Founding America: Documents from the Revolution to the Bill of Rights

by Jack N. Rakove (editor)

  Because the policy of the bill is adverse to the diffusion of the light of Christianity. The first wish of those, who ought to enjoy this precious gift, ought to be, that it may be imparted to the whole race of mankind. Compare the number of those, who have as yet received it, with the number stil remaining under the dominion of false religions, and how small is the former! Does the policy of the bill tend to lessen the disproportion? No; it at once discourages those who are strangers to the light of truth, from coming into the regions of it; and countenances, by example, the nations who continue in darkness, in shutting out those who might convey it to them. Instead of levelling, as far as possible, every obstacle to the victorious progress of truth, the bill, with an ignoble and unchristian timidity, would circumscribe it, with a wall of defence against the encroachments of error.

  Because an attempt to enforce by legal sanctions, acts, obnoxious to so great a portion of citizens, tends to enervate the laws in general, and to slacken the bands of society. If it be difficult to execute any law, which is not generally deemed necessary nor salutary, what must be the case when it is deemed invalid and dangerous? And what may be the effect of so striking an example of impotency in the government on its general authority?

  Because a measure of such singular magnitude and delicacy, ought not to be imposed without the clearest evidence that it is called for by a majority of citizens; and no satisfactory method is yet proposed, by which the voice of the majority in this case may be determined, or its influence secured. “The people of the respective counties are, indeed, requested to signify their opinion, respecting the adoption of the bill, to the next session of Assembly.” But the representation must be made equal, before the voice, either of the representatives, or of the counties, will be that of the people. Our hope is, that neither of the former will, after due consideration, espouse the dangerous principle of the bill. Should the event disappoint us, it will still leave us in full confidence, that a fair appeal to the latter will reverse the sentence against our liberties.

  Because, finally, “the equal right of every citizen to the free exercise of his religion according to the dictates of his conscience,” is held by the same tenure with all our other rights. If we recur to its origin, it is equally the gift of nature; if we weigh its importance, it cannot be less dear to us; if we consult the “Declaration of those rights which pertain to the good people of Virginia, as the basis and foundation of government,” it is enumerated with equal solemnity, or rather with studied emphasis. Either then we must say that the will of the Legislature is the only measure of their authority; and that in the plenitude of this authority, they may sweep away all our fundamental rights; or, that they are bound to leave this particular right untouched and sacred; either we must say, that they may control the freedom of the press; may abolish the trial by jury; may swallow up the executive and judiciary powers of the State: nay, that they may annihilate our very right of suffrage, and erect themselves into an independent and hereditary assembly; or we must say that they have no authority to enact into a law, the bill under consideration. We the subscribers say, that the General Assembly of this Commonwealth have no such authority; and that no effort may be omitted on our part, against so dangerous an usurpation, we oppose to it this Remonstrance, earnestly praying, as we are in duty bound, that the Supreme Lawgiver of the Universe, by illuminating those to whom it is addressed, may, on the one hand, turn their councils from every act, which would affront his holy prerogative, or violate the trust committed to them; and, on the other, guide them into every measure which may be worthy of his blessing, may redound to their own praise, and may establish more firmly the liberties, the property, and the happiness of this Commonwealth.

  —Thomas Jefferson—

  VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

  JANUARY 16, 1786

  An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom

  WHEREAS ALMIGHTY GOD HATH created the mind free; that all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy author of our religion, who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, as was in his Almighty power to do; that the impious presumption of legislators and rulers, civil as well as ecclesiastical, who being themselves but fallible and uninspired men, have assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting up their own opinions and modes of thinking as the only true and infallible, and as such endeavouring to impose them on others, hath established and maintained false religions over the greatest part of the world, and through all time; that to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; that even the forcing him to support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular pastor, whose morals he would make his pattern, and whose powers he feels most persuasive to righteousness, and is withdrawing from the ministry those temporary rewards, which proceeding from an approbation of their personal conduct, are an additional incitement to earnest and unremitting labours for the instruction of mankind; that our civil rights have no dependence on our religious opinions, any more than our opinions in physics or geometry; that therefore the proscribing any citizen as unworthy the public confidence by laying upon him an incapacity of being called to offices of trust and emolument, unless he profess or renounce this or that religious opinion, is depriving him injuriously of those privileges and advantages to which in common with his fellow-citizens he has a natural right; that it tends only to corrupt the principles of that religion it is meant to encourage, by bribing with a monopoly of worldly honours and emoluments, those who will externally profess and conform to it; that though indeed these are criminal who do not withstand such temptation, yet neither are those innocent who lay the bait in their way; that to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion, and to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy, which at once destroys all religious liberty, because he being of course judge of that tendency will make his opinions the rule of judgment, and approve or condemn the sentiments of others only as they shall square with or differ from his own; that it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government, for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order; and finally, that truth is great and will prevail if left to herself, that she is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear from the conflict, unless by human interposition disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument and debate, errors ceasing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to contradict them:

  Be it enacted by the General Assembly, That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinion in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no way diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.

  And though we well know that this assembly elected by the people for the ordinary purposes of legislation only, have no power to restrain the acts of succeeding assemblies, constituted with powers equal to our own, and that therefore to declare this act to be irrevocable would be of no effect in law; yet we are free to declare, and do declare, that the rights hereby asserted are of the natural rights of mankind, and that if any act shall be hereafter passed to repeal the present, or to narrow its operation, such act will be an infringement of natural right.

  THE ROAD TO PHILADELPHIA

  James Madison: Letter to James Monroe (March 19, 1786)

  PAGE 307

  Benjamin Rush: Address to the People of the United States (June 3, 1786)

 
PAGE 308

  Alexander Hamilton: Address of the Annapolis Convention (1786)

  PAGE 313

  Resolution of Congress (February 21, 1787)

  PAGE 316

  James Madison: Vices of the Political System of the United States (April 1787)

  PAGE 317

  James Madison: Letter to George Washington (April 16, 1787)

  PAGE 324

  DURING HIS TERM IN Congress (1780-1783), James Madison was deeply involved in the efforts to ratify and amend the Articles of Confederation. Once he returned to Virginia, he continued to do whatever he could to persuade his fellow legislators to support Congress and the Confederation. Through his correspondence with James Monroe, who had replaced him in the Virginia delegation, he remained well informed about doings in Congress. But by early 1786 Madison was coming to the conclusion that the formal procedures for amending the Articles, which required the unanimous approval of the states, were unworkable. With some misgivings, he supported a resolution of the Virginia assembly inviting other legislatures to send deputies to a meeting to discuss the need to provide Congress with the power to regulate commerce. When the appointed time came, however, only a dozen commissioners from five states appeared at Mann’s Tavern in Annapolis, too few to proceed with the business at hand.

  Rather than simply adjourn without doing anything, the commissioners opted to pursue a risky gambit. Drawing upon the language of the credentials of the New Jersey deputies, the Annapolis commissioners issued a call for a second convention to meet at Philadelphia in May 1787. In the months to come, all the states but Rhode Island agreed to appoint deputies to this second convention. The cause of reform was advanced when Congress itself endorsed the convention, even though this meant approving a proceeding unknown to the Articles of Confederation.

  The agenda for the convention, however, remained uncertain, and many competent observers thought either that the delegates should err on the side of caution or simply discuss possible reforms without offering any particular proposals. Madison disagreed. He no longer believed that the reform of the Confederation could wait indefinitely. If it were delayed much longer, the federal union might devolve into two or three regional confederacies. Back in New York City, where he was again attending Congress, Madison began to prepare his agenda for the convention. He first sketched his general understanding of the problems of the union in a memorandum on what he called the “vices of the political system of the United States.” Then, in letters to George Washington and Governor Edmund Randolph, Madison converted these general ideas into a sketch of a new government, one that would replace the existing unicameral Congress with a bicameral legislature and constitutionally independent executive and judicial departments.

  —James Madison—

  LETTER TO JAMES MONROE

  MARCH 19, 1786

  ORANGE 19TH MARCH 1786

  DEAR SiR,—I am just favored with yours of the 11 & 16 of Feby. A newspaper since the date of the latter has verified to me your inauguration into the mysteries of Wedlock, of which you dropped a previous hint in the former. You will accept my sincerest congratulations on this event, with every wish for the happiness it promises. I join you cheerfully in the purchase from Taylor, as preferably to taking it wholly to myself. The only circumstance I regret is that the first payment will rest with you alone, if the conveyance should be accelerated. A few months will elapse inevitably before I shall be able to place on the spot my half of the sum but the day shall be shortened as much as possible. I accede also fully to your idea of extending the purchase in that quarter. Perhaps we may be able to go beyond the thousand acres you have taken into view. But ought we not to explore the ground before we venture too far? Proximity of situation is but presumptive evidence of the quality of soil. The value of land depends on a variety of little circumstances which can only be judged of from inspection, and a knowledge of which gives a seller an undue advantage over an uninformed buyer. Can we not about the last of May or June take a turn into that district, I am in a manner determined on it myself. It will separate you but for a moment from New York, and may give us lights of great consequence. I have a project in my head which if it hits your idea and can be effected may render such an excursion of decisive value to us. I reserve it for oral communication.

  “The Question of policy,” you say, “is whether it will be better to correct the vices of the Confederation by recommendation gradually as it moves along, or by a Convention. If the latter should be determined on, the powers of the Virga Comare inadequate.” If all on whom the correction of these vices depends were well informed and well disposed, the mode would be of little moment. But as we have both ignorance and iniquity to combat, we must defeat the designs of the latter by humouring the prejudices of the former. The efforts for bringing about a correction thro the medium of Congress have miscarried. Let a Convention then, be tried. If it succeeds in the first instance, it can be repeated as other defects force themselves on the public attention, and as the public mind becomes prepared for further remedies. The Assembly here would refer nothing to Congress. They would have revolted equally against a plenipotentiary commission to their deputies for the Convention. The option therefore lay between doing what was done and doing nothing. Whether a right choice was made time only can prove. I am not in general an advocate for temporizing or partial remedies. But a rigor in this respect, if pushed too far may hazard everything. If the present paroxysm of our affairs be totally neglected our case may become desperate. If anything comes of the Convention it will probably be of a permanent not a temporary nature, which I think will be a great point. The mind feels a peculiar complacency in seeing a good thing done when it is not subject to the trouble & uncertainty of doing it over again. The commission is to be sure not filled to every man’s mind. The History of it may be a subject of some future tête a tête. You will be kind enough to forward the letter to Mr Jefferson and to be assured that I am with the sincerest affection y.r friend & serv.t

  —Benjamin Rush—

  ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES

  JUNE 3, 1786

  THERE IS NOTHING MORE common than to confound the terms of the American revolution with those of the late American war. The American war is over: but this is far from being the case with the American revolution. On the contrary, nothing but the first act of the great drama is closed. It remains yet to establish and perfect our new forms of government; and to prepare the principles, morals, and manners of our citizens, for these forms of government, after they are established and brought to perfection.

  The confederation, together with most of our state constitutions, were formed under very unfavourable circumstances. We had just emerged from a corrupted monarchy. Although we understood perfectly the principles of liberty, yet most of us were ignorant of the forms and combinations of power in republics. Add to this, the British army was in the heart of our country, spreading desolation wherever it went: our resentments, of course, were awakened. We detested the British name; and unfortunately refused to copy some things in the administration of justice and power, in the British government, which have made it the admiration and envy of the world. In our opposition to monarchy, we forgot that the temple of tyranny has two doors. We bolted one of them by proper restraints; but we left the other open, by neglecting to guard against the effects of our own ignorance and licentiousness.

  Most of the present difficulties of this country arise from the weakness and other defects of our governments.

  My business at present shall be only to suggest the defects of the confederation. These consist—1st. In the deficiency of coercive power. 2d. In a defect of exclusive power to issue paper-money, and regulate commerce. 3d. In vesting the sovereign power of the united states in a single legislature: and, 4th. In the too frequent rotation of its members.

  A convention is to sit soon for the purpose of devising means of obviating part of the two first defects that have been mentioned. But I wish they may add to their recommendations
to each state, to surrender up to congress their power of emitting money. In this way, a uniform currency will be produced, that will facilitate trade, and help to bind the states together. Nor will the states be deprived of large sums of money by this means when sudden emergencies require it: for they may always borrow them as they did during the war, out of the treasury of congress. Even a loan-office may be better instituted in this way in each state, than in any other.

  The two last defects that have been mentioned, are not of less magnitude than the first. Indeed, the single legislature of congress will become more dangerous from an increase of power than ever.

  To remedy this, let the supreme federal power be divided, like the legislatures of most of our states, into two distinct, independent branches. Let one of them be styled the council of the states, and the other the assembly of the states. Let the first consist of a single delegate—and the second, of two, three, or four delegates, chosen annually by each state. Let the president be chosen annually by the joint ballot of both houses; and let him possess certain powers in conjunction with a privy council, especially the power of appointing most of the officers of the united states. The officers will not only be better when appointed this way, but one of the principal causes of faction will be thereby removed from congress. I apprehend this division of the power of congress will become more necessary, as soon as they are invested with more ample powers of levying and expending public money.