From SAS to Blood Diamond Wars

by Ross, Hamish

  While EO was contracted to carry out a combat role, one of its other main functions was to train and support the Sierra Leone army. And this was to turn out to be an opportunity for Fred to draw on the depth of his own experience. Fred thought highly of his EO commander.

  The planned move was that we’d have two armoured vehicles, Russian armoured vehicles for troop carriers that we had, that were to be loaded on to a low-loader; and then we were to move the low-loader up to a point, off-load them and then drive the rest of the way to Kono. So that was the move. And the Commander for that move was Colonel Roelf (Rudolph) van Heerden A very well seasoned leader of Executive Outcomes’ fighting force and Tom Nyuma, the Sierra Leonean, who was also the Deputy Defence Minister. That was the move.

  On 24 June, they formed up on the shooting range of the Benguema training centre for their move on Kono. But their first priority was to watch on TV the South African national rugby team, the Springboks, play New Zealand in the final of the Rugby World Cup, which was held in Johannesburg. The Springboks won 15–12, and President Nelson Mandela, wearing a Springbok shirt, presented the trophy to the home side. Post-apartheid, South Africa had come back into international sport. It seemed to augur well for the operation.

  Col Roelf deployed Fred ‘running right up front with the front guard.’ This was a position that Fred relished.

  We drove up to Makala and then off-loaded the vehicles and we drove by road. I was in the Executive Outcomes’ vehicle leading, as I knew the country. Everybody wanted to be in the first vehicle, and so the first vehicle was overloaded. And if that was not bad enough we had a fuel problem – so start and stop. And at one of the check-points, I looked behind and there was this vehicle that had an anti-aircraft gun. So while a mechanic was repairing our vehicle, the Executive Outcomes’ land rover, I walked over to the Sierra Leonean driver, a sergeant, and I said, ‘Excuse me, who’s the Commander?’ And he said, ‘I’m the Commander.’ I said, ‘You were the Commander, now I’m the Commander.’ I said ‘This is Sierra Leone, I want you with me in front, we’ll take the lead.’

  As part of its support for the Sierra Leone army, EO was asked by senior officers to look out for shortcomings in the training and tactics of their country’s military, and to make recommendations for improvement. From the start of the move on Kono, Fred saw that the local soldiers were inexperienced in convoy movement and fighting off an ambush.

  I briefed the people how they should sit, about observation, and, when we stopped, de-bus and all-round defence. And every time we stopped, the same drill. They did very well; it was only a matter of teaching them and showing them. The driver said, ‘Come and sit with me in front.’ I said, ‘No my friend, it’s not in the front the fighting is done but at the back. You don’t sit in the front, you sit in the back with your fighting men and fight the action at the back. You must be there with your men to make sure – if something happens.’ I briefed them and discussed with Col Roelf and Tom Nyuma that if we should come to a cutting in the road, I would accelerate and if the rebels took me on, that would be a warning to everybody, and the main party could give me covering fire and then clear the objective. Then we would move forward. And that was how we moved.

  It did not take Fred long to spot some fundamental weaknesses at the leadership level in the army, weaknesses of a kind that would undermine the commitment of men fighting in this type of warfare. But these were weaknesses that could be addressed.

  This is the sad thing about the leadership: normally, when they fight, and this is what the army asked us to find out, the wounded are left behind. And that is the fear of any soldier – that you are wounded and you are going to be left behind. And I was to prove it later on when the group took Gandorhun, when we cleared ten miles, twenty miles all around, up north and east.

  On the first day of their advance, Col Roelf recalls, ‘We encountered little drama along the road.’ They had helicopter top-cover and thanks to their capable pilots, who warned them of ambushes ahead, they were easily able to roll them up. But at times, Col Roelf had to restrain Fred’s style of leadership.

  I had to call him back on a number of occasions, as he was to break contact with the men and put himself at risk. What Fred showed to me was his disrespect for the enemy and he really wanted to overrun them. Fred showed to me that he has no fear, and I had to ask him to take it slowly, as he was then very much older than my average guy. He was a pleasure to work with – a horse I had to keep the bridle pulled on.2

  They spent the first night at Masingbi at an old school that was burnt out by the rebels.

  From the appearance of the school, it must have been a secondary school and a big one at that. I sighted the defensive positions for 2 armoured cars covering the main road and the rest was all round defence, which the soldiers took up automatically.

  On day two they carried on along the road again; their second stop was at a military camp at Bumpe – less than a 1000 metres from Yengema Airfield and Sefadu (the town is known as Sefadu or as Koidu and sometimes written as Koidu-Sefadu). Col Roelf ’s plan was to rest there for the night, start early, and move to Koidu-Sefadu and clear and establish a firm base. Fred gives a glimpse of that night that shows Executive Outcomes as a well disciplined team, working together, familiar with their proven tactics, preparing to deliver maximum impact.

  So we spent the night at Bumpe, and the commanders of Executive Outcomes covered all the vulnerable points: they set the mortars up; the team silently ready at the mortars; and the rest of us in all-round defence.

  That very morning, early in the morning, the rebels came and attacked the camp. I don’t think they knew who were there; they were firing at the camp, a normal stand-off attack. And when they finished – we never returned any fire, because we wanted to follow up –, when they finished, they all went back on the road; they didn’t know that we were there; and in the meantime, everyone got from stand-to to ready, and we followed. And when we came over the little rise we could see them going in two ranks with their weapons on their shoulders; and we hit them, and they ran and we followed all the way up to Yengema; and we cleared Yengema airfield and then from there we moved on to Sefadu and cleared the centre of Sefadu. And the rebels had never come across anybody that chased them like that.

  Col Roelf ’s summary of the last twenty-four hours of their advance on the Kono district neatly sums up the effectiveness of EO’s strategy and tactics.

  When we reached Yengema, we found only a small contingent of the SLMF, now very much relieved. The plan was to attack the town of Koidu the next day and to drive out the rebels. Very early the next day the rebels did an attack on our position; and we killed 9 rebels that morning, and did an immediate follow up of the enemy. Within an hour we had taken the Yengema airport with little resistance; and by midday we had the town of Koidu under control. The rebels could not stand the momentum and withdrew from the area.3

  In one of the villages EO cleared, women and children and elderly people, who had been unable to flee the area, told them of their treatment at the hands of the rebels. Word of the company’s presence got around, and over the next two days, as they cleared the Kono district, local people came out to cheer them, hailing them as liberators and heroes, calling them ‘Bafana Bafana’, which was the name of the South African national soccer team. The rule of law was re-established, and the presence of Sierra Leone troops with EO helped to restore people’s confidence in the army.

  The next operation that EO undertook was to Gandorhun, south east of the Kono district; on this operation, Fred was involved from the planning stage, when it was decided that he would lead the ground assault force, as Col Roelf outlines.

  We had some rebel incursions. So I planned this operation with the Sierra Leonean Army, with top guys like Tom Nyuma; and Fred was part of the operation. We planned it over a few days – 3 or 4 days – and assembled all the forces, of which the ground force was all Sierra Leonean Government troops. The EO contingent were airlifted by helicopter
and put on high ground and they did the shelling with the mortars and they did some strikes with the helicopter gunships.

  And Fred was put in charge of the Sierra Leonean troops. There was a captain in charge; but I mean Fred was more energetic and knew more, had more knowledge; he had more drive; he was not a scared man, not at all. It was very difficult for me to sort of hold him back, because it was bordering on unnecessary exploitation of a soldier. I’ve never done it that way: I use the indirect method of scaring off my enemy and chasing them into the bush, back into the bush.4

  Operations Officer for this attack was Col Renier Hugo; Jim Hooper, a military journalist, who knew some Executive Outcomes personnel from their previous contract in Angola was given access to the company’s forward base and eventually accompanied Col Hugo with a mortar team to high ground overlooking Gandorhun. He later wrote an account of the operation for military journals, and then covered both the Angola campaign as well as the Sierra Leone actions in his book, Bloodsong.

  The original plan called for air strikes in support of the ground assault force, but the weather closed in and heavy rain and low cloud prevented any flying. Instead, it was decided that whenever the helicopters could operate, they would airlift the mortar team to higher ground and the Mi-24 gunship would support with rocket attacks. Fred was to be the professional leader of the assault force, and, on that understanding, the Sierra Leone officers assembled the troops. Then Fred took charge.

  So the first day we left by road and we left late; and I knew the first place we would come to – we had been there before –, I told them, ‘Look that is likely to be an ambush place.’ Which it was.

  There was a dip in the road leading up to a narrow path, overlooked by a very good ambush position. Immediately after that, the ground opened up to a lovely killing field of fire from the scrub to the right of the track under the mangrove trees. As if this was not enough, the rebels left the body of an old man right on the road as a bait – for when everyone automatically moves closer for a look. There and then they sprang the ambush, and 4 of our soldiers got hit. We took casualties but beat off the rebels.

  At EO’s forward base they received a radio message from Fred that that his force had been ambushed but had cleared through and were advancing towards the nearby village of Woama. They stayed the night there.

  As darkness fell, the Sierra Leone troops became nervous: trying to boost their morale, they would occasionally fire their weapons at nothing at all, thinking it would scare off the rebels from attacking.

  What they did not realize was that they were showing that they were ill-disciplined and scared too. Johnny Moore was the Sierra Leone captain in charge. I said to him, ‘Tell your troops to save their ammunition because tomorrow we are going to be hit.’

  Fred impressed on the men that nobody would be left behind, they would carry their wounded and dead with them, and when the weather cleared they would be airlifted out. Fred’s leadership, however, amounted to more than depth of experience and personal courage: he was able to imbue these men with a sense of their own worth and their own proud heritage. During the Second World War, Fred’s father had fought with the British army in the Burma campaign; so also had British West African units of the 82nd (West Africa) Division. He said to them, ‘You are the same people that fought in Burma with honour.’ Given the depths to which morale in the Sierra Leone army plummeted during those years when it was shown not to be a credible force against the rebels, it is doubtful if these soldiers had ever before been reminded of the military tradition to which they belonged.

  At first light next day they assembled, and moved out.

  Five hundred yards out of our camp we got hit; we were ambushed. Eventually, at the end of the day we had one dead and ten wounded. And they were carried to the next place. And the local soldiers, at first they were just like fish − when you see the fish swirl in the water –, but when they realised that nobody was going to be left behind, they stood firm and everybody wanted to get in there. The enemy dead, we just searched the body, but nobody was to mutilate, ever. We are who we are. Discipline must be maintained.

  When they reached their next objective, Gbekidu, Fred radioed EO’s forward base that they had been hit and taken casualties. And that was as far as he got before the radio batteries went flat on him. At EO’s base, Jim Hooper, the military correspondent, was aware of the frustration the team felt because the weather kept the helicopter grounded. They were not concerned though.

  Everyone was confident of Fred’s ability to keep his troops together and see off any rebels. But it was time to get the mortars in position to support him.5

  Jim Hooper lent a hand, loading the helicopter with ammo crates of 120mm and the 82mm mortar bombs. At daybreak, if the weather lifted, the mortar team were ready to leave.

  Night closed in swiftly and silently on Gbekidu. Fred made the troops stay in the same room as the dead. They did not like that: they were superstitious. He told them, ‘That’s nonsense.’ No one demurred; and no sound of moaning came from the wounded – although the unit had no morphine with them.

  In the morning, the cloud base lifted and the helicopter arrived. Fred had briefed the troops that when the helicopter landed, they would unload the ammunition first then load the wounded and the dead.

  And there were some young kids that were part of the group that lived there; and I told them to stay at one side, and after the dead and wounded were taken on board, when I gave the signal, this group of five or six kids went straight into the helicopter. I signalled the helicopter to close the door and it took off. And that was it: no one else could jump into the helicopter.

  After the helicopter took off, the ground assault force left Gbekidu and headed for their objective, Gandorhun; Fred was with the lead troop. This time there was no contact with the rebels, who, they knew from the previous day’s fighting, had taken losses. When they entered Gandorhun, Fred could see that there were very good firing positions that gave excellent cover for view and fire and would have cost the assault force heavily. Then as they took over the town, a few mortar rounds began to fall: the mortar team had been airlifted to higher ground. However, because his radio’s batteries were flat, there were no communications between the ground force and the EO team, and so Fred put down yellow markers on the ground for the helicopter pilots to see. On the higher ground, Col Hugo was already with the mortar team and the journalist, Jim Hooper, had been allowed to join them.

  Through his binoculars Colonel Hugo could see armed troops in Gandorhun. Knowing how frightened the rebels were of helicopters, he immediately deduced that Marafono and his men had already taken the town. At this point the Mi-24, having been rushed through its scheduled maintenance, screamed past us before making a low pass over the town and verifying what Hugo suspected. ‘We have a visual on Fred,’ the radio crackled.’6

  Gandorhun was in government forces’ hands again. What the operation had shown was that although, in the past, there were instances of Sierra Leone troops being reluctant to engage with the RUF in combat, here, with the support of Executive Outcomes and under good leadership, they could acquit themselves well.

  The net effect of what Executive Outcomes achieved in a matter of months led to changes taking place in the country’s political climate. Its impact for the good was out of all proportion to its numerical strength: during the first three months it had 114 – 116 men in the country; when its Angola contract came to an end, that number rose to between 180–190.7 The large concentrations of rebel forces that had threatened Freetown had been pushed back to the east; the diamond-bearing areas of the country were becoming safe for companies to work in again; and politicians were beginning to think in terms of elections for a re-established democracy. However, there was some way to go yet: guerrilla warfare continued; and a military regime still ruled the country, but in principle agreement had already been reached that at a suitable time, power would be relinquished to a democratic government.

  Until that happened
though, there was an authority vacuum at district level. Many of the local chiefs, the traditional source of authority, had fled to Freetown; and as Executive Outcomes cleared areas of the rebels, interim, ad hoc, authority would rest with military personnel, whose integrity and professionalism could be questionable. With that in mind, Fred returned to Freetown and contacted Chief Hinga Norman.

  Having cleared the area we established a rule of law – no more harassing of people and so on. And as we established in Kono and it became safe, I came back to Freetown and I saw the Chief. And I said, ‘Chief could you arrange for me to meet the Kono chiefs?’ Because what I didn’t want was the military to rule the civilians. I wanted the chiefs to go back. And the Chief organized it so that I met the Kono chiefs, six of them; and we met at my house on Wilkinson Road. It’s the same house that Branch Energy with the mining company use now – it was my house then. The Chief organized it so that I met them. I asked them, ‘Please could you come back to Kono to look after your people?’ And the question they asked was, is Kono safe? And I said that Kono was safe, safer than Freetown, there was no harassment, no looting or anything; the rule of law was very strict. Unfortunately, I think there were certain fears on their part and it never came about.

  Other chiefs did return and some had never fled, and they were to be very useful to Executive Outcomes in helping to flush out pockets of RUF rebels in the Gandorhun area. Fred arranged for Col Roelf to meet Chief Hinga Norman.

  There were a number of chiefs from various districts, one of whom was Regent Chief Hinga Norman, who played a major role in bringing these guys together. I think they all had a sort of political agenda in helping Kabbah [later President of the restored democracy] come into power; and in the war at that level as well. I met Hinga Norman there with the help of Fred; and we became friends, Hinga Norman and I, we became good friends.8

  It seems that Chief Hinga Norman was giving thought to whether, in the longer term, the Sierra Leone army could hold on to the gains made by Executive Outcomes. Kamajor, in the Mende language, means hunter, and the society of hunters known as the Kamajors probably existed from time beyond memory. More recently, however, it was developing into a chieftaincy-based militia.