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From SAS to Blood Diamond Wars

Page 18

by Ross, Hamish


  He was over a very hostile area, 120 kilometres from DHQ , an area that had not been known about during the EO days (Juba felt that it may have been because of strong political connections with the RUF). It only became apparent when he entered the area and realized how it was possible for the rebels to move from the south-east of the region to the north-west without any problems. The stronghold would not have become known had not the rebels given it away by attacking friendly forces so close it.

  Juba had the target visual that JJ in the front cockpit directed him to. On this old Mi-24 there was mounted a 12.7mm Gatling gun in the nose with a firing rate of up to 5000 rounds per minute and 4 x mini-guns on the wings with 6000 rounds a minute firepower each.

  He approached the target from the south and delivered effective fire on its eastern side, and then swiftly changed direction to direct fire to its western side and so create pandemonium among the rebels. He then flew north of the target to come in for the final attack, when he experienced engine vibration and oil pressure reduction on No. 2 engine, and at the same time the guns started giving problems. He recalled from EO days that, ‘The rebels liked their human soup’, and visualized himself and his crew ending up in the pot by dark the same day, if the other engine malfunctioned. Without alerting his crew, he very calmly requested the direction back to DHQ. By this time he had already turned on a south-westerly direction for the shortest route out of the area to cross the closest river to give them some headway in case the other engine failed.

  He managed to return the helicopter to DHQ under extreme conditions. After landing, inspection showed that there was no oil left in the engine due to a leakage, and it was about to seize. The helicopter was then grounded until spare parts could be acquired. The Chief Operations Officer of ECOMOG apologized to Juba for putting him under pressure to fly the unserviceable Mi-24 that nearly did not make it back to base.

  The order for two reconditioned engines and spare parts for the gunship was won by Chatelet Investment Ltd, a company with an office in Luxembourg and another in Freetown; the engines would be bought in a former Soviet bloc country. However, Gp Cpt Easterbrooke, ECOMOG Chief Air Officer, and Juba were refused entry visas for Russia to carry out advance inspection of the engines because the firm that invited them was not a recognized company.

  Good news and bad news arrived together at the end of October in a communication from Sandline. The company gave Bokkie over into the ownership of its crew at no charge; it was theirs and all monies accruing. But Bokkie was long overdue complete refurbishment. Keeping the air bridge open between Monrovia and Lungi demanded much effort and commitment on the part of the crew, but it took a greater toll on the aircraft. Juba had nursed it along beyond the designers’ limits, and now they were going to be responsible for maintaining it. The three who flew Bokkie since October the previous year plus Neall Ellis, the pilot Sandline sent in February, formed a company and called it JESA, taking the first letter of each name: Juba, Ellis, Sendaba and (an exotic variation of Fred’s to provide a vowel) Alfredo. They would be contracted to the Sierra Leone government through ECOMOG.

  On 7 November, the first consignment of spares for the gunship arrived at Lungi along with a military equipment contractor, who had had dealings with the Sierra Leone government for some years, and three Russian technicians to be met by a reception committee that included Gen Kbobe CDS, Abdulai Mustapha, an adviser to President Kabbah (or as Fred described him, ‘Kabbah’s Mr Fix It’), Chief Air Officer Grp Capt Easterbrooke, Juba and Sendaba. When the engine logbook was inspected, Sendaba noticed that on the cover, the engine specification and serial number was pasted over and sellotaped; and moreover, he checked and found that some of its pages were missing or not completed. As he explained later to a Board of Inquiry,

  The details that are supposed to be contained in the missing pages are as follows:

  Page 65 (missing) is supposed to be the ‘acceptance certificate’ containing the engine type, engine serial number, 3 signatures stamped to certify that the engine has been correctly overhauled.

  Pages 35, 36 and 37 (not missing but not filled) are supposed to contain the engine parameter details.

  Pages 382 and 383 (missing) are supposed to be filled with the bench test report after overhauling.

  The graph showing the engine parameter reading is also not supplied with the log book.

  It is based on all these reasons that we did not install the engines on the aircraft.6

  The logbook, in Juba’s view, was a legal document. He refused to accept the engines, and reported the matter to Gen Khobe. Over the next couple of days, while the contractor and the Russian technicians were still in the country, further meetings were held. The contractor’s position was that he felt he had been treated in a hostile manner, that the Russian technicians had no doubts that the engines ordered were for the Mi-8 transporter, not the Mi-24, but that is what they were asked to provide and that was what they delivered.7 But when the technicians were challenged about the missing and uncompleted pages, their position was that the engines were operated in different conditions, so it was not necessary to include the missing pages of the logbook. Then matters were compounded when the Russian technicians assessed that the Mi-24’s airframe was due for a complete overhaul. CAO Tijjani Easterbrook summarized it thus,

  Some interest in Sierra Leone, hoping to make a profit decided to order for the required helicopter spares, engines and armaments. The engines delivered were expired, the arms and ammo were for the ground forces and could not be used from an airborne platform, while the spares were not the ones required. I raised an observation to the Force Commander and the President. The President set up a Board of Inquiry.8

  The upshot was that the gunship remained grounded, and the Sierra Leone Defence Headquarters set up a Board of Inquiry. However, due to the worsening security situation with the AFRC/RUF rebels, it would be the following year before it was able to report.

  Without a gunship, the Sierra Leone government forces had lost a valuable edge over the rebels. But Tijjani Easterbrook took an important initiative.

  In November 1998 when the rebels’ push towards Freetown became a real threat, a meeting was held between the President, Force Commander, Deputy Minister of Defence Mr Hinga Norman, and myself on how the Air Force could stop the rebel advance and raise the morale of ECOMOG troops. I used the opportunity to rekindle the helicopter issue and told the meeting that a helicopter gunship would be the only solution. The President agreed and the Deputy Minister of Defence was directed to handle the matter.9

  Hinga Norman proposed to President Kabbah that Juba be mandated to procure a replacement helicopter from the former Soviet bloc, and should be accompanied by CAO Easterbrook as well as Sendaba, in the light of his knowledge of Russian. The president concurred, and he issued Juba with a diplomatic passport and the mandate for the procurement of helicopters: Juba’s original idea was both an Mi-24 and an Mi-17 because ‘Bokkie was on its last legs’.10 He would also procure ammunition. The implications of that decision were then discussed with the CDS and one or two of President Kabbah’s advisers.

  It may have been before this time that Juba began to sense that the change in Brig Gen Khobe’s role from ECOMOG Task Force commander to Chief of the Defence Staff for Sierra Leone had introduced a certain detachment on Khobe’s part, and it dawned on Juba that there might be an agenda there.

  In the first week of December, Chief Hinga Norman called a meeting to discuss the implications and finer points of the president’s decision. The meeting was held in Gen Khobe’s house. It began around 12 o’clock at night. Among those present were both Tijjani Easterbrook and Juba. Chief Hinga Norman outlined to the CDS and the others who were there, including one of President Kabbah’s advisers, that the president had agreed to give Juba the mandate to procure an Mi-24 gunship. Counter suggestions were made: one of Kabbah’s trusted advisers, perhaps even more than one should be involved in the procurement. But the Deputy Minister of Defence hel
d firm.

  That’s when the Chief said to Khobe, and everybody else who was sitting there, ‘Juba will make a success of it.’ And then he said that if I didn’t succeed in doing the procurement of these machines for them, they could take his head. And what happened after the meeting was that they went out in full force and tried to get me to fail because that was the way to get the Chief out of the way.11

  Juba felt that Chief Hinga Norman knew that others had their own agenda. The meeting ended at 3 am; it was sobering, in the still night, to realize that there were people at a high level whose undisclosed aims were to further their own interests. And he formed that impression not simply from that one meeting but over a host of others in what was to become a saga: he was supposed to be out of the country for ten days, but it was to be over three months before he was able to return. However, there were two great strengths on his side: he had the mandate from the president for the final decision; and the budget was underwritten by the UK as part of its £30 million package of support – most of which was for economic reconstruction – and, because of that, contracts would be monitored by Britain’s Crown Agents.

  So on 30 December, Juba and Tijjani Easterbrook left Sierra Leone, bound first for London before going on to Russia. As the plane touched down, alarm bells ought to have been ringing for some members of the House of Commons, who, a few months earlier had been intoning high-minded sentiments about the scourge of private military operators in Africa, for here was a South African former member of Executive Outcomes, travelling on a diplomatic passport (carrying a visitors’ visa for entry to Russia), mandated by the President of Sierra Leone to procure war machines with a budget of $3.3 million of British taxpayers’ money at a time when there was a UN embargo on importing military equipment to the country.

  The country that they had left was badly in need of an Air Wing with a gunship. On 6 December, ECOMOG forces backed by CDF fought for control of Lunsar. Four days later rebels were fighting less than 40 miles from Freetown. On 18 December, Fred noted in his diary that they flew to Masiaka with food for the Guinean troops, then on to Kenema with the Old Lion (Chief Hinga Norman) on board with supplies of shotgun ammunition for the CDF, next to Daru with ammunition for the ECOMOG force there. They returned to Kenema where they refuelled and picked up Chief Hinga Norman again, then back to Masiaka to air-lift some casualties before returning to DHQ at Cockerill. Next day the BBC reported that Deputy Defence Minister Sam Hinga Norman had distributed weapons to the CDF in Kenema.

  The move followed the passing of enabling legislation on Tuesday and marks the first time the government has officially distributed arms to the militia. Norman said the move was to help deal with the remnants of fleeing junta forces, and that the CDF will now be allowed to accompany ECOMOG troops fighting AFRC/ RUF rebels.12

  Not before time too: the only indigenous force that could be relied on to fight the AFRC/RUF, ill organized though they were, the CDF needed ammunition. But the rebels kept up the pressure. ECOMOG removed its heavy artillery from up-country, and UN personnel were evacuated to Freetown. The rebels took Koidu on 20 December, and two days later thousands of civilians fled Waterloo as it came under attack. They were being supported, supplied and armed despite an international embargo. Britain sent two RAF Hercules planes to evacuate its nationals. A foreign ministers’ conference was held in Abidjan with representatives of several African countries. Britain was represented by Peter Penfold. Meanwhile, UN personnel left the capital.

  Bokkie flew daily with ammunition and food resupply to areas under severe pressure. From 24 December and in the days leading up to the fall of Makeni, they took ammunition for an ECOMOG force and shotguns and ammunition for the CDF. They were often under fire, and they had taken on − and Fred trained − two Nigerians to act as rear gunners, because their blind spot was at the rear. Both newcomers were called Mohammed; so they were known as Mohammed and Old Mohammed.

  On our run in, we came in so low and fast that they did not have time to react, even though Mohammed (right rear gunner) and myself were ready, for them. But on our way out, all hell broke loose. I saw them running towards the path of the flying helicopter and I let loose with my GMPG. It was really music to the ears. One guy with his RPG tube was lining up to shoot us, but I beat him to it. The last I saw of him was him flying into the air as we passed over.

  Under such pressure, the discipline of some ECOMOG soldiers broke, and the danger for the helicopter crew in medivac role was their being swamped with deserters in a panic to get out. In the event of the helicopter being rushed by deserters, Fred and Neall agreed that whenever Fred called ‘lift off ’, Neall would pull power immediately, even if the steps were still down. On this particular run in, they landed with a heavy load of ammunition, and, as usual, no soldiers ran to assist with the unloading. It was the CO himself, covered by six soldiers, who came across as Fred unloaded and said, ‘Sir, do you know you’re under fire?’ After they unloaded the ammunition, they loaded the wounded and dead.

  It was to be a memorable flight back, and one in which they had to call on PAE for assistance. After the casualties were loaded on board, some soldiers, in desperation to get away, started to pile on board.

  I tapped Mohammed on his back and told him to get inside. He jumped out again to close the doors. Unfortunately, at that very moment, thinking that we were all in, I told Nellis [Neall Ellis was often called Nellis] to lift off. Mohammed managed to unhook one of the bars but unfortunately, he was unable to close it properly and it was still outside. Worst of all, the helicopter was pulling up, and Mohammed told us later that he was hanging on to the tail, and realizing that he was going out of the camp perimeter eventually let go of the helicopter, but fortunately, still inside the camp safe area. On landing at Port Loko and realizing that Mohammed was missing everyone was very sad but promised that we would go back tomorrow come hell or high water to bring Mohammed back.

  One of the funniest sights I will never forget was on our landing at Port Loko. The door that Mohammed unhooked was still loose, and whilst in the air, the speed of the slipstream forced the air around to the rear and this kept the door closed. But on landing the sudden touchdown threw the door open and the 2 soldiers that were sitting on it flew past us as the door came off the wing! They just flew past like surfers on an improvised surfboard. But miraculously, they were not hurt.

  But our troubles were not over because the uninjured refused to get off the helicopter, and we had to get the rear door back with us to see what could be done immediately if we were to be back in the air again. No one got off until the PAE helicopter arrived and took the wounded. We asked them not to take any of the useless soldiers who deserted their posts. Finally, we got off on our way home. On arriving in Freetown, Sendaba and his staff flew with Nellis to Lungi and took one of the rear doors from an old shell there and soon sorted out Bokkie.

  On 6 January, the rebels entered Freetown in force moving from east to west leaving a trail of destruction and huge loss of life.

  We got a call very early, at about 6am in the morning, and we took off. And when we came back we had 10 bullet holes in the aircraft. RPGs were fired and we moved to the eastern side of Freetown. When we came back and landed to refuel, I said to Neall, ‘Neall you carry on and I’ll go and see the Chief.’ So we got one of our vehicles, it was a Toyoto and I drove to see the Chief. It was about 7 am that I came and he was in his house in Freetown with two of his people, no weapons, nothing. I said, ‘Chief what are you doing? You cannot stay here, you’ve got to come with me.’ He said, ‘Fred I tried to call the President this morning and there was no answer. I tried to call Gen Khobe; there was no answer. And I said, ‘Chief come, you’ve got to come with me.’ So he came with me to the base at Cockerill, and when we arrived there was Dr Jonah, he was the Finance Minister. He said that he got a message from the President that they were to meet up, the Chief and him at Lungi, at the VIP lounge at Lungi, meet him, the President. But Kabbah was nowhere near Lungi, he was
out at sea.

  Where was the president? Deputy Defence Minister Sam Hinga Norman did not know the whereabouts of President Kabbah.

  ‘I don’t know where he is. I wish I knew,’ Norman told journalists at Lungi International Airport. ‘As a president, (Kabbah) should not go too far from his people. He should be in Sierra Leone,’ Norman added. ‘I’m not president, and I haven’t left.’ Norman said the Civil Defence Forces ‘controlled certain points’ in Freetown, but maintained he had no knowledge of rebel positions. ‘Only their friends, their collaborators, know where they are,’ he said.13

  Not agonizing long over a lost leader, Hinga Norman linked up with the CDF and the remnants of government forces, and was in the thick of the fighting to turn the tide of the RUF advance from east to west. There was heavy destruction to the city, with the rebels torching what they could and Nigerian Alpha jets dropping bombs on rebel positions near Freetown. The RUF advance got as far as Congo Cross bridge. An expert eye-witness: Brig (now Gen Sir) David Richards (currently Chief of the General Staff of the UK) had been sent by the British government to make a military assessment of the situation. He discovered the importance of Chief Hinga Norman in the fight against the RUF:

  We had not picked up his role with the country as much as I then discovered it was. So I was more focused on ECOMOG and Brig Gen Khobe at that time on that first day.14

  And on that first day in Sierra Leone, Gen Khobe took David Richards from a rudimentary command post to observe the fighting for a key crossing: Congo Cross bridge, from where the RUF, if they crossed it, could fan out and probably capture an armoury that contained arms and ammunition. With a pair of binoculars, behind some cover, David Richards observed the fighting.

  I observed the government forces successfully stopping the RUF advance and they got across the bridge – the government forces got across the bridge and took some prisoners. I had observed 10, 15 minutes before that, through my binoculars, the killing of some people on the far side of the bridge, the RUF side of the bridge, which everyone had seen from the safe side, if you like. It was clear that the government forces were very excited and angry when they captured the prisoners and I think I remember the atmosphere. It was very dynamic, a lot of shouting, excitement. There were still bodies on the road from the fighting. All this sort of thing. And I saw a group of people go across the bridge to where the prisoners were being held. And I said to Khobe, ‘What are they doing?’ and he said, ‘That’s Chief Norman.’ And I remembered that I had been introduced to him on my first day here. And he remonstrated with the government forces, the group I’d say there were about 10 or 12 of them, who had captured the RUF or AFRC, I don’t know which they were, … I mean, basically the RUF and the AFRC were on one side of the bridge and the government forces on the other. They [government forces] had attacked across the bridge and another group came down the line of the river or stream. And they had – it was a very neat little operation; and they had captured – there was a fight, and they had captured some of the RUF…

 

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