The Chinese Must Go
Page 21
and received a promotion to the rank of col o nel. When he was honorably
discharged at the end of the war, Col o nel Squire accepted a secretarial posi-
tion at the Remington Arms Com pany and worked his way up to man ag er.
Squire was an East Coast gentleman, highly educated, well- traveled, and
attentive to fashion. He married the boss’s daughter, Ida Remington, in 1868
and purchased a large tract of land in Seattle from his father- in- law in 1876.
Three years later, he moved to Seattle with his family, began to develop his
vast land holdings, and became a major investor in railroads in Washington
Territory. Thanks to his connections to Republican leaders back East, he se-
cured an appointment as governor of Washington Territory in 1884.8
It was in Seattle that Squire first encountered Chinese mi grants. He did
business with Chinese merchants, including Chin Gee Hee, and found them
to be “able and honorable” businessmen. He was not so sure, however, about
the Chinese working class. After a few years steeped in the West Coast view
of Chinese labor, he came to believe that most Chinese were “of a diff er ent
order” and “deleterious to the best interest of society.” He condemned the
Chinese for migrating without their families, living in “disreputable” quar-
ters, working for disturbingly low wages, and sending their earnings abroad.9
Squire, ever the businessman, still saw the merits of the Chinese work-
force. Washington Territory was seeing rapid commercial growth and needed
workers to support its flourishing economy of extraction. As late as 1886,
Squire maintained that “the presence of Chinese in large numbers has
heretofore been necessary,” because there were not enough white laborers
to complete “works of great magnitude like our transcontinental rail-
ways.” Squire believed that Washington Territory needed Chinese workers
and, moreover, that Washington, D.C., needed to tread carefully with China.
Years later, he explained to historian Hubert Bancroft that the United States
must avoid offending China because “we want her trade, that is, we want
what ever material good can come from her.” Therefore, the federal govern-
ment had to be cautious about restricting Chinese migration or risk losing
the race to open China. Squire was not just concerned about his corner of
the nation but also about the future of Amer ica’s “ great empire.”10
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141
On the eve of the anti- Chinese vio lence, Governor Squire supported
Chinese migration but was more concerned with bringing American “civi-
lization” to this rough territory. During his tenure as governor, Squire es-
tablished new institutions to maintain social order, including a penitentiary
at Walla Walla, a hospital for the insane at Steilacoom, and a school for
“defective youth” at Vancouver. “On the Pacific Coast we must take into
consideration manhood,” explained Squire, “and all our efforts there should
be to develop manhood, ability, character and intellect.”11 Envisioning a so-
ciety led by an educated and manly elite, he expanded both the University
of Washington and the local militia.
What Squire sought, above all, was statehood. Statehood would bring a
steady stream of American citizens, a flood of investors, and the right to vote
in federal elections.12 In a bid to convince Congress that Washington was
ready, Squire began, in the fall of 1885, to prepare a report on the territory’s
many advancements. The territory, boasted Squire, was full of “intensely
loyal citizens” who “universally desire admission” to the Union.13 But as Gov-
ernor Squire compiled the report, white workingmen murdered Chinese in
Squak Valley and mass protests began throughout Puget Sound. Immedi-
ately, Squire realized that the vio lence could overshadow the territory’s
accomplishments as well as his own. His worries proved more than warranted.
In the end, his eleven- page territorial report contained a forty- eight- page
appendix to explain the riots and justify his own reaction.14
The governor anticipated that grassroots vio lence would tarnish the ter-
ritory’s reputation but knew that using state vio lence to suppress it would
bring more unwanted attention. Calling in local militia or federal troops was
tantamount to admitting he could not control his own population, so Gov-
ernor Squire tried to stop the expulsions without the use of military force.
He brushed aside the advice of Granville Haller, who told him as early as
September to call for “U.S. troops or at least advise the Sec[retar]y of State,
Mr. Bayard, of the imminent danger of an uprising.”15 Hoping that law en-
forcement alone would be enough to prevent bloodshed, Squire wrote to
the sheriffs of King and Pierce Counties to make his desires clear. “I think
you are fully aware,” he said, “of my determination to enforce the law by all
the power and influence I officially possess, and at the same time you know
how much I deprecate the necessity of any military interference what ever.”
Both sheriffs swore to aid his cause. Squire reported to his mother in late
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VIO LENCE
October 1885, “I have been getting the sheriffs in each of the disturbed coun-
ties to or ga nize a strong force of reliable deputy- sheriffs, to preserve order. . . .
This plan works splendidly so far.” He boasted to his mother that he had
already received compliments for handling the situation “with energy, but
with moderation.”16
There were plenty of signs that all was not well, but Squire ignored them.
When he wrote to the mayor of Tacoma asking for his support in “the pres-
ervation of order and thereby the preservation of the good name of the
Territory,” he received no response.17 It must have also seemed troubling
when the sheriff of Pierce County reported that all the recently sworn deputy
sheriffs in Tacoma and Puyallup belonged to the Knights of Labor.18 The
Knights, Squire was well aware, were a driving force behind the call for ex-
pulsion. There was also the matter of the well- known November 1 deadline
for the Chinese to vacate Tacoma. Publicly, the vigilantes had left unspoken
the consequences of missing that deadline, but privately a friend of Governor
Squire explained the Tacoma method in detail.19 If any outbreak did occur,
the governor’s wife explained in a private letter to her in- laws, Watson could
not claim it was unexpected, for the roughs had “given notice of what they
intend to do.” “I wish,” Mrs. Squire wrote in mid- October, “the 1st of Nov.
was over and past.”20
As the governor continued his half- hearted attempt to beef up law
enforcement, he also began to encourage a “quiet” exit for the Chinese.
When N. W. Gow and other leaders of the local Chinese community
petitioned him for protection, he advised them to “quietly withdraw.” He
repeated this sentiment to the Chinese consul at San Francisco. “I really
believe it to be for the best interest of the Chinese residents on this coast to
scatter themselves throughout the United States,” he explained, “thus so
; thining [ sic] out their numbers that they will not be offensive.”21 Writing
to an anti- Chinese agitator, Governor Squire was more direct. Explaining that
he “sympathize[d]” with American workingmen, he advised the vigilantes
to “maintain law and order” so “victory fi nally [ will] be yours.” His letter
appeared to subscribe to the vigilante’s own narrow definition of vio lence,
endorsing the concept of a “peaceful” and “orderly” expulsion. In so doing,
Squire turned a blind eye to the frequent physical assaults and rampant
intimidation tactics that already plagued the territory. Agitators seized on
his letter and had it reprinted in the Seattle Daily Call on November 2.22
THE LOYAL
143
The following day, vigilantes drove the Chinese out of Tacoma. As un-
rest spread quickly to Seattle, Governor Squire may have begun to regret
his tacit support for the anti- Chinese movement. Reporting the situation to
the secretary of the interior, he seemed genuinely distressed to have received
pleading tele grams from Chinese residents “imploring” him for protection.23
And yet, the governor still hesitated to call for troops. Instead, he issued a
public proclamation to his “fellow- citizens” calling for “peace and good
order” to protect “the good name and prosperity of the Territory.” The
Tacoma vigilantes maintained they had achieved a nonviolent expulsion,
but Governor Squire made it clear in his proclamation that, to his mind,
they had crossed the line between agitation and vio lence. If the vigilantes
could not control their “spirit of lawlessness,” he warned, they should expect
the “speedy interference of United States troops.” Two days later, after
Haller and other leading citizens begged once again for military rein-
forcements, Governor Squire fi nally deci ded his words of warning would
not be enough. “It is evidently imipossible [ sic],” he telegraphed the secre-
tary of the interior, “to protect the Chinese at Seattle without United States
troops immediately.”24 When federal troops marched into Seattle, they
quickly quelled the threat of expulsion and the territory returned, briefly, to
a relative state of calm.25
After that violent autumn, Governor Squire lost any remaining desire to
defend the merits of Chinese migration. “ These trying events led me to un-
derstand, as I had never done before, the intense feeling of antagonism that
is seated in the breasts of the great body of our labouring people in refer-
ence to the Chinese,” he reflected a few years later. Squire had come to be-
lieve it was necessary, in the name of “domestic tranquility,” for the United
States to “adopt more vigorous mea sures . . . to enforce the exclusion of the
Chinese.” And besides, he was beginning to suspect that the Chinese had
outlived their usefulness. The completion of the Northern Pacific Railway
in 1883 meant fewer jobs for Chinese mi grants and more white mi grants
traveling the rails west in search of work. If only white workers would stop
their violent protests, Squire believed, their swelling numbers might be ad-
equate fuel for the development of the West.26
When vio lence returned to Seattle without warning in February 1886,
Governor Squire found himself with a second crisis and chance to prove his
leadership. While his earlier reaction was lackluster, this time he acted swiftly.
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VIO LENCE
“At the time of the Chinese Trou bles” (1886). The leading men of Washington
Territory who stood against the anti- Chinese vio lence included Granville O. Haller
(lower right) and Governor Watson C. Squire (seated beside him). University of
Washington Libraries, Special Collections, Watson C. Squire Photograph Collection,
PH COLL 1230, UW29604z.
When he received word that the vigilantes had transformed Seattle into a
“scene” of “terrorism,” Squire rushed out of his Seattle hotel room without
breakfast, quickly called up the militia, issued a proclamation denouncing
vio lence, and telegraphed the secretary of the interior asking for U.S. troops.27
While taking robust and public action to stop the vio lence, Squire also
privately worked to speed the Chinese retreat from Seattle. He summoned
a group of Chinese men and asked them whether they wished to stay or go,
although he was not shy with them about his own opinion. “If they wanted
to go,” Squire explained to the frightened men, “we would pay their passage to
San Francisco; indeed we would [be] very glad to do so.” A sizable number
took him up on the offer, he recalled, and he “paid the passage of eight of
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145
them [himself].” While he believed forcible expulsion by a mob to be crim-
inal, he saw his own actions as simple charity.28
By 1889, when he ran for U.S. Senate, Squire had no doubt on the Chinese
Question and advanced a strong anti- Chinese platform. “I don’t believe in
the persecution of a race,” he insisted, but he still feared that the unrestricted
migration of Chinese “would tend to drag down our standard of elevation.”
“I have nothing against the Chinese themselves,” explained Squire, “but I
take a great deal more interest in my own people and I wish that American
citizens should have the preference always.”29
Ida R. Squire: “The Poor Things Were Going as Fast as They Could”
“I don’t see what the people in this country will do—if they succeed in
driving away the Chinaman,” first lady Ida Remington Squire wrote to her
mother- in- law in October 1885. “ There are very few [Chinese] employed
about here that do any work that white men would do,” she continued, “and
there are few girls or women to be had for house work and washing.” Before
the expulsion from Tacoma and Seattle, Ida Squire, like her husband, be-
lieved that Washington Territory needed Chinese workers. Who else would
wash her clothes and cook her meals?30
Ida Remington was born far from the Pacific Northwest in the village
of Ilion, New York, in 1842. When Watson Squire became governor of
Washington Territory, Mrs. Squire rose to prominence as the wife of a
wealthy politician. A memorial sermon, written after her death in 1919,
describes her as a pious woman who was “quiet,” “genuine,” and “unas-
suming.” But she was no wallflower. “With all her modesty and humility,
she had a strong personality,” it explained. Mrs. Squire’s “strong person-
ality” comes through in the handful of letters and the short diary she
wrote during the anti- Chinese vio lence in Washington Territory. With her
husband occupied with po liti cal affairs, she took it on herself to keep her
mother- in- law, who was living in Ohio, and her two sons, who were at-
tending a military acad emy in New York, abreast of the “excitement.” She
herself was very well informed. During the riots, Governor Squire had
grave difficulty with his eyesight and relied on his wife to read him all re-
ports, tele grams, and newspapers articles. Every day, Mrs. Squire read her-
self hoarse.31
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VIO LENCE
husband’s convictions as well as his fondness for the status quo, but she de-
scribed the conflict in more emotional and moral terms than her husband.
Her writing is full of pity for the Chinese and dread of the working- class
“ruffians.” It was her overwhelming fear of the lower classes, and the harm
they could inflict on her family’s reputation, station, and safety, that ultimately
made her eager for the Chinese to depart. The vigilantes, her personal writ-
ings make clear, did more than terrorize the Chinese; they intimidated their
social superiors.
When it came to the Chinese, Mrs. Squire saw a clear distinction between
intimidation and vio lence; the former she could condone, the latter was in-
excusable. In a letter to her mother- in- law she explained, “We were hoping
the anti- Chinese agitators would be satisfied with their meetings and intimi-
dation—as that was doing such effective work— the poor things were going
as fast as they could.” Though she seemed tolerant of these methods of ha-
rassment, Mrs. Squire was infuriated at the news of outright expulsion in
Tacoma. She chided the lower classes for committing “such an outrage” and
causing “real injury” to the territory’s bid for statehood.32
Ida Squire had second hand knowledge of the expulsion from Tacoma,
but she lived through the one in Seattle and recorded her experiences each
night on hotel stationery. On that Sunday morning of February 7, 1886,
Mrs. Squire awoke at the Occidental Hotel, which was located only a few
blocks from Seattle’s Chinatown. When she went down to breakfast, she
overheard two men say, “They are moving out the Chinese.” She looked
out the win dow and could see an express wagon working its way down the
street, loaded high with Chinese goods. Before she could wake her sleeping
husband, the sound of a fire bell, announcing that something was amiss,
roused him from his sleep. The governor raced out the door without break-
fast, leaving his wife to wait and worry. That after noon, she went to see the
vigilantes’ triumph: “three hundred [Chinese] were crowded on the wharf—
trembling and crying.” “Poor things,” she penned in her makeshift diary,