by Lewis Sorley
20 Transcript, Westmoreland Background Briefing, 29 June 1967, History File #18, Box 13, WPCMH. In Washington, on 26 May 1967, Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson had written to a friend in Vietnam: "One of our major difficulties continues to be failure to get blunt, outspoken views on what is right and what is wrong with our performance in Vietnam...." HKJ Papers, MHI.
21 Pentagon Papers, iv:518.
22 McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 237. Years later, when Westmoreland was deposed in connection with his libel suit against CBS, he said: "When I came back in April [1967], if you'll read all of my statements, I was not very optimistic. I was confident, uh—there was no suggestion in April about any crossover point." Another trial document, a McNamara Chronology labeled as Exhibit 488, states regarding the 27 April 1967 White House meeting: "Westy tells the President that the Crossover Point has been virtually reached, and that the enemy force has leveled off at 285,000."
23 McNamara, Remarks to the Press Upon Departing Vietnam, Saigon, 11 July 1967, Exhibit 1807, Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, USAWC Library.
24 Gen. Walter T. Kerwin Jr., Oral History Interview, 22 March 1980, MHI. See also Kerwin Oral History, 13 September 1985, LBJ Library.
25 George McArthur interview, 18 September 1989.
26 Chaisson, Letter of 20 May 1967, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University.
27 Cyrus R. Vance interview, 11 May 1989.
28 Keyes Beech interview, 28 September 1989.
29 Davidson in 5 March 1969 Brief, as quoted in Sorley, Vietnam Chronicles, p. 138.
30"The McNamara-Westmoreland Clash," Washington Post (20 July 1967).
31 Actually there is some confirmatory evidence that LBJ might have been shrewdly correct in keeping Westmoreland where he was. Said Gen. Bruce Palmer Jr., "It began to dawn on them [the politicians in Washington] that Westy was a political threat. It was obvious to me that Westy was bitten by the presidential bug as early as the spring of 1967. They wouldn't want Westy back in the US under those circumstances." Palmer interview, 25 July 2000.
32 As quoted in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Vietnam: Policy and Prospects, 1970, p. 441.
33 Quoted in Chester Cooper, Lost Crusade, p. 506.
34 MFR, Brig. Gen. J. R. Chaisson, MACV Commanders' Conference, 13 May 1967, dated 21 May 1967, Box 13, WPCMH.
35 Message, Wheeler to Westmoreland and Sharp, JCS 7126, 301429Z August 1967, Box 28, WPCMH.
36 Message, Palmer to Johnson, ARV 1522, 190930Z August 1967, MHI.
37 As quoted in Berman, Lyndon Johnson's War, pp. 57–58.
38 Murray Fromson, "Name That Source," New York Times (11 December 2006).
39 Ibid. Apple, said Fromson, considered the stalemate piece "the most important story he'd ever done."
40 Pentagon Papers, II:403.
41 Transcript, Meet the Press, NBC Television Network, 19 November 1967, Box 1, WPCMH. When, two years later, the United States did indeed begin to withdraw its forces from Vietnam, Westmoreland tried to claim credit for an accurate forecast, glossing over the fact that his prediction had clearly been based on an expectation of successful prosecution of the war such that withdrawals could begin, whereas when they did in fact take place it was for an exactly opposite reason, that we had given up on the war.
42 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 234.
43 Westmoreland Address, National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 21 November 1967, Box 1, WPCMH.
44 Ibid.
45 Braestrup in Willenson, The Bad War, p. 190.
46 Message, Johnson to Abrams, WDC 15663, 221857Z November 1967.
47 Palmer, The 25-Year War, p. 75.
48 Gen. Walter T. Kerwin Jr. interview, 2 April 1999.
49 MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, p. 20.
50 Gen. Donn A. Starry interview, 1 September 1989. Starry also described this episode in "Remarks on Joint Operations" at the Army War College on 14 October 1986. See Sorley, Press On!, I:424–425. There were confirmatory accounts from others. Herbert Schandler said in Argument Without End, a collaborative work written with Robert McNamara, that Westmoreland had asserted, asking for forty-four battalions, and then another twenty-four, that this force would enable him "to take the offensive that year and, with 'appropriate' (but unspecified) additional reinforcements,... defeat the enemy by the end of 1967." Certainly that was McNamara's understanding of what had been predicted, as he wrote in his earlier book In Retrospect, referring to Westmoreland's 1 September 1965 paper, "Concept of Operations in the Republic of Vietnam," a description of a multiphased prosecution of the war. "Phase 3 would kick in 'to destroy or render militarily ineffective the remaining organized VC units and their base areas,'" McNamara quoted from the document. "It would begin July 1, 1966, and run through December 31, 1967." Westmoreland later countered that "this common reading of his 1965 timetable is inaccurate," but if so it appears he badly misled the Secretary of Defense at the time. Another who heard that optimistic prediction was Air Force Major General Edward Mechenbier, in June 1967 a young fighter pilot flying F-4Cs out of Danang. Westmoreland came to visit. "The war will be over in two months," Mechenbier remembers hearing Westmoreland tell them. Two days later he was shot down over North Vietnam. When he arrived at the "Hanoi Hilton," he told the other prisoners what Westmoreland had said, "and there was jubilation," at least for a time.
51 Starry interview, 31 May 1995.
52 The Pentagon Papers as Published by The New York Times, pp. 474–475.
53 As quoted in Bilton and Sim, Four Hours in My Lai, p. 46.
54 Clarke, Advice and Support, p. 521. Dr. Clarke later became the Army's Director of Military History.
55 Halberstam, "Return to Vietnam," Harper's Magazine (December 1967), as reprinted in Vietnam Roundup (24 November 1967), U.S. Information Agency, pp. 1–12. Quotation from p. 4.
56 CBS Reports, "The Uncounted Enemy," 23 January 1982, Transcript, p. 21.
57 As quoted in Tom Johnson, "Notes of the President's Meeting with General Earle Wheeler, JCS and General Creighton Abrams, March 26, 1968, Family Dining Room," LBJ Library. Quoted with permission.
16 ORDER OF BATTLE
1 When Gen. McChristian arrived in Vietnam to become the MACV J-2 in mid-1965, he asked his predecessor, Marine Maj. Gen. Carl Youngdale, to brief him on his order of battle files. "He asked me, 'What do you mean by order of battle?'" said McChristian. "They didn't have any." Affidavit, Westmoreland vs. CBS libel suit, 20 April 1984. Also McChristian interview, 26 April 1999. In 1968 Maj. Gen. Youngdale returned to Vietnam, this time to command the 1st Marine Division.
2 Memorandum, 26 August 1966, Joint Exhibit 217, Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, USAWC Library.
3 As quoted in Berman, Lyndon Johnson's War, p. 22.
4 Westmoreland, "Memorandum of Law," 20 July 1984, p. 15.
5 McChristian, Trial Transcript, pp. 9018 and 9024–9025, Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, USAWC Library.
6 Allen, None So Blind, p. 245.
7 Remarks, Press Conference, Honolulu, 5 February 1966, Box 1, WPCMH.
8 As quoted in Cubbage, "Westmoreland vs. CBS," p. 79.
9 BDM Corporation, Study of Strategic Lessons Learned, VI: page not recorded.
10 Ibid., VI:9–31.
11 Maj. Gen. George Godding interview, 26 February 1996.
12 As quoted in Palmer, "US Intelligence and Vietnam," p. 58.
13 Hawkins testimony, Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, p. 9510, USAWC Library.
14 McChristian Affidavit, p. 5, Trial Exhibit 1837, Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, USAWC Library. There is nothing in the Westmoreland history file on this meeting, an omission Westmoreland was quizzed about during the later libel trial. His response was that this was nothing very significant and therefore did not warrant a mention. For those familiar with the history files, in which such matters as wearing of the white uniform, tennis court injuries, water skiing arrangements, and other such ephemera get frequent mention, the omi
ssion of this meeting is puzzling.
15 McChristian interview, 26 April 1999.
16 McChristian Affidavit, pp. 4–5, Trial Exhibit 1837, Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, USAWC Library.
17 Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, p. 29967, USAWC Library.
18 Allen, None So Blind, p. 247.
19 Harold P. Ford, "Why Were CIA Analysts So Doubtful About Vietnam?" Society for Military History Annual Meeting, McLean, Va., 18 April 1996.
20 As quoted in Allen, None So Blind, p. 248.
21 Maj. Gen. Joseph A. McChristian interview, 26 April 1999.
22 As quoted in Helms, A Look Over My Shoulder, p. 324.
23 As quoted in Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers, p. 99.
24 Helms, A Look Over My Shoulder, pp. 325–326.
25 Ibid., p. 326.
26 Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers, p. 87.
27 Message, Davidson to Godding, Joint Exhibit 251, Godding document collection.
28 As quoted in Jones, War Without Windows, pp. 101–102.
29 Message, Davidson to Godding, Joint Exhibit 251, Godding document collection. Davidson, while totally committed to carrying out Westmoreland's wishes, was not all that admiring of him. "Westmoreland used to have a theory—he had a lot of theories which had no basis in fact," he later said. See Sorley, Vietnam Chronicles, p. 138.
30 Hawkins Testimony, Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, pp. 9525–9526, USAWC Library.
31 Hawkins deposition, 21 September 1983.
32 As quoted in Berman, Lyndon Johnson's War, p. 120.
17 KHE SANH
1 Message, Westmoreland to Wheeler, MAC 01049, 22 January 1968, CMH.
2 Westmoreland, "Westmoreland in Vietnam: Pulverizing the Boulder," Army (February 1976), p. 41.
3 As quoted in Cosmas, MACV, p. 39.
4 Col. Reamer W. Argo interview, 14 October 2003.
5 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 338.
6 Krulak, First to Fight, p. 215.
7 Lehrack, No Shining Armor, p. 141.
8 Message, Westmoreland to Cushman, MAC 02128, 150148Z February 1968, CMH.
9 DePuy, "Our Experience in Vietnam," Army (June 1987), p. 40.
10 An additional estimated 3,600 tons of munitions were delivered by artillery positioned at Khe Sanh and elsewhere within range, but that was not a particularly happy part of the story. "We were outgunned, totally outgunned," said Major Jim Stanton of the 26th Marines Fire Support Coordination Center. "Their 130mm guns could sit out beyond our range and shoot us up something awful. We had nothing that could reach them, not even our two towed 155s. Their 130mm guns had a 27,000-meter maximum range and our 155mm guns had a 14,000-meter maximum range. Even their 100mm guns and 122mm rockets outshot us. They parked everything 1,000 meters outside of our artillery fan. We knew where they were, but we couldn't reach them from inside the combat base with our guns and howitzers." As quoted in Hammel, Assault on Khe Sanh, p. 177.
11 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 336.
12 Ibid., p. 338.
13 Ibid.
14 Time (16 February 1968), p. 19.
15 Message, Westmoreland to Sharp Info Wheeler, MAC 01060, 230138Z January 1968, Box 31, WPCMH.
16 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 335.
17 Ibid.
18 As quoted in Laura Palmer, "The General," MHQ (Autumn 1988), p. 33.
19 Sharp in his portion of Report on the War in Vietnam, p. 8.
20 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 456.
21 Maj. Gen. Rathvon McC. Tompkins, Marine Corps Oral History, 13 April 1973, MCHC.
22 Letter, Brig. Gen. John R. Chaisson to his wife, 17 April 1968, Chaisson Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University.
23 Gen. Walter T. Kerwin Jr. interview, 1 March 1989.
24 Gen. Walter T. Kerwin Jr. Oral History, 13 September 1985, LBJ Library.
25 Message, Sharp to Wheeler, 181231Z June 1968, CMH.
26 Lt. Gen. Charles A. Corcoran interview, 14 September 1989.
27 Message, Abrams to Wheeler and Sharp, MAC 8515, 261202Z June 1968, CMH.
18 TET 1968
1 Message, Westmoreland to Sharp and Wheeler, MAC 01108, 231328Z January 1968, Box 31, WPCMH.
2 Davidson, Vietnam at War, pp. 555–556.
3 Maj. Gen. Rathvon McC. Tompkins Marine Corps Oral History, 13 April 1973.
4 Davidson, Vietnam at War, p. 557.
5 Message, Westmoreland to Cushman, MAC 02707, 260936Z February 1968, Box 29, WPCMH.
6 Message, Westmoreland to Wheeler, MAC 01011, 220052Z January 1968.
7 Gen. Kerwin read this letter to Sorley in a telecon of 15 January 2007.
8 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 342.
9 Westmoreland Marine Corps Oral History, 4 April 1983, MCHC.
10 Per Merle Pribbenow, "In some areas, the last-minute General Staff cable ordering that the offensive be launched on the night of the last day of the Lunar New Year was misunderstood because of a one-day difference between North and South Vietnam in the date of the beginning of the Lunar New Year. As a result, a number of provinces in Central Vietnam launched their attacks one day early." In "General Vo Nguyen Giap," p. 19. Westmoreland was apparently not overly concerned by these first attacks since, the official Army history notes, the next day (30 January) he "played a mid-day game of tennis." Cosmas, MACV, p. 56.
11 As quoted in Mann, Grand Delusion, p. 569.
12 As dictated for his history notes for 23 January 1968 and following, Box 8, WPCMH.
13 North, "VC Assault," pp. 46–47. Thus began the Year of the Monkey. Most accounts of the Tet Offensive state that within a matter of days enemy attacks had been turned back everywhere but in Saigon and Hue. Thus it is worth noting that over a month after the offensive began Westmoreland cabled Wheeler to advise that "major cities which still have Main Force units in the central area include: Hue, Danang, Hoi An, Pleiku, Kontum, Saigon, My Tho and Con Tho." MAC 02960, 021148Z March 1968, HKJ Papers, MHI.
14 Bradford, "Perfume River," p. 15.
15 Col. Ted Kanamine, Oral History interview: Abrams Story, MHI.
16 Brig. Gen. Zeb B. Bradford Jr. interview, 12 October 1989.
17 Ibid.
18 Westmoreland History Notes, Box 8, WPCMH. This is one of a number of instances in which, referring on a given date to events well in the future, Westmoreland clearly has the benefit of hindsight in shaping his dictated entries.
19 Weyand interview, 27 September 1999.
20 Mangold and Penycate, The Tunnels of Cu Chi, p. 175.
21 MACV Command History 1967, p. 108, CMH.
22 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 318.
23 Lt. Gen. Fred C. Weyand, Debriefing Report, 4 October 1968, copy in Westmoreland History File #34, Box 15, WPCMH.
24 AP datelined Saigon 26 December 1967, Westmoreland History File #27, WPCMH.
25 Richard Dudman, "Westmoreland Shares the Blame," St. Louis Post-Dispatch (16 June 1968).
26 As quoted in Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet, p. 203.
27 While the MACV report called 1967 a "Year of Progress," Conrad Gibbons's brilliant Congressional Research Service compilation and commentary titled the relevant chapter "A Year of Reckoning."
28 As quoted in Peter Osnos, "Westmoreland," Washington Post (1 April 1972).
29 Ky, Twenty Years and Twenty Days, p. 158.
30 Maj. Gen. Nguyen Duy Hinh, Vietnamization, p. 5.
31 Lung, The General Offensives, p. 37.
32 Meeting of 10 February 1968, Tom Johnson's Notes, Box 2, LBJ Library. Cited with permission.
33 In Vietnam: A Television History, Segment 7: Tet 1968, MacArthur Foundation Video Classics Project.
34 150 Newsweek (19 February 1968).
35 Col. Fred B. Schoomaker interview, 3 March 1997.
36 Letter, Westmoreland to Tim Young, 10 September 1991, Box 17, WPSCL.
37 Westmoreland, Report of the Chief of Staff, p. 4.
38 Westmore
land History File #34, Remarks to Army Personnel Serving Outside DA, 9 November 1968, Box 15, WPCMH.
39 Memorandum, "Enemy Strategy," Argo to Westmoreland, 11 May 1968, Westmoreland History File #32, WPCMH.
40 George Crile interview with McNamara, 16 June 1981, Joint Exhibit 33, Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, USAWC Library.
41 As quoted in Mann, Grand Delusion, p. 568.
42 As quoted in Hammel, Assault on Khe Sanh, p. 10.
43 Simpson, Inside the Green Berets, p. 117.
44 Combat After Action Report, Battle of Lang Vei, 22 March 1968, VNIT 138, CMH.
45 Prados, Hidden History, p. 172.
46 Pisor, End of the Line, p. 195.
47 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 341.
48 Ibid.
49 Col. Jonathan F. Ladd Oral History: Abrams Story Collection, MHI. Westmoreland's account and that given by Col. Ladd are mutually exclusive.
50 Westmoreland Marine Corps Oral History, 4 April 1983, MCHC.
51 Pisor, End of the Line, p. 198.
52 Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr. Marine Corps Oral History, December 1982, MCHC.
53 Message, Abrams to Cushman, MAC 7462, 061125Z June 1968, Rosson Papers, CMH.
54 Brig. Gen. Charles A. Corcoran Oral History, MHI.
55 Washington Post (27 March 1968).
56 Ibid.
57 Thompson, "Viet Reds' Drive," Washington Post, 11 February 1968, as reprinted from London Sunday Times, Box 4, WPCMH.
58 Col. John Barrie Williams, Joint Exhibit 45A, Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, USAWC Library.
59 As quoted in CBS Memorandum to Dismiss, 23 May 1984, citing Joint Exhibit 305, Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, USAWC Library.
60 Gen. William E. DePuy Oral History, MHI.
61 Charles W. Corddry, "Westmoreland," Baltimore Sun (23 March 1968).
19 TROOP REQUEST
1 Dates mentioned in press accounts can be confusing. Saigon (in the H or Hotel time zone in the international system) was thirteen hours ahead of Washington (on R or Romeo time). But the relative timing and sequencing of military messages can always be easily determined since, regardless of the local time where they originate, all are marked with the DTG (date-time group) in Z or Zulu time, meaning Greenwich Mean Time. Thus, for example, a message marked 090021Z February 1968 would have been dispatched on 9 February 1968 at 21 minutes past midnight GMT.