The Axix Forces 3

by Afiero, Massimiliano

  G. Tambs, L. Kleinfeld, “La división española de Hitler. La División Azul en Rusia“, Editorial San Martín.

  Sven Erik Norling, “Guerreros de Borgoña. Historia de los voluntarios valones de León Degrelle en el Frente del Este. El ocaso de los Dioses (1944-1945)“, García Hispán Editor. 2008.

  J.P. Sourd, “True Believers. Spanish Volunteers in the Heer and Waffen-SS, 1944-1945“, Europa Books.

  Jean-Pierre Sourd, “Croisés d´un idéal“, Dualpha. 2007.

  Gregorio Torres Gallego, “Españoles en las Waffen SS. Italia, 1945“, Revista Española de Historia Militar, nº10. 2001.

  German perception of volunteers of the Muslim division of the SS

  by Dmitry Frolov

  Military service of Bosnians in SS-troop formations (Waffen SS) marked the new stage of recruiting Muslims to the German army from the beginning of the war against the USSR. The division, which was supposed to be actively used at the place of its formation (Bosnia and Herzegovina), needed very intense support from Islamic politicians and the German command, which emphasized the importance of Bosnians’ efforts in establishing the “New Order” in the Balkans. SS-Brigadeführer and Major General of the Waffen SS Karl-Gustav Sauberzweig as the division commander aimed at creating a single combat group, united just like other Waffen SS units. Relations between different categories of military servicemen within the division became a vital question in the context of effectiveness of its future combat use. Thus, as expected, national-religious preferences of the SS newcomers became a major obstacle to accomplishing the objective as stated by the division commander.

  SS-Brigadeführer Karl Sauberzweig. As an experienced commander Sauberzweig understood importance of providing close connection between Islam and National Socialism within his division (NARA).

  The reason for such sharp contradictions was the fact that so called “political soldiers” appeared in the Waffen SS structure – these people didn’t have a lot to do with these elite units of the Nazi state. Racial doctrine, an essential part of the Third Reich, became one of the first problems for creating a combat unit, unified by the idea of fellowship, widely spread across the Waffen SS. But the cultural gap between the German SS-soldiers, who had previous military service in elite divisions, and Bosnian ex-farmers and workmen turned out to be a problem for attempts to combine religious and Nazi ideas in the new formation. With reference to this there is the example of a German SS-officer, transferred to the Muslim SS-division from the “Das Reich” SS armored division. He was unsatisfied with his service in the “legionary division”, which, to his mind, was of much lower status than his previous duty assignment. Heinrich Himmler’s idea to use the experience of the Hapsburg monarchy and create their own elite Bosnian military units didn’t fit the frame of the Nazi state, either.

  The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem was a spiritual advisor of the division and contributed to close interrelation of the Third Reich with Islamic world (NARA).

  The Nuremberg race laws, adopted in 1935, formed the basis of creating the “super-human” complex in German society, together with disregard of representatives of other nations.

  Ethnic German SS-Uscha. Zvonimir Bernwald. Within the division he conducted military service in VI squadron – unit, responsible for spirit and belief work with personnel assets.

  Failures, which followed the German army from the middle of the war, and the war itself, forced Nazi apologists to look for more reasons to involve foreigners into first the Wehrmacht and then the Waffen SS. For cases of recruiting Balkan Muslims into the Waffen SS, the latter had to establish trustworthy relations between Muslims and Germans, based on necessity of co-existence of National-Socialist and Islamic ideas within the division. Sauberzweig mentioned that the Bosnians willingly adopted the ideas of National-Socialist theory, receiving them via their commanders. As for unit commanders Sauberzweig had an opinion, different from SS-Obergruppenführer A. Phleps’, who claimed it was necessary for Bosnians not to focus on their commanders’ personalities, but to accept them as ambassadors of the Führer’s will. The division commander believed that Muslims, as the “Balkan primitive people” representatives were fully focused on personalities of their commanders, whose manner of behavior was copied by their Muslim subordinates. “He will give his fidelity to the officer, who wins his heart, like a child. He has a deeply developed feeling of justice and honor” – stated Sauberzweig. As another problem he stated the necessity to save the basis of Islam among the German regular personnel and together with it to save understanding of the importance of subordinate soldiers’ religious needs. In this regard a lot depended on division “spiritual guides” – imams, who had to both organize religious ceremonies and increase the level of empathy and understanding among German soldiers. Sauberzweig was one of the few who put much effort into making German officers understand the importance of the imams institution. To do that the battalion officers asked German SS-officers to visit the mosque in Brcko, where the latter presented a short report on cultural and religious topics, referring to traditions and rules, developed in the territory of Bosnia.

  SS-Gruppenführer Artur Phleps in a Moroccan-style tarboosh. This type of tarboosh would become the main headwear of Muslim SS-division.

  When characterizing subordinates the division commander first of all emphasized the necessity of understanding Muslims. According to his report to SS-Obergruppenführer G.Berger, SS-Obersturmführer Geze “didn’t understand either the Muslim temper or their logic” due to his Westphalian background, and SS-Hauptsturmführer E.Wangemann, who was transferred to the division by SS-Reichsführer “could hardly understand the existing situation and had strained relations with his colleagues, commanders and imams”. Muslims had poor relations with ethnic Germans as well. This was not limited to reference to the Volksdeutsche of SS-Division “Prinz Eugen”, responsible for mass murders in Košutica. When transferred to the Muslim SS-Division, they despised Bosnians and considered them to be “subhuman”. As stated by the report of a German people’s unit führer in Croatia, families of German SS-soldiers reacted quite negatively to the news of recruiting Muslims into the Waffen SS. Local German citizens considered Bosnians “imperfect”, too (relying on experience of working with refugees and conflicts with smugglers). It became unclear how Muslims got into the Waffen SS, since it caused the collapse of all the previous propaganda work, due to which only the Germanic peoples could serve in the Waffen SS. This equalization of ethnic Germans’ rights with foreign volunteers caused puzzlement and loss of pride of doing military service in the Waffen SS. But the SS-Reichsführer, who enjoyed the idea of active use of Muslim volunteers’ potential by the Waffen SS, was not overly concerned with that matter. By his opinion, equal rights lead to establishing fellowship between all categories of military personnel: “There’s no difference between Reichdeutsche, Bosnians, Croatians or South-Eastern Germans for creating the spirit of fellowship. We wear the same uniform, fix our belts with the same buckle and have the same badges”. Himmler considered it important to meet all religious preferences of the volunteers. Thus he supported the division commander. The “Special unbreakable right” of all Muslims - members of the Waffen SS and police – meant they could avoid pork and alcohol in food. This was seen from the perspective of promoting the stability of the Muslim soldiers.

  German officers show the important guest combat skills of their subordinates. Neuhammer shooting range. Silesia, 1943.

  The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem al-Husseini greeting the soldiers of SS Muslim division. Neuhammer shooting range. Silesia, November, 1943

  The SS-Reichsführer ordered all officers, squadron commanders and heads of supply corps to bear that in mind when organizing provision and food. “We mustn’t reject thousands of fanatic Muslim volunteers and their families because of narrow mindedness and stubbornness of certain people” – Himmler said. What’s interesting here, is that at first German the command couldn’t organize food supplies for the division in France.


  Training of the Handschar Division at Neuhammer Training Grounds in Autumn of 1943.

  As SS-Hauptsturmführer E. Romberg said, this lead to reduction of a “common attitude” among Muslim soldiers. Meanwhile SS-soldiers were forced to do the hardest work with public disciplinary punishments for the smallest mistakes. To solve that problem division commander Sauberzweig sent the SS-Reichsführer a letter with a request to increase the food allowance of the division. By emphasizing enthusiasm, obedience and loyalty of Muslim soldiers Sauberzweig managed to get a positive response from Hitler. Supplies, including better food allowance, were supposed to be the most efficient tool for improving the state of morale of soldiers by establishing a relationship of trus between them and the Germans. What led to tense relations between Catholic Croatians and Muslims was propaganda work, devoted to Muslims, and the Bosnian status of the division, marked by its name. One hundred twenty-one Catholic Croatians deserted from the division while it was in France. This was mainly caused by Croatians rejecting the idea of autonomy of the Independent State of Croatia together with disappointment in service with the division. Except for specific peculiarities the Muslim SS-division had problems not connected to the Islamic character of the unit. Difficulties in cooperation between Germans and Bosnians were expected, but racial prejudice affected two other categories of the division’s servicemen – Reichs and Volksdeutsche. SS-Hauptsturmführer Romberg noticed the unwillingness of Reichsdeutsche commanders to study the volunteers’ language together with zero tolerance to Volksdeutsche conversations in Croatian. Their, as they believed, higher Reichdeutsche status was emphasized by refusal to live in the same room with Volksdeutsche, who were forced to live with their soldiers. We must state that German command did their best to solve all the problems, despite the obvious issues which affected the first “non-Germanic” division of the Waffen SS. The SS-Reichsführer published an order, forbidding the ignoring of cultural and religious peculiarities of Bosnian SS-soldiers, since he understood it was unacceptable to limit religious rights and freedoms of Muslim soldiers. Stubbornness on the part of certain people who not willing to follow the rules necessary for the division caused Himmler to call it “stubborn commissionerism”. He issued orders to prevent it in the harshest possible way, without paying attention to ranks and duty positions of the guilty. As for the problem of establishing understanding between Germans and Muslim soldiers we should agree with the opinion of German historian Stefan Petke. He has stated a fair doubt regarding the possibility of creating a unit, unified by common weaponry, instructions or badges only. Sauberzweig, an experienced officer who knew the true meaning of “trench brotherhood”, understood that, also.

  Handschar soldiers, Autumn 1943.

  A commander must not miss any single opportunity to influence their subordinates. The fighting cohesiveness, capable of overcoming any crisis or combat-tension, was created during talks at rest breaks, route marches, rest points or “with an evening cigarette”, when soldiers shared their cares or asked for advice. But reality did not meet the attempts of certain commanders and of the division commander to influence the situation. The dominating Nazi racial doctrine of “alien elements” completely neutralized the Germans’ experience in creating such units. This happened despite the re-thinking of relations between German and Muslim SS-soldiers, which happened nearly at the end of war, even for purposes of propaganda.

  Bibliography

  National Archives and Records Administration (NARA T175 R70).

  Lappin Е., “Rolle der Waffen-SS beim zwangsarbeitseinsatz ungarischer juden im gau Steirermark und bei den todesmarschen ins kz Mauthausen“.

  Центральный архив Министерства обороны Российской Федерации. Ф. 500. (Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. F. 500).

  Petke S., “Militärische Vergemeinschaftung Versuche muslimischer Soldaten in der Waffen-SS. Die Beispiele der Division «Handschar» und des «Osttürkischen Waffenverbands der SS»”

  Kazimirović V., “NDH u svetlu nemećkih dokumenata i dnevnika Gleza fon Horstenau. 1941-1945”

  Sulejmanpasic Z., “13. SS Divizija «Handzar». Istine i lazi”.

  Lepre G., “Himmler’s Bosnian division. The Waffen-SS Handschar Division 1943-1945”

  Zaugg F. A., “Albanische Muslime in der Waffen-SS. Von «Grossalbanien» zur Division «Scanderbeg»”

  A Swedish Hero: Gösta Hallberg-Cuula

  by Erik Norling

  Between 1939-1945, the small country of Finland, with a population of not even 3.7 million, was involved in three wars: The Winter War (1939-1940), the Continuation War (1941-1944) and the Lapponian War (1944-1945). The first one standing alone against Stalin´s aggression; the second one to recover the lost territories and secure the border against the dangerous neighbour and the third one a short and relatively bloodless campaign to expel the withdrawing German troops still in Finland after the armistice with the Soviet Union September 1944. It has been calculated that around 12.000 Swedish volunteers fought in the Finnish Army during the Winter and Continuation War.

  Hallberg-Cuula on the cover of the most distributed non political Swedish magazine, March 1940.

  This was a high percentage considering that Sweden had then a population of only around 6,5 million. These wars created many legends and heroes, many controversial due to their political engagement. The most famous was to be Lauri Törni, one of the most decorated Finnish soldiers, an officer in the Waffen-SS and later KIA in Vietnam as US Colonel in the Special Forces. His life was depicted in John Wayne´s movie Green Berets (1968). Not to be forgotten also was Georg von Haartman, Colonel in General Franco´s army during the Spanish Civil War or the Swedish Major Martin Ekström who fought not one but five wars against the Bolsheviks between 1917-1944. However, the most known Swedish legend to be was Gösta Hallberg-Cuula.

  Youth and political engagement

  Gösta (but registered as Gustaf when enlisted) Eugén Hallberg-Cuula was born in the Swedish capital, Stockholm, the 4th November 1912 in a Swedish-speaking family from Finland that had emigrated to Sweden decades before. He received his baptism in the Finnish Lutheran Church of the Swedish capital. His father, Captain Carl Hallberg-Cuula, died when he was only two years old leaving his mother Fanny alone. He became a philosophy student at the University of Stockholm, served his military service as volunteer between 1931-1932, first as Corporal and ending as Sergeant of the Swedish Army in the Reserve.

  Sven Olof Lindholm, leader of the Swedish Nationalsocialist party.

  Soon after he would became politically active(1). With strong anticommunist feelings he engaged in political activities of the several existing Swedish National Socialist parties. He joined not even being 18 years old the NSAP (Swedish Workers National Socialist Party), led by Sven Olof Lindholm, receiving the member number 240 and assumed despite his youth the rank of Propaganda Chief of this small party of Stockholm´s branch. He was the founder of the Youth Organisation (Nordik Ungdom – Nordic Youth) between 1932-1933. In 1939, the party changed their name to SSS (Swedish Socialist Union) but remained loyal to their National Socialist program and Gösta Hallberg-Cuula soon began to be considered one of the most active members. Every year his greetings to the party and his name was reproduced in the special number for the Christmas magazine Den Svenske Nationalsocialisten (The Swedish National Socialist)(2).

  The first volunteer to enlist

  When the Soviet Union assaulted Finland in the autumn 1939, Hallberg-Cuula joined as volunteer in the Finnish Army. He was unmarried and became the first party member to do so. Many others would follow him and were KIA during WW2.

  Gösta Hallberg-Cuula during the Winter War, 1940, with the “Death Patrull´s sign at the helmet.

  He served during the Winter War in a Swedish-speaking unit (the Second Company 2./JR10) as Sergeant since the 5th December 1939. He commanded a so called dödspatrull (Suicide patrol) of six men that infiltrated enemy lines. On one occ
asion his unit killed 43 Russian soldiers and was awarded the 12thJanuary 1940 the Frihets medaljen Second Class (Liberty medal – Fm II).

  A few days later, the 10th February, he lost at the bloody Summa Front his left eye, after being wounded by a bullet in the head at Marjonpellomäki, and since then he wore the patch that made in legendary. Wounded and ending the Winter War he was promoted to Fänrik (Aspirant Officer) due to his courage receiving the Finnish Frihetskorset (Liberty Cross – Frk IV) of 4th Class and the Frihets medaljen First Class (Fm I). The Swedish magazine SE, one of the most widely sold magazines in the country, dedicated him the cover of the special number and a photographic reportage inside where the Swedish flag on his chest is seen clearly(3).

  The Continuation War

  In June 1941 Operation Barbarossa was launched, and the Finnish armies joined the Third Reich. Immediately Swedish volunteers enlisted massively and in Summer 1941 the Swedish Volunteer Bataillon with the first 800 volunteers incorporated into the Swedish speaking regiment JR55 was deployed at the Hangö front, besieging a Russian naval base west of Helsinki. Hallberg-Cuula, enlisted the 29th June still being under rehabilitation for his heavy wounds from the Winter War and travelled to Finland early July 1941.