into the Storm (1997)

by Tom - Nf - Commanders Clancy

  In short, with all of this moving about, the staff officers and NCOs charged with writing things down and reporting to higher HQ could catch only bits and fragments . . . and then only when they themselves were not moving. When the CPs displaced, the staffs missed the part of the fight that went on while they were in transit. If the fight develops fast, the staffs can miss a lot in a short time.

  Even today, battle logs are handwritten accounts of unit activities taken down from what the transcriber hears on the radio. These transcribers are normally accurate, but you can't report what you don't hear. In addition, if a radio operator uses a headset, then the transcriber cannot eavesdrop on what the operator's hearing, and so pick up potentially useful information. Finally, there are no electronic recording devices in CPs; and the review and supervision of the transcriber is sometimes haphazard. In other words, it is not a good system and we should get it fixed--but it was the one we were using in Desert Storm.

  By the evening of 26 February, my VII Corps main CP in Saudi Arabia was both far out of line-of-sight FM radio range (and thus unable to hear the reports of the fight over the corps FM command net) and far from the sounds and sights we were seeing and hearing ourselves. It was not their fault. I told the CP to stay there, because it was our nerve center, and to break it down, move it more than 100 kilometers, and set it up again would have taken longer than the whole four days of the war.

  However, their immobility, combined with our mobility, didn't help the accuracy or timeliness of their reports on the current friendly situation.

  The VII Corps SITREP that went to Third Army as of midnight 26 February from my main CP illustrates it:

  "2nd ACR attacked in zone to fix elements of the Tawalkana Division. Regiment attacked covering forces of an armored BDE and destroyed enemy T-72s and BMPs vicinity PT4797." Phase Line Smash: "One tank and nine MTLBs were destroyed; 1,300 EPWs were captured. During attacks on 26 Feb, 2nd ACR fought one brigade of the Tawalkana Division and elements of two bde's of the 12 AD, the 46th and 50th Bde's."

  Now, considering the circumstances, that is not a bad report, but it is far from complete and scarcely conveys the intensity of the fighting by the 2nd ACR during the Battle of 73 Easting.

  In the same SITREP, the 1st AD was reported to have attacked one battalion of the Tawalkana and destroyed more than 30 tanks and 10 to 15 other vehicles, while the 3rd AD was reported to have run into stiff resistance along the 71 north/south grid line, destroyed numerous armored vehicles with direct and indirect fires, and captured 130 EPWs.

  In fact, that day the 1st AD destroyed 112 tanks, 82 APCs, 2 artillery pieces, 94 trucks, 2 ADA systems, and captured another 545 EPWs, while the 3rd AD "experienced its heaviest contact of the war and effectively fought both close and deep operations simultaneously. 1st and 2nd Bde engaged forces of the Tawalkana Division along the FLOT, while 2-227 the attack helicopter Bn (AH-64), and 2/6 Cavalry (AH-64), supported by Air Force stealth fighters (F-117A) and A-10s, engaged forces approximately 10-15 kilometers further east." Extracts of their battle logs (some of this was reconstructed at AARs from a number of unit battle logs) showed:

  260900: Hundreds of enemy surrendering in trenches at NT815910.

  260900: 2nd Brigade engaging MTLBs with close air support in the vicinity of PT690245.

  261043: 5 T-72s engaged by CAB (combat aviation brigade).

  261610: 4/7 CAV moving across 63 north/south grid, contact with dismounts in trench line; artillery impact PT7310; EPW collection point PU366177; 4/18 INF engaged from bunkers with T-62s at AT698485.

  261638: 2nd Brigade, 5/3 ADA taking hostile fire in the vicinity of Phase Line Bullet (just east of Smash).

  261702: 3/5 CAV engaging T-72s at PU 722136

  261840: 1st Brigade at 713139; damage assessment 23 T-72s, APCs, and trucks.

  261927: 4/32 AR reports 1 Bradley hit. 2 KIAs, 3 WIAs; being counterattacked by T-72s.

  What these reports indicate is that 3rd AD battles were continuous all day both close and deep. By 2400 they had destroyed upwards of at least two battalions of Iraqi tanks (more than 100 tanks) and other vehicles, and in so doing had cracked the middle of the Tawalkana defense. Their combat was continuous throughout the twenty-sixth into the night and early-morning hours of the twenty-seventh. I knew most of this personally because I often visited with Butch Funk and saw it with my own eyes.

  Yet little of the intensity of these and other battles was getting reported to Third Army or CENTCOM. For instance, as the above actions were happening, Colonel Kendall at Third Army reported (accurately reflecting what was known in Riyadh), "At the 1700 hours operational update [26 February], Yeosock announced that the mission was to gain and maintain contact with the RGFC and for the G-3 to ensure that the CENTCOM briefers stressed that ARCENT was still conducting a movement to contact . . . and preparing for a coordinated attack. Just before he departed for the CINC's 1900 hours update, Yeosock talked with General Franks for a situation update. Franks reported that the corps would be moving and fighting all night but that enemy units and logistics bases were being bypassed. He did not know if the 1st Cavalry Division would arrive in time for the battle." We definitely were not in a movement to contact at that time. We were in a series of continuous hasty attacks. From all I have read since the war, it seems that the impression in Riyadh was that the RGFC battle would really start on the twenty-seventh--but in fact we had been in the RGFC attack since noon on the twenty-fifth, and especially since about 0900 on the twenty-sixth, as 3rd AD and 1st AD came on line and I pushed 2nd ACR east.

  I did make a short phone call to John Yeosock to give him an accurate description of our maneuvers and to inform him that we were in contact with the RGFC, but I did not go into details about the fighting or the enemy destroyed (I didn't know many of them myself at the time). For that reason, and because other reports were so incomplete at that time, neither CENTCOM nor the Third Army staffs who posted the maps and made up the 1900 briefing for General Schwarzkopf had any details of the 2nd ACR actions at 73 Easting, or of the 1st AD, the 3rd AD, and British actions. Since General Schwarzkopf never called me directly or came out to see for himself, he did not have a complete picture of the VII Corps situation.

  I was not to find out how flawed that picture was until much later.

  VII CORPS ATTACK

  Once I had completed the forecasting and had put the next day's operation into motion, I turned my attention back to our current attack.

  You always plan ahead to maintain tempo, but you also have to adjust your forecasted plan--depending on how your current operation works out--so that you can meld the two together and continue relatively smoothly. The two are never a perfect fit. This would be no exception.

  Three things were on my mind about the current attack:

  First, I wanted to maintain its momentum, yet I also wanted all my commanders to be aware of the rising risk of fratricide as we maneuvered three U.S. armored divisions abreast to conduct a night attack. I had seen and talked to all the commanders and was confident they would use whatever tactics they thought necessary in their sector. Ron Griffith chose to put all three brigades on line and simultaneously attack both close and deep. Butch Funk, while attacking close and deep at the same time, had two brigades forward and one back, then passed his third brigade forward through a leading brigade to sustain his momentum. Tom Rhame attacked through the 2nd ACR with two brigades forward and one back. Though we monitored the direction of attack of each of the units at the TAC, the units themselves had to make the flank coordination necessary to ensure that no unit strayed or fired across boundaries. It was an enormous task, and it was carried out with the greatest skill and discipline. Although all the commanders made adjustments on their own initiative to ensure that we avoided fratricide, they would not all be successful.

  Second, I wanted to pass the 1st INF through the 2nd ACR. The 2nd ACR was skillful in these maneuvers and would take steps to ensure a clean handoff. Their coordination with the 1st INF, an
d the 1st INF's execution of the maneuver, would be flat well done and a tribute to them all. It was only later that I learned of the initiative at all levels in both units that had made it happen.

  The third thing on my mind was our aviation deep attack. I thought there was a good chance we would need two that night. To give us time for them, the first was scheduled to go at 2100, which would make for some complications, since they would be flying out over the 2nd ACR and then returning over the 1st INF. To simplify, we could have waited until the passage of the two units was complete, but that would have eliminated the chance to attack again if it was necessary. It was a risk, but it was a risk worth taking.

  The FSCL got in the way of our deep attack--it had been drawn just east of the aviation attack objective of Minden. My air coordination cell informed me F-111s would be attacking the escaping Iraqi forces to the east of the FSCL and along Highway 8. It would have resulted in more damage to Iraqi forces, and fewer Iraqi forces would ultimately have escaped, if we could have adjusted the FSCL, changed that air tasking to move the F-111s to another target, and attacked along Highway 8 with our own Apaches. But making those changes was not possible in the time we had.

  By now VII Corps had been attacking for a little more than fifty hours without pause. We had gone about 150 kilometers and our attack was about twenty-four hours ahead of all the prewar projections of movement. Third Army's estimate had had us ready to attack the RGFC at H+74 hours. We were well ahead of that.

  DEEP ATTACK

  What every commander of an attacking corps tries to do is to fight both close and deep at the same time. The effect is to hit the enemy simultaneously throughout the depths of his formations. His deep forces do not have time to set up a coherent defense to await your fast-closing direct-fire tank and infantry forces. This destroys him physically. These attacks give him so many problems to deal with simultaneously that he cannot handle them. This destroys him mentally as well. The result of this dual breakdown is that his defense starts to lose coherence. Soon you have a disorganized enemy, fixed in position, fighting you in small units without any overall tied-together plan. We were beginning to achieve this effect on the Iraqis on the night of 26 February.

  Because the 2nd ACR had found the southern flank of the Tawalkana's three-brigade defense, I thought that if we hit them close at Objective Norfolk and deep at Objective Minden, then we might crack their defense and also prevent more Iraqi troops from escaping from Kuwait.

  We assigned the mission to the 11th Aviation Brigade, commanded by Colonel Johnnie Hitt. They had two Apache battalions, 2-229 and 2-6, as well as a lift company of UH-1s and a CH-4744 company. Johnnie chose 2- 229, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Roger McCauley, for the mission.

  They were to take off from their current location, which was about fifty kilometers behind where we were then fighting, fly over the 2nd ACR, then forward of the line of contact to Objective Minden. Minden was about eighty kilometers deep (or east) from Norfolk, and it was at Minden that we thought the Iraqis had their defense set in depth (Objective Minden was about twenty kilometers in diameter and only imprecisely drawn, based on our best estimate of where Iraqi forces were). Before the attack, McCauley and Lieutenant Colonel Terry Johnson, the 11th Brigade deputy commander, came forward to see me and coordinate personally. Because of the risks of blue on blue, and also because of the passage of 2nd ACR and 1st INF, over which they'd be flying, I told them both to be damn sure they had nailed down their coordination with both units. And stay west of the 20 north/south grid line, Stan Cherrie added. Since that was the current FSCL, east of it was under the control of CENTAF in Riyadh, and F-111s would be attacking targets there. Both of us wished them good luck.

  They left at 2100, then had to divert around a tank battle in the vicinity of Objective Norfolk. They arrived in the target area with three companies of six Apaches each, and found some Iraqis attempting to set a defense, but other units generally moving south to north, apparently trying to escape. It was what they called a target-rich environment, and they hit it hard. They also got return fire from the Iraqis, mostly small arms. For the better part of an hour, they stayed in the target area with their three companies; the spacing of the Apaches varied, but they tried for about 150 meters. Each Apache carried eight Hellfire missiles, and each was constantly firing and destroying Iraqi tanks, infantry carriers, trucks, and air defense vehicles. They let go any Iraqis escaping on foot (after the war, they showed me the gun camera films).

  When the attacking battalion returned at 2300, they brought news that caused me some concern. Though they reported that numerous vehicles were destroyed, they also noticed that, further east, Iraqi units continued to move north up Highway 8 from Kuwait City to Basra. They requested to attack at about midnight farther east beyond the FSCL.

  That was a tough decision. I wanted to go east all the way to Highway 8. Our Apaches had much more staying power in an engagement area, especially at night, than the fixed-wing air, which would drop a single bomb per pass over the target and then have to leave the target area. My main CP had strongly recommended that we send the second strike east, but when I asked them to try to get it coordinated with Third Army and CENTAF by moving the FSCL east and letting us have Highway 8, the answer was that we couldn't get it done in time. Since none of the decision makers in Riyadh was available at that hour, to request it, and then get it approved and disseminated, would have taken all night and we'd be out of the night attack window.

  I could have chosen to go anyway to ignore the boundary, go east, and take the risk that there would be no interference or fratricide from the F-111s attacking Highway 8, or hope that we could tie it together with them on the fly. However, to deliberately cross a boundary and get some of your troops killed by fratricide is a grievous breach of discipline, and in my judgment is cause for disciplinary action. In battle you just cannot have local commanders deciding when or when not to obey boundary restrictions. Another alternative was to try to reach the airborne command-and-control aircraft, and coordinate locally, but it was not clear to me there was one.

  Complicating all this was the time and distance between the CPs. We were in the middle of the corps sector at the TAC CP. My deep-attacking planning cell was at the main CP, almost 200 kilometers away. The attack helicopter battalion was 100 kilometers from the main and a good 80 from us. Riyadh was a good 800 kilometers away, or farther than the distance from London to Paris. All of our discussion was over the phone, and it wasn't a conference line, on which everyone could be talking at once, and thus preclude misunderstanding. The people were tired--not the least the aviators. And this time, as they flew forward, they would be passing over the 1st INF Division, which meant that they'd have to coordinate with a different unit in the middle of the night. My gut told me to do it. My head said no. It was not a risk, it was a gamble. If it did not work out, and we had some serious fratricide, then we would never recover from it, and it would be a major distraction from our final attack against the RGFC for the rest of the night and all the next day and the next night.

  Besides, if there were that many Iraqis on Highway 8, surely J-STARS or the F-111s also would notice it, and send out some fixed-wing air.

  I ordered our Apaches to go back to Minden and as far east as they could, and at 0200 they went back with two companies, A and C, and destroyed more Iraqi vehicles.

  Total BDA reported from both attacks was: 53 tanks, 19 APCs, 16 MTLBs, 1 ATC (air-traffic control) tower, 1 ammunition carrier, 1 bunker, and 40 enemy KIA. (I trusted their BDA, since they could see the Hellfires impacting on the vehicles. Once a Hellfire hit something, it was gone.) They had broken the back and the spirit of the Iraqi 10th Armored Division and prevented them from reinforcing the forming RGFC defense. Afterward, many of the 10th Armored abandoned their vehicles and fled on foot. We would destroy their equipment later.

  It was an enormously powerful application of the battle-fighting doctrine we had written so long ago--and were now executing in war for the
first time.

  THE ZONE

  At this point late at night, with the sounds of battle close by, my emotions were running high. I wanted to pour it on the Iraqis, just pound them in an unrelenting attack with everything we had. We had the fist where we wanted it and wanted to drive it home. Go for the knockout. Boom. In sports, they call it the killer instinct. I had been in these situations before in Vietnam, only with much smaller units and with much less combat power and fewer complex organizations to maneuver.

  I was not alone in these feelings. You could sense the same thing all over the corps. I had already seen it in training, in chats and visits with the soldiers and leaders--seen it in their eyes. Now I was seeing it in combat. It was in the 2nd ACR at 73 Easting. It was in the Apaches' deep strike that night. It was in the Big Red One during their night attack through Objective Norfolk. Later, it was in 1st AD's battles at Medina Ridge and in 3rd AD's battles at Phase Line Bullet. It was in all the cavalry squadrons out front or on the flanks of their divisions. Get the job done. The Army calls it the "warrior spirit," but it is more than that. It's about being a warrior, yes, but also a soldier, which means the disciplined application of force, according to the laws of land warfare and our own values as a people. It goes beyond being a warrior.