by Danny Orbach
[back]
5. “gang of brigands”: Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:451.
[back]
6. In his first two years of service: Heinz Höhne, Canaris, trans. J. Maxwell Brownjohn (London: Secker & Warburg, 1979), 260–63.
[back]
7. Canaris ordered that nothing would be done: Ibid., 303; see also Helmut Krausnick’s interview with Franz Maria Liedig (date unknown), 1, 15–16, Harold C. Deutsch Papers, USAMHI, series 4, box 15, Liedig. For a much less flattering description, see General Halder’s testimony: Halder an Deutsch, 23.10.1954, 2–3, Halder an Krausnick, 28.4.1955, 2(11), Deutsch Papers, series 3, box 2.
[back]
8. “His appearance was as stiff”: Walter Laqueur and Richard Breitman, Breaking the Silence: The German Who Exposed the Final Solution (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England for Brandeis University Press, 1994), 168.
[back]
9. “A friend described him”: Ibid., 169–70.
[back]
10. he “went in formal dress”: Peter Hoffmann, Carl Goerdeler and the Jewish Question, 1933–1942 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 42; letter to Gauleiter Mutschmann in the name of Bruno Basarke (author name unclear), 19.9.1933, BA, PK/A201, pp. 2724–27.
[back]
11. Deputy Mayor Haacke’s pressure: Peter Hoffmann, “The Persecution of the Jews as a Motive for Resistance Against National-Socialism,” in The Moral Imperative: New Essays on the Ethics of Resistance in National Socialist Germany, 1933–1945, ed. Andrew Chandler (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), 86.
[back]
12. “[Goerdeler said that] the foremost German problem”: Harold C. Deutsch, The Conspiracy Against Hitler in the Twilight War (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970), 11.
[back]
13. Goerdeler’s wife, “who is known”: Wolf an Kunz, 7.12.1936, SAL, Kap 10 G Nr.685 Bd.1, 270R.
[back]
14. “The Mendelssohn monument affair”: Haacke an Mutschmann, 4.12.1936, SAL Kap 10 G Nr.685 Bd.1, 267R–268; Marianne Meyer-Krahmer, Carl Goerdeler—Mut zum Widerstand: Eine Tochter erinnert sich (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 1998), 143–44.
[back]
15. in order to “spare the lord mayor”: Sabine Gillmann and Hans Mommsen, eds., Politische Schriften und Briefe Carl Friedrich Goerdelers (Munich: Saur, 2003), 2:1223.
[back]
16. “Thus I decided without hesitation”: Meyer-Krahmer, Carl Goerdeler, 144; Ines Reich, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler: Ein Oberbürgermeister gegen den NS-Staat (Cologne: Böhlau, 1997), 266–73; SAL Kap 10 G Nr.685 Bd.1, 263, 65.
[back]
17. “an informal association of people”: W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt, The Social Life of a Modern Community (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1941), 32, 110. For more discussion on the definition of a clique, see also John Scott, Social Network Analysis: A Handbook (London: SAGE, 2009), 20–21.
[back]
18. “The recruitment of new members”: Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:523.
[back]
19. “an insurgency can more easily attach”: David Knoke, Political Networks: The Structural Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 68. Paul Staniland studies this phenomenon in detail in his new book, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), p. 9.
[back]
20. the SS and the Gestapo were not allowed: Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:525–7; Abschrift Huppenkothen, 11.7.1947, IfZ ZS 0249-1, p. 7. A study of the indictments in the various July 20, 1944, trials indicates that many of the accused neither participated in the conspiracy nor supported it; they were just acquainted with leading connectors of the conspiracy, such as Goerdeler or Leuschner, or belonged to the same social circles. Even if they disagreed politically with the conspirators, all of them were reluctant to turn over comrades to the authorities. For one example among many, see Anklageschrift gegen Richter, Lenz, Zitzewitz, and Korsch, 18.11.1944, Eberhard Zeller Papers, IfZ ED 88/3, pp. 371–90.
[back]
21. Generally speaking, the club was an ideal venue: Jacobsen,“Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:117.
[back]
22. Goerdeler and Oster were “salesmen”: Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (Boston: Back Bay Books, 2002), 30–89.
[back]
23. In winter 1938, the network was mainly intended: Helmut Krausnick’s interview with Franz Maria Liedig (date unknown), 1, Deutsch Papers, series 4, box 15, Liedig; Jacobsen, “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung,” 1:430.
[back]
24. “Conspiracy and mutiny do not exist”: Nicholas Reynolds, Treason Was No Crime: Ludwig Beck, Chief of the German General Staff (London: Kimber, 1976), 135. Compare Salmuth an Krausnick, 7.8.1955, 1–2, Deutsch Papers, series 3, box 3, round 1 Material.
[back]
25. Whatever the results of his trial might be: Niederschrift der Unterredung zwischen Herrn Ministerialdirigent Dr. v. Etzdorf und Herrn Dr. H. Krausnick im Auftrage des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte München, durchgeführt am 26.9.1953 in Bonn, 6, Deutsch Papers, series 3, box 2, Material on Groscurth.
[back]
26. Simultaneously with Brauchitsch’s appointment: Reynolds, Treason Was No Crime, 128; Nuremberg Red (3704-PS), 6:419–20.
[back]
27. “obsequious to his seniors”: Constantine FitzGibbon, The Shirt of Nessus (London: Cassell, 1956), 25.
[back]
28. Hitler used the opportunity: Abschrift Huppenkothen, 11.7.1947, IfZ 0249-1, p. 8.
[back]
29. The central actor in the cell: Eckart Conze et al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik (Munich: Karl Blessing Verlag, 2010), 155, 296.
[back]
30. Hassell, too, supported Hitler: Gregor Schöllgen, Ulrich von Hassell, 1881–1944: Ein Konservativer in der Opposition (Munich: Beck, 1990), 89–90.
[back]
31. Kleist . . . was an implacable enemy: Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, “Selbsterlebte wichtige Begebenheiten aus den Jahren 1933 und 1934,” Bodo Scheurig Papers, IfZ ZS/A 31-8, pp. 64–68.
[back]
32. one of few members of the German National People’s Party: Schlabrendorff to Scheurig (interview, 19.9.1965), Scheurig Papers, IfZ ZS/A 31-8, http://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_08.pdf, pp. 11, 17; Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, “Adel und Preußentum,” Süddeutsche Monatshefte 51 (August 23, 1926): 378–84.
[back]
33. National Socialism . . . was bound to destroy Germany: Wetzel to Scheurig, 29.4.1965, Scheurig Papers, IfZ ZS/A 31-8, http://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_08.pdf, p. 35; Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, Der Nationalsozialismus: Eine Gefahr (Berlin-Britz: Werdermann, 1932).
[back]
34. Hitler and his followers were a new reincarnation: Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, “Glaubt ihr nicht, so bleibt ihr nicht,” in Bodo Scheurig, Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin: Ein Konservativer gegen Hitler (Oldenburg: Stalling, 1968), 265 and also 140.
[back]
35. Kleist’s hatred of fellow conservatives: Ibid., 132, 144; Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, “Selbsterlebte wichtige Begebenheiten aus den Jahren 1933 und 1934,” Scheurig Papers, IfZ ZS/A 31-8, http://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0031_08.pdf, pp. 64–68; Fabian von Schlabrendorff, The Secret War Against Hitler, trans. Hilda Simon (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 41–45. Between 1933 and 1944, Kleist was frequently arrested by the authorities. During one of his arrests, SA thugs tried to storm his castle in order to fly the swastika over it. They were blocked, however, by Kleist’s loyal villagers, who barricaded themselves in the castle. In the end, the local party leader wisely decided to give up in order to avoid a scandal. On Kleist’s ideology, see also Ekkehard Klause, “Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin (1890–1945): Ein altpreußischer Konse
rvativer im Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus,” Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preußischen Geschichte19, no. 2 (2009): 243–55.
[back]
36. “Until our last breath”: Michael Balfour, Withstanding Hitler in Germany, 1933–1945 (London: Routledge, 1988), 163.
[back]
37. Hitler expressed his personal sympathy: Ibid., 147; Abschrift Huppenkothen, 11.7.1947, IfZ 0249-1, p. 8.
[back]
38. “Hitler is Germany’s fate”: Ulrich von Hassell, Die Hassell-Tagebücher, 1938–1944: Aufzeichnungen vom anderen Deutschland, ed. Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gärtringen (Munich: Goldmann, 1994), 71; Salmuth an Krausnick, 7.8.1955, 2, Deutsch Papers, series 3, box 3, round 1 Material; Franz Halder, “Zu den Aussagen des Dr. Gisevius in Nürnberg 24. Bis 26.4.1946,” BA-MA BAarch N/124/10, pp. 1–2. Fritsch repeated the same words to Halder. See Halder’s testimony, “Protokoll der öffentlichen Sitzung der Spruchkammer Muenchen X, BY 11/47, am 15.9.1948,” p. 4(68).
[back]
4. “In the Darkest Colors”: The Decision of General Beck
1. suffering from incessant feuds: R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Czechs and Slovaks (Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1965), 325.
[back]
2. The party chairman . . . summarized his agenda: Johann W. Brügel, Tschechen und Deutsche, 1918–1938 (Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1967), 332.
[back]
3. “It is my [Hitler’s] irrevocable decision”: Walther Hofer, ed., Der Nationalsozialismus: Dokumente, 1933–1945 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1957), 204.
[back]
4. Beck had praised the 1933 takeover: Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck: Eine Biographie (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008), 100.
[back]
5. he felt like a military Cassandra: Ludwig Beck, Studien, ed. Hans Speidel (Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler, 1955), 119; Nicholas Reynolds, Treason Was No Crime: Ludwig Beck, Chief of the German General Staff (London: Kimber, 1976), 148–59; Müller, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck, 319–21, 375–76.
[back]
6. Beck had expressed opposition to the invasion: Reynolds, Treason Was No Crime, 99–100.
[back]
7. “The three nations share Europe”: Beck, Studien, 119; Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Armee und Drittes Reich, 1933–1939: Darstellung und Dokumentation (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1987), 73–82; Müller, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck, 332–33.
[back]
8. “although Czechoslovakia in its current boundaries”: Peter Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat: Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler (Munich: Piper, 1985), 98–99; Wolfgang Foerster, Ein General kämpft gegen den Krieg: Aus nachgelassenen Papieren des Generalstabchefs Ludwig Beck (Munich: Münchener Dom-Verlag, 1949), 94.
[back]
9. For years Beck had been an advocate: Müller, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck, 320, 322–23, 377.
[back]
10. “Critical decisions about the future of the nation”: Foerster, Ein General kämpft, 103.
[back]
11. “For the Führer”: Ibid., 106.
[back]
12. Caught up in his idealism: Müller, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck, 319–21; Franz Halder, “Zu den Aussagen des Dr. Gisevius in Nürnberg 24. Bis 26.4.1946,” BA-MA BAarch N/124/10, p. 2; Halder, “Protokoll der öffentlichen Sitzung der Spruchkammer Muenchen X, BY 11/47, am 15.9.1948,” BA-MA Msg 2/213, p. 5(69).
[back]
13. “Brauchitsch [has] left me in the lurch”: Halder, “Zu den Aussagen,” BA-MA BAarch N/124/10, p. 2; Reynolds, Treason Was No Crime, 168, 171, 181; Helmut Groscurth, Tagebücher eines Abwehroffiziers, 1938–1940: Mit weiteren Dokumenten zur Militäropposition gegen Hitler, ed. Helmut Krausnick and Harold C. Deutsch (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1970), 168; Müller, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck, 377, 386–87.
[back]
14. Oster visited Beck again and again: Reynolds, Treason Was No Crime, 181; Halder an H. von Witzleben, 6.9.1952, Deutsch Papers, series 4, box 9, General Opposition.
[back]
15. It is uncertain whether Beck gave his consent: Historians disagree over whether Beck was involved in the 1938 attempt at a coup and, if so, to what extent. Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Beck’s newest biographer, believes that he was not involved (Generaloberst Ludwig Beck, 368). However, there is convincing evidence pointing in the other direction. Franz Halder, for one, told historian Helmut Krausnick that Beck was involved. It is hard to believe that Halder, who despised Beck, wanted to protect his posthumous reputation. See Halder an Krausnick, 1952, 3–4, Deutsch Papers, series 4, box 9, Plot to Assassinate Hitler.
[back]
5. The Bird and Its Cage: First Attempt at Coup d’État, September 1938
1. “When I rang the doorbell”: Hans B. Gisevius, To the Bitter End, trans. Richard Winston and Clara Winston (New York: Da Capo Press, 1998), 288.
[back]
2. “That madman, that criminal”: Ibid., 289; Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck: Eine Biographie (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008), 381–82. The animosity, it seems, was mutual. In his later testimony, Halder denied the mere existence of this meeting and admitted to having met Gisevius only once, on September 26. According to Halder, Schacht brought Gisevius to a meeting without asking his permission beforehand, and he (Halder) was “very angry” about it. See Halder an Krausnick, 28.4.1955, 2(10), Deutsch Papers, series 3, box 3, round 1; Franz Halder, “Zu den Aussagen des Dr. Gisevius in Nürnberg 24. Bis 26.4.1946,” BA-MA BAarch N/124/10, p. 3.
[back]
3. When Hitler ordered the army: Erich Kordt, Nicht aus der Akten (Stuttgart: Union deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1950), 244; Hans B. Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende (Zurich: Fretz & Wasmuth, 1946), 329.
[back]
4. “no third side will be so reckless”: Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik, 1918–1945 (Baden-Baden: Impr. Nationale, 1950–95), 2:421.
[back]
5. He promised his associates: Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, 339–40.
[back]
6. Oster, though, was not content: Erich Kordt, “Kommentar zu einer Erklärung von Lord Vansittart,” 2–3, Deutsch Papers, series 3, box 3, round 1 Material.
[back]
7. The first volunteer was Dr. Carl Goerdeler: Gerhard Ritter,Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1954), 158–61.
[back]
8. “The National Socialists were masters of propaganda”: Marianne Meyer-Krahmer, Carl Goerdeler—Mut zum Widerstand: Eine Tochter erinnert sich (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitatsverlag, 1998), 149.
[back]
9. “Goerdeler impressed us all”: Arthur P. Young, X Documents (London: Deutsch, 1974), 24.
[back]
10. “X [Goerdeler] fears catastrophe”: Ibid., 139. Goerdeler mentioned the Jewish question several times during his talks with Young, and even demanded that England stop all discussion about “crucial questions” with Germany as long as the persecution of the Jews was going on. See ibid., 59, 136, 139, 161, 177.
[back]
11. “I showed the document”: Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann (New York: Harper, 1949), 411.
[back]
12. Goerdeler’s mission ended in failure: Andrea Mason, “Opponents of Hitler in Search of Foreign Support: The Foreign Contacts of Dr. Carl Goerdeler, Ludwig Beck, Ernst von Weizsäcker, and Adam von Trott zu Solz” (master’s thesis, McGill University, 2002), 50–51, available at http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/webclient/StreamGate?folder_id=0&dvs=1340873715337~113.
[back]
13. The prime minister wanted above all: For the debate on appeasement, see Andrew D. Stedman, Alternatives to Appeasement: Neville Chamberlain and Hitler’s Germany (New York: Tauris, 2011), 232–47; Sidney Aster, “Guilty Men: The Case of Neville Chamberlain,” in Origins of the Second World War, ed. Patrick Finney (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 62–78. For a survey of the debate
, see Mason, “Opponents of Hitler,” 6–15.
[back]
14. Alexander Cadogan . . . wrote in his diary: The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, O.M., 1938–1945, ed. David Dilks (London: Cassell, 1971), 123–24, 128–29. For Goerdeler’s view on the Sudeten question, see Sabine Gillmann and Hans Mommsen, Politische Schriften und Briefe Carl Friedrich Goerdelers (Munich: Saur, 2003), 2:1151, 1179–80.
[back]
15. Kleist told the British explicitly: “Notiz über ein Gespräch zwischen Sir R. Vansittart und Herrn von Kleist,” C/8520/1941/18 (18.8.1938), Scheurig Papers, IfZ ZS-1 31-8, pp. 40–45.
[back]
16. “I take it that von Kleist”: “Note of Conversation at Chartwell Between Monsieur de K. and Mr. Winston Churchill,” 19.8.1938, Sir Winston Churchill Papers, reel 534, CHAR 2/340 B, HULL; David Faber, Appeasement and World War II (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), 226.
[back]
17. “The interview was a stormy one”: Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 298.
[back]
18. All three gave their full consent: For Thomas’s version of his own motives, see Georg Thomas, “20. Juli 1944,” 20.7.1945, BA-MA Msg 2/213, pp. 4–6.
[back]
19. In conversations with other officers: Hans A. Jacobsen, ed., “Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung”: Die Opposition gegen Hitler und der Staatsstreich vom 20. Juli 1944 in der SD-Berichterstattung: Geheime Dokumente aus dem ehemaligen Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1984), 1:366.
[back]
20. “Witzleben was a refreshingly uncomplicated man”: Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 304.
[back]
21. The real difference between Halder and Witzleben: Peter Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat: Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler (Munich: Piper, 1985), 118; Halder an Deutsch, 28.4.1952, 1, Deutsch Papers, series 3, box 2.
[back]
22. Dr. Schacht, who would take it upon himself: Based on Gisevius’s version. Halder denied after the war that he ever proposed the Reich chancellorship to Schacht. See Franz Halder, “Zu den Aussagen,” 24. Bis 26.4.1946,” BA-MA BAarch N/124/10, p. 4.