From SAS to Blood Diamond Wars

by Ross, Hamish

  Further down the road, we came across a deserted green pickup with a 12.7 anti-aircraft gun, and I shot it up with nearly all the rounds left − bar 300 rounds for protection − but could not completely destroy it. Point of interest, even though they had the AA gun, when faced up to by someone who could shoot back, they ran like the rats they were.

  Rebel groups kept in close touch with one another by radio; they had done so since the early days of the RUF insurgency – Foday Sankoh’s previous life as a wireless operator convinced him of the need for good radio communications in running a guerrilla war – and they used it extensively. Their radio messages were intercepted and monitored by the UN force as well as by ECOMOG. ECOMOG had already announced that it would cede its role in Sierra Leone to the UN, but until that happened it was still interlinked with Air Wing. Its Chief Air Officer, Gp Capt Easterbrook, was in charge of the Air Wing operations; Juba and the team ran the day-to-day operations, but tasking was done by the CAO, assisted by his Liaison Officer, Flt Lt. Wakili. And what ECOMOG picked up in the intercepts was the rebels’ complaining that the gunship’s attacks were killing numbers of them. That day’s attack, for example, had killed the Makeni rebel commander.

  The following day they flew first to the Mange bridge area, from Lunsar to Port Loko; then on a Lunsar-Makeni axis with guest observers from UK forces on board. That evening though, Fred had a drink at Paddy’s and the Cape Sierra with their guests. But next morning, the crew had to be clearheaded when they were fired on during a battle at Rogberi Junction. Two vehicles carrying journalists and Sierra Leonean soldiers were ambushed. An American and a Spanish journalist, as well as four soldiers, were killed, and two journalists were wounded during the engagement.12 There had been a military checkpoint there in the past with a makeshift building. This was the location of the firing.

  They shot at us from inside the house, but because of the speed we were flying, we passed it before we could react. We could not orbit and shoot it up in case we killed some civilians.

  The principle Fred operated on was that he either had to be able to eyeball the shooter or be under continuous fire from a source before he could return fire.

  More of the same followed over successive days with reconnaissance and fighting patrols. Not, however, on Saturday 27 May when they had to change a blade on the Mi-24, but they made up for lost opportunity with marathon flight times the next day: they went first to Lunsar and Konta areas and attacked both locations; then they flew Chief Hinga Norman to Bo; their third sortie was to fly top-cover for their own troops advancing towards Lunsar; on a final flight they attacked retreating rebels and, as the weather worsened, shot up two trucks. Fred’s diary entry sums it up – ‘very long day.’ Foul weather continued the next day, but they again flew top-cover for their troops who were now established in Lunsar.

  A break from the intensity of these patrols would have been welcome, and indeed one was to come his way; but the prompt for it was concerning: when Fred phoned Hawa, she told him that their little daughter, Maliaka, was very sick. He had to continue with his immediate commitment; he flew to Bo to pick up Hinga Norman before making a night flight. The rebels had been under attack during the day when they tried to move in force along the Makeni – Lunsar road, so they waited until dark. And so did Fred and Neall Ellis. They were over the target at 2000 hours.

  We flew along the side of the road giving me space to observe any lights of vehicles moving along the road. The area was strong, rebel-held territory, and because they suffered using the road in the daytime, we received information that they were moving at night, which made sense to us, hence the night flight. You only have a shot at the target lights, but once they were off, you have lost it. The area we flew over was pitch black. Because we flew without lights, we were at the target before they knew it. Then shots started flying. But they learned very fast. But at least we stopped the night movement in that area.

  On 2 June, returning from Bumbuna, they came across a hijacked UN truck and shot it up with ‘Big 3’, the gunship’s 3inch rockets.

  It was beautiful to watch. These were the vehicles that were stolen from the 600 plus troops who surrendered without a single shot fired because they were not there to ‘fight’! Indian Troops would never have surrendered their weapons without a fight and the rebels knew that very well. But African troops were a different story.

  Later that day, Fred had pepper soup with Chief Norman and told him that he was due some leave and he would like to go to the UK for two weeks as his young daughter was quite ill. Chief Norman, ‘agreed with me wholeheartedly. He thanked me and hugged me and wished me and my family the best, so I left Sierra Leone.’

  Little Maliaka was very resilient and recovered quickly, and two weeks later Fred returned to a hero’s welcome. Air Wing was about the only credible force carrying the war to the rebels; and this was widely perceived to be the case. On his first night back Fred went for a drink, and was overwhelmed at the reaction when he appeared.

  Received a standing ovation from everyone at Paddy’s as if I was a hero. It was because of what we as a group had done to help the country and the people during their most difficult time that I received such an unearned applause. I was very humbled by their instantaneous reaction. I felt very humble indeed.

  But the conditions for bringing back stability to what, in effect, was becoming a failed state were being put in place, thanks to the role of the United Kingdom. Britain’s unique contribution to its former colony began with a Short Term Training Programme for the Sierra Leone army, but it became much broader based than that, and was part of an overall counter-insurgency policy that the UK had developed over decades. Nonetheless, close co-ordination was required between the British High Commissioner and the Sierra Leone government, and neat footwork by British military commanders on the ground. Brig David Richards later summed it up like this.

  What transpired … was a fascinating example of modern day intervention operations in an uncertain environment. It started as a NEO [Non-combatant Evacuation Order] but developed into something that has characteristics between counter-insurgency and small-scale war-fighting operations. I found myself directing a campaign at the operational level.13

  At one level it was a low intensity military operation with patrols being sent out and information being gathered, at the same time as the training programme was underway. At another level, the Department For International Development (DFID) was to be engaged to train the Sierra Leone police, so that, when the rebels were defeated or neutralized and disarmed, the vacuum that existed in law enforcement in up-country areas could be filled. And at international level, Britain took a lead in pressing through sanctions in the UN against the trading of diamonds from the rebel-held areas of the country. In all of this it was essential to have the close support of the Sierra Leone government. Indeed the role of the British commander on the ground gave him direct access to the Defence Ministry.

  In appearance, the British Force commander worked for the GoSL [government of Sierra Leone]. This was important to maintain the GoSL legitimacy. In reality, the system placed the British commander in a position where he could directly influence the Sierra Leone Ministry of Defence.14

  Fred was in a pole position at this time: he was a friend of Chief Hinga Norman, Deputy Minister of Defence, who trusted him; he had extensive experience in the SAS; by now he had worked in Sierra Leone for almost six years, several of them serving in combat against the rebels, so he was respected; and he had access to people of influence. It is not surprising, therefore, that he was sought out. On 19 August Fred recorded in his diary that he had, ‘a very useful and fruitful discussion with British military advisers.’ These were two of the team of 15 military advisers that the British Defence Secretary had earlier promised would be sent to Sierra Leone.

  The meeting that I referred to was with the two military advisers at the Defence HQ. They explained their views of how the rebuild was going to be carried out in a very thorough and profession
al way, and the parts each party would play. I saw the Chief afterwards and mentioned my meeting with the two military planners, and he smiled. His remark was, ‘Yes they are doing a very good job indeed. Fred, you will see a change in the Sierra Leone Army.’ The Chief was very proud of his British army training and always believed that the British would bring back the pride and professionalism that was once there. Today the Sierra Leone Army are very well disciplined, smartly dressed and regularly paid with their accommodations and welfare improving yearly.

  By late August, the short-term training programme for the Sierra Leone army was in the second tranche of trainees. The first cohort had been put through the course by men from the Royal Anglian Regiment, who then handed over to the Royal Irish Regiment. But there was still a long way to go: in the wider bailiwick of the UN (whose numbers now amounted to some 13,000, shortly to be authorized to increase to 20,000 ) lawlessness reigned. Even Kamajors, the former bulwark of the CDF, were reported by the BBC to be carrying out criminal acts in the Kenema area. Vice President, Albert Joe Demby, led a government delegation to the area and warned them to desist from lawlessness and work for peace. Sam Hinga Norman, Deputy Defence Minister and National Co-ordinator of the CDF warned that, ‘the Civil Defence Forces are not an organization for sheltering criminals, adding that anyone caught involved in any criminal activity will face the full force of the law.’15

  Full force of the law did not mean much to a group of rebels who styled themselves the West Side Boys. They were a motley assortment of young, motiveless killers looking for a motive; they had no political objectives; their reason for being was banditry; there were ex-RUF as well as former AFRC members among them – and they were volatile and highly dangerous, equipped with an impressive arsenal, thanks to what they had captured from UN forces. Their local leader was Foday Kallay, and if they needed some figurehead at a national level it appeared to be Johnny Paul Koroma, the former AFRC leader. But he soon renounced any affiliation with them.

  They took control of movement on the Freetown – Masiaka road, although that route had been cleared by a UNAMSIL operation and came under the surveillance of the Jordanian Second Battalion. The West Side Boys devised a sideline by charging illegal taxes on motorists: they stopped cars and charged a rate of SLL 2000 per vehicle. The Jordanian Second Battalion adopted a relaxed attitude to this highway robbery (thereby giving the impression that there was a two-way benefit from so doing) and claimed that ‘the presence of armed West Side Boys militia on that road is merely a confidence-building measure and not at all a security threat.’16

  In their fiefdom, though, the drug-fuelled West Side Boys were really in a fool’s paradise. Not since Executive Outcomes had a military force successfully attacked and destroyed a rebel stronghold: ECOMOG had not been able to do it – although it had cleared Freetown − nor had UNAMSIL. There seemed little likelihood of it now with the general lacklustre performance of the UN forces. But then, by their own actions on 25 August, when they surrounded and took hostage a reconnaissance patrol of 11 Royal Irish and a Sierra Leone army liaison officer, the West Side Boys set in train a response that would not only destroy them but have a demoralizing effect on the wider rebel movement.

  They took their hostages and their three Land Rovers to the area they had selected for a stronghold. Like that of the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, in which Swiss Consul-General, Rudi Bruns was held hostage five years earlier, the site of the West Side Boys’ stronghold was cleverly chosen. It was only about seventy kilometres from Freetown, and it lay in the Occra hills on the north side of the Rokel Creek, in Gberi Bana. To the east was swampland, to the north and west dense jungle, an approach track ran along the north bank of the creek. But as part of intuitive defensive planning, they established a position in Magbeni on the south bank of the creek to block movement coming from the Freetown-Masiaka road. They were experienced jungle fighters; it would have been a mistake to under-estimate them.

  Because they had no rationale that could be fitted into the pattern of other insurgency groups, it meant that, from a negotiating stance, they were unpredictable. Five years earlier, the RUF knew what they wanted out of taking expatriate hostages: international awareness-raising as a stepping stone to assuming power. Not so the West Side Boys. From the start they used their prisoners as bargaining tender for food and medicine, then for the release of one of their commanders, Brigadier Bomb Blast (aka Brigadier Papa). They separated the Sierra Leone officer from the others, and tortured him. On 3 September, they released five of the soldiers as a goodwill gesture, but they subjected the others to beatings, mock executions and daily humiliation – quite unlike the disciplined regime that Foday Sankoh imposed on the management of the RUF’s hostages, which, as we saw earlier, Rudi Bruns experienced.

  The omens pointed to a final scenario where, with nothing to gain and not much to lose, the West Side Boys would kill the remaining hostages out of hand. Direct action would be necessary; planning was already well underway for an attack to release the hostages. British Special Forces infiltrated two observer teams along the Rokel by assault boat,17 and they were passing back high grade intelligence.18 A land-based assault was not viable because of the location, so it would be a complex undertaking, involving high risk in an unpredictable situation. The rebel camp at Magbeni on the south of the creek would have to be attacked as well as the site at Gberi Bana, where the hostages were held. The raid would be carried out by men from the 1st Battalion the Parachute Regiment and Special Forces.19 And such was the complexity of this operation that, as the MoD later confirmed, it would involve all three services. In addition, ‘Assistance was also provided by the Sierra Leone army.’20

  Uppermost among the elements of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces to provide assistance was the Air Wing. And so it came about that Fred, only three months from his sixtieth birthday, and contracted by the Sierra Leone government, would play what he describes as a minor part in Operation Barras. Juba was in South Africa at the time, so the Mi-24 gunship crew would consist of Fred and Neall Ellis.

  Our involvement was because the West Side Boys had a twin barrel 14.5mm antiaircraft gun, and if the ground forces were to fail to destroy it, we would be called to destroy it with the rockets. We had two pods of 16 x 7” rockets, which are much more powerful than the 3” ones that we normally carried on patrol, plus we had the 12.7mm Gatling four-barrel gun that fires up to 5,000 rounds per minute.

  An RAF liaison officer had been attached to Air Wing at the time of Operation Palliser, and now a British army electronics engineer arrived and worked on the Mi24, so that it was provided with a secure communications systems for its part in the operation. As part of his Air Wing duties, Fred continued with the practice that had been established when they supplied the ECOMOG bases of noting in his diary their flying times and routes, which were then written up at the end of the day in the pilot’s flying log book. He sometimes included the odd cryptic comment. On Thursday 7 September, two British soldiers, X and Y, arrived and the electronics specialist handed over liaison to X, the senior of the two. Fred’s laconic entry in his diary that day, ‘Nice to see the guys.’ Meanwhile the Mi-24’s Gatling gun was still malfunctioning; they test-fired it the following day. Then on Saturday 9 September, Fred and Neall were briefed on Operation Barras, ‘but based on need to know. Must carry on as normal.’ They had been warned to be prepared for an early call out over the week-end.

  Throughout all this, the rumour mill was grinding away at full tilt in Freetown’s bars, spreading scenarios galore of imminent rescue missions. And since Fred, Juba and Neall frequented those same bars, and three months earlier Fred received a hero’s reception on behalf of the work of Air Wing, all that was needed was one chatterer to float the suggestion of their involvement to put them on the defensive. But it was Saturday night; if they did not turn up, it would lead to speculation; so they went out to the bars and put on an act.

  By then the rumour machine in Sierra Leone was rife that something might happe
n that week-end. To counter that Neall and myself went out to Cape Sierra, Paddy’s and other beach bars to be seen drinking. But what they did not know was that for every half pint of shandy, we had at least 2 or 3 of lemonade or tonic. We stayed till about 11pm and then left and went home. To any casual observer, we went home drunk, which was what we wanted them to believe.

  Next morning at 04.25 hours, Fred’s phone rang. He recognized X’s voice, and he heard the code word: it was D-day for Operation Barras. Neall must then have been contacted, for he in turn confirmed with Fred at 04.35. Ten minutes later, Fred made a cup of tea, and left his house at 05.15 hours and drove to Cockerill, where there was a quick up-date brief before departure. Operation Barras went in at 06.16 hours,21 and Fred, Neall, X and Y monitored everything in the Mi-24 on the ground at Cockerill. Then came their clearance to take off, and at 06.32, the Mi-24 was airborne with a crew of four: X in the front cockpit, operating the radio, Y in the back with Fred. They headed straight for the operational area, but not right in to its centre. The gunship was kept at a holding point where they could see the activities of the helicopters as they listened out, as prearranged, for any call for assistance from the commanders on the ground.

  On the ground, the surprise, overwhelming firepower and speed of the assault was matched by its precision. The British Special Forces had the hostages free and unharmed and had them, and the Sierra Leone army liaison officer, on the Chinook in a matter of twenty minutes. But the West Side Boys fought fiercely, and the raiders took casualties.

  In the air, in their holding position, the four-man team waited. And when the request for assistance came from one of the ground commanders, it was for a rocket attack. Neall fired a salvo of rockets at the specific target given by the ground commander. From his position at the gun port, Fred saw the spectacular result: one rocket severed a palm tree, the others exploded where their target was but the results were lost from sight because of the dense canopy. That was their only involvement in Operation Barras. In all they flew two sorties – with a brief refuelling at Lungi – and were in the air over the area for about three hours until they were given permission to leave when their assistance was no longer required and the operation was being wrapped up.