into the Storm (1997)

by Tom - Nf - Commanders Clancy

  Depth

  Depth of the battle space is a vital element on any modern battlefield. As weapons gain longer reach and become increasingly lethal, formations on land are tending to grow smaller and more dispersed. A similar process has gone on in the air and at sea. It's doubtful that we'll ever see again anything like the massed air and sea armadas of World War II. The developments on the ground allow an army commander to use more and more of the battle space to focus his combat power simultaneously on more and more of a given enemy force. Such capabilities require a senior tactical commander to look ahead in time two to three days, and in distance normally 150 to 200 kilometers.

  He must, in short, consider the battle space in depth. During the Cold War, the echelonment doctrine of Soviet and Soviet-style forces--waves of attacking echelons that ultimately overwhelm a defender by attrition at the point of attack--made it necessary to consider depth. If the defender did not attack follow-on echelons at the same time he was defending against attacking echelons, he would soon be overwhelmed. Even after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, a corps commander in today's battlefield environment must see the battle space given him to accomplish his mission as three dimensional. It has width, depth, and airspace above it. Within that bounded area, the corps decides where, when, and in what priority to continually apply its own combat power (as well as that temporarily available from air-and sea-based forces) to accomplish the mission it has been given.

  To gain intelligence of the enemy forces in this depth, the corps has available to it its own intelligence-gathering capabilities in a military intelligence brigade. The corps further depends on the intelligence-gathering assets available to the theater command and those available at the national level.

  The corps also receives help in conducting operations in depth from the theater in the form of theater attack air assets. Normally a corps commander will be able to select targets or enemy capabilities he wants destroyed deep in his operational area (up to the forward boundary of his battle space, or about 150 kilometers). Though this was the doctrine in NATO, it was not the practice in Desert Storm; and that greatly influenced how VII Corps and XVIII Corps could shape the battles they were fighting into the depth of the enemy's formations.

  Another area for theater help is in logistics. Normally, theater assets are used to rapidly replenish supplies consumed by an attacking corps. In Desert Storm, this was especially critical in the area of fuel. The theater corps logistics support connection worked well.

  Meanwhile, in the attack, the idea is to give the enemy no rest. You want to create a moving 150-kilometer-wide and 175-kilometer-deep killing zone in which he can neither hide nor survive. To create this, depth of the corps battle space is normally divided between the divisions and the corps. Divisions will usually fight to a depth of about 30 to 40 kilometers in front of their forward-most units. Beyond that and out to a depth of 150 to 200 kilometers, the corps will normally fight simultaneously with the divisions, mainly with fires. The killing zone of the attacking divisions dominates the terrain and the enemy. It is all-inclusive. Beyond this 30- to 40-kilometer killing zone, the destruction is more selective, because the attacking assets are usually limited to air, attack helicopters, and long-range Army tactical missiles. With those attacking assets, corps normally go after targets and enemy capabilities that, if taken out, will leave the enemy weakened for the advancing divisions, or take apart the enemy's coherence and cause chaos. Some of these targets might well be the enemy's command centers, his long-range artillery, his logistics and supplies, and his reserves (to keep them out of the division's fight and to severely attrit them).

  Time and distance are important to any commander, and these factors held some particular challenges in the deserts of Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The map of southwest Asia superimposed over a portion of the eastern United States gives the distance challenges facing General Franks and his commanders in commanding, maneuvering, and resupplying VII Corps while simultaneously keeping Third Army and CENTCOM aware of the disposition of the corps.

  In some circumstances, the corps commander might see an opportunity to break through with a ground formation and send them deep into the enemy's rear. Such an action can severely disrupt the enemy, for a ground force has not only destructive power but staying power. That is (unlike air, which has limited staying-power effect and eventually goes away), it stays and controls the area it is in, thus denying it to the enemy. In Desert Storm, for example, XVIII Corps positioned the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) on Highway 8, thus blocking early any hope of RGFC retreat toward Baghdad. When to do this and when not to is a major decision for the corps commander and involves both combat power and the capability to continually support such a deep attacking force.

  Allocating airspace boundaries above the landmass is also important, so that all air assets can be used simultaneously. For example, the corps wants to be able to operate its own helicopter fleet (up to 800 in VII Corps), while allowing centrally controlled fixed-wing assets to attack targets simultaneously within the same battle space. In Desert Storm, an airspace boundary of 1,000 feet was agreed to; that is, VII Corps could fly its helicopters wherever and whenever they wanted, as long as they stayed below 1,000 feet. This did not prove to be a problem, as air forces flew combat missions normally at 10,000 feet or above.

  Formation Alignments

  With only passing regard to VII Corps's maneuver during its eighty-nine-hour attack in Desert Storm, let us look at a hypothetical situation in which a mounted corps moves to contact an enemy force that is also moving. Imagine, for example, a three-division corps moving toward an enemy force that is itself moving toward the corps. Each formation has the mission to defeat the other. Perhaps 200 kilometers initially separate the forces. One might also assume air forces are in parity, that is, the air battle at the moment gives no advantage to either side.

  The friendly commander's first priority in this situation will be to designate a point of main effort. Let us imagine that the corps sees an enemy vulnerability and a terrain avenue of movement that will allow a swift attack against the enemy's key reserve units (that is, the reserves he is saving for his own main effort). The friendly commander then designates that operation as his main effort. This designation signals that it is that particular operation that must receive the full support of the corps, and that if the operation is successful, the corps will accomplish its mission. The friendly corps commander designates this part of the operation as his main effort to focus energy and support of his corps. If there is any question, support goes there. Subordinate commanders of all the various units in the corps (especially artillery, aviation, signal, engineers, and logistics) devise their own unit operation to assist the main effort.

  At the same time, the corps commander might have another operation in progress that, while necessary, he will designate as a secondary attack or an economy of force. To this and other secondary operations will be allocated only minimum essential resources, so that maximum resources can be applied to the main effort. In this way, the commander can occupy the attention of enemy forces while allowing his main attack to succeed and freeing up some of his own forces for his main effort.

  Sometime during the course of the main effort, the corps commander will adopt a basic form of maneuver to attack the enemy force. He will shift to this formation alignment when he determines that the enemy formations are identified well enough for effective plan making, and likely to remain in that posture long enough for the chosen corps maneuver to be successful. If this is not possible and the enemy is not precisely located or fixed, the corps puts itself into a form of the tactical offense called "movement to contact." This is a formation of units on the ground that permits the widest variety of maneuver options once the enemy force is more precisely fixed. It is like an offense in American football coming to the line of scrimmage and lining up in a basic formation from which it can shift rapidly once it determines the other side's defense. In the U.S. Army, this is called staying in a
"balanced stance."

  In a movement to contact, the lead element will normally be the corps armored cavalry regiment, and the regiment will be spread over the entire width of the corps sector. The regiment's mission is to cover the main corps movement while simultaneously finding and fixing the enemy force so the corps commander can maneuver the main punch of the corps in for the kill. Sometimes an artillery brigade (an additional forty-eight 155-mm howitzers and eighteen MLRS launchers) and an aviation battalion (twenty-four Apaches) will be added to the regiment's organic assets to accomplish its mission. The cavalry regiment so reinforced will have about 8,000 soldiers, 123 M1A1 tanks, 125 Bradleys, 72 155-mm howitzers, 27 MLRSs, and 32 Apache helicopters. It will project a lethal zone twenty to thirty kilometers to its front. On desert terrain, a regiment might cover a frontage of sixty to eighty kilometers and extend to the rear perhaps twenty-five kilometers. In Central Europe, its sector might be somewhat smaller. Meanwhile, the corps will be looking deeper in zone, partly with its own intelligence assets and partly with the assistance of theater reconnaissance assets. With the intel thus gained, the corps can attack key targets deep and thus influence the enemy's posture by shaping the upcoming battle for the divisions, which are its heavy punch. This intel also allows the corps to warn the cavalry regiment of enemy locations and dispositions. Theater air operations are vitally important to this early action. If air elements gain air supremacy, they will be able to attack freely targets at distances of up to 150 to 200 kilometers beyond the advancing corps while keeping enemy air and intelligence-gathering means away from the advancing corps.

  Behind the advancing cavalry regiment, divisions normally follow by thirty minutes. In other words, they are at a distance from which they could take up the fight thirty minutes after the cavalry regiment has found and fixed the enemy. The divisions normally advance on a front about forty kilometers wide. In that posture they will usually have two of their three (ground) maneuver brigades side by side and one to the rear. Each of their lead maneuver brigades normally has 116 M1A1 tanks and about 40 Bradleys. Artillery battalions (twenty-four 155-mm howitzers) normally move with advancing brigades, and are available for immediate fire support. Supporting trucks and other logistics units follow behind the advancing combat units. Each advancing brigade brings its own support with it; this is replenished as required from division assets farther to the rear. An armored or mechanized division9 so configured on desert terrain advances on a forty-kilometer front and extends to the rear about eighty to one hundred kilometers.

  In the attack, there are normal additions to divisions. These include an artillery brigade of three battalions of artillery, two with twenty-four 155-mm howitzers and one with eighteen MLRS rocket launchers. There is also a MASH (mobile army surgical hospital). There are specifically tailored support groups from the corps with additional transportation assets for fuel and ammunition and other supplies. Depending on the mission, each division grows from its standard 18,000 soldiers to up to 24,000. (In Desert Storm the 24th Mechanized Division got so much additional fuel-hauling capability for its mission that strengths reached more than 24,000. VII Corps Divisions had from 20,000 to 22,000 soldiers.)

  If divisions are part of the corps's main effort, they will receive other assets from corps to "weight" the main effort. In some cases corps attack aviation could be added to divisions. Additional artillery and more CAS (close air support) also can be added. And intelligence priorities can be shifted from corps units to assist main attack divisions. Meanwhile, other corps units are normally behind the divisions, but they can also be co-located with them, either operating independent of division control or else assigned temporarily to the divisions for specific missions. These corps units normally extend behind divisions by another 80 to 150 kilometers, and they can either be moving steadily or leapfrogging from position to position, depending on their mission. In total, the corps would extend from front to rear of its own formations 125 kilometers wide and up to 300 kilometers deep. Its reach into the enemy depth would extend another 150 to 300 kilometers.

  As the corps advances, the corps support units will be accomplishing missions that keep the corps moving and ready to transition rapidly into the attack. For example, units of the engineer brigade will be ensuring mobility by building or maintaining roads and bridges, clearing obstacles, and even building airfields for C-130 aircraft or unmanned drones (which are used for intelligence gathering of enemy forces). Military intelligence brigade units will position themselves to listen to the enemy, jam his communications where appropriate, and fly drone or aviation unit missions deep to locate and target enemy capabilities. It will also use its specially trained infantry company by clandestinely inserting them deep into enemy territory to report directly on observed activity. The signal brigade will be operating a moving communication infrastructure that lets the corps communicate by voice and images on screens, as well as with paper orders and diagrams of future maneuvers. It will also establish continuing communications with the corps's higher headquarters, sometimes at great distances (in Desert Storm, higher headquarters was more than 500 kilometers away in Riyadh). The military police brigade will be securing roads used by the corps advance and by corps resupply going both ways (even in the desert it was necessary to have improved roads for resupply). Military police will additionally ensure disciplined use of those roads so that the right priority units can use them when required. And they will operate any prisoner-of-war compounds and move and process prisoners (a huge task in Desert Storm). The air defense units of the corps will alternately move and set up to provide continuous coverage over the corps as it advances.

  The corps aviation brigade normally conducts attacks deep into the enemy rear with its two eighteen-Apache battalions. These attacks will be well forward of the cavalry regiment--normally at distances of up to 150 kilometers and normally at night. Meanwhile, the remainder of this brigade will be moving supplies with its heavy helicopters, providing command support with specially configured aircraft and providing troop lift where required.

  Logistics support to a moving corps is provided by a combination of means. Some supporting units are placed directly with advancing units, providing area coverage (any unit in that area can go to that unit to get supplies). Meanwhile, logistics bases with fuel and ammunition are prepositioned at convenient locations, and unit supply vehicles from advancing units will go there for replenishment. The order of magnitude of supply is staggering: an advancing corps of five divisions will consume about 1.5 million gallons of fuel a day (an amount carried by about 600 trucks, each with 2,500- or some with 5,000-gallon capacity). In an attack, the corps will consume about 2,500 tons of ammunition a day (one truck carries 5 tons). In calculating the rate of movement and distances you expect for your corps advance, you have to figure in these numbers. Such calculations put a limit on advance. When the limit is reached, you either have to stop or else displace logistics bases forward. Without this displacement, advancing units travel so far from logistics bases that replenishment vehicles cannot make the turnaround from divisions to bases before units run out of supplies. This is especially the case with fuel.

  While all of this movement and formation alignment is proceeding, the enemy is trying to do much the same thing you are doing. He is trying to gain intelligence on you that allows him to predict where you might be vulnerable; and he is seeking either to attack you or else to cause you to attack him where he is strong (which will dissipate your combat power and make you vulnerable to his counterattack). It is a deadly contest of hiding your intentions from the enemy and seeking to strike hard at the last moment, and keep striking, until you win.

  Seeing a force like the one above bearing down on him, an enemy commander might choose to defend. If he began to set a defense with an extended security zone in front and supported by artillery, the attacking corps commander would want to discover this and to select his form of attack and act before the enemy commander can get set.

  Both enemy and fri
endly forces are working on the same problem, and both are using the same time parameters and the same weather and terrain. Battle victory goes to the side that can more quickly solve those problems, and disseminate and act on the solutions, and that can keep doing that faster than the enemy until he quits or runs out of the wherewithal to continue.

  Attack

  When the commander determines (by a combination of means) the location and posture of the enemy force he is attacking, he arranges his units on the ground from their balanced formation alignment to his chosen attack formation (usually one of the forms of maneuver discussed above). If, for example, the cavalry regiment was leading, and it was followed by two divisions, with a third division in reserve, he would alter that alignment to a more potent combination. As soon as the cavalry regiment succeeds in finding and fixing the enemy force, he will quickly remove them from the lead and bring the full combat power of his divisions to bear. He does this with all units moving constantly toward the enemy.

  If the cavalry regiment has surprised the enemy or has discovered an exploitable flank or gap in enemy forces, the corps commander might bring his reserve division forward. He might perhaps then concentrate two of his divisions on a narrow attacking front (maybe sixty kilometers) at the discovered or created vulnerability, while simultaneously distributing his third division on a broader economy-of-force front (maybe also sixty kilometers).