Sèvres Protocol

by David Lee Corley

  The Israeli frigate INS Miznak took up the pursuit of the Ibrahim. The Ibrahim was still performing evasive maneuvers in the open waters just in case the Kersaint’s captain changed his mind or was staging some sort of ruse to fool the Egyptians. The Miznak headed northeast straight towards the Ibrahim’s position at maximum speed and made good time. The Miznak was no match for the larger Egyptian ship. Her purpose was not to fight but rather to prevent the Ibrahim from doubling back and drive the Egyptian destroyer toward Beirut. If the Ibrahim engaged the Miznak, the captain of the Miznak had orders to run. The Israelis had so few ships they could not afford to lose even one.

  As the Miznak pursued the Ibrahim, the two Israeli destroyers INS Yaffo and INS Eilat turned northwest and sailed at full speed to cut off the Egyptian ship’s escape into Lebanon. At five in the morning the Eilat’s radar acquired the Ibrahim and the two Israeli destroyers pushed to intercept it as it made its final turn toward the port in Beirut.

  A few minutes later, the radar operator picked up a second set of contacts - four surface vessels approaching from the west. Yanai realized that his task force may have fallen into a trap. The four approaching vessels could be Syrian. His two destroyers could be caught in a pincer-type maneuver between Egyptian and Syrian forces. There was a good chance that the frigate Miznak could escape the trap if it was warned in time. The two Israeli destroyers would stand a better if they too broke off the pursuit of the Ibrahim and headed out to open sea. The Egyptian warship would escape unharmed.

  Yanai decided to break silence and identify his ships. He sent a Morse code signal using the ship’s search lights in the direction of the four approaching ships. He waited for a reply that could very well determine the fate of his ships and crew. One of the four ships signaled back identifying themselves as neutral American vessels from the U.S. Navy 6th Fleet. Yanai and his men on the bridge were relieved. The Israelis continued their pursuit of the Ibrahim. The American ships turned 180 degrees about to avoid getting caught in the crossfire from the battle that was about to unfold.

  The Israeli destroyers closed to within six miles of the Egyptian destroyer and used their radar to calculate the position of their target. Their guns turned toward the Ibrahim and at nine thousand yards they opened fire.

  With two Israeli destroyers bearing down on the bow of his vessel and an Israeli frigate approaching astern, Tamsyn knew he and his crew were in trouble. He radioed for help from the Syrians and the Lebanese. He received no reply. He had little choice but to fight against the odds. The Ibrahim returned fire.

  The Israelis kept their shelling hot and heavy. One of the lookouts reported an explosion followed by black smoke on the extreme bow of the Ibrahim. The Israeli shell had pierced the forward deck, passed through the ship and exited through the starboard hull. The dark holes in the hull and deck looked a lot more serious than they were in reality. The shell had passed through the anchor’s chain compartment and did no real damage to the ship. The Egyptians were lucky. A depth charge rack was nearby and would have created a massive explosion, if hit.

  The Israelis didn’t let up. They didn’t know how much time they had before other vessels or aircraft joined the fight. They wanted to sink the Ibrahim before others could come to her rescue. Another lookout reported a second hit on the stern of the Ibrahim.

  A round had hit underneath the Ibrahim’s aft gun mount and damaged the magazine hoist, dramatically slowing the gun’s rate of fire. The shell had pierced the deck and detonated inside the ship. One piece of the shell destroyed one of the boilers, and another piece damaged some machinery. A third piece of the shell destroyed one of the turbogenerators which fed the electrical system.

  A third shell slammed into the forward deck underneath the main gun turret, damaging its operating mechanism. With several of his crew killed and badly wounded, Tamsyn gave the order to turn about and head due north back out to sea. He wasn’t sure where they would go but anywhere was better than the deadly triangle the Israeli ships had formed. The safety of Lebanon would have to wait.

  As the Ibrahim’s crew prepared to flee the battle, one of the Israeli shells penetrated the upper deck over the engine compartment and badly wounded several of the engineers. The Ibrahim was slow with a speed of only seventeen knots. It wouldn’t take the Israelis long to close in. The counterfire from his guns was slow and sporadic. The gunnery crews were tired and their aim was abysmal.

  Two Israeli Ouragan jets appeared on the horizon and flew toward the Ibrahim. The Egyptians opened fire with their anti-aircraft guns with little effect against the fast flying jets. The jets fired thirty-two unguided air-to-surface missiles scoring only one hit. The armor-piercing warhead penetrated the weather deck, went through the wardroom, and exploded in a machinery space, further crippling the Ibrahim. With their missiles expended, the Israeli pilots strafed the decks of the Ibrahim with their Hispano 20-mm guns. Several more of the Ibrahim’s crew members went down wounded or dead.

  Tamsyn knew it was just a matter of time until the Israelis caught up with his vessel. The only question was how many of his crew would die before the battle was over. Tamsyn was not afraid of dying himself. He had come to grips with the possibility long ago. He knew that he could be court-martialed if he did not continue fighting until the last man or he ran out of ammunition, but he didn’t care at that point in the battle. He wanted to save his crew. He considered scuttling his ship before abandoning her but knew that it would be difficult to penetrate the ship’s hull without a massive explosion that would kill many more of his men. His men had fought the Israelis bravely. They had done their duty. It was time to let go. Tamsyn ordered a flag of surrender to be hoisted above the bridge.

  Colonel Menachem Cohen, the captain of INS Eilat, was surprised when his lookouts reported that the Ibrahim had hoisted a flag of surrender. At first, he thought it a trick. No captain of a modern warship had ever hoisted a flag of surrender. He ordered a message sent in Morse code by searchlight asking the captain of the Ibrahim to declare his intentions. The message that came back said that the Egyptian captain was indeed surrendering his ship. Cohen sent another message requesting that the Ibrahim cut its engines and come to a full stop. The Ibrahim stopped. The Eilat pulled alongside the Ibrahim and trained its guns on the hull of the ship should it restart its engines or open fire. Cohen ordered an armed boarding party to sail over to the Egyptian destroyer and take its crew captive.

  The surrender went off without incident and the battle was over. Israeli intelligence officers scoured the ship for intelligence that might reveal the Egyptians’ war plans. They found little information of use. The Egyptians didn’t have a plan, except to react.

  Tamsyn was transferred to the Eilat where he met Cohen and officially surrendered his ship, as was naval tradition. Tamsyn asked that his wounded crew members be evacuated and for additional men to help fight the fires above and below deck. Cohen agreed but said that his men would fight any fires.

  The Egyptian prisoners left their ship under guard and the Israelis took over. The Israeli chief engineer inspected the Egyptian ship and reported that the damage was relatively superficial and the Ibrahim was in no danger of sinking. Cohen was miffed. Warships were rarely taken in modern warfare, but he was happy to oblige.

  The Ibrahim was towed back to Haifa and the damage repaired. Months later, the destroyer was recommissioned into the Israeli navy as the INS Haifa.

  NINE

  October 31, 1956 – Mitla Pass, Egypt

  When Sharon awoke the next morning after reuniting his forces, he saw the obvious problem facing his brigade. The mountains overlooked the Israeli positions. He wondered why the Egyptians had not already attacked. They would have a clear advantage using the mountain ridges for protection.

  He received his answer when the first Israeli jets arrived overhead and scouted the mountains – There were no Egyptian forces in the Mitla Pass.

  Sharon and the other commanders were puzzled on hearing the news. Why would the E
gyptians not protect such a strategic point? The Mitla Pass was the gateway to the middle of the Suez Canal Zone. It was easily defensible and didn’t require a large force.

  The Egyptians were more concerned with protecting the Suez Canal than any of the passes leading to it. They had placed the majority of their armed forces in the Sinai near the shores of the canal and not in the mountains bordering it.

  It was clear to Sharon and the others that this was a strategic mistake. The 202nd Brigade needed to occupy the pass or face the consequences of an Egyptian force gaining a well-covered position that could rain down artillery and mortar shells on the Israeli forces with impunity. The Israelis would have no choice but to withdraw, which could endanger Operation Musketeer and Operation Revise. With the threat of the Israelis gone the British and French military would lack a legitimate reason to invade Egypt and protect the canal.

  Israeli intelligence reported that an Egyptian armored brigade was forty miles to the northeast at Bir Gifgafa and had changed direction to advance on the Israeli positions. It was almost like the Egyptians had been listening in on the Israelis and realized their blunder. The Egyptian redeployment would quickly develop into a race to see who could occupy the pass and the surrounding mountain slopes first. Sharon’s brigade was weak. His men were exhausted and he had left a battalion at the Nakhl crossroads and a company at Themed Oasis to protect his communication lines. With only three tanks and a few artillery pieces, his brigade looked more like a battalion. He needed to put his men in a defensible position before the Egyptians counterattacked.

  Sharon radioed Dayan at Army HQ in Jerusalem, informed him of the Egyptian armored movements and asking for permission to occupy the empty pass. To his amazement, he was denied. Dayan and the Israeli leaders were concerned that the pass was too close to the canal and, because it was a key strategic point, could be considered within the restricted zone that British and French had declared. Sharon argued that it would be better to take and hold the pass until the British and French forces arrived. His troops could simply withdraw at the first sign of Western soldiers. The British and French could then occupy the pass without having to fight for it with the Egyptians. Dayan was concerned that things could quickly get out of hand if the Israelis were found to occupy the pass. Sharon persuaded Dayan to at least allow him to scout the pass but on the condition that Sharon’s reconnaissance units were to pull back the moment they encountered a large force of Egyptians.

  Sharon selected Motta to lead the reconnaissance mission. Motta and his men were to attempt to take the entire twenty miles of the pass before stopping. He gave Motta specific instructions to break off any engagement with the enemy that threatened to become a large-scale battle. Motta agreed.

  Motta took two companies of paratroopers in the six Russian armored troop carriers, plus several halftracks and the three remaining tanks into the pass. They would move fast, hoping to catch any Egyptian forces by surprise.

  The reconnaissance force rounded a bend less than a mile into the pass and came under heavy fire. The Egyptians had hidden behind the ridges of the mountain and nearby caves hoping to ambush the unsuspecting Israelis. The Israeli jets were flying too fast to spot them. They had placed a truck in the middle of the road to block the Israelis from advancing.

  The first two Israeli halftracks were hit with Soviet-made recoilless rifle rounds and exploded, killing the drivers, gunners and several of the troops inside. Motta ordered a third halftrack to push the Egyptian truck out of the way while the first Israeli tank moved up and provided covering fire. The halftrack succeeded in pushing the truck off the road but ended up crashing into a wadi when the driver was blinded by a ricocheting bullet through the halftrack’s viewing porthole. Lieutenant Arieh Crespi, one of the company commanders, was also killed.

  A few moments later, the light tank was hit with a recoilless rifle round killing the gunner. The tank could still move but the main gun was useless. Within the first five minutes of battle, twelve Israelis had died and the rest of the convoy was under heavy fire from the surrounding ridgetops.

  Motta refused to retreat despite his orders. He had been taught by Sharon never to leave his men, dead or wounded, behind. This allowed the paratroopers to fight without reservation. They knew if they were wounded their comrades would come and get them. If dead, their bodies would be returned to their families. It gave them courage. Motta was not about to betray that trust. He and his men fought on.

  They were fortunate to have the Russian troop carriers which were enclosed in armor and allowed the soldiers inside to shoot out through gun portholes. The armor on the Soviet vehicles was heavy enough to resist heavy machinegun fire but could not deflect a direct hit from a recoilless rifle. The paratroopers kept a sharp-eye out for any signs of a recoilless rifle team setting up their weapon and would pour fire on their position until the enemy was killed or retreated.

  Once the convoy had entered the pass, Sharon had lost radio contact with Motta and his men. He could hear the distant explosions and gunfire but had no idea as to the ferocity of the ambush.

  To make matters worse, an Egyptian squadron of British-made Vampire jets flew into the valley and strafed the paratrooper position outside the pass. The twin-tailed Vampires had four 20-mm cannons and had been purchased by Egypt from the Italian Air Force using Syria as an intermediary. Their maneuverability at high speeds made them ideal for air-to-ground attack. The Israeli lost five more vehicles and three paratroopers were killed with several more severely wounded. The Israelis were being torn apart and were taking heavy losses.

  October 31, 1956 – Cairo, Egypt

  Once word reached the Egyptian commander that the Israelis had attempted to take the pass, he ordered several battalions to redeploy across the Suez. A chain ferry was used to transport the troops and their light vehicles across the canal. Tanks and halftracks were too heavy for the ferry and had to be left behind. The battalions were still well-armed with fourteen medium machineguns and twelve anti-tank guns. Many of the battalion officers found excuses not to cross with their men and left them leaderless. The NCOs carried out the redeployment. In some respects, this worked to the Egyptians’ advantage. The men respected the NCOs and loathed the officers. They fought more valiantly when only led by their platoon commanders.

  When the majority of the Egyptian force had crossed Suez, they set out for the Mitla Pass. They took up positions on the Heitan defile just past a bend in the road near the top of the pass. As more troops made it across the Suez they joined their comrades in the pass and waited for the Israelis.

  October 31, 1956 – Mitla Pass, Egypt

  The Egyptian companies that had been battling with the Israeli units most of the day, pulled back so that the larger force could confront the enemy. The Israelis, once again, did not know what they were facing as they advanced through the pass.

  Below the mountain pass, Sharon redeployed his men to form a defensive position facing outward from the mouth of the pass. His concern was that the Egyptian armored column might use another pass to cross over to the eastern side of the mountains and attack the Israelis from the rear.

  Sharon received his first reports of the ambush when Motta send back a soldier to give Sharon the message in person. Sharon was running low on troops and vehicles, but he did his best to shore up the beleaguered assault force. He sent Eitan with several companies of paratroopers to reinforce Motta and his men.

  When Eitan and his reinforcements arrived, Motta ordered the halftracks to push the damaged vehicles out of their path and clear the road. The Israelis again pushed forward deeper into the pass, carefully watching the ridges above them.

  No sooner did the first battle end than the second one started. The Israeli vehicles rounded a bend in the mountain road and encountered the larger Egyptian force waiting in ambush. The Egyptian anti-tank guns were well placed to cover the road and several Israeli vehicles were immediately destroyed, killing several drivers and passengers. The Israelis were in trouble aga
in but they didn’t retreat. Instead, Motta send a company up the side of the mountain ridge in hopes of flanking the Egyptian anti-tank gun positions. Black smoke rising up from the burning vehicles hid the Israeli flanking maneuver and kept the anti-tank guns from destroying more vehicles. The Israelis were forced to scale a large cliff to avoid Egyptian fire as they climbed to the top of the ridge.

  When the Israelis reached the top of the ridge they came under heavy fire from well-positioned Egyptian machineguns placed on the ridgetops on both sides of the road. The Israelis were pinned down and taking more losses. With the Egyptians having two angles of attack, the Israelis were unable to get at the anti-tank guns. Realizing the situation was hopeless, the Israeli company commander ordered his men to gather their wounded and retreat down to the road and the safety of the armored vehicles.

  Hour after hour the two sides chipped away at each other taking a shot when the opportunity arose through the dust and smoke. It was a stalemate, which meant that the Israelis were unable to take their objective, and therefore losing.

  Motta and Eitan were determined to break through and secure the pass. They decided to try again to clear the enemy position on the ridgetops. This time they would send men up both sides of the road and attack simultaneously denying the Egyptians the ability to concentrate their fire. At the same time, they would send a halftrack and the two remaining tanks up the road to engage the Egyptian units at the bottom of the ridgeline. It was an all-or-nothing push to overrun the Egyptian positions and take the pass. The Israelis had three advantages: aggressiveness, training, and leadership. Bravery aside, the Israelis were far better fighters than the Egyptians. The Israeli soldiers were led well by their officers unlike the Egyptians who believed their blood and lives were often being wasted.