Days of Valor

by Robert L. Tonsetic

  While the 856th Radio Detachment provided signal intelligence to the 199th LIB, the 179th Military Intelligence (MI) Detachment provided all other intelligence. The MI Detachment had 38 men assigned. The detachment was broken down into five sections: Headquarters, Order of Battle, Prisoner of War Interrogation, Image Interpretation, and Counterintelligence. Colonel Davison relied heavily on the MI Detachment to pull together all the enemy information that was gathered from the field assets. He later credited the 199th LIB’s success in countering the Tet attacks to the 179th MI Detachment. The 179th MI had many experienced personnel, some of whom had more than a year in-country. One such individual was Chief Warrant Officer Ken Welch.

  Welch was the chief of the 179th MI Detachment’s analysis section, and was well qualified for the job. Arriving in Vietnam in 1963 as a Specialist Fifth Class, Welch worked his way up through the intelligence ranks to Chief Warrant Officer by the time he was assigned to the 199th LIB in 1967. He knew the intelligence business, and had personal contacts in all the major US and Vietnamese military and civilian intelligence outfits in Vietnam. He later received a direct commission to second lieutenant and made captain before leaving country. Welch attributed his success to the many great people he had working for him, such as 26 year old John Durby. Durby held a PhD, and was a college professor before joining the Army and volunteering for duty in Vietnam. Welch and the brigade’s personnel officer worked closely together to screen incoming replacements, selecting the “best and brightest” for Welch’s analysis section.

  Chief Warrant Officer Ken Welch and his section started to put the pieces of the puzzle together in mid-January. He noted that small groups of VC were detected moving with increasing frequency between War Zone D and the Bien Hoa and Long Binh areas. Welch thought that these were supply parties charged with the movement and positioning of weapons and ammunition in preparation for an attack. Additionally, Welch and other members of the 179th, including Warrant Officer James Creamer, were well aware that VC agents dressed as civilians were operating in the villages surrounding Long Binh. The Communist agents gathered information from Vietnamese civilians who worked on the US bases concerning their layout and defenses. Welch and Creamer were particularly concerned about enemy activity in Ho Nai village.

  Ho Nai village sat astride Highway 1 just north of the main base camp of the 199th LIB. The village was eight kilometers east of Bien Hoa and six kilometers south of the Dong Nai River. Houses on the south side of the village were within pistol shot range of the base camp’s outer perimeter. Many of the residents of the village were Catholic refugees who had fled North Vietnam when the country was divided. The Than Tam Refugee Hospital, and Da Minh Orphanage were located in Ho Nai Village, along with a thriving Catholic Church. The hospital was sponsored by the Order of St John of God in Montreal, Canada. This Roman Catholic order of nursing brothers had organized and partially staffed the hospital since its founding in 1952. A distinctive architectural feature of the hospital was a 50-foot tower that overlooked the village and the surrounding area. Medical personnel assigned to the 199th LIB provided technical assistance, supplies, and drugs to the hospital as part of the civic action program.

  Many of the residents of Ho Nai were employed at the U.S. installations in and around Long Binh. Welch recruited Vietnamese agents who lived in the village to track VC activity in the area. One such agent was a young girl who worked as kitchen help in one of the brigade’s mess halls. The girl was well connected, a niece of the mayor of Ho Nai, and a cousin of the commander of a VC reconnaissance unit. The cousin visited the village prior to Tet to warn family members to move out of the village before the end of the month. He even identified the 275th VC Regiment as the unit that would attack through the village to reach the 199th LIB base camp and other targets in the area. The girl reported this cousin’s visit to Welch, who took the information seriously.

  In addition to his agents, WO Welch relied on intelligence gathered by a Combined Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon (CRIP). The platoon consisted of Vietnamese and US military personnel, and it conducted nightly roving patrols and ambushes to prevent VC infiltration of the village. The platoon, which rarely exceeded two dozen men, lived in the village and had numerous contacts among the villagers. The CRIP reported directly to WO Welch. Along with his agents, the CRIP was his eyes and ears in Ho Nai village.

  Along with the collection of intelligence from its own assets, the MI detachment received intelligence from other in-country assets. From 15 through 25 January 1968, numerous reports were received that indicated units of the 5th VC Division as they moved out of War Zone D toward their Tet targets. By 27 January, the 5th VC Headquarters was located in eastern Uniontown, while the division artillery and supporting divisional units were confirmed to be in the central portion of AO Columbus. The division’s assault regiments, the 274th and 275th VC Regiments, were also located in AO Columbus and Uniontown. The movement of these two regiments, numbering almost 3,000 men, gave a clear indication of an impending attack. Assisting the 274th and 275th Regiments was the U-1 Local Force Battalion. This battalion provided reconnaissance support, communication liaison, and guides to for the main force regiments as they infiltrated into the Bien Hoa and Long Binh areas. The 179th Order of Battle specialists were also trying to locate the 88th NVA Regiment, which was known to operate with the 5th VC Division. US intelligence units were not able to locate the 88th. An unaccounted for NVA Regiment of 1,500 hard-core regulars, weighed heavily on Colonel Davison’s mind. He realized that his own brigade was opposed by a division-size force of three regiments.

  Despite the large number of VC/NVA forces pouring into the 199th’s AO s, enemy contacts with brigade forces were few and far between during early January 1968. In part, this was due to the size of the brigade’s AO s. The Warrior battalion’s area alone encompassed more than 130 square kilometers, a large area for a single infantry battalion to cover. To the east the 2/3d Infantry was responsible for AO Columbus, an area almost the size of Uniontown. Some intelligence analysts thought that the 5th VC Division was located in the rugged jungle terrain in the northern portion of Columbus. US operations in this AO were limited because of a lack of artillery coverage. Much of the area was beyond the maximum range of the artillery located at FSB Concord. To remedy this situation, Colonel Davison ordered the establishment of a new fire support base, FSB Hotel. The location of the new FSB was eight kilometers to the northeast of FSB Concord, just east of Highway 24 that paralleled the Dong Nai River. Three 105mm howitzers from A Battery 2/40th Artillery, and two 8-inch self-propelled howitzers from II Field Force Artillery were moved to FSB Hotel. Security was provided by two platoons from Bravo Company, 4/12th, along with four ACAV from Delta Troop, 17th Cav. While the additional artillery coverage was needed, the establishment of another fire support base with the requisite security requirements, stretched the brigade’s resources even further.

  The 3/7th Infantry’s AO Haverford, southwest of Saigon, was slightly smaller than AO Uniontown, but the terrain presented different challenges. Streams and canals flowed throughout the AO, slowing crosscountry movement by ground troops. The enemy took full advantage of the waterways to move supplies and men toward Saigon. At night, sampans and other watercraft plied the waterways moving men and equipment from numerous small base camps and way stations toward the city.

  During January 1968, there were six VC Local Force, District, and Provincial Force battalions operating in and around the 3/7th’s AO Haverford. From 15 January through 29 January, however, there were only three company-size contacts in the AO. Most contacts with VC elements were platoon-size or smaller. Attempts to bring on a major engagement with the enemy were unsuccessful. The VC commanders limited their operations to occasional mortar attacks on US and ARVN positions, and harassing attacks designed to draw attention away from the stealthy movement of Communist units infiltrating into Saigon.

  The 4/12th Infantry was a battalion in transition during January of 1968. Three of fo
ur rifle company commanders were new. Captain Pete Albers took command of Alpha Company in mid-December. Captain Bob Tonsetic was even newer, having assumed command of Charlie Company at the beginning of January. The Warrior battalion’s newest company commander was Captain Jim Dabney who assumed command of Delta Company in mid-January. Echo Company was redesignated as Delta Company shortly after Dabney assumed command, and a new Echo Company was formed as a heavy weapons company equipped with 4.2-inch mortars and 106mm recoilless rifles. A reconnaissance platoon was also formed as a part of Echo Company. In addition to the new line company commanders, there was a huge turnover in other officers and enlisted men in the battalion during the period December 1967 through January 1968.

  Beginning in December 1967, many of the seasoned combat veterans of the brigade began to leave for home. These men were part of the original cohort that had arrived with the brigade in December 1966. Their 12-month tours were over. To offset the loss of combat experience, USARV directed the infusion (in-country reassignment) of soldiers from other units in Vietnam into the 199th LIB, but there was still a shortage of seasoned combat veterans in almost every rifle company. This personnel problem could not have come at a worse time. LTC Mastoris, the Warrior battalion commander, knew full well that his battalion, including himself, had a lot to learn. What he didn’t know was the limited amount of time the battalion had to do it.

  From mid to late January 1968, Lieutenant Colonel Mastoris deployed two companies, Alpha and Echo, in the “rocket belt” to disrupt 122mm rocket attacks on Bien Hoa and Long Binh. Contacts with enemy forces were few and far between. On 15 January, an Echo Company patrol encountered an enemy squad and killed three of the VC. Two US soldiers were wounded in the firefight. Then on 25 January, Alpha Company engaged two VC protecting a rest station. The two enemy soldiers fled the area with the Alpha Company grunts in pursuit. They followed the pair to a fortified position on a jungle covered hill mass just two kilometers north of the Dong Nai River. When the Alpha Company grunts assaulted the position they were met with a hail of small arms and RPG fire.

  Fighting continued throughout the afternoon and early evening. The Charlie Battery howitzer crews firing from FSB Concord could clearly see their 105mm rounds slamming into the hilltop across the river. Fighting continued until nightfall when Mastoris ordered Alpha Company to withdraw to a more secure position. Alpha Company sustained four casualties, three men wounded and one KIA. The body of the US KIA was not recovered until the following day. It was found inside the labyrinth of tunnels that honeycombed the hilltop. It was difficult to identify the body after it arrived at the morgue, and Mastoris was shown the grim photographs. The corpse had been mutilated by the enemy before they withdrew.

  Alpha and Echo Company continued to patrol the “rocket belt,” reinforced on daylight operations by Charlie Company. Charlie Company was still charged with guarding FSB Concord, and was on 30-minute standby as the brigade ready reaction force, but Mastoris got permission for the company to conduct daylight sweeps of the “rocket belt.” The company would airmobile assault into the area, search an assigned area, and then return to FSB Concord before nightfall. This was an excellent opportunity for the new commander to get a feel for the company.

  The Warrior battalion was spread thin during the latter part of January. On 23 January, it was spread even thinner when the battalion was assigned the mission of securing the large Prisoner of War (POW) compound that was located between just off Highway 1 between Bien Hoa and Ho Nai village. Over 2,000 VC and NVA POWs were held at this facility. It was normally secured by ARVN troops, but the ARVN had a liberal leave period for the Tet national holiday, and asked for US troops to secure the facility. During daylight hours, defense forces consisted of five ACAVs from Delta Troop, 17th Cavalry, and the brigade security platoon. At night, however, the security was beefed up with a rifle platoon from the Warrior battalion’s Charlie Company. Charlie was also tasked to send a rifle squad to secure an engineer dredge site on the Dong Nai River south of Bien Hoa, further dissipating the unit’s combat power.

  Despite the warning signs, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam continued to send its officers and men to their homes throughout the country on holiday leave, oblivious to the looming threat. Approximately fifty percent of the soldiers assigned to the 46 ARVN battalions in the III Corps area were on leave status by 29 January 1968. Regional and Popular Force units were similarly undermanned by the end of the month.

  On 24 January, Colonel Davison ordered the commander of the Old Guard, 2/3d Infantry to terminate operations in AO Columbus and commence operations in AO Uniontown. LTC Carper, the Old Guard Commander, deployed two of his rifle companies on the border of Central Uniontown, and two companies south of Highway 1 in South Uniontown. Colonel Davision ordered this realignment of brigade forces to facilitate the defense of Long Binh. He was convinced that a major attack was only days away.

  By late January, there were strong indications that attacks on the Bien Hoa and Long Binh areas were imminent. Ground surveillance radars at FSB Concord began to detect enemy movement through the valley to the east of the fire base. Each night, Charlie Company’s 81mm mortar platoon located at FSB Concord fired dozens of rounds into the valley in attempts to interdict the enemy as they attempted to slip into the Bien Hoa area. Additionally, the number of sightings reported by the brigade’s and II Field Force’s LRPs were on the rise. When the sightings were plotted on operational maps, a disturbing pattern began to emerge. The sightings were steadily moving toward Long Binh. Consequently, Colonel Davison made the decision to deploy the LRPs closer to the city. The LRPs normally operated in remote areas forward of the areas patrolled by the brigade’s infantry battalions, but with Davision’s new order they patrolled the areas immediately surrounding the Long Binh base area. It was a gamble that paid off.

  On 27 January, a LRP team ambushed an enemy reconnaissance team in a graveyard just north of Ho Nai village. Davison quickly ordered his ready reaction force, Charlie Company 4/12th, located at FSB Concord to reinforce the LRP team. The reaction force, consisting of two Charlie Company platoons mounted on ACAV from Delta, 17th Cav, and commanded by Captain Tonsetic, sped to the scene. A sweep of the area turned up a single enemy body. The dead VC was a lieutenant who had been leading a VC reconnaissance unit. He was armed with a US caliber .45 pistol, and carried a US lensatic compass and a pair of East German Zeiss binoculars. The incident took place less than two kilometers from the brigade’s main base. After radioing in a report to brigade headquarters, Tonsetic’s force was ordered to return to FSB Concord.

  The following day, a patrol from Bravo Company of the Warrior battalion killed another enemy soldier armed with a pistol in AO Central Uniontown, and on 29 January, two members of a Local Force VC unit were captured in the same AO. Under interrogation, the POWs revealed that they were serving as guides for main force VC units that were moving toward their attack positions. LRPs and local agents continued to report numerous enemy units moving into AO CENTAL Uniontown over the next two days. Intelligence analysts continued to put the pieces of the puzzle together. The question was not “if” the enemy was going to attack, but “when and where.”

  On the afternoon of 29 January, The 199th LIB communication center received a “flash” II Field Force message warning of “positive intelligence indicators that the enemy will deliberately violate the truce by attacking friendly installations during the night of 29 Jan. or the early morning hours of 30 Jan.” The addressees were instructed to take action to insure maximum alert posture through the Tet period.

  When the alert went out, the 199th LIB was in a defensive posture, but the infantrymen were spread thin across its assigned AOs. Colonel Davison knew he had to have early warning of any attack in order to concentrate his forces to counter the threat. The LRPs were key to an early warning. After the II Field Force message was received, Colonel Davison met with Major Maus, commander of F/71st LRPs. Davison was concerned that the area to the north of Ho Nai villa
ge was not under surveillance by the LRPs. Maus had five LRP teams deployed in AO Uniontown and Columbus. Deployment of a sixth team would limit his ability to reinforce any team that got into trouble. Davison was adamant to the point of ordering the Major to do it. The LRP Commander was not happy, but knew he had to comply. He was a good soldier. The two looked at the map, and Davison pointed to a road that ran directly north out of the center of Ho Nai village toward the Dong Nai River. The unpaved road had a gravel base, and had been constructed by US Army engineers some months earlier. Colonel Davison recognized that the road was seldom used after the hours of darkness, and had the potential to be a high-speed avenue of approach for enemy infantry right into the heart of Ho Nai village. Davison wanted a LRP team deployed north of the village in a position where they could observe the road. It was a prescient decision.

  During the early morning hours of 30 January, a second II Field Force “flash” message announced that the Tet Truce was terminated, and instructed all units to resume normal operations. Word of the Tet Truce cancellation was passed down the chain from brigade to battalion to the rifle companies. Warnings of imminent attacks and possible attacks were not unusual and were taken in stride by the line units. Combat battalions resumed their operations, unaware of all the intelligence behind this warning. Meanwhile, every intelligence unit in Vietnam was humming with the knowledge that the level of enemy activity had reached unprecedented proportions.