Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam

by Lewis Sorley

1 Col. Jack R. Butler, "The All-Volunteer Armed Force," Parameters (Vol. II, No. 1, 1972), page not recorded.

  2 Brian Doherty, "The Life and Times of Milton Friedman," Reason (March 2007), as quoted in Washington Times (2 February 2007).

  3 Gen. Bruce Palmer Jr. interview, 15 April 1988.

  4 Col. Jack R. Butler, "The All-Volunteer Armed Force," Parameters (Vol. II, No. 1, 1972), pp. 24, 26.

  5 As quoted in Griffith, U.S. Army's Transition, p. 27n1.

  6 Van Atta, With Honor, p. 151.

  7 In reporting this speech the Baltimore Sun (14 October 1970) noted that "only last spring, General Westmoreland testified before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees that the change to an all-volunteer force 'may be impractical for some time to come.'"

  8 Butler, "All-Volunteer," p. 27.

  9 As described by Lt. Gen. George I. Forsythe in Oral History, MHI.

  10 Charles B. MacDonald interview of Lt. Gen. George Forsythe, 16 June 1973, Box 31, WPLBJ.

  11 Gen. Walter T. Kerwin Jr. Oral History, MHI.

  12 Lt. Gen. George I. Forsythe Oral History, MHI.

  13 Telecon, Brig. Gen. James L. Anderson, 14 January 2010.

  14 L. James Binder, "Well Done, Westy!" in Army (August 1972), pp. 9–10.

  15 As quoted in John L. Moore, "National Security," National Journal (12 November 1971), p. 2452.

  16 Gen. Donald V. Bennett interview, 23 August 1994.

  17 As quoted in Griffith, U.S. Army's Transition, p. 177.

  24. VIETNAM DRAWDOWN

  1 Westmoreland added a relevant comment to the paperback edition of his memoirs, a sentence that did not appear in the original book, referring to the period when Melvin Laird was Secretary of Defense: "Despite the fact that I had four and one-half years of experience in Vietnam, my advice was seldom sought." A Soldier Reports, p. 511 of the May 1980 Dell paperback edition.

  2 Palmer, The 25-Year War, p. 91.

  3 Gen. Donn A. Starry, "Review of Thunderbolt," Armor (September-October 1992), pp. 50–51.

  4 Telecon, Palmer with Westmoreland, 1720 hours on 28 May 1969, Box 37, WPCMH.

  5 Starry, "Review of Thunderbolt." Years later Starry explained the effects of Westmoreland's insistence on bringing out individuals rather than units in a talk, "Recruiting and the Soldier." "What happened to the Army in the last months of Vietnam was not that the ethical value system of the officer and NCO corps collapsed, as some have alleged. Rather it was that, in redeployment from Vietnam, the centralized individual replacement system demanded redeployment of individuals, not units. Those who remained were reassigned to remaining units. As the pace of redeployment quickened this constant shuffling insured lack of cohesion in the residual force—in the leadership and amongst the soldiers. Careerism there may have been, and may still be, but the root problem was that the sense of community was destroyed. There simply was no cohesion. In that hostile environment the leadership was overloaded, and it behaved accordingly." As quoted in Sorley, Press On!, p. 706.

  6 Gen. Maxwell R. Thurman interview, 2 August 1995.

  7 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, p. 549.

  8 Lt. Gen. Sidney B. Berry interview, 3 May 1989.

  9 Lock-Pullan, "Inward Looking Time," p. 493. See also Spiller, In the School of War, pp. 226–227. In 2010 Kelvin Crow, an Army historian at the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, conducted extensive inquiries into the validity of reports of the alleged booing incidents at Fort Benning and Fort Leavenworth. His tentative conclusion was that "the 'Revolt of the Officers' is an urban legend, perhaps arising from the discontent of the era. While it catches 'the tenor of the times,' it does not represent an actual event, or has become so exaggerated over time as to be best regarded as a 'war story.'" Crow also contacted Dr. Roger Spiller, who had alluded to such episodes in his work cited above. Now, Crow reported, Spiller acknowledged that the account "could be an urban legend" but observed that "the fact that it became an urban legend is telling." Crow prefaced his summation of the research with what he identified as an "Italian saying": "If it's not true, it ought to be." Attachment to e-mail, Crow to Sorley, 2 September 2010.

  10 In discussion with Sorley at the Society for Military History Annual Meeting in Charleston, South Carolina, on 25 February 2005.

  11 Dr. Alan Gropman telephone interview, 29 September 2009.

  12 Surut e-mail to Sorley, 2 October 2009.

  13 Letter, Grum to Sorley, 5 July 1999.

  14 Westmoreland Oral History (Ganderson), MHI.

  15 As quoted in Charles R. Smith, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility and Standdown 1969, p. 10n.

  16 Westmoreland Marine Corps Oral History.

  17 Westmoreland Oral History (Ganderson), MHI.

  18 William McG. Morrison telephone interview, 30 September 2009.

  19 Notes, James Westmoreland (identified as "Freshman, Son of Gen. W. C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff, USA"), Box 38, WPSCL.

  25. DEPARTURE

  1 Department of the Army, Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1970, p. 152.

  2 Moskos, "The Enlisted Ranks," in Keeley, The All-Volunteer Force, p. 40.

  3 Message, Woolnough to Westmoreland, MRO 1269, 101929Z September 1970, Box 36, WPCMH.

  4 Message from the Chief of Staff, Cumulative Mandatory Training Requirements, 10 May 1972, Lt. Gen. F. J. Brown Papers.

  5 Remarks, CONARC Commanders Conference, Fort Monroe, Va., 17 May 1972.

  6 Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: General Westmoreland's Conversation with Colonel Warner, evening, 2 April 1972, Volney F. Warner Papers, MHI. Handwritten at the bottom of this document is an indication that Brig. Gen. Dunn had recently mentioned an ambassadorial position to Westmoreland. At that point Westmoreland had no discernible "civilian plans."

  7 In anticipation of having the portrait painted, Westmoreland took Herbert Abrams with him on an extended January 1972 trip to the Pacific, including Vietnam, so Abrams could "study" his intended subject. Abrams made a reported 4,000 slides during the trip.

  8 Davidson, Vietnam at War, p. 378.

  9 Gen. Walter T. Kerwin Jr. Oral History, 13 September 1985, LBJ Library.

  10 Palmer, The 25-Year War, p. 124.

  26. IN RETIREMENT

  1"Like many others before them, the Westmorelands have found that the old Charleston families do not easily welcome newcomers to the social fold," wrote Levona Page. "Westy," The State (Columbia, S.C.) (21 January 1974).

  2 Orr Kelly, "Westmoreland's Place of Honor," Washington Close-Up column, Washington Star, c. 3 July 1972, Box 64, WPSCL.

  3 Bunker responded that he would put Westmoreland's name forward, whereupon Westmoreland wrote again: "Your interest in my interest is deeply appreciated."

  4 Seymour M. Hersh, "The Decline and Near Fall of the U.S. Army," Saturday Review (December 1972), p. 58.

  5 Ambrose, Nixon, p. 632.

  6 As quoted in Randolph, Powerful and Brutal Weapons, p. 381n1.

  7 Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, p. 356.

  8 Westmoreland, MFR, "President Nixon's Address to the Nation, 7 October," dated 8 October 1970, History File 38, WPCMH.

  9 Over a decade later Westmoreland wrote to the Chief of Protocol in the Office of the Army Chief of Staff to request fifty more copies of his official photo. "Tell the photolab this will probably be my final request," he said.

  10 McCaffrey interview, 16 January 1989.

  11 As quoted in Valerie Wieland, "The Inevitable General," Vietnam (December 2003), pp. 34–41, 64. Quotation on p. 41.

  12 Letter, Westmoreland to Haig, 3 February 1973, Box 14, WPSCL. Westmoreland was extremely unhappy when Nixon chose Haig for the four-star position. "I think a serious mistake was made by the President in nominating such a young and inexperienced officer as Vice Chief of Staff who came into the White House a little more than three years ago as a colonel," he wrote to another officer. "Who advised the President in this regard, I do not know, but I suspect his advice came from sources unfamiliar with the Army a
nd not aware of the implications of his decision. In fact, the advice he received was utterly naïve."

  13 Westmoreland, "Vietnam in Perspective," Military Review (January 1979), pp. 34, 35.

  14 Westmoreland, "Vietnam Blunders," Honolulu Advertiser (26 March 1978).

  15 Remarks, Hampden-Sydney College Symposium, September 1993, as reported in Richmond Times-Dispatch (18 September 1993).

  27. MEMOIRS

  1 Enclosure to Letter, Westmoreland to Charles MacDonald, 5 June 1974, Box 41, WPSCL.

  2 Memorandum, Maj. Paul L. Miles Jr., Research Assistant, to Westmoreland, 19 June 1972, Box 1, WPCMH. Note also in Box 1.

  3 MacDonald comments in the discussion following his "Contrasts in Command" lecture, U.S. Army War College, 17 May 1976, MHI.

  4 Westmoreland apparently was referring to the Cao Dai sect and meant to indicate that its organization was similar to that of the Catholic hierarchy.

  5 Moore and Galloway, We Are Soldiers Still, pp. 123–124. The extent of the carnage at LZ Albany is illustrated by what happened there to Company C, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry. That unit began the day with 110 officers and men. A day later only eight were present for duty, the rest dead or wounded.

  6 Dr. John Carland, Ia Drang 40th Reunion Symposium, Washington, D.C., 12 November 2005.

  7 Interview, MacDonald with Westmoreland, 7 June 1973, Box 31, WPLBJ.

  8 MacDonald, "Contrasts in Command," 17 May 1976.

  9 Ibid. MacDonald also said, regarding sales of the book (then at about 30,000), "If it doesn't sell 50,000, I don't make any money."

  10 Some years earlier, when Westmoreland was about to leave Vietnam, he had written of his service there to his brother-in-law, N. Heyward Clarkson Jr.: "It has been a period of constant crisis, and I believe if I ever write a book I will name it such." That became a chapter title in the memoirs.

  11 Westmoreland responded to an expatriate living in Canada, who had written asking for permission to translate portions of the book into Vietnamese, that he would have to contact the publisher since they held the copyright, apparently not realizing that he himself owned the copyright.

  12 The correspondence between Westmoreland and MacDonald includes nearly a hundred potential titles, including "Mission Frustration," "Confused Conflict," "War in a Goldfish Bowl," and "We Could Have Won." Some prepublication review copies were apparently sent out using the title "War in Vain?" They then settled on "The War Nobody Won" until that choice was overtaken by events. The B/O reference is obscure. Colonel Miles suggests it may have stood for Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.

  13"Westmoreland Won't Fade Away," Washington Star (18 January 1976).

  14 S.L.A. Marshall, "Westmoreland: His Career Rose Like a Phoenix—Until Vietnam," Chicago Sun-Times (25 January 1976).

  28. CAMPAIGNER

  1 Lee Bandy interview, 16 August 2005.

  2 Analysis as reported by William E. Rome Jr., "Memo on General's Loss," Atlanta Journal-Constitution (18 August 1974).

  3 Letter, Joseph O. Rogers Jr. to Westmoreland and others, 20 December 1976, Box 28, WPSCL. Emphasis in the original.

  4 Letter, Joseph O. Rogers Jr. to Westmoreland and others, 4 January 1977, Box 15, WPSCL.

  5 Ernest B. Furgurson, "Westmoreland: To Him, the War Was Unkind," The State (20 March 1974).

  6 Letter, Dorn to Westmoreland, 24 July 1974 (enclosing a copy of the telegram), Box 14, WPSCL. It seems rather surprising that, only days after the end of the failed primary campaign, and with his house in Charleston newly finished, Westmoreland should have been actively seeking a federal job in Washington.

  29. PLAINTIFF

  1 Letter, Crile to Wallace, 11 May 1981, as quoted in Kowet, Matter of Honor, p. 55.

  2 Note, Crile to Wallace, 11 May 1981, Exhibit 504, Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, USAWC Library. Apparently no honorarium was paid, but the Westmorelands were lodged at a New York hotel at the network's expense.

  3 As quoted in Kowet, Matter of Honor, p. 57.

  4 Buckley, "Vietnam: The Short Count," New York Daily News (28 January 1982). Buckley marveled at how Wallace was able to get people to submit to interviews that were clearly not in their own interest, speculating that in an earlier day he "would have succeeded in getting Jack the Ripper to talk to him on the subject of how London's streets were crowded with unnecessary young ladies."

  5 Braestrup, "'The Uncounted Enemy,'" pp. 46ff.

  6 CBS Reports, "The Uncounted Enemy," 23 January 1982, Transcript, Joint Exhibit 1, Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, USAWC Library.

  7 Ibid.

  8 CBS Reports, "The Uncounted Enemy," 23 January 1982, Transcript, p. 13.

  9 Ibid.

  10 Ibid.

  11 Ibid.

  12 Ibid., p. 14.

  13 Westmoreland, as shown in the documentary: "I can't remember figures like that. You've... done some research. I haven't done any research. I'm just... reflecting on my memory." In a 10 February 1982 letter to the editor of Broadcasting Magazine, Westmoreland said that, "Having been taken by surprise and having come unprepared for the grilling on statistics that were 14 years old, I made some unfortunate slips." Letter in Box 19, WPSCL.

  14 Routing Slip with Attachment, Hannah M. Zeidlik, OCMH, 29 October 1984.

  15 Vince Demma, telephone interview, 29 August 2005.

  16 As it was characterized in the Benjamin Report, about which more below.

  17 CBS Reports, "The Uncounted Enemy," 23 January 1982, Transcript, p. 3.

  18 McChristian interview, 26 April 1999.

  19 As quoted in Cubbage, "Westmoreland vs. CBS," p. 46.

  20 As quoted in Kowet, Matter of Honor, p. 167.

  21 Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, p. 35233, USAWC Library.

  22 Kaiser, "Westmoreland Denounces TV Program," Washington Post (27 January 1982).

  23 David Zucchino, "Vietnam Cables Reveal Extent of Numbers Game," Orange County Register (8 December 1985). In February 1967 MACV J-2 published a MACV Order of Battle Reference Manual, a publication subsequently endorsed by members of the Intelligence Community attending the Honolulu Order of Battle Conference that same month. The manual defined Self-Defense Forces as "a VC para-military structure responsible for the defense of hamlet and village areas controlled by the VC.... Duties consist of conducting propaganda, constructing fortifications, and defending home areas." For Secret Self-Defense Forces, the definition was similar, "a clandestine VC organization which performs the same general functions in GVN-controlled areas. Their operations involve intelligence collection as well as sabotage and propaganda activities."

  24 Westmoreland testimony, pp. 439–440, Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, USAWC Library.

  25 Deposition of General William C. Westmoreland, 28 June 1983, p. 456, Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, USAWC Library.

  26 Ibid.

  27 Kowet, Matter of Honor, p. 184. Westmoreland's sister said that he had Alzheimer's for the last ten years of his life (thus from about 1995). This account suggests the possibility of a far earlier onset of that cruel disease.

  28 Kowet, Matter of Honor, p. 239.

  29 As quoted in Benjamin, Fair Play, p. 177.

  30 Ibid., p. 114.

  31 Ibid., p. 160.

  32 Ibid., p. 12.

  33 Affidavit of Joseph A. McChristian, General William C. Westmoreland v. CBS Inc. et al., 21 December 1983.

  34 Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, p. 4507, USAWC Library.

  35 As quoted in Eleanor Randolph, "Agonizing Self-Criticism May Embarrass CBS," Washington Post (25 November 1984).

  36 Benjamin, Fair Play, pp. 122–123.

  37 Palmer interview, 29 April 1995.

  38 Halberstam, "The Call to Duty," Parade (c. 1985), Box 19, WPSCL. Halberstam, who could be devastating in his profiles, was in this case sympathetic. "I believe Westy is a sort of decent man, not smart, and he is politicized. He didn't understand the war," Halberstam told Burton Benjamin. Fair Play, p. 159.

  39 Lt. Gen. P
hillip B. Davidson Jr. interview, 27 March 1995.

  40 Brewin and Shaw, Vietnam on Trial, p. 213.

  41 Ibid.

  42 A telling episode occurred when General McChristian was deposed at his home in Florida. "On the eighth day," he recalled, "Westmoreland's lawyers subpoenaed me and all of my telephone records.... Westmoreland's lawyers then went to lunch and didn't even look at the papers. But the CBS lawyers did not go to lunch and read all the papers." McChristian interview, 26 April 1999.

  43 Benjamin, Fair Play, p. 186.

  44 Deposition of General George A. Godding, General William C. Westmoreland vs. CBS Inc., et al., 19–20 April 1983.

  45 Typed notes, George Crile, Joint Exhibit 20D, pp. 20522 and 20524. Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, USAWC Library.

  46 Roth, The Juror and the General, p. 157.

  47 Letter, Westmoreland to Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr., 21 March 1982, Box 19, WPSCL.

  48 Westmoreland, "Comment by General W. C. Westmoreland." Copy provided Sorley by Lt. Gen. Dave R. Palmer. Later (according to this same document), in what sounds very much like a threat, Westmoreland says he called McChristian again and "cautioned him that, in his own interest, he should realize that in the hands of clever lawyers we were both expendable."

  49 Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, p. 29979, USAWC Library. During the CBS broadcast Westmoreland referred to his having given McChristian command of a corps at Fort Hood. McChristian commanded a division there, not a corps, and had been given that post by Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson, not Westmoreland, who as MACV commander had no authority to assign officers anywhere outside his own organization.

  50 As quoted in Benjamin, Fair Play, p. 69.

  51 McChristian testimony on direct examination, pp. 9028–9029, Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, USAWC Library.

  52 Ibid.

  53 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 245.

  54 McChristian testimony on direct examination, p. 9027, Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, USAWC Library.

  55 CBS Reports, "The Uncounted Enemy," 23 January 1982, Transcript, p. 6.

  56 Westmoreland Deposition, 4 April 1983, Westmoreland vs. CBS Microfiche File, p. 103, USAWC Library. During Westmoreland's testimony in the libel trial, Boies ascertained that there was no mention in Westmoreland's dictated history notes of the meeting at which McChristian brought in the increased strength estimates. He asked Westmoreland about the omission, to which Westmoreland responded that the meeting was "inconsequential" and "insignificant," adding, "Well, I didn't have everything in my history notes." Boies noted tellingly that Westmoreland had put in those notes such things as referring a visiting congressional staff person to his surgeon for treatment of a head cold. He might well have added the numerous times Westmoreland wrote in the notes about his putting on or wearing a white uniform, playing tennis, wiring ahead to arrange for water skiing, LBJ's attending a sheep auction, and other such pedestrian matters. Omission of the McChristian meeting appeared in contrast to be deliberate and inappropriate.