by Lewis Sorley
2 Gen. William C. Westmoreland, "The Origins of the Post-Tet 1968 Plans for Additional American Forces in RVN." Unpublished paper, April 1970. Major Paul Miles prepared this White Paper for Westmoreland in an effort to show that Westmoreland had not actually "requested" the 206,000 troops in the wake of the Tet Offensive.
3 Message, Wheeler to Westmoreland Info Sharp, JCS 01529, 080448Z February 1968, Box 29, WPCMH. Westmoreland later told historian Herbert Schandler: "It seemed to me that for political reasons or otherwise, the president and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were anxious to send me reinforcements.... My first thought was not to ask for any, but the signals from Washington got stronger." Schandler, Unmaking of a President, p. 97, citing a 16 September 1973 interview with Westmoreland.
4 Message, Wheeler to Westmoreland Info Sharp, JCS 01590, 090021Z February 1968, Box 29, WPCMH.
5 Message, Westmoreland to Wheeler, MAC 01858, 091633Z February 1968, HKJ Papers, MHI.
6 Message, Westmoreland to Wheeler Info Sharp, MAC 02018, 121823Z February 1968, Box 29, WPCMH.
7 Message, Wheeler to Westmoreland Info Sharp, JCS 01695, 120108Z February 1968, Box 29, WPCMH.
8 Message, Westmoreland to Wheeler, MAC 01975, 120612Z February 1968, Box 29, WPCMH. Recounted Westmoreland in his White Paper on the matter: "[M]y formal request for reinforcements was not made until 12 February. Only after extensive consultations among General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp, and myself concerning the utilization of reinforcements and their logistical support did I send the following message to General Wheeler: 'I need reinforcements in terms of combat elements.'"
9 As quoted in Perry, Four Stars, p. 187, citing a Perry interview with Westmoreland.
10 Kinnard, The War Managers, p. 79.
11 McNamara, In Retrospect, p. 315.
12 As quoted in Henry, "February, 1968," p. 23.
13 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 357.
14 As quoted in Willenson, The Bad War, p. 97.
15 Clifford, Counsel to the President, p. 481.
16 Ibid.
17 As quoted in Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 358.
18 Chronology, Exhibit 488, Westmoreland vs. CBS libel trial. The following day Wheeler cabled Westmoreland that "there is strong resistance from all quarters to putting more ground force units in South Vietnam." Regarding prospects for a reserve call-up, said Wheeler, "you should not count upon an affirmative decision for such additional forces. With this cheerless counsel I will sign off." Message, Wheeler to Westmoreland Info Sharp, JCS 2767, 090130Z March 1968, WPCMH.
19 Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 407.
20 As reported in Brandon, Anatomy of Error, p. 241.
21 Westmoreland White Paper.
22 Clifford in Segment 7: Tet 1968, Vietnam: A Television History, MacArthur Foundation Library Video Classics Project.
23 Tom Johnson, "Notes of the President's Meeting with General Earle Wheeler, JCS and General Creighton Abrams, March 26, 1968, Family Dining Room," LBJ Library. As revealed in the body of the notes, Secretary of State Rusk was also present. Quoted with permission.
24 Hanson W. Baldwin, "Westy's Side: His Memoirs of a Bitter War," Army (January 1976), p. 58.
25 Karnow, Vietnam: A History, p. 551.
26 In Gittinger, The Johnson Years, p. 88.
27 Gelb and Betts, The Irony of Vietnam, pp. 173–174.
28 Letter, Chaisson to wife, 26 February 1968, Chaisson Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University.
29 Amb. Ellsworth Bunker Oral History, II:15, LBJ Library.
30 Clifford, Counsel to the President, pp. 479–482. Emphasis in the original.
31 Ibid., p. 496. Emphasis in the original.
32 Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 389.
33 Lt. Gen. Elmer H. Almquist Jr. interview, 13 June 1989. The acronym indicates where Almquist was assigned on the Army Staff, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.
34 Lt. Gen. Robert E. Pursley (USAF) served as Military Assistant to a succession of Secretaries of Defense. Regarding the 206,000 troop request, Pursley said that "the characterization and the interpretation of that was so clearly a request that, if not one, Westmoreland would have stepped in to correct it. Certainly that's what Clark Clifford thought it was. Clifford was just horrified by the 206,000 troop request. All the people who were going to make determinations about it thought it was a request." Pursley interview, 15 November 2007.
35 Westmoreland interview with Sam Donaldson on This Week with David Brinkley, ABC-TV (Channel 7 in Washington), 28 April 1985. Westmoreland prefaced the admission by saying it was "on the assumption that we would call up the reserves and that there would be a change of strategy."
36 MacDonald, Outline History, p. 72.
37 Cosmas, MACV, p. 104. Daniel Davidson was a member of the Harriman delegation to the Paris peace talks. He remembered that there the North Vietnamese referred to Westmoreland as "Limoges." Asking around to find out what that meant, Davidson learned that Limoges was a city in France "where they assigned military commanders who had failed. In France, if you wanted to put a commander out of play you made him commander of the garrison at Limoges—a city equidistant from the French frontiers and therefore unlikely to involve him in further fighting. So it was a very sophisticated analysis of what had happened to Westmoreland." As quoted in Appy, Patriots, pp. 463–464. While Limoges is not literally in the center of France, it is close enough for the image to work.
20 HEADING HOME
1 Nearly a decade later Westmoreland was still trying to combat the notion that he had been relieved as a result of Tet. He wrote a hot letter to Charles Van Doren, editor of Webster's American Biographies, saying "the Tet offensive was not the reason for my transfer as implied. Six months earlier, after four years in Vietnam and three years away from my family, I was told that I would be transferred to another assignment, the details of which were discussed with me at that earlier date." Van Doren's reply was not conciliatory. "On carefully reading your biography," he said, "I cannot see what you are complaining about. What did we say that you object to?" And: "If we made any errors, I am sorry. But errors are easy to make. You yourself misspelled my name twice in your letter, even though you must have had it before you as you wrote." Both letters may be found in Box 15, WPSCL.
2 Lt. Gen. Phillip B. Davidson Jr. telephone interview, 25 October 1995.
3 Letter, Dr. Edwin A. Deagle to his sons, 23 April 1995, copy provided Sorley by Deagle. Some years later Deagle again encountered Bundy, by then heading up the Ford Foundation. "Do you remember that little talk we had at Harvard?" Bundy asked. "Yes, sir, I do," responded Deagle. "You were absolutely right," Bundy told him. "We were wrong, and I've been regretting it ever since." Deagle interview, 12 November 2002. In the event, of course, Westmoreland had been named Chief of Staff, Abrams took over in Vietnam, and Goodpaster was sent out as deputy to Abrams. General Lyman Lemnitzer continued as NATO commander.
4 Thayer Award Address, West Point, N.Y., as printed in the Congressional Record (28 May 1970), pp. E4731–4733. Quoted passage found on p. E4732.
5 Gen. Bruce Palmer Jr. in Willenson, The Bad War, p. 158.
6 Gene Roberts, "Victory Doubted," New York Times (11 June 1968).
7"Top General Flying Home," Chicago Daily News (12 June 1968). Royce Brier, writing in the San Francisco Chronicle (14 June 1968), commented on Westmoreland's contention that the shelling of downtown Saigon had no military significance. "The validity of this pronouncement," Brier observed, "depends on your immediate view of the event. It is true enough there is no 'military significance' in the death of several hundred civilians, with up to a thousand wounded, and the wrecking of scores of city streets. These people aren't doing anything to put down the Viet Cong rebellion, as most of them are women and children and skinny cyclists, anyway." But: "If enemy forces ringed Washington with rocket artillery which was not dislodged in three weeks, and were dropping rockets daily a few blocks from the White House and the big hotels
, it would hardly be considered of no 'military significance,' even in the Pentagon."
8 That unconcern represented a change of outlook on Westmoreland's part now that he was being called to account for the attacks. Earlier, during a 1966 National Day parade, the enemy had fired fourteen recoilless rifle rounds into the vicinity. "I chided Vien about it," said Westmoreland. "Saigon simply had to be made secure." Westmoreland interview by Charles MacDonald, 17 June 1973, Box 31, Westmoreland Papers, LBJ Library.
9 Bunker Reporting Cables #52 (23 May 1968) and #53 (29 May 1968), Indochina Archive, University of California, Berkeley.
10 Brig. Gen. S.L.A. Marshall, Philadelphia Inquirer (5 May 1968).
11 As quoted in Col. Harry G. Summers Jr., "Troops to Equal Any," Vietnam (February 1988), p. 24.
12 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 261.
13 Ibid. The quotation is rendered rather differently by Count Yorck von Wartenburg in his Napoleon as a General: "Every commander-in-chief who takes upon himself to execute a plan which he considers bad or ruinous is culpable; he ought to remonstrate, to insist upon alterations, and, if necessary, rather resign, than become the means of the defeat of the force entrusted to him." I:51.
14 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 262.
15 MFR, D. Lambertson, "MACV Briefing for National Assembly Members," 13 May 1968, Westmoreland History File #32, WPCMH.
16 As per the New York Times article of 10 June 1968.
17 McNamara, Argument Without End, pp. 385–386.
18 As quoted in Beech, Not Without the Americans, p. 307.
19 As quoted in Gibbons, IV:50, citing CRS interview of 1 August 1988.
20 Weigley, "Review of Eliot A. Cohen's Supreme Command," Journal of Military History (October 2002), pp. 1275–1276, quotation from p. 1276.
21 Williams Oral History, LBJ Library, 16 March 1981.
22 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 46.
21 CHIEF OF STAFF
1 Message, Abrams to Westmoreland, MAC 8886, 031158ZJUL1968, WPCMH.
2 Message, Abrams to Westmoreland, MAC 8958, 050021ZJUL1968, WPCMH. In a later oral history interview Westmoreland was, surprisingly, unsure of his late brother-in-law Fred's class at West Point, saying "he was in the Class of 1952 or 1953." In a later letter to Lieutenant General "Hank" Emerson, commander of the brigade in which Fred had been serving as a battalion commander when he was killed, Westmoreland remembered that Fred "was devoted to Kitsy and to his family," adding churlishly of Fred's widow that "unfortunately, Caroline was not an asset to him and we, and you, knew that."
3 Westmoreland's confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee had taken place on 4 June, during a brief visit to the United States (when he also attended the graduation of his daughter Stevie from Bradford Junior College). The SASC, including Senator Stephen Young of Ohio, unanimously endorsed Westmoreland's nomination, which two days later was approved by the full Senate. Before the hearings General Wheeler had warned Westmoreland that Young "has been outspokenly critical of you, and he may attempt to embarrass you on such subjects as being surprised at Tet, unnecessary use of force resulting in inordinate damage to civilian property, loss of civilian life, and creation of refugee problems."
4 Maj. Gen. William B. Steele telephone interview, 1 March 2010.
5 Col. Paul Miles interview, 26 July 2000.
6 Westmoreland interview (Felter and Gritz), c. 1974, Box 52, WPSCL.
7 Remarks, Westmoreland to Army Personnel Serving Outside DA, 9 November 1968, Westmoreland History File #34, Box 15, WPCMH.
8 Johnson, White House Diary, pp. 718–719.
9 Interview, Dr. James E. Hewes Jr. with Col. S. V. Edgar, 8 December 1981, CMH. During the critical period when the plan was briefed to the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense for their approval Westmoreland was on an extended trip to the Pacific area.
10 Robert Froehlke interview, 3 October 1988.
11 Gen. Bruce Palmer Jr. telephone interview, 20 January 2000.
12 Gen. William McCaffrey interview, 16 January 1989.
13 Col. William Greynolds interview, 22 March 2000.
14 Letter, Ailes to Johnson, 20 August 1968, Johnson Papers, MHI.
15 Gen. Ferdinand J. Chesarek Oral History, MHI.
16 Col. Reamer W. Argo interview, 14 October 2003.
17 E-mail, Buckingham to Sorley, 1 June 2010.
18 Peers, My Lai Inquiry, p. 254.
19 Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor, reported the Washington Post, "conceded that 'a great deal of information suggesting that a possible tragedy of serious proportions had occurred at My Lai was either known to General Koster or was readily available in the operational logs and other records of the division.'" Koster obituary, 10 February 2006.
20 Peers, My Lai Inquiry, p. 223.
21 Ambrose in Anderson, Facing My Lai, p. 190.
22 Lewy, "Vietnam," Commentary (February 1978), p. 46.
23 Memorandum, Lt. Gen. W. R. Peers to Westmoreland, Subject: The Son My Incident, 18 March 1970, Exhibit 1600, Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, USAWC Library.
24 Goldstein et al., My Lai Massacre, p. 7.
25 Memorandum, Army General Counsel Robert E. Jordan III to SecArmy, 2 October 1970, Westmoreland History File #38, Box 16, WPCMH.
26 Memorandum for Record, Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor, "Charge Against General William C. Westmoreland," 14 October 1970, Westmoreland History File #38, Box 16, WPCMH.
27 Buckley, "Observations on Calley Reaction," Washington Star (7 April 1971).
28 Letter, Maj. Gen. Russel B. Reynolds to Col. John H. Tucker Jr., 6 December 1970, Box 10, WPSCL. Reynolds died two days after sending this letter.
29 Hoopes, Limits of Intervention, pp. 62–63.
30 Record of Telephone Conversation, Westmoreland with Brig. Gen. Pattison, 1350 hours on 5 January 1970, Box 40, WPCMH.
31 DePuy Oral History, MHI.
32 Gen. William E. DePuy, "Our Experience in Vietnam," Army (June 1987), p. 32.
33 As quoted in Maurer, Strange Ground, p. 453.
34 As quoted in Royal United Services Institution, Lessons from the Vietnam War, pp. 2–3.
35 Despite his full schedule, Westmoreland handled for himself a number of routine matters that aides or executive officers could easily have dealt with, continuing a practice from his years in Vietnam. Heading for Okinawa, for example, Westmoreland cabled ahead to say that, "if possible, I would like you to incorporate a round of golf into my itinerary."
36 Sell, "Younger Military Critics," Washington Post (25 March 1968).
37 Col. James Barbara interview, 17 November 2006.
38 Buckingham, "Ethics and the Senior Officer," p. 31.
39 Ibid., p. 32.
40 As Sewall, by then a retired major general, recalled this incident many years later, he added with feeling that it had made him profoundly thankful for the American system of government in which civilians control the military.
41 As quoted in Peers, My Lai Inquiry, p. 249.
42 Lt. Gen. Walter F. Ulmer Jr. telephone interview, 12 August 1997.
43 Lt. Gen. Walter F. Ulmer Jr. Oral History, MHI. In 1993, asked by a correspondent about the study, Westmoreland responded, "I vaguely recall requesting such a study."
22 SHAPING THE RECORD
1 Dr. Robert E. Morris, Vietnam War Conference, University of Virginia School of Law, Charlottesville, Va., 28–29 April 2000.
2 See Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: An Expanding War, 1966, p. 14.
3 Describing the holdings of the U.S. Army Center of Military History, the Army Director of Military History, Dr. Jeffrey Clarke, identified the William C. Westmoreland Papers as "the largest and most important" collection of a single officer, "an extensive group of approximately 18 linear feet of papers assembled and maintained by General Westmoreland and his personal staff during his tenure as MACV commander. Most significant," he added, "is his diary, or history, contained in about thirty loosely bound
volumes detailing his daily activities and decisions, and often the thoughts behind the decisions. Appended to the entries are copies of pertinent incoming and outgoing messages, memorandums, reports, and other documents that Westmoreland considered important at the time the entries were made." Advice and Support, pp. 529–530.
4 The JCS historians got it right, noting that "the United States had included the strengthening of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) among its objectives since the beginning of its involvement in South Vietnam, but in the period 1965 through early 1968, major US attention was devoted primarily to the conduct of combat operations. It was only after the 1968 Tet offensive, when President Johnson ruled out a further US troop increase in South Vietnam, that the United States undertook serious preparations for eventual South Vietnamese assumption of the combat effort." U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 177.
5 Letter, Westmoreland to Hobart Lewis, 25 October 1969, Box 39, WPSCL.
6 This put Keiser in a difficult position, as his wife was with child and expected to deliver any day. Fortunately, after spending a couple of days in Honolulu massaging the document, Keiser made it back before the birth occurred. Things didn't go as well subsequently, however, since two days later Westmoreland sent him back to Hawaii for more of the same and, before he could again get back home, his wife delivered their third child. She was not, and remained not, happy about what had transpired.
7 A year and a half after the Report was published, the Government Printing Office reported having sold 6,588 copies of the 7,208 printed.
8 Braestrup, "Vietnam as History," Wilson Quarterly (Spring 1978), p. 180.
9 Message, Maj. Gen. Willard Pearson to Westmoreland, Subject: Post Mortem on Vietnam Strategy, 6 September 1968, Westmoreland History File 34, WPCMH.
10 Rosson, Assessment of Influence, pp. ii-iii.
11 Letter, Col. Rod Paschall to Westmoreland, 13 February 1987, Box 13, WPSCL. As of June 2010 the Military History Institute had no record of any other senior officers having requested destruction of their interview tapes.
23. VOLUNTEER ARMY