by Danny Orbach
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23. According to one version: Heinrich Bücheler, Generaloberst Erich Hoepner und die Militäropposition gegen Hitler (Berlin: Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit, 1981), 9–10; Halder, “Protokoll der öffentlichen Sitzung der Spruchkammer München X, BY 11/47, am 15.9.1948,” BA-MA Msg 2/213, p. 6(70); and compare with the version of Hoepner’s son, who believed (perhaps erroneously) that his father’s mission was to block SS reinforcements from Munich; see Joachim Hoepner to Peter Hoffmann, 3.4.1964, IfZ ZS-2121, p. 2, http://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zs/zs-2121.pdf.
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24. “My God, . . . he’s given us everything!”: Hugh Ragsdale, The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 48–49.
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25. “A splinter of a nation”: Hermann Göring, Reden und Aufsätze (Munich: F. Eher Nachf, 1938), 387; Max Domarus, Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen, 1932–1945: Kommentiert von einem deutschen Zeitgenossen (Würzburg: Schmidt, Neustadt a.d. Aisch, 1962), 888–89.
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26. both train station and airport “were full of Jews”: William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960), 1:383.
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27. “In view of the increasingly critical situation”: Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (London: Macmillan, 1970), 363.
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28. the Führer kept his belligerent mood: Ibid., 367; compare to the testimony of Paul Schmidt, Hitler’s personal interpreter; see Paul Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, 1923–1945: Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetschers im Auswärtigen Amt mit den Staatsmännern Europas (Bonn: Athenäum Verlag, 1949), 396–97; “2.Teil, Fortsetzung der Befragung Professor Deutsch von Botho von Wussow [und Gräfin Schwerin]” (undated), pp. 4–6, Deutsch Papers, series 3, box 3, round 1 Material.
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29. “The Führer told Chamberlain yesterday”: Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik,2:648; Horace Wilson, Report on Berchtesgaden, 17.9.1938, Papers of Neville Chamberlain, HULL, reel 45, NC8/26/2.
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30. “The putsch and the assassination”: Halder, “Protokoll,” BA-MA Msg 2/213, p. 86(62); for similar complaints, see Halder, “Zu den Aussagen des Dr. Gisevius in Nürnberg 24. Bis 26.4.1946,” BA-MA BAarch N/124/10, pp. 2, 4.
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31. Dohnanyi had a slightly different plan: Halder an Deutsch, 23.10.1954, 3, Deutsch Papers, series 3, box 2; Franz Halder, “Zu den Aussagen des Dr. Gisevius in Nürnberg 24. Bis 26.4.1946,” BA-MA BAarch N/124/10, p. 5.
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32. Its job was to arrest Hitler: Susanne Meiml, Nationalsozialisten gegen Hitler: Die nationalrevolutionäre Opposition um Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz (Berlin: Siedler, 2000), 283–98. In Liedig’s testimony on the shock troops, he is wrong in dating them 1939, which is one year later. However, the fact that this scheme was born in 1938 becomes clear at p. 10 (“these plans took a systematic shape already in 1938”). See Hauptquartier, Streitkräfte der Vereinigten Staaten, Europäische Abteilung, Zentrum des militärischen Geheimdienstes APO 757, Sonderbericht seiner Vernehmung (CSIR) No. 6, Ereignisse des Monats Juli 1944, Franz Maria Liedig, 7, 10, Deutsch Papers, series 4, box 9, General Opposition.
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33. only three people were privy to the plot: Meiml, Nationalsozialisten gegen Hitler, 292–93.
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34. “It was a disgusting day”: Unterhaltung mit Frau Ursula von Witzleben, 10.2.1970, 2, Deutsch Papers, series 3, box 3, round 1 Material.
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35. he used to boast of his ties: Ted Harrison, “‘Alter Kämpfer’ im Widerstand: Graf Helldorff, die NS-Bewegung, und die Opposition gegen Hitler,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 45, no. 3 (July 1997): 385–423; SD report, 11.8.1944, GARF Fond R-9401, Opis 2, Del 97, p. 208. SS prosecutor Walther Huppenkothen, who was deeply involved in the investigations following July 20, 1944, related after the war that the conspirators planned to replace Helldorff with Tresckow because of the former’s “bad reputation.” See Abschrift Huppenkothen, IfZ ZS 0249-1, p. 51.
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36. Now, he promised Oster: There is an interesting eyewitness testimony on Schulenburg’s involvement in the 1938 conspiracy. The witness, Countess Schwerin von Schwanenfeld, confirming her memories with her sister’s diary, told Harold Deutsch that on September 17 (probably a mistake; it must have been a few days earlier, before the Berchtesgaden summit), she and her husband were traveling with the Schulenburgs in their car. When they passed a military convoy, Schulenburg told her, “Soon this army will liberate us from Hitler and all of his associates.” Her testimony is supported by the unrelated account of Charlotte, Schulenburg’s wife, also to Harold Deutsch; see “2.Teil, Fortsetzung der Befragung Professor Deutsch von Botho von Wussow [und Gräfin Schwerin]” (undated), pp. 3–4, Deutsch Papers, series 3, box 3, round 1 Material.
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37. Arthur Nebe . . . was and remains an unsolved mystery: After the war, some of the surviving conspirators, most prominently Gisevius, Gersdorff, and Schlabrendorff, opened a posthumous campaign to clear Nebe’s name. They argued that Nebe helped them in the conspiracy against Hitler and also tried to do his best to mitigate the massacres in the east. Historical research has not been kind to these arguments. Indeed, they seem to be poorly supported. Schlabrendorff himself was cynically asked by the prosecutor in the government ministries trial at Nuremberg “how many millions of Jews” it was acceptable to kill if the “final goal is to overthrow Hitler.” Not even one, answered Schlabrendorff, and the prosecutor rested his case. See Nuremberg Green, 13:402.
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38. Witzleben decided to send Gisevius: Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 320.
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39. Oster met privately with Captain Heinz: Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat, 121; Meiml, Nationalsozialisten gegen Hitler, 290-93; Terry Parssinen, The Oster Conspiracy of 1938: The Unknown Story of the Military Plot to Kill Hitler and Avert World War II (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 132–35.
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40. “Hitler was in a highly nervous state”: Shirer, Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, 1:391.
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41. These were days of immense pressure: “2.Teil, Fortsetzung der Befragung Professor Deutsch von Botho von Wussow, [und Gräfin von Schwerin]” (undated), pp. 6–7, Deutsch Papers, series 3, box 3, round 1 Material.
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42. “With the most profound regret”: Paul Schmidt, Hitler’s Interpreter, ed. R. H. C. Steed (New York: Macmillan, 1951), 101.
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43. “The bird . . . has to come back to its cage”: Romedio G. Grav von Thun-Hohenstein, Der Verschwörer: General Oster und die Militäropposition (Berlin: Severin & Sielder, 1982), 113.
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44. Foreign Secretary Halifax had a serious conversation: Halifax Papers, CAC, HLFX I/3/3.6, A4.410.3.7, p. 3; Cadogan,Diaries, 105–6.
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45. “so long as Nazism lasted”: Cabinet Papers, NA CAB 23/95, pp. 198–200.
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46. “The complete change of view”: Halifax Papers, CAC, HLFX I/3/3.6, A4.410.3.7, pp. 1–2. In the introduction to the relevant section of his papers, Halifax was not able to recall the exact date when the notes were exchanged, only that it was during the height of the Sudeten crisis. However, a comparison with the description of the same incident in the diary of Alexander Cadogan (see note 44), and the cabinet minutes of September 25 (see note 45), shows that 25.9.1938 is most probably the right date, as Parssinen argues (Oster Conspiracy of 1938, 146).
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47. Another surprising turn took place: Halifax Papers, CAC, HLFX I/3/3.6, A4.410.3.7., p. 6; Cabinet Papers, NA, CAB/23/95, pp. 234–35.
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48. “if France, in fulfillment of her treaty obligations”: Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Buhne, 409; for the agreed-upon text of Wilson’s message, see Cabinet Papers, NA, CAB
23/95.
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49. “he would have liked best”: Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 324.
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50. “I had not been standing long”: William L. Shirer, Berlin Diary: The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent, 1934–1941 (London: Hamilton, 1943), 27.9.1943, p. 119; compare with the versions of Gisevius (To the Bitter End, 324) and Ruth Andreas-Friedrich, who witnessed the parade: Schauplatz Berlin: Ein deutsches Tagebuch (Munich: Rheinsberg Verlag G. Lentz, 1962), 27.9.1943, pp. 5–6.
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51. “How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is”: Chamberlain Papers, HULL Roll 31, NC 4/5/24: 2, 6–7, 42:3.
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52. “The silence of predawn Berlin”: Parssinen, Oster Conspiracy of 1938, 161.
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53. Oster gave Gisevius the Führer’s reply: Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 325.
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54. “Gisevius, the time has come!”: Ibid.
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55. “I have something further to say”: Feiling, Life of Neville Chamberlain, 374.
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56. Chamberlain probably continued to believe: Chamberlain Papers, HULL, NC 4/5/40, 7–8.
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57. “We, the German Führer and Chancellor”: Chamberlain Papers, HULL, NC 4/5/29, NC 4/5/30, 13.
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58. “We are in the presence of a disaster”: Chamberlain Papers, HULL, NC 13-11-274-811; Winston S. Churchill, Into Battle: Speeches by the Right Hon. Winston Churchill, ed. Randolph S. Churchill (London: Cassell, 1941), 42–53.
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59. “We are abandoned”: Robert Kee, Munich: The Eleventh Hour (London: Hamilton, 1988), 204.
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60. “Never, since 1933, . . . was there such a good chance”: Erich Kordt, Wahn und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart: Union deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1947), 126.
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61. Now the heartbroken conspirators met: Halder, “Protokoll der öffentlichen Sitzung der Spruchkammer München X, BY 11/47, am 15.9.1948,” BA-MA Msg 2/213, p. 8(71).
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62. “I had already passed the order to Witzleben”: Nuremberg Green, 12:1083.
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63. “It is clear from the chain of events”: Hjalmar Schacht, Abrechnung mit Hitler, WC-TAU N4F SCHA.
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64. Gisevius and Oster had to quietly dissolve: Gerhard Ringshausen, Hans-Alexander von Voss: Generalstabsoffizier im Widerstand, 1907–1944 (Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2008), 37–38.
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65. “The impossible had happened”: Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 326.
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6. Without a Network: The Lone Assassin
1. Until the end of 1944: Peter Steinbach and Johannes Tuchel, Georg Elser: Der Hitler Attentäter (Berlin: Be. Bra Wissenschaft, 2008), 108–27; Walter Uslepp (interview, 10.5.1964), Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-4, http://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_04.pdf, pp. 42, 84, 86–89, 137. Elser lived in similar conditions at his second, and last, place of internment—the concentration camp of Dachau. There, too, he was held in strict isolation but given carpentry tools and his old zither. See Franz Lechner (interview, 5.12.1959), Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-2, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_02.pdf, pp. 20–21.
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2. “He does not have a typically criminal face”: Völkischer Beobachter, November 22, 1939. As Elser left hardly any writings, there is only one major primary source on his life and activities: his detailed Gestapo interrogation, which can be seen as an autobiography of sorts. This chapter is based mainly on this source, as well as on other documents and testimonies kept in IfZ, BA, and GEAH. For a published version of the interrogation, analysis, and juxtaposition, see Georg J. Elser, Autobiographie eines Attentätters: Der Anschlag auf Hitler in Bürgerbräukeller, 1939, ed. Lothar Gruchmann (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1989), 22.
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3. Georg Elser was born in 1903: Anton Egetemaier (interview, undated), Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-1, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_01.pdf, p. 48.
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4. Georg was interested in little: Ibid., pp. 51–52; Leonhard Elser (interrogation, undated), Friedrich Grupp (interview, undated), Elsa Votteler (interview, 28.7.1950), Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-1, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_01.pdf, pp. 61–63, 102–6; Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-3, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_03.pdf, p. 15. On Elser’s time in Switzerland, see the replies of the Swiss police to the inquires of the Gestapo, 1.2.1940: BA, E 4320 (B) 1970/25 Bd 1–4, Dossier C.2.102, Ermittlungsbericht VI.
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5. Elser’s family . . . came close to the brink: Hilda Wetzel (interview, undated), Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-3, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_03.pdf, p. 140.
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6. Elser related to his Gestapo interrogators: Elser, Autobiographie, 80.
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7. “I believe that God made the world”: Ibid., 75–74, 79, 80.
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8. “I am convinced that the Munich Agreement will not hold”: Ibid., 81; compare with Otto Kessler (interrogation, 15.8.1950), Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-1, www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/ed_0088.pdf, p. 141.
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9. “My hope was to prevent a bigger bloodshed”: Elser, Autobiographie, 75, 84.
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10. Elser was never “normal”: Leonhard Elser (interrogation, undated), Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-1, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_01.pdf, p. 61–63.
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11. “So I decided to kill the leadership myself”: Elser, Autobiographie, 84–85.
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12. “Here in this gathering”: Peter Hoffmann, Hitler’s Personal Security (London: Macmillan, 1979), 106–7. See also Resch to Hoch (18.1.1966), Schmitt to Hoch (29.3.1966), Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-2, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_02.pdf, p. 147; ZS/A 17-3, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_03.pdf, p. 33.
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13. the two veterans responsible for the security inside: Maria Strobl (interview, 15.10.1959), Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-3, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_03.pdf, pp. 63–64.
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14. “I went from the entrance to the middle of the hall”: Elser, Autobiographie, 87.
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15. During the nights, he sneaked unnoticed: Wilhelm Rauschenberger (interrogation, 9.8.1950), Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-2, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_02.pdf, p. 135.
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16. Quickly, he found that the great hall could be reached: Maria Strobl (interview, 15.10.1959), Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-3, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_03.pdf, p. 64.
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17. he planned a highly sophisticated bomb: Eugen Elser (interview, undated), Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-1, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_01.pdf, p. 58.
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18. “From that moment, . . . I lived only for one purpose”: Elser, Autobiographie, 104; Karoline Schmauder (interview, undated), Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-3, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_03.pdf, p. 21.
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19. Again he rented an apartment close to the beer hall: Ibid.; Rauschenberger (interrogation, 9.8.1950), Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-2, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_02.pdf, p. 135.
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20. “When the hall was opened . . .”: Elser, Autobiographie, 126.
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21. Many of his generals deemed the plan: See chapter 8.
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22. “During my short stay at Stuttgart”: Elser, Autobiographie, 38; compare with Karl’s version: Karl Hirth (interview, 5.8.1950), Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-1, www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/ed_0088.pdf, p. 111.
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&n
bsp; 23. “Immediately upon my arrival at the hall”: Elser, Autobiographie, 152.
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24. “The lies of that time [1914] are identical”: Max Domarus, Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen, 1932–1945: Kommentiert von einem deutschen Zeitgenossen (Würzburg: Schmidt, Neustadt a.d. Aisch, 1962), 1406.
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25. This time chance betrayed him: Hoffmann, Hitler’s Personal Security, 107–8; Steinbach and Tuchel, Georg Elser, 74–75.
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26. The pillar exploded: Steinbach and Tuchel, Georg Elser, 76–77; Maria Strobl (interview, 15.10.1959), Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-3, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_03.pdf, pp. 67–68; Elser, Autobiographie, 8–9. Quote taken from an anonymous eyewitness account, translated by the British Foreign Office, “The Black Night of Munich,” Der Bund No.532, 14.11.1939, NA, FO 371/23012, p. 112.
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27. “I stopped right away”: Elser, Autobiographie, 154; compare with the version of the guards: Xaver Rieger (interrogation, 23.10.1950), Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-2, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_02.pdf, pp. 146–49.
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28. The policemen searched him: See the official reports on Elser’s arrest: Xaver Rieger and Othmar Zipperer “Schilderung des Aufgriffs des Georg Elser,” 15.12.1939, Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-5, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_05.pdf, pp. 29–33; compare with Otto Grethe (interview, 30.4.1964), Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-1, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_01.pdf, pp. 92–100; Karl Metzen an den Generalstaatsanwalt bei dem Oberlandesgericht München, 16.10.1956, Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-2, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_02.pdf, pp. 77–80.
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29. Göring and his other close associates congratulated him: Joseph Goebbels, Tagebücher, 1924–1945, ed. Ralf Georg Reuth, 2nd ed. (Munich: Piper, 1992), entry 9.11.1939, 3:1346–47.
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30. This true statement was accepted by Nebe: Paul Bässler (interview, 18.8.1950), Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ, http:://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_01.pdf, p. 12; Steinbach and Tuchel, Georg Elser, 96.
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31. two British intelligence operatives were kidnapped: Abschrift Huppenkothen, 11.7.1947, IfZ ZS 0249-1, p. 17; BA, E 4320 (B) 1970/25 Bd 1–4, Dossier C.2.102, available also online in GEAH, http:://www.georg-elser-arbeitskreis.de/texts/schweiz.htm; Wilhelm Rauschenberger (interrogation, 9.8.1950), Bürgerbräuattentat, IfZ ZS/A 17-2, http://www.ifz-muenchen.de/archiv/zsa/ZS_A_0017_02.pdf, p. 135.