In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan

by Seth G. Jones

  In addition, Washington needs to make a concerted effort to engage both Pakistan and India, which have competing interests in Afghanistan. Transforming regional security perceptions among the Afghans, Pakistanis, and Indians has always been a monumental challenge, especially in light of such events as the November 2008 terrorist attacks in India’s financial hub, Mumbai, which were perpetrated by militants operating from Pakistani soil and tied to the Pakistani group Lashkar-e-Taiba. But regional cooperation constitutes the only way to stabilize and secure Afghanistan so that it does not again become a terrorist sanctuary. Otherwise, the Afghan population will continue to pay a heavy price for the conflict between New Delhi and Islamabad, on the one hand, and Kabul and Islamabad, on the other.

  Paradise on Earth?

  In Babur’s gardens, the inscription on his tomb serves as a source of inspiration for those who pay tribute: “If there is a paradise on earth, it is this, it is this, it is this!” Afghanistan can be deceptive. It has a beautiful, dramatic landscape with villages and district centers that look much as they did hundreds of years ago, untouched by modern technology. But the country has also been a quagmire for invading armies, which have torn the country apart even as they wasted themselves in the high mountain sands.

  On the outskirts of Kabul, in an area called Asmai Heights, lies the Kabre Ghora graveyard, which was established by British forces during the second Anglo-Afghan War. The name is taken from the term used by Afghans to describe British soldiers (ghora), and the cemetery is believed to contain the graves of 158 British soldiers, diplomats, and their families who died in the city during the occupations of 1839—1842 and 1879—1880. The original British gravestones have mostly disappeared, leaving only the remnants of ten grave markers, now relocated against the southern wall of the cemetery. But a new memorial has been erected and new names have been added, honoring soldiers from the United States, Canada, and Europe who have died here from 2001 to the present day.

  Perhaps the most extraordinary thing about Afghanistan is its continuity. The NATO memorial may be brand new, but soon it will feel as ancient and totemic as the British graveyard, another artifact from empires past. Like the gardens of Babur, Afghans have shown an uncanny ability to regenerate. Time has a rather curious way of slowing down here. “You have the watches,” one Taliban detainee told his American interrogators, “but we have the time.”14 Most Afghans have never asked for much. They have longed for security and hope, and perhaps something to make their difficult lives more bearable. After decades of constant war, they deserve it.

  AFTERWORD

  THE GREAT CHALLENGE of writing about any ongoing conflict is knowing when to “end” the story. While I was living in Kabul in 2009, there appeared to be no end to the insurgency—at least on the surface. Many Afghans remained defiant of the Taliban, but insurgents continued to pull off lethal attacks against international forces and Afghans. Not far from my office, the Haqqani network blew up a two-vehicle Italian military convoy traveling from Kabul International Airport in September. The suicide bomber pulled out of a side street in an SUV, maneuvered between the two vehicles, and detonated. The blast was deafening. The explosive weight of the main charge was between 600 and 800 pounds, and left a huge crater in the middle of the road. The force of the blast threw the front Italian vehicle thirty-five meters to a dirt patch on the shoulder and peeled the roof off the passenger compartment. As with many suicide attacks in Afghanistan, it was innocent Afghans who took the most casualties. Sixteen civilians were killed and another sixty were wounded, in addition to the six Italian soldiers and four Afghan police officers who were killed.

  “It was a mess,” said one U.S. army soldier who had been standing near the blast zone. “Shrapnel was coming down like rain. And car fragments, dirt, rocks, and chunks of nearby trees came hurtling at us.”1

  But there were bright spots. I noticed grassroots initiatives sprouting across Afghanistan in which local tribes and communities began to resist the Taliban and other insurgents. They ranged from Noorzais, Barakzais, and Alikozais in the west and south to Shinwaris, Kharotis, Mangals, and Jajis in the east. Even in such northern provinces as Konduz, there were ongoing local efforts by Tajiks, Uzbeks, and even Pashtuns to fight the Taliban. In October 2009 in Herat Province, Afghan army commandos and U.S. Special Operations Forces killed Ghulam Yahya Akbari, a senior insurgent leader who had just tried (and failed) to assassinate Afghan Minister of Water and Energy Ismail Khan. Akbari was colloquially referred to as the “scourge of Herat” because he had committed so many kidnappings and assassinations. Seventeen of his close associates were also killed during the air assault as AH-64 Apache attack helicopters closed in on them after they scrambled away from a camp of nomadic Kuchi herdsman with whom they had been hiding. The most startling outcome of Akbari’s assassination, however, was that seventy insurgents loyal to him turned themselves in to U.S. Special Operations Forces and the Afghans, vowing to support the government.

  The Obama administration, which had come to office pledging to reverse course in Afghanistan and defeat the Taliban and al Qa’ida, still found itself in a predicament. “This is not quite where we expected to be,” one White House official told me somewhat wryly.2 U.S. General Stanley McChrystal’s summer 2009 assessment of Afghanistan said, “we face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans—in both their government and the international community—that undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents.”3 For many Americans, support for the war boiled down to a simple question: What are America’s strategic interests in Afghanistan?

  Al Qa’ida and Russian Roulette

  For some, Afghanistan has little strategic value for the United States. They contend that the objectives are skewed and the war is unwinnable. Instead of continuing a faltering counterinsurgency campaign, they believe the United States should withdraw most of its forces and shift to a counterterrorism strategy that targets al Qa’ida terrorists with Special Operations Forces and drones.

  Steven Simon, for example, who served as senior director for transnational threats on the Clinton administration’s National Security Council, said that “Washington should concentrate on its already effective policy of eliminating al Qa’ida’s leadership with drone strikes” rather than target the Taliban, since “the moment to rescue the mission…has passed.”4 Simon continued that the core al Qa’ida threat to America resides in Pakistan, not Afghanistan.5 University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer, a West Point graduate, similarly wrote that the U.S. government should “accept defeat” and “withdraw its forces from Afghanistan.”6 In September 2009, U.S. State Department employee Matthew Hoh, a former U.S. Marine captain, resigned from his post as the senior civilian representative for the U.S. government in Zabol Province. In his letter of resignation, he warned that “we are mortgaging our Nation’s economy on a war, which, even with increased commitment, will remain a draw for years to come.”7

  These are serious arguments from thoughtful, experienced individuals. But they are ultimately misleading and unrealistic. First, they fail to grasp the close relationship between al Qa’ida and Afghan insurgent groups, which make the prospect of a Taliban victory in Afghanistan perilous for America’s national interest. It would mean playing Russian roulette with U.S. security. Take the Taliban. The al Qa’ida–Taliban relationship has deep historical roots going back to the personal links that Mullah Mohammad Omar developed with Osama bin Laden in the 1990s. The relationship strengthened after the 2001 overthrow of the Taliban regime, and senior al Qa’ida and Taliban officials regularly communicated and coordinated efforts to overthrow the Karzai government in Afghanistan.

  In southern Afghanistan, there are pockets of al Qa’ida and other foreign fighters in Helmand and several neighboring provinces, such as Kandahar and Zabol. Taliban leaders, including Helmand shadow governor Mullah Naim Barech, offer protection to al Qa’ida and other foreign fighters. During a November 2009 trip to Helm
and Province, U.S. and British forces detailed for me the networks of foreign fighters in such areas as Marjeh, which lies southwest of Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand province. Marjeh is a small agrarian community near the Helmand River that is a hotbed for the drug trade, and it has long been a strategic location for the Taliban. From Marjeh they are able to launch attacks on Lashkar Gah and the surrounding region. “The foreigners are involved in helping local fighters conduct suicide attacks and other improvised explosive devices,” said one U.S. Army major, who had led several operations in the Marjeh area. “Some also bring video cameras with them to take footage of insurgent operations and use it for propaganda.”8 In eastern Afghanistan, there are several small pockets of al Qa’ida and other foreign fighters in the area beginning around Khowst Province and reaching north to Kunar Province. In July 2008, at least one Arab was involved—and ultimately killed—in the insurgent attack on a U.S. vehicle patrol base in Wanat Village, Kunar Province. A U.S. Army After Action report on the attack described him as wearing “traditional Afghan clothing over a set of woodland camouflage military fatigues.”9

  The Haqqani network has also developed close ties with al Qa’ida. Jalaluddin Haqqani, the organization’s founder, picked up on al Qa’ida themes in his propaganda, equating the United States with “Crusader” forces. “The financial expenses that the United States spends in Afghanistan as well as the killing of dozens of the U.S. forces at the hands of the mujahidin every day reflect the victory of the mujahidin and the defeat of the aggressive Crusader forces,” he wrote in Al-Samud, a monthly jihadist magazine.10 Jalaluddin even married an Arab woman as a symbol of his support. Jalaluddin’s son Sirajuddin, who was given the title “khalifa” as the leader of the Haqqani network, developed a close relationship with al Qa’ida leaders in Pakistan, who helped him orchestrate a range of audacious terrorist attacks in Afghanistan.11 One of the most spectacular was the September 17, 2009, attack in Kabul, for which some al Qa’ida operatives from Peshawar helped build the IED that killed six Italian soldiers.12

  Second, proponents of a withdrawal overstate the effectiveness of drone strikes using MQ-1 Predators and MQ-9 Reapers. Drones can have a short-term impact, as they did in the 2008 and 2009 attacks on al Qa’ida operatives such as Abu Khabab al-Masri, a chemical and biological expert; Khalid Habib al-Masri, a commander in Afghanistan; and Abu Jihad al-Masri, an external operations planner. But drones don’t offer a long-term solution. One U.S. intelligence official told me, “They are lethal in targeting foreign fighters. But using them as a long-term strategy would be like playing whack-a-mole.”13

  Finally, there remain small numbers of al Qa’ida operatives and other foreign fighters in Afghanistan, and the al Qa’ida fighters in Pakistan tend to be clustered along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Few actually recognize the border, and insurgents cross regularly with ease. Beginning in October 2009, the Pakistan army launched Operation Rah-e-Nijat against militants in South Waziristan, which triggered an exodus of foreign fighters across the border into Afghanistan. Indeed, Pakistani militants, including Wahad Shah, facilitated the movement of foreign fighters out of South Waziristan and into the Afghan province of Paktika. In addition, senior al Qa’ida leaders have repeatedly claimed the war in Afghanistan as their raison d’être. “The mujahideen [in Afghanistan] are hopeful and high spirited,” remarked Abu al-Yazid, al Qa’ida’s chief of operations, in a 2008 interview with Pakistan’s GEO TV. “They are now expanding their areas of operations and carrying out actions in northern provinces too. And by the will of God, we will be able to wrestle Afghanistan free of foreign occupation very soon.”14

  A related contention is that it is pointless to focus on Afghanistan because al Qa’ida can easily find other sanctuaries in Somalia, Yemen, or numerous other locations.15 Yet this argument fails to understand the origins and development of al Qa’ida in the Pashtun areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, which have taken nearly three decades to hone. “It is simply not true that all potential al Qaeda sanctuaries are of the same importance, now or potentially,” wrote journalist Steve Coll, author of the Pulitzer Prize–winning Ghost Wars, which documented the CIA’s activities in Afghanistan from the Soviet invasion to September 11, 2001. “Bin Laden and his No. 2, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, have a 30-year, unique history of trust and collaboration with the Pashtun Islamist networks located in North Waziristan, Bajaur, and the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan.”16

  It is important to recognize the link between al Qa’ida and Afghan insurgent groups. A policy focused on targeting al Qa’ida—and not the Taliban, Haqqani network, or other groups—would ignore one of the most egregious lessons from September 11, 2001: Taliban-controlled areas will likely be used as a sanctuary for al Qa’ida and other jihadist groups targeting the United States. These groups have close links with al Qa’ida, and there is no evidence—just wishful thinking—that senior Taliban or other leaders would break those links if they controlled more territory in Afghanistan, including Kabul itself. Taliban leaders permitted al Qa’ida and other militant groups to establish training camps in Afghanistan in the 1990s, and a similar development would likely occur again because their relationship is even stronger today.

  A Shadow Government

  The al Qa’ida connection is significant because the Taliban and other groups continue to push into rural Pashtun areas and are desperately trying to get a permanent foothold in northern parts of the country. As I visited Pashtun villages in southern and eastern Afghanistan, I saw the Taliban strategy at the grassroots level.

  At its core, their strategy is designed to co-opt or coerce local tribes and other communities at the village and district levels. The insurgency is organized along both vertical and horizontal lines. The inner shura, based out of Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province, exerts some authority over lower-level Taliban fighters inside southern Afghanistan through a series of subordinate shuras, shadow governors, and military commanders. Some of the most influential figures include Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, his principal deputy Abdul Ghani Berader, and military commander Abdul Qayum Zakir. Berader is particularly important because he tends to run most of the shuras involving senior Taliban commanders. “Omar is reclusive and unpolished,” one Taliban leader told me, “and has preferred to confide in a small number of trusted advisors rather than address larger groups.”17 The two are close, however, and Omar is apparently married to Berader’s sister. Berader, whose name means “brother” in Pashto (making it a nom de guerre), is a devout Muslim from the Popalzai tribe, the same tribe as President Hamid Karzai. His body has paid the price of years of jihad: he has a scar on his shoulder from a bullet wound and a scar on his leg from shrapnel. Like many senior Taliban leaders, Berader lives in Baluchistan Province, Pakistan, where he cannot be reached by U.S. operations and can coordinate with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) and other organizations.

  The insurgency also includes loosely aligned horizontal networks of full-time and part-time guerrillas, criminal groups, tribes, local powerbrokers, and support networks. Few are motivated by ideology; the majority of insurgents are driven by money, grievances against the government, or coercion. The Taliban’s primary goals remain expanding their territory, instituting sharia law, and creating an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Taliban leaders describe their struggle as a “confrontation between Islam and apostasy” and have created a shadow government in areas they influence or control.18 This focus on Islam explains why so many of the Taliban’s shadow governors are mullahs, including Mullah Aminullah (Kandahar), Mullah Naim Barech (Helmand), Mullah Ismail (Zabol), Mullah Rasul (Farah), and Mullah Salam (Kunduz). Historically, the Taliban have attempted to enforce a strict dress code for men, forcing them to grow beards and avoid Western haircuts or dress. But in some areas they have temporarily relaxed their insistence on a strict interpretation of Deobandi Islam to secure popular support. They released an updated code of conduct before Afghanistan’s August 2009 presidential elections, n
oting that the “mujahideen should strive to win the hearts and minds of Muslims by treating them with justice and good faith.”19 And senior Taliban leaders created an accountability commission to relieve members involved in corruption or unwarranted brutality toward the local population.

  Not surprisingly, Taliban commanders have developed a fairly sophisticated understanding of the tribal dynamics in their areas. It is impossible to generalize about the Taliban’s overall tribal strategy because of their adaptability to conditions and shifting tribal dynamics. In broad terms, however, they aim to take advantage of grievances against the government or international forces, conducting targeted assassinations against collaborators, and capitalizing on Taliban momentum (and the perception of a domino effect) to increase their appeal to locals. In April 2009, the Taliban announced the beginning of Operation Nasrat (Victory), noting that they would continue to use “ambushes, offensives, explosions, martyrdom-seeking attacks and surprise attacks.”20 Taliban commanders being knowledgeable of Pashtun tribes, sub-tribes, clans, and qawms, can convince local leaders that resistance is futile, prompting them to either disband or join them. The Taliban sometimes appoint commanders who come from local tribes to more effectively reach out to the population. And they have recruited tribes that are the majority in their districts but have been marginalized by ruling minority tribes, such as the Popalzais or Barakzais, who are favored by the central government. The Taliban’s tribal engagement strategy is perhaps best summarized in Mullah Omar’s 2009 code of conduct, or La’iha, which provided guidance that “Taliban will constructively engage tribal leaders” and “commanders should, where possible, be reassigned to their ancestral, tribal area” to better engage tribal leaders at the local level.21

  The ultimate goal of any insurgent movement is to become the government. While I was visiting Paktia Province in October 2009, tribal leaders explained to me that local Taliban were involved in trying to resolve a land dispute between the Chamkani and Moqbil tribes in Chamkani District. “The government has failed to resolve the land dispute,” noted one local, “and the Taliban has moved in to broker it. They are trying to play the role of the government.”22