Nomonhan, 1939: The Red Army's Victory That Shaped World War II

by Stuart D. Goldman

  Shtern reported that he would be unable to concentrate all his units at the front until August 5. Instead of waiting until then to mount a powerful offensive, he frittered away much of his strength by throwing his units piecemeal against the heights as they arrived off the march. This began on August 1, when three thousand men of the 40th Division were hurled in a frontal assault along the ridge and were driven back with heavy losses.34

  After this first Soviet counterattack, General Nakamura recognized the incorrectness of his earlier view and allowed Suetaka to deploy the entire 19th Division in the Changkufeng area. August 2 and 3 brought repeated and costly frontal assaults against the Japanese-held heights as more units of Shtern’s 39th Corps reached the area. Colonel Sato’s 75th Regiment distinguished itself in repelling these Soviet attacks but suffered heavy losses itself.

  Shtern was also able to bring Soviet air force attacks and heavy artillery bombardments to bear on the 19th Division. Although the rain and fog that persisted in the area through the early phases of the battle hampered the effectiveness of Soviet aircraft and artillery, their employment in large numbers posed a serious threat to the Japanese defensive positions, because the 19th Division’s organic artillery was far outgunned by the Soviet 39th Corps and Japanese air force units had been forbidden categorically to enter the combat zone, an order they obeyed.

  The mounting Soviet counterattacks convinced General Suetaka and his staff that a static defense of the Shachaofeng-Changkufeng ridgeline was tactically unsound, because it tied the 19th Division to the high ground, exposed to air and artillery bombardment against which they had no effective defense or reply. Even more ominous was the threat of envelopment by the rapidly growing Soviet forces, a move that could easily be effected if the Soviets expanded the combat zone in the north or south. To forestall this threat and to relieve some of the pressure on his embattled troops, on August 2 Suetaka proposed a flanking attack of his own in which his 76th Regiment would attack the Soviet forces north and east of Lake Khasan, that is, several miles inside the USSR. Chosen Army Headquarters approved this tactically sound maneuver, but IGHQ in Tokyo immediately rejected the plan on the grounds that such a move would expand the scope of the incident, a tendency that was to be avoided at all costs.35 The unequivocal orders from IGHQ were for Suetaka to continue holding the heights and adhere to the policy of “nonexpansion,” staying exclusively on the defensive. The 19th Division was specifically forbidden to expand the combat zone, attempt flanking maneuvers, call upon air support, receive strategic reinforcements, or retreat from the hills—despite increasingly powerful attacks launched by a superior enemy force. This unenviable situation was implicit in Colonel Inada’s concept of a probe of Soviet intentions. The probe had been placed; it was now for the Soviets to demonstrate their intentions.

  As Shtern’s attacks continued and the fighting began to turn against the Japanese defenders, Kwantung Army drew up plans for a diversionary attack against the Soviet flank to relieve the pressure at Changkufeng. This too was prohibited by central authorities in Tokyo. Behind this Japanese restraint were decisions reached by IGHQ and confirmed by the cabinet, that the incident was to be settled diplomatically. In the meantime, expansion of the conflict was to be avoided by having the forces on the spot maintain the status quo. But the leaders in Tokyo and on the ground at Changkufeng found that with the Soviets holding the whip hand, even those limited objectives might be difficult to achieve.

  Meanwhile, within some parts of AGS and the Army Ministry, the idea was beginning to gain ground that Japanese troops should be withdrawn unilaterally from Changkufeng because the honor of the 19th Division had been satisfied by the night attack of July 31 and the continued fighting was threatening the Wuhan operation.

  In the Army Ministry, in particular, nearly all important figures, including Vice Minister Tojo Hideki, began to urge withdrawal. The deputy chief of AGS, General Tada, weakened and began drawing up orders for the withdrawal of the 19th Division at the first appropriate opportunity. However, Colonel Inada’s influential Operations Section objected, arguing that a unilateral withdrawal of the Japanese forces under such circumstances would “wreck the proud traditions of the Imperial Army” and would “exert unfortunate effects upon Soviet-Japanese relations in the future.” These conflicting views could not be resolved, and indecision prevailed in Tokyo.36

  On August 4, while Shtern continued to mass his forces and hammer at the Japanese entrenched on the high ground, Ambassador Shigemitsu again met with Litvinov in Moscow. The Japanese envoy proposed that both sides immediately suspend hostilities and refer the dispute to a joint commission to establish a clear and mutually satisfactory boundary. He supplemented this proposal with a series of “on-the-spot” photographs that the Japanese army had fabricated, purporting to show Soviet fortifications and corpses some fifty yards inside Japanese territory. Litvinov was unmoved, replying that the fighting would end only after the Japanese army ceased its attacks and withdrew all its forces from Soviet territory. He declared firmly that there would be no alteration of the boundary, as understood by the Soviet Union.37 Litvinov and Stalin seemed confident that unless the Japanese were willing and able to terminate the war in China, they would have to bow to the Soviets at Changkufeng.38

  Shigemitsu’s report of the uncompromising Soviet diplomatic position reached Tokyo at the same time as grim news from the fighting front. From August 4 to 5, Shtern relied primarily on intensive artillery and air bombardment of the Japanese positions while he continued to build up his frontline troops and prepare for a renewed assault. Colonel Sato likened the rate of Soviet artillery fire to that of machine guns, and Japanese artillery to lightly falling raindrops. The ratio of Soviet to Japanese artillery fire may have reached 100:1 according to Japanese estimates, an incredible disparity attributable in part to differing tactical concepts and to Japan’s lack of experience with massed artillery fire—a lesson the European armies had learned in the First World War. Meanwhile, the 19th Division dug in and awaited the expected onslaught. On August 6 Shtern renewed his ground assaults.

  Suetaka’s position would have been altogether hopeless except for the terrain, which favored the defenders of the heights. Colonel Inada of IGHQ had taken that into account in proposing his probe at that point on the frontier. If the Soviets meant to keep the hostilities localized, they would have to attack with the lake close at their back, leaving little room for deployment and maneuver. Japanese artillery on the high ground commanded all approaches to the hills. Moreover, the southeastern and northeastern approaches to the hills—which the Soviets would have to traverse unless they were willing to expand the combat zone by crossing the Tyumen River—were flat marshland with little protective cover, most ill suited for the deployment of large formations of men and tanks.39 Yet it was precisely through these murderous fire lanes that the Soviet infantry and tank attacks of August 6–10 were channeled. This suggests that Shtern, as well as Suetaka, was under restraint from higher authorities to keep the fighting localized. Within the context of this strategic constraint, however, the Soviets spared no effort to achieve their goal of driving the Japanese from Changkufeng.

  The renewed Soviet attacks were pressed relentlessly, heedless of their heavy losses of men and machines. Official Japanese military records report that on August 6 “Japanese positions appeared to be on the verge of collapse. The defenders managed to hold on, however, with the aid of steadily received reinforcements from the 19th Division.” The next day brought even stronger Soviet assaults. Losses were extremely heavy on both sides. “Again the Japanese defenses appeared to be crumbling, but the units still clung to the heights.”40

  This was not the only pressure the Soviets applied. The Soviet press abandoned its earlier restraint, and in August Pravda and Izvestia headlines clamored for a “Savage Rebuff to the Brazen Aggressors.” An American journalist was encouraged by the Soviet news censor at the Foreign Ministry to emphasize strongly in his reports the possibility of war
between the Soviet Union and Japan unless Japan ceased its aggression. The journalist was authorized to ascribe this view to “the Soviet circles here.”41 Such press campaigns by totalitarian governments often are used to prepare the populace for an impending crisis. The Japanese press, in contrast, gave Changkufeng low-key treatment, leading the U.S. embassy in Tokyo to conclude correctly that Japan was trying to play down the fighting and terminate the incident.42

  By the end of the first week of August, military and civilian authorities in Tokyo were growing alarmed. The specter of simultaneous wars against China and the USSR was beginning to take shape, a grim prospect that even the activists at IGHQ dreaded. Against this was weighed the restraint shown by the Red Army in two respects: restricting the fighting to the immediate vicinity of Changkufeng Hill despite the major tactical disadvantage this imposed on the attacking troops, and not threatening Japan by concentrating offensive forces at other points along the three-thousand-mile frontier.

  In view of these factors, IGHQ ordered some “emergency” military measures. The 19th Division’s artillery, consisting of 75-mm mountain guns and some smaller ordinance, was beefed up with heavy artillery drawn from North China and from Kwantung Army. The 104th Infantry Division, earmarked for the China Expeditionary Army, was ordered to the Hunchun area in eastern Manchuria, where it took up a threatening position on the flank of Soviet forces in that area. Kwantung Army itself deployed its main forces to eastern Manchuria to exert “silent pressure” on the USSR. In addition, on August 4 the Japanese male population of Harbin and other Manchukuoan cities was ordered to prepare to report for military service with units on the frontier. No such order had ever before been issued.43

  Despite all these efforts, the Soviet attacks grew still fiercer from August 7 to 10. The casualties grew alarmingly, reaching 51 percent of Colonel Sato’s 75th Regiment. Morale among the frontline Japanese troops began to sink after August 7, as the hopelessness of their situation bore in on them. To the Japanese defenders on the ridges, as well as to military authorities in Tokyo, it was becoming increasingly clear that if IGHQ attempted to maintain the current position in the combat zone without committing substantial reinforcements to the battle, the 19th Division faced annihilation.

  In absolute terms, the Soviet 39th Corps was taking even heavier casualties in its repeated frontal assaults against the dug-in Japanese defenders. On August 8 Chosen Army intercepted a message from Shtern to Blyukher to the effect that Soviet losses could be expected to double if the fighting continued.44 This news, which must have provided some grim satisfaction to Suetaka and his men, is doubly revealing, for in spite of it, the Soviet attacks continued without letup.

  As early as August 6 Shigemitsu was informed by Foreign Minister Ugaki that the government was considering serious concessions to the Soviets in order to settle the incident and that, depending on the circumstances, the abandonment of Changkufeng might even be permissible. However, the deadlock within IGHQ persisted, with the staff officers of the Operations Section stubbornly resisting any notion of Japanese withdrawal. Consequently, Shigemitsu was not sent clear instructions and the negotiations continued into the second week of August as the agony of the 19th Division approached the breaking point.

  By August 10 Shtern had achieved a 3:1 superiority in manpower and a 4:1 margin in artillery. This pressure on the 19th Division, which had been in continuous action since July 31, was simply too much. That afternoon, Soviet infantry at terrific cost succeeded in wresting control of the southern corner of the crest of Changkufeng. The defenders temporarily stabilized the situation and drew up a new defense perimeter, but the Soviet entrenchment on the high ground signaled that a turning point had been reached. Suetaka could not bring himself openly to admit defeat, but his chief of staff took the remarkable step of signaling to Chosen Army Headquarters requesting the immediate suspension of operations and asking that IGHQ be notified that “appropriate diplomatic measures are immediately necessary.”45 Chosen Army Headquarters was so startled by this unprecedented request that they did not relay it to Tokyo. However, one of IGHQ’s own staff officers, Colonel Terada Masao, had just returned to Tokyo on August 10 from a battlefield inspection and argued vigorously for the immediate withdrawal of the 19th Division. The opinion of Colonel Terada, himself a member of Inada’s Operations Section, carried substantial weight. That afternoon, in an atmosphere that was “rather gloomy and permeated with a sense of disaster,” “appropriate diplomatic measures” finally were authorized. Foreign Minister Ugaki sent the following instructions to his ambassador in Moscow:

  1. Settle the matter quickly.

  2. Consent to withdraw to the lines as of July 29.

  3. Base the settlement on the Hunchun Treaty [as the Soviets insisted].

  4. Permissible to withdraw one kilometer from the Changkufeng and Shachaofeng line and agree not to re-enter.46

  Shigemitsu met with Litvinov that evening and offered to have the Japanese troops withdraw one kilometer westward from the ridgeline if the Soviet side would agree to a cease-fire. Litvinov quickly agreed, and it was decided that the cease-fire would go into effect at noon the following day, August 11. Later that same evening, while the Japanese embassy staff was celebrating the cease-fire with a few drinks, a telephone call came from Litvinov’s office advising that it would not be necessary for the Japanese troops unilaterally to withdraw one kilometer. The Soviet government would be satisfied with a cease-fire along the line that both sides were occupying as of midnight, August 10. The Japanese diplomats jumped at the offer, and the authorities in Tokyo were delighted when notified that their forces would not be compelled to withdraw unilaterally.47

  The Litvinov-Shigemitsu agreement of August 10 established a joint border commission to redemarcate the boundary. This commission never reached a mutually acceptable definition of the boundary in that area, but the real outcome became clear before the border commission’s first meeting. On the afternoon of August 11, a few hours after the cease-fire went into effect, General Shtern met with one of the 19th Division’s regimental commanders to arrange details for the separation of forces. With the hostilities “honorably” terminated, IGHQ ordered the immediate withdrawal of all Japanese forces to the west bank of the Tyumen River. When the last Japanese soldier crossed the Tyumen on the night of August 13, that river became the de facto border. Soviet troops reoccupied Changkufeng and the other nearby heights—with unforeseen and far-reaching consequences.

  The Meanings of Changkufeng

  Authoritative Japanese military sources conclude that if the negotiations in Moscow had been prolonged for one more day, the 19th Division most likely would have been driven from Changkufeng and the surrounding heights.48 No doubt General Shtern’s infantry also was greatly relieved that the bloodletting had come to an end. Still, one wonders why Moscow accepted a cease-fire at a moment when its troops were so close to achieving complete victory on the battlefield.

  Perhaps the leadership in Moscow concluded that it would be prudent to accept the “three-quarters of a loaf” offered by Shigemitsu rather than try to win it all. After all, there had been threatening Japanese troop mobilizations in eastern Manchuria and the Imperial Army already had established a record of brash and unpredictable action. Furthermore, in the midst of the crisis over Czechoslovakia, Moscow might not have wanted to risk an escalation of hostilities in Asia. Another possibility is that Moscow was incorrectly informed about the actual battlefield situation. Perhaps the news of the seizure by their troops of a small section of the crest of Changkufeng was taken to mean that the entire ridgeline already was, or shortly (i.e., before midnight August 10) would be, in Soviet hands. The surprising telephone call from Litvinov to the Japanese embassy on the night of August 10, trading the one-kilometer Japanese withdrawal for a cease-fire line based on actual frontline positions, suggests that faulty communications between Shtern’s headquarters and the Kremlin may have helped save the “face” of many Japanese army men, effecting the remov
al of the 19th Division from Changkufeng by diplomatic rather than military means.

  Both sides sustained heavy casualties. Immediately after the battle, the Japanese press reported 158 Japanese troops killed and 740 wounded. The medical records of the 19th Division show 526 killed and 914 wounded, for a total of 1,440. The actual total may have been somewhat higher, perhaps 1,500–2,000. After the armistice, TASS announced 236 Red Army men killed and 611 wounded. In view of Shtern’s tactics, these figures are far too low. The attackers, forced to advance uphill across exposed terrain against an enemy in prepared positions, probably suffered a casualty rate two to three times greater than that of the defenders. This would place Soviet casualties in the neighborhood of 3,000–5,000. That conforms to the findings of a Soviet Military Council inquiry into the conflict (August 31, 1938), which said Soviet casualties were 408 killed and 2,807 wounded. The official Japanese estimate of Soviet casualties is 4,500–7,000.49

  Not all the casualties fell on the battlefield. Vasily Konstantinovich Blyukher, marshal of the Soviet Union, distinguished soldier and diplomat, one-time warlord of the Soviet Far East, and candidate member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, was recalled to Moscow in August 1938, relieved of his command in September, and, together with his family, arrested in October. He was accused of failing adequately to prepare his forces to meet the Japanese aggressors and, more ominously, of concealing a multitude of “enemies of the people” at all levels in his command. On November 9, 1938, Blyukher died under interrogation, a sanitized way of saying he was tortured to death.50