposes at Walleroo'. This decision revealed just how well the British official had come to know his character for, as he had feared, Evatt still had a card to play. Four days later he gave on off-the-record briefing to the British press correspondents covering the Conference. Those present were left with the impressions that he was trying to discredit the work of the British delegation in order to claim greater credit for Australia. He criticized a number of members of the British delegation by name, including Halifax and Cranborne, and had complained that Britain had not supported Australia. This was all a clear breach of the one of the guiding principles of inter-Commonwealth relations, that one country of the Commonwealth does not interfere with the affairs of another.49 The matter was reported in the Australian media and debated in the House of Representatives in Canberra where every effort was made to dampen excitement about any potential damage to imperial relations.50 Forde, having returned from the Conference, specifically refuted the idea that there had been any British criticism. The truth was that Cranborne had written to Evatt complaining at his actions and had also forwarded a copy to the deputy Australian leader. He, in response, had issued his usual 'forceful' rebuttal; clearly this in large part was because Forde had been copied into the correspondence. Cranborne had been so stunned by the language and argument employed in this that he at once wrote back refusing to accept the version of events put forward by Evatt and suggesting that no good would come from continuing their correspondence.51
Shortly following the conclusion of the San Francisco gathering a new nuclear age dawned and Hiroshima and Nagasaki's destruction was swiftly followed by the end of what had proven to be the Empire's final war. One FO commentator noted that recent events did not mean the Dominions' attachment to the Commonwealth was impaired. It was, however, clear that 'the lead did not rest with the UK in the same way as before the war'.52 Traditional impressions of Dominion independence had been adapted as a result of events at San Francisco. The Canadians, whose performance had been so warmly applauded by the British, had been anxious that this should be the case and were pleased with the results; reports reached the DO confirming that senior Canadian officials thought 'the myth of unity' had now been broken.53 Such a position was entirely as some felt should be the case. British Labourite Frederick Pethick-Lawrence was a conscientious objector during the First World War who was destined to become post-war secretary of state for India and Burma. The previous December, during the debate on the King's Speech at Westminster, he had responded to criticisms that the Dominions were displaying a policy of their own which differed from that of Britain, by rising to defend them. He saw this as a source of strength, the fact that there was a unity based around loose bonds, and attempts to turn them into something more rigid would not work. He held the Dominions to be 'a magnificent partnership of free nations, the constitution of which we certainly would not desire to see altered'.54 The war had certainly seen all of the Dominions grow increasingly more confident of their abilities to manage their respective foreign policies. It had also provided them with levels of fiscal and military strength that had been hitherto unimagined and a sense of independence that would not now be surrendered. Canada and South Africa had shown this on numerous occasions before the war had begun; now they were joined by even New Zealand, the most loyal of Dominions, but a member in its own right of the United Nations of independent states.
Batterbee, writing for the last time as the high commissioner before he left Wellington in the summer of 1945 for retirement, warned that Britain needed to show the will and ability to take the lead in the new world. His lesson for London was that 'as soon as peace comes again Great Britain, if she is to retain her prestige, must show that she belongs to the future and not to the past, and that she is determined not to follow but to lead the world in all matters of social and economic progress'.55 The final word must, however, go to the figure who had laboured longest to try and keep this sometimes difficult but nonetheless crucial coalition working. Following the defeat suffered by his Conservative Party colleagues in the July 1945 general election, Cranborne wrote to Emrys-Evans with a long appraisal of the DO's wartime performance. He was modestly pleased with the role he had played and the successes that had been achieved but he was less happy with the situation that now prevailed within the Empire, generally concluding that there had actually been little improvement during the last five years. As the figure who had been most intimately involved in the management his is a fitting epitaph.
First Canada, and now as appeared at San Francisco, Australia and New Zealand, are beginning to show most disturbing signs of moving away from the conception of a Commonwealth acting together to that of independent countries, bound to each other only by the most shadowy ties. Dr Evatt is only a particularly repulsive representative of a not at all uncommon point of view in his own and the other Empire countries. I wish that I could see the answer to all this, but I don't. It may be that we ought to speak more frankly to Dominion governments. Whenever, however, we have tried this, the only result has been to irritate them and strengthen the voices of independence. I really, during the last few months, sometimes felt at my wits' end. Perhaps that is a sign that I had been at the DO quite long enough, and that what is needed is a fresh mind, both at the Dominions and Foreign Offices, and perhaps most of all, at No.
10. For I think that Winston, with all his great qualities, always tended to look at Foreign and Empire policy as if they were in watertight compartments whereas they are in fact mingled. Our prestige with the other countries of the Commonwealth is dependent on our prestige in the outside world. Today we are regarded abroad as very much the junior partner of the Big Three and this inevitably and immediately affects the attitude of the Dominions towards us.56
Britain had lost its Imperial position and the unquestioned leadership of the Empire and, in his mind, if this could not be regained it would now have to look to Europe to demonstrate it still maintained a strong global role. This would not be a challenge Churchill would have to face, but instead would be one for Attlee and his new Labour post-war government. It would quickly discover that the Anglo-Dominion alliance had in fact seen its best days.
Conclusion: Brave New World
War had come again in September 1939, and once more the call had gone out to the Empire's scattered millions. The Australian Minister Richard Casey was reportedly fond of G. K. Chesterton's remark that Commonwealth members were like passengers on a London omnibus; as a rule they ignored one another until such time as there was a crisis, when they all pulled together.1 On this occasion the same was once again true, leaving London overrun with 'bold-eyed Canadians with a slouch and a swagger, New Zealanders with overcoats hanging untidily, Australians often with girls', an 'invading armies of irresponsible younger brothers' who, according to the observer who was working in Canada House, 'the English soldiers looked at not unkindly but with a sober ironic air -puppies and old hound dogs'.2 Speaking at a lunch of the United Wardens of the City of London in February 1942, Attlee had reminded his audience that 'in the dark days of 1940 after the fall of France when Hitler's blow fell on Britain, Britain was not alone because she had with her the British Commonwealth and Empire'.3 They had come not to fight a war of survival, as many seemed to think, but as a demonstration of their loyalty to a far greater cause. This fortitude was shared by a Colonel in the Royal Army Medical Corps, writing in May 1940 before Dunkirk, who did not feel his Empire was threatened by ultimate defeat. The idea had never entered his head because the British Empire, what he termed as 'the domination of the world by the English-speaking nations in consultation', was in fact in its infancy.4 This all seems at odds with the recent research which, by examining British society and cultural trends, has sought to demonstrate that there is little evidence to suggest that public opinion necessarily still held such views. None of this is a new argument: to some 'the Empire penetrated the emotions of millions'; to others 'the British Empire vanished quietly and almost imperceptibly'.5 This is perhaps today most obviously to be seen in the debate on 'Britishness' and the commonly perceived national ignorance about British history and the country's origins that exists among contemporary society.6
Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War Page 25