Warrior [15] Late Roman Cavalryman AD 236-565
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This gravestone of a cavalryman from an earlier period shows fairly complete scale armour which would also have been worn throughout the later Empire. Gravestones from the 3rd century onwards tended, however, to depict soldiers without their armour; if anything, cavalry armour became more complete in the later Empire. (Colchester and Essex Museum)
Shock tactics were used by the foederati and other primarily Germanic troops in the Roman army. These soldiers, the ancestors of the medieval knight, did not skirmish at a distance; armed with lances and shields and perhaps supported by Roman or Hun horse archers, they would charge directly at the enemy and attempt to destroy him in close combat. Such a charge is described in the Strategikon:
At the command "Junge” [Close ranks!], the soldiers close up from the rear for the charge. With the troops marching in close formation, particularly after they have closed in tightly from the flanks, the archers open fire and the command is given: "Percute" [Charge]. The dekarchs and pentarchs [experienced men in the front two ranks] then lean forward, cover their heads with their shields, hold their lances high on their shoulders in the manner of the fair-haired races, and protected by their shields they ride in good order, not too fast but at a trot, to avoid having the impetus of their charge breaking up their ranks before coming to blows with the enemy, which is a real risk.'
This bit from Newstead is exceptionally severe. The slightest pressure on the reins would drive the spoon into the roof of the horse's mouth, ensuring instant obedience. (National Museums of Scotland)
H Cavalry in pursuit (Milvian Bridge, AD 312)
In battle it was not the job of the cavalry to engage infantry. Cavalry would he deployed on the wings of the army to protect the flanks of the infantry and to defeat enemy cavalry. If the opportunity presented itself, they would try to hit the enemy infantry in the flank after their cavalry support had been driven off. Horses could not be made to charge formed bodies of men on foot, but if the infantry lost their formation it was a different story. Then, fighting as individuals, the mounted men would have had a significant advantage. Once an infantryman lost his nerve and broke and ran from his formation, he would be easy meat for a pursuing cavalryman. Describing a battle between Goths and Romans in AD 377, Ammianus Marcellinus says: '...the fugitives on either side were pursued by cavalry who hacked at their heads and backs with all their strength.'
This plate, based on a relief from the Arch of Constantine, shows the pursuit and destruction of Maxentius’ Praetorians by Constantine's heavy cavalry supported by horse archers. The Praetorians are retreating over a pontoon bridge which has suddenly collapsed in the middle, throwing many of them into the water. All semblance of order has been lost on both sides, and in a dash of disordered individuals the infantry would have had no chance.
The scale pattern depicted for the Praetorians' shields is shown on a 5th-century ivory of Stilicho as well as the 1st-century Cancellaria relief. Presumably it was a traditional guards pattern that remained in use over several centuries.
Cavalry against infantry
Usually cavalry fought cavalry, either on the flanks of the infantry line or, by the 6th century, in all-cavalry battles. They were not expected to charge well-ordered infantry for the simple reason that as long as the infantry held their ground, the cavalry would not be able to force their horses to close. The best cavalrymen could hope to do against steady infantry would be to break their nerve through missile fire combined with the terror of being charged by a mass of horsemen. Against poorly trained foot soldiers with low morale this could succeed. Belisarius' infantry in the Gothic War, for example, usually broke and ran as soon as enemy cavalry approached them. But even second- rate infantry could easily fend off determined cavalry as long as their nerve did not break. At the Battle of Sura in AD 531, for example, Persian cavalry were unable to force their horses to close against a line of unsupported Roman infantry:
'The foot soldiers, and a very few of them, were fighting against the whole Persian cavalry. Nevertheless the enemy were not able either to rout them or in any other way overpower them. For standing shoulder to shoulder they kept themselves massed in a very small space, and they formed with their shields a rigid, unyielding barricade, so that they shot at the Persians more conveniently than they were shot by them. Many a time after giving up, the Persians would advance against them, determined to break up and destroy their line, but they always retired again from the assault unsuccessful. For their horses, annoyed by the clashing of the shields, reared up and made confusion for themselves and their riders.' (Procopius)
On the rare occasions when Roman cavalry faced steady infantry, they would employ typical skirmish tactics: riding up, shooting, wheeling away, then rallying back beyond bow range ready to try again. In his description of 2nd-century cavalry games, Arrian describes these tactics against a simulated infantry target:
‘Charging in a straight line forwards they then veer to one side, as though turning to make a circle. This turn they make to their right, that is to the spear-throwing side. For thus nothing stands in the way of the javelin throwing, and the shields afford protection to those throwing them as they charge.'
The aftermath of battle
While in theory cavalry could cover the retreat of a defeated army, this rarely seems to have happened. Being more mobile than their infantry counterparts, the cavalry would usually flee the field as soon as things began to go wrong. For example, during the retreat from Persia in AD 363, four legions are named fighting off cataphracts and elephants in a rearguard action with no mention being made of Roman cavalry; and at Adrianople, the Roman cavalry abandoned the infantry to their fate. When the battle had been won, however, the cavalry came to the fore, pursuing and harrying the broken enemy.
While mail was perhaps the most common form of protection, scale armour, usually bronze but sometimes iron, was also frequently worn by Roman cavalrymen. Although not quite as flexible as mail, its inflexibility has been overstressed by some modern writers. Reconstructions have proved that when constructed of small scales, the armour could bend freely with the movement of the body. (National Museums of Scotland)
Like all soldiers after a successful engagement, the Romans were eager to scour the battlefield for loot. In earlier periods and in infantry-based armies discipline may have been stricter and the men easier to control, but in the multi-racial cavalry armies of the 5th and 6th centuries Roman generals could expect to lose control of their troops once the battle had been won, as Procopius so vividly describes:
'They pursued the fugitives throughout the whole night, killing all the men upon whom they happened, and making slaves of the women and children... Belisarius, seeing the Roman army rushing about in confusion was disturbed [in case the enemy attacked while the men plundered]... for the soldiers, being extremely poor men, upon becoming all of a sudden the masters of great wealth and of women both young and old and extremely comely, were no longer able to restrain themselves... For neither did fear of the enemy nor respect for Belisarius occur to them, nor indeed anything at all except the desire for spoils.'
The author of the Strategikon recognised the obvious dangers of such behaviour, and advised that the soldiers should be warned well ahead of time, as is made clear in the military code, that they must absolutely avoid such acts. One suspects, however, that looting was commonplace, particularly in the 6th century, when soldiers were expected to equip themselves from allowances.
These triangular Roman arrowheads attached to reconstructed shafts would have been able to pierce armour at short range. (National Museums of Scotland)
One area in which the Roman army stood apart from its opponents is the way in which it was able to provide medical care to its soldiers. Procopius describes some amazing operations after a skirmish during the siege of Rome (see Plate H), and the Strategikon advises that ‘after the battle the general should give prompt attention to the wounded and see to the burying of the dead. Not only is this a religious duty, but it greatly helps the mor
ale of the living. In fact, the Strategikon gives detailed instructions on the use of battlefield medics, recommending that eight to ten men per bandon, 'alert, quick, lightly clothed and without weapons' should follow behind their units 'to pick up and give aid to anyone seriously wounded in the battle, or who has fallen off his horse, or is otherwise out of action, so they may not he trampled by the second line or die through neglect of their wounds'.
Roman medical instruments. The well developed system of medical care was unrivalled in Europe until the modern era. (National Museums of Scotland)
I Medical treatment (6th century AD)
Each unit had its own medicus (doctor), and medical treatment was of a higher standard than at any other time in Western history until the modern era. This scene is based on descriptions by Procopius of the treatment of three men wounded in a skirmish during the siege of Rome.
The central figure, Arzes, was one of Belisarius’ Guards, who had been hit by an arrow between the nose and the right eye. 'The point of the arrow penetrated as far as the neck behind, but it did not show through but the rest of the shaft projected from his face, ...The physicians wished to draw the weapon from his face but were reluctant to do so, not so much on account of the eye, which they supposed could not he saved, but for fear lest, by cutting the membranes and tissues such as are very numerous in that region, they should cause the death of a man who was one of the best of the household of Belisarius. But one of the physicians, Theoctistus by name, pressed on the back of his neck and asked whether he felt much pain. And when the man said that he did, he inferred that the barb of the weapon had penetrated to a point not far from the skin. Accordingly he cut off that part of the shaft which showed outside and threw it away, and cutting open the skin at the back of the head, at the place where the man felt most pain, he easily drew toward him the barb, which with its three sharp points now stuck out behind and brought with it the remaining portion of the weapon, Thus, Arzes remained entirely free from serious harm and not even a trace of the wound was left on his face.'
In the background is Cutilas, a Thracian officer who had a javelin embedded in the middle of his head, and when the javelin was drawn rather violently from his head (for it was very deeply embedded) 'he fell into a swoon' (and later died).
The soldier being helped into the hospital room is Bochas, whom Procopius describes as a ‘youthful Hun' who had been wounded by one spear thrust 'where his armour did not cover him, above the right armpit, very close to the shoulder' and another spear thrust which had 'struck him in front and pierced his left thigh, and cut the muscles there'. (He died three days later.)
During the 5th century, under the influence of the Huns and Persians, archery became increasingly important, so that by the 6th century the typical Roman cavalryman had become an armoured horse archer. Roman bows were of composite construction; the arrows often of cane or reed with the feathers glued on. (Dura Europos)
THE SOLDIER ON CAMPAIGN
We have already seen that during the 3rd and 4th centuries the cavalry played a supporting role in battle and on campaign, (For a full description of a 4th-century campaign see Warrior 9, Late Roman Infantryman). This soon changed, and from eyewitness accounts of Procopius we can see that by the 6th century the cavalryman had become an all-round warrior who could be employed in any variety of tasks, from traditional reconnaissance missions to fighting on board ships. Taking Belisarius' campaign against the Vandals AD 533—34) as an example, we can get a glimpse of what life might have been for a typical soldier engaged on an offensive campaign.
This water bottle, similar to those in use in the 18th century, would have been a vital part of the cavalryman s equipment. It would usually be attached to a saddle horn. (National Museums of Scotland)
The African campaign (AD 533—34)
The army assembled at Constantinople is recorded as containing 10,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, the latter consisting of regular horse archers and lance-armed foederati. To this number were added 400 Germanic Eruli, 600 Hunnic Massagetae and an unspecified but large number of Belisarius' personal bucellarii (possibly as many as 7,000). The troops embarked on a flotilla of 500 ships. The cargo vessels, carrying men and horses, were escorted by 92 fast fighting ships. It must have been bedlam at the docks as this force, together with thousands of horses and all their provisions, embarked. The loading must have taken days, and everyone would have felt relieved when 'in the seventh year of Justinian's reign [AD 533], at about the spring equinox', they were finally under way.
Difficulties at sea
A sea voyage was no easy undertaking in those days. There were delays due to lack of wind as well as the threat of storms. There was always a danger that in rough winds ‘many of the ships should be left behind and scattered on the open seas'. Added to this were the more mundane problems of seasickness and the difficulty of caring for the horses on board. Many animals must have become sick and perhaps died on the voyage. For those soldiers not chronically seasick, boredom would have soon set in, and there were very few things more dangerous than bored soldiers. During a four-day delay for lack of wind, 'two Massagetae killed one of their comrades who was ridiculing them, in the midst of their intemperate drinking, for they were intoxicated'. To lose control of his men this early on would have been disastrous, so Belisarius set a stern example by impaling the culprits, and only narrowly averted a mutiny due to the severity of the punishment.
To make matters worse, disease soon began to take its toll, partly because the bread, which formed the basis of the soldiers' hard rations, had not been properly double-baked to preserve it. Procopius says that the loaves, which should have stayed hard, disintegrated and turned to a rotten, mouldy flour. ‘And the soldiers, feeding upon this... became sick and not less than five hundred of them died.' Furthermore, by the time the flotilla reached Sicily, the water of the whole fleet was spoiled.
If at this point the Vandals, who were reasonably good seafarers, had attacked the Roman fleet, the campaign would probably have been over. Not only were the Roman soldiers ill and weary from their journey, but they were 'in mortal dread of sea-fighting . They had no shame in saying beforehand that if they should disembark on land, they would try to show themselves brave men in the battle, but if hostile ships assailed them, they would turn to flight; for, they said, they were not able to contend with two enemies at once, both men and water.' Fortunately for the Romans they were not attacked, since no word of their approach had reached the Vandals; they were able to land on the African coast unopposed.
Infantry are predominant in this siege scene from The Arch of Constantine. During sieges the cavalry would usually be deployed on foraging and scouting duties. The helmets worn by the men on the left are the late Roman style Attic helmets of single bowl construction. They are similar to the classical Attic style, but different enough to make artistic convention unlikely. The men in the town wear ridge-style helmets which, unlike the Attic Style, have been confirmed by archeology. (Deutsches Archäologisches Institute, Rome)
Establishing a base camp
Procopius recorded a speech by Belisarius which describes the landing procedure:
‘We must disembark upon the land with all possible speed, landing horses and arms and whatever else we consider necessary for our use, and me must dig a trench quickly and throw a stockade around us of a kind that can contribute to our safely... and with that as our base must carry on the war from there. And if we show ourselves brave men, we shall lack nothing in the way of provisions, for those who hold the mastery over the enemy are lords also of the enemy's possessions.'
On their first night in an alien land, a long way from home, the soldiers worked hard to set up an almost text-book base camp. Procopius seems to have been amazed that the trench and stockade were completed in one day and that 'the soldiers bivouacked in the camp, setting guards and doing everything else as was customary'. One wonders, however, how impressed Julius Caesar would have been if his legionaries had taken all day to set up c
amp!
J Camp life (Grasse, N. Africa7 AD 533)
The rigid camp discipline of the earlier Roman army had long been replaced by a more flexible and relaxed approach. In hostile country, camps might still be fortified, but this was not necessarily routine. The Strategikon recommends that fortifications be constructed 'even though the army might stay there only for a day', but it is doubtful that this advice was always followed. Temporary fortifications might be little more than a wagon laager or a scattering of caltrops round the perimeter. Procopius’ contemporary descriptions of camps during Belisarius’ North African campaign paint a rather relaxed picture:
'We made camp as thoroughly secure as the circumstances permitted... The inhabitants furnished a market and served the soldiers in whatever they wished... In that place was a palace of a ruler of the Vandals and a park the most beautiful of all we know. For it is excellently watered by springs and has a great wealth of woods. And all the trees are full of fruit; so that each one of the soldiers pitched his tent among fruit trees, and all of them ate their fill of the fruit which was then ripe.'