Another key tool in this research process was the FO's memorandum on the future of the Empire which had been distributed the previous year and was generating a 'flood of suggestions' from the overseas embassies. Perhaps the most incisive of these came from Halifax, fresh from his recent brush with Dominion sensitivities.11 He offered a both perceptive and far-sighted view, taking issue with the central idea that Britain could preserve its 'Great Power' status without the support of the Dominions. He recognized the changing nature of the relationship, even if some of his colleagues in London did not, and disagreed with the notion that there could remain 'any lingering tendency to assume that the members of the Commonwealth are in any way less than equal'. He counselled that there should no longer be talk of 'preserving' or 'maintaining' the Commonwealth 'as if it were a venerable but hoary building which has to be shored and buttressed if it is not to tumble down'. Not until October 1944 was a précis available of all the responses, and it took the form of a draft FO programme for promoting better Commonwealth cooperation. All new candidates for the Foreign Service would be encouraged to spend part of their training period in a Dominion and refresher courses of lectures on the British Commonwealth and Empire would be given to serving officials. It was also agreed that members of the DO would, in appropriate cases, be attached to British Embassies where other Commonwealth governments were represented and junior FO staff would be attached to the High Commissions in Canada and South Africa. Even nomenclature was considered. Reminding the reader that the term 'Commonwealth' actually connoted Britain and the Dominions, it was stressed that it whenever possible would be well received. One oft-advanced suggestion which it was agreed not to include was that the DO and FO should be amalgamated; despite the obvious lingering contempt shown by many of the ambassadors it remained official policy that relations with the Dominions required special handling and their own Whitehall department.
The DO was generally content with the submission. There were, however, some reservations about the 'somewhat patronizing tone' in places and the degree to which the special nature of the relationship between Britain and the Dominions was not necessarily brought out. The British high commissioners in their distant outposts had also been asked for their views about this document. From the High Commission in Ottawa, despite not agreeing with all of the points that were made, it was seen as encouraging that the FO should be taking an interest in Commonwealth matters. There were, however, some telling criticisms. The paper appeared to have been written from a 'superior standpoint', one which seemed 'to regard the Dominions as strange animals which require special treatment'. The Dominions were in fact 'good friends or ours', who if treated in an adult way as being able to 'form their own views' could be of great help, not only in terms of defining the future relationship but also helping find common ground with the United States. There were also some agreement with Halifax and his doubts that Britain could be a Great Power without the Dominions. Batterbee thought it to be generally sound both in terms of the picture it presented and the conclusions it reached. He did, however, note that the memorandum failed to carry any disclaimer saying that it did not represent the official view of the government and worried about this omission presumably because of how it might have been interpreted by certain of his diplomatic colleagues. In his view Britain held its position in the world because it had 'long been regarded as the champion of political liberty'. In order to maintain its position at the head of the Commonwealth, enabling in the process 'the Commonwealth to endure', there was a need to show a much greater interest in social and economic liberty and this was entirely overlooked in the FO's conclusions.12
Wider public attention was inevitably increasingly focused on the myriad discussions to determine the nature of the post-war international system. One of these was the meeting held in Chicago in November and December 1944 involving delegates of 52 nations to plan for international cooperation in the field of air navigation in the years following the war's end. As Attlee had explained at the beginning of a long debate in the House of Commons the year before, Britain's need was urgent as it was at the centre of a great Commonwealth and Empire, a quarter of the world's inhabitants 'scattered over every Continent'.13 What he did not say was that concerns about American rivalry over air routes, which had existed since before the war, had worsened as its attempts to dominate had become much more obvious. A November 1944 high commissioners' meeting in London was dominated by bitter warnings that the United States now regarded the air as 'something created by divine providence for them to dominate' and it degenerated into 'a chorus of anti-Americanism'.14 In this light the International Conference on Aviation might not have been the best venue to test the cohesive nature of the alliance. This proved to be the case; following the meeting a long and secret report was produced by the DO's representative and it made for difficult reading. It was a 'depressing' account for Cranborne to read, who claimed to have had no idea of 'the divergences in the British Commonwealth' when the intention should have been to settle on 'a united Empire policy'. The Canadian delegation had been especially difficult and it was feared that there might be a rift as an outcome. It was believed that the Ottawa attendees were more concerned with modifying the British viewpoint to meet that of the United States' delegation than arriving at a common Empire policy. The result was that they were 'unfortunately mistrusted', and not just by the British but also by the other Dominions. There were nightly meetings of the British Commonwealth delegates to discuss progress and future policy but the Canadians declined to attend and generally appeared to have a tendency to disappear for long periods of the conference.15 It was recognized that there had in fact been a breakdown of the alliance during these discussions, the Canadian delegation being in much closer touch with its American counterparts than the British.16 The conclusion was that relations with the Dominions had in this case been adversely affected, and what Cranborne read certainly made him pessimistic in terms of preparing for future meetings.
The major focus of the many proposed conferences facing him was obviously to bring together an effective post-war global security organization. It has already been seen that Churchill favoured regional councils and blocs and proposed a network of them. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion though that the British leader's policy towards such ideas was prone to sporadic bursts of imaginative energy but lacking in any real substance or, for that matter, a policy that was coherent and workable. Planning on the British side was achieved in spite of his efforts while his most consistent characteristic was that of 'obstinate apathy'.17 There was also little reference to Gladwyn Jebb's Economic and Reconstruction Department within the FO, which had been tasked with planning for the postwar organization. As Jebb commented, the prime minister was quite allergic to any proposals for post-war action that he had not himself engendered, or at least discussed personally with his American counterpart.18 An obvious example had been when Roosevelt apparently proposed the term 'United Nations' because 'Associated Powers' sounded flat and when he tested it on Churchill, who was taking a bath at the time, he concurred.
The Moscow Declaration, signed in October 1943, had reaffirmed the announcement of the previous year relating to the 'United Nations' and marked the official recognition of the need for an international organization to replace the League of Nations. The earlier 'Four Power' Declaration, authored by the United States, had already necessitated the Dominions be approached for their views and they had broadly agreed with the proposal but with some anxiety about the role to be played by the non-'Great Powers' such as themselves. As the Cabinet in London were told Australia had a further recommendation; the 'British Commonwealth of Nations' as a whole should be treated as one of the four 'Great Powers' and not just Britain alone. This was in keeping with Curtin's proposals for closer political integration but, despite its superficial attractiveness to the DO—the idea was after all no different than had been adopted at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919—it was once again recognized as being untenable. Aside from the
fact that Canada and South Africa were unlikely to endorse such an idea, it was felt that each of the Dominions would insist on retaining a final say on questions affecting their foreign policy and considerable time would be consumed during any future international negotiations in trying to secure their complete agreement.19
At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, held near Washington in August and September 1944, the four 'Great Powers' attempted to draft specific proposals for a charter for the new organization. It was clear that there were considerable differences of opinion, particularly over the issue sponsored by the Americans that the Permanent Members of the proposed Security Council should have a right of veto on any decision which potentially affected their own interests. The Soviets had a different view and were adamant that only the four principals should have any form of vote.20 So great were the disagreements that it proved necessary to hold another series of discussions about the structure of the proposed World Organization. This was held at the Crimea resort of Yalta in early February 1945; once again the Dominions were not represented in person but, instead, had to rely upon Britain to safeguard their interests.21 One of the British officials who had been at the Dumbarton Oaks talks admitted that the attitude of the British delegation there changed 'in a rather remarkable way' during the course of the talks. Initially there was strong indignation at what were considered to be 'disreputable' proposals from the Russians that would 'place the Great Powers above the law'. In time the British came to see that this view was actually quite 'realistic' and that to oppose it would have been hypocritical and akin to the worst days of the League of Nations.22
Cranborne had striven at every opportunity to cajole Churchill into keeping the Dominions fully informed about developments affecting the proposed post-war security organization. They had been equally forceful in turn in making it clear how much they disliked any system under which the smaller powers were to be treated differently. The Dominions secretary's argument, that he had made repeatedly to the prime minister, was if they were consulted on the proposals at the formative stage it would not then later appear that they were being approached merely for their acquiescence in a policy that had already been settled in London.23 This was sage advice as it remained the issue about which the Dominions had indicated from the outset of the war that they were most sensitive. As Cranborne now noted, any suggestion that the British government endorsed the idea of regional blocs would likely make it 'most difficult' to bring the Dominions into line. The announcement from the White House in the spring of 1945 that it had been agreed at Yalta that it would be acceptable for the United States and the Soviet Union to have three votes each only served to make the situation worse.24 The British government had not actually been consulted about this proposal in advance, not for the first time. The British delegates at the conference realized that there remained a popular belief that the Dominions would actually perform as a bloc and there was still little understanding of the British Commonwealth and how it functioned.
It had been decided that final talks involving delegates from around the world would be held in San Francisco in April 1945 to establish the United Nations organization. In preparation for this a group of Commonwealth politicians met in London for ten days to discuss associated issues. Chaired by Cranborne, the meetings included some now big 'Imperial' hitters, notably Smuts, Evatt and Fraser. The Dominions secretary was keen that these talks should not be viewed by the press and public at large as anything more than 'a perfectly normal feature of the routine working of Commonwealth cooperation'.25 The opening session would, however, include a series of speeches which would be released and during these he stressed that what would follow would merely take the form of 'conversations'—Mackenzie King was not present so it had to be clearly stated that they were informal—concerned mainly with the plans for the new World Organization. As Cranborne told the delegates, it was quite possible to be a citizen of the world and a member of a family. 'We are a family and it is natural that we should wish to deliberate together so as to ensure that, as far as possible we see eye to eye on the difficult problems we have to face.'26 Cadogan was also centrally involved but found himself harassed by the 'bloody Dominions' who took up so much of his time and he was left uncertain in his own mind whether the Anzac representatives were 'more stupid than offensive'.27
The sensitive issue of the Colonial Empire which had been so exposed the previous year had not gone away and the question of trusteeship remained a bitter one. In late December 1944 it appeared that an official British position had finally been reached with a long memorandum entitled 'International Aspects of Colonial Policy'. There was little within the document that differed from the statement made by Oliver Stanley to the gathering of the Dominions' leaders. It did not raise any issues that were considered controversial with regard to the proposed establishment of a number of regional organizations, including those in the South Pacific and South East Asia which had been highlighted by Curtin. The question of 'accountability' was, however, different and would need some specific explanation to the Dominions. It was recommended that an International Colonial Centre be created through which each Colonial power could publish an annual report outlining economic and social progress in their respective territories. As this would not have any supervisory or executive powers this was deemed as not going far enough to appease the views on the subject expressed by the Tasman Dominions.28 Churchill was much less enthusiastic about such talk of colonial trusteeship. There was no question of Britain being 'hustled or seduced' into making any declarations that affected sovereignty in the Dominions or Colonies. He had no opposition to the Americans taking Japanese islands which they had conquered, 'But "hands off the British Empire" is our maxim and it must not be weakened or smirched to please sob-stuff merchants at home or foreigners of any hue.' Eden reassured him that there was not the slightest question of liquidating the British Empire, Stanley's paper instead represented 'a constructive policy', one which safeguarded both the sovereignty and administrative responsibility of the powers involved. It was an attempt to persuade the Americans to accept the British version of colonial administration and 'not to go in for half-baked international regimes' in the ex-enemy held territories they occupied.29 Churchill nonetheless remained vehement in his opposition to any American-inspired move which might weaken his Empire, erupting at regular intervals at Yalta in a grand old imperial fashion, famously advising his audience that under no circumstances would he ever 'consent to forty or fifty nations thrusting interfering fingers into the life's existence of the British Empire'.30 The position changed dramatically in the run-up to the San Francisco Conference. It was clear that it was unacceptable not just to the United States but also New Zealand and Australia, who had indicated that they remained advocates of the existing mandate system. Added to this it was unlikely that much in the way of international support could be garnered. But most importantly it was now obvious that this subject would not be discussed in private but in open session, in front of a 'motley assembly', where the future of Britain's colonies would no doubt be painfully scrutinized. A new memorandum, released to the War Cabinet in March 1945, recommended that the continuation of mandates be therefore endorsed in principle but with some insistence on revisions to remove their worst features. Ideally discussions about trusteeship could be avoided and resolved later by an ad hoc, and presumably less uncertain and potentially emotive body. The great danger remained that American elements would demand that the whole of the Colonial Empire be placed under international review and, potentially, pressure would be applied that it be placed under trusteeship.31 Attending the London meetings the following month the Dominions had been informed of the changes which, once again, had been reached without any prior communication with them and they remained unconvinced.32 Despite Cranborne's best efforts the alliance departed for San Francisco in questionable spirit.33
The Conference was conducted on a typically American grand scale and as one commentator put it, 'confusion reigned at almost every l
evel'. No less that 2,636 journalists were accredited as part of the propaganda campaign orchestrated by the authorities in Washington. A total of 282 delegates represented their countries and were assisted by staffs and a secretariat totalling over 2,500 people. At 4.30 pm on the afternoon of 25 April 1945, American Secretary of State Edward Stettinius Jr. struck his gavel three times on the podium to convene the first plenary session of the United Nations Conference on World Organization. The Conference opened on the same day as American and Russian troops met on the banks of the River Elbe. For working purposes the Conference was divided into 12 committees with sections of the Dumbarton Oaks documents assigned to each for review and revision. These committees reported in turn to one of four Commissions, which in turn reported to plenary sessions of the entire Conference. Coordination was theoretically the responsibility of a Steering Committee supported by a smaller Executive Committee. In reality the most important work was done by the informal group made up of the representatives of the four Great Powers, joined later by France. Along with China, however, the French delegate had little real voice; power rested with 'the Big Three'.34
Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War Page 24