into the Storm (1997)

by Tom - Nf - Commanders Clancy

  That's what I had in mind. And now this news from Ron. I pushed the anger down and forced myself to consider the options:

  First, I could force it. Tell Ron, just do it. You handle your contact, but get it done. I need the 1st CAV in the fight tonight, so we'll bull our way through this. That is sometimes a workable option.

  Second, I could adapt tactics; that is, order 1st CAV and 1st AD to make a forward passage of lines, just as the 1st INF had done with the 2nd ACR, rather than have 1st CAV pass to the north. But the 2nd ACR was well practiced in passage of lines and had time to set it up. This would be from a standing cold start, with planning and execution in the dark. Not only was there the risk of fratricide, it would probably take them all night. Besides, in the morning I'd have two exhausted divisions on my hands from all the coordination and passage, and the Iraqis left alone most of the night.

  Third, I could absorb the chance by adjusting for time; that is, we could wait until Ron got things under control and then pass the 1st CAV, probably by first light next morning. We had that time, it would involve less risk, and even though we would be giving the Iraqis who weren't in contact with the 1st AD another twelve hours, we would still get the mission done. On the other hand, the RGFC still seemed to be fighting rather than running away (after the Medina Ridge fight experience, it did not look as though the RGFC would be going anywhere soon), and we had theater air to isolate the battlefield and keep them from running.

  Fourth, I had to consider Ron's judgment, which I totally trusted. He knew what I wanted to do and had ordered him to do. He knew the significance of attacking east into the Hammurabi. He also knew his current situation. He wanted to finish the fight. I had always trusted the loyalty and judgment of my subordinates. I had never given a mission that I knew was not possible to execute. That principle had never failed me in over thirty-one years, not once in peace and war. Why abandon it now? Besides, we had the next day--or so I thought at the time.

  "IRON 6, this is JAYHAWK 6. Roger your situation. I want you to pass PEGASUS at first light tomorrow without fail. Contact him directly and coordinate."

  "WILCO."

  "PEGASUS 6, JAYHAWK 6, did you monitor my call to IRON 6?"

  "Roger, JAYHAWK, understand BMNT to attack east same axis and objective." It was John Tilelli talking; I could hear the disappointment in his voice. They had busted their ass to be in Area Horse by 1100 that day, moving almost 250 kilometers in a little more than twenty-four hours. And now this.

  "Affirmative, coordinate directly with IRON for passage."

  That was it. We still had time, I thought.

  Stan and the troops had heard both ends of this exchange. They made the necessary adjustments.

  At 1800, I made my usual call to John Yeosock to give him a SITREP before his 1900 meeting with General Schwarzkopf. I reported that Iraqi resistance was becoming less coherent, and that 1st INF was in pursuit, but that 1st and 3rd ADs were still in hasty attack mode. I then updated him on our double-envelopment maneuver. We needed another twenty-four hours or so, I told him, and it would be all over: by then we would have run out of maneuver room and would have the remaining Iraqi forces surrounded. John agreed with my assessment. Another twenty-four hours was about what we would get, he thought.

  I learned after the war that John had already given what was essentially the same message to the CINC on the morning of the twenty-seventh, and that General Schwarzkopf had used that judgment as the basis of a report he had given to General Powell that afternoon.52 In that report, General Schwarzkopf stated that he wanted to continue the ground attack one more day to destroy everything to the Persian Gulf.

  I was also at that time totally unaware of General Schwarzkopf's briefing the evening of 27 February that has been called "the mother of all briefings," during which the CINC essentially said that the escape door was shut and declared victory.

  After that call, Stan, Creighton Abrams, and I went over the next day's operation. We looked at the objectives assigned, the fire-control measures (including placement of the FSCL), and other fire-support and control measures. This was the closest to a war game we could get during our attack--that is, we looked at moves and countermoves by the Iraqis. We figured there was nothing they could do to stop us from our double-envelopment maneuver.

  I was satisfied that all of it would work, and by the end of the day--or at the latest by Friday morning--it would all be over, and we would have done what we had come to do. The RGFC would be destroyed, not only in our sector but in the Kuwaiti theater of operations, as XVIII Corps closed in from the north.

  Our own actions were to continue to attack in the sector while setting the double envelopment in motion. Yet I also was becoming increasingly focused on ensuring that major corps units did not run into one another, since our success was beginning to run us out of maneuver room.

  Here is what I was seeing. The 1st INF was approaching Highway 8, and their axis of advance had them moving northeast rather than the more due east I had ordered earlier. Third AD was into Kuwait and also approaching Highway 8, attacking east-southeast. Looking at the map, it appeared we might have to do something to change their directions or establish a limit of advance, or else they would run into each other. First AD also was approaching Highway 8, to the north of 3rd AD.

  I left the TAC and walked outside to clear my head. Not much else I could do right now. We had the corps attacking due east against the RGFC, the 1st CAV committed for a first-light attack, and the 2nd ACR (in reserve) also committed to follow the 1st INF, then attack north inside them to Hawk. I also had my one remaining Apache battalion in our 11th Aviation Brigade in reserve for deep attacks, although that appeared unlikely, given the cramped space deep. I walked around, ate some MREs, then relaxed for a few minutes and smoked a cigar in the small tent the troops had put up for me, about twenty feet from the TAC entrance.

  At about 1845, when I went back inside the canvas enclosure of the TAC, Stan pointed out to me that the 3rd AD attacks had, in fact, taken them so far east and southeast that if the Big Red One were to keep its current axis of attack, then 3rd AD might run into them. Since all we had to go on was the friendly situation we had posted on our map, this information was not certain enough for me to make a decision to adjust. Figuring how long it takes to get orders out and executed, and wary of map postings not current, I told Stan to confirm the information and, if correct, to give 3rd AD a limit of advance, and to redirect the 1st INF attack farther east (and toward the blue as I had ordered early that morning), then north once they were across Highway 8.

  But at 1900, when the call went to the 1st INF Division, it was interpreted as an order to stop. And so they ordered a halt to their movement, and came to a stop sometime later, at around 2200 to 2300 (although unit moves and combat actions continued most of the night).

  What I had wanted them to do was to cease their northeast movement and continue due east toward the Gulf. Then, once they were across Highway 8, I wanted them to turn north. They never got the part of the order that told them to resume attacking east.

  Meanwhile, their cavalry squadron, by now far forward and out of radio contact with division and the lead or second brigade, knew of my intent from earlier that day and kept attacking east. In the best example of initiative in accordance with the commander's intent that I knew of in the war, Lieutenant Colonel Bob Wilson and the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (known all over the Army as the quarter horse for 1/4 CAV) moved across and cut Highway 8 at around 1900. Afterward, his squadron was inundated with prisoners. His small unit had to handle almost 5,000 of them, which overwhelmed his capability. But by the early evening of 27 February, we had control of Highway 8.

  At least that arm of the envelopment was working.

  I did not find out until two days later that the 1st INF had interpreted the order from the TAC to stop completely. That was my fault. If an order can be misunderstood, it will be, as the old Army saying goes. After I learned of it, I asked Tom Rhame, "Who the hell or
dered you to stop?"

  "We thought you did," he said.

  "Damn," I said, then explained what I had intended.

  G+3 . . . THE REST OF THE THEATER

  In the west, on the afternoon of the twenty-seventh, XVIII Corps changed its orientation from north toward the Euphrates to east toward Basra, and then moved to close the by-now-expanding gap with VII Corps. The 3rd ACR, now under operational control of the 24th MECH, was the first XVIII Corps unit to make the turn.

  Meanwhile, the airfield at Umm Hajul (which straddled the east-west boundary with VII Corps, a few kilometers north of al-Busayyah, and thirty kilometers south of the more important Iraqi airfield at Jalibah) was converted by elements of the 101st Airborne into FOB (Forward Operating Base) Viper. From this base, 101st Apaches attacked 145 kilometers farther east into what was called EA (Engagement Area) Thomas and shot up with Hellfires, rockets, and chain gun rounds everything that moved between Viper and Thomas. EA Thomas was a kill box directly north of Basra through which ran the highway north that was thought to be a major exit route for Iraqi armor. As it happened, four hours of continuous attack by 101st Apaches destroyed personnel carriers, multiple rocket launchers, antiaircraft guns, trucks, and grounded helicopters, yet no tanks were found to be moving through EA Thomas.

  The next morning, the 101st commander, General Peay, planned to air-assault his 1st Brigade into Thomas. If they could get forces on the ground to cut the highway north out of Basra, it was thought they would strangle the last escape route of the Republican Guards. The cease-fire put a stop to this plan.

  Meanwhile, the heaviest punch out of XVIII Corps, the 24th MECH, attacked and captured Jalibah airfield, and moved eastward along Highway 8 at about 1300. By 1000, the airfield, which was defended by an Iraqi armored battalion, was secure. The battalion had lost all of its vehicles, and fourteen MiG fighters, abandoned by the Iraqi air force, also were destroyed.

  Not far from Jalibah, the division ran into huge logistics and ammunition storage sites; the area just beyond that was defended by scattered elements of RGFC divisions--the al-Faw, the Nebuchadnezzar, and the Hammurabi (the first two were infantry divisions, the last armored). Though Iraqi artillery tried to lay fires down on the rapidly advancing columns, they didn't do any damage. That afternoon, the 24th took more than 1,300 Iraqi ammunition bunkers and captured more than 5,000 Iraqi soldiers.

  IN Kuwait, the Marines had come close to completing their mission. While Tiger Brigade cut the highway out of Al Jahrah, and the land route north toward Iraq, the 2nd Division had halted on Mutlah Ridge. And at 0600 the morning of the twenty-seventh, elements of the 1st Division made the final assault on the international airport. It wasn't long before they took down the Iraqi colors and raised the U.S. and Kuwaiti flags (the U.S. flag soon came down, for the sake of diplomatic decorum).

  By 0900, Kuwaiti forces, supported by Egyptian armor and other Arab forces, entered Kuwait City.

  Coalition forces found a city that had been sacked. Many of its citizens had been tortured (with acid baths, electric drills, and electric prods), killed (dismemberment, shooting, or beating to death were frequent methods), or raped.

  Some Iraqi looting had been systematic--a million ounces of gold from the Kuwait Central Bank, jewels from the gem market, marine ferries, shrimp trawlers, baggage-handling equipment, airliners, runway lights, granite facing from skyscrapers, thousands of plastic seats from the university stadium, and grave-digging backhoes, to name a few. Most government and public buildings had been looted and pillaged--many were burned. So too were hotels, department stores, and telephone exchanges. Other looting had been more opportunistic--rugs, drapes, toilets, sinks, light fixtures, lightbulbs, most of the country's cars, buses, and trucks, and books from libraries. The Iraqis sabotaged all but a few of the country's 1,330 oil wells and twenty-six gathering stations. Every day, something approaching 11 million barrels of crude escaped from these broken wells. About half of those 11 million barrels burned up. The rest made vast crude oil lakes. Ships were scuttled, to block channels through the harbor. Water and electrical utilities were sabotaged.

  Scattered along the so-called Highway of Death, littered around the ruined--and mostly stolen--cars and trucks, was a partial "inventory" of the loot from Kuwait City--television sets, washing machines, carpets, scuba gear, jewelry.

  After the Arabs took the city, the Marines entered. When they did, the Kuwaitis came out like Parisians in August 1944. "God bless Bush!" they cried. "Thank you, U.S.A.! Thank you! Thank you! Thank you!"

  BY evening in Riyadh, momentum was growing in Washington for a cease-fire. And at 2100 (1300 in Washington), General Schwarzkopf gave the live, televised "mother of all briefings" that, in essence, declared victory. Although he allowed that armored battles were still going on, the CINC indicated that he would happily stop fighting if the order came to do that.

  He did not have long to wait.

  CHAPTER FOURTEEN

  Cease-Fire

  THE next twelve hours brought an end to the war for VII Corps.

  On into the night, we continued to fight a series of close battles. Following the decisions to adjust the 1st INF and 3rd AD axes of advance, I continued to focus on making adjustments in these fights in a way that would allow us to complete the double envelopment sometime the next day.

  That evening, I got a quick update on the Iraqi units left in our sector and a look at our own situation. From the reports of the commanders I had visited earlier and from my own observations, it was clear to me that we had the Iraqis on the floor. A short briefing from Bill Eisel, G-2 at the TAC, confirmed it: The Iraqi intent was to continue to defend with what they had while attempting to withdraw their remaining units from the theater over pontoon bridges they were constructing over the Shatt al Arab53 and the Euphrates. Since both these areas were outside VII Corps sector, and had been since late on 25 February, there was nothing we could do to stop the units leaving by that route. Meanwhile, the Iraqis we were facing no longer appeared capable of any kind of coordinated defense--battalion-sized actions, but not much more. We estimated that the Hammurabi Division and what was left of the Medina (by this time only a brigade) would defend around the Rumaila oil fields, or our Objective Raleigh (and about thirty kilometers from where the 1st CAV was now). It was still not clear to me how much of the Hammurabi was left in our sector, and whether they were joining the retreat, or were part of the defense. Other Iraqi military options in our sector were extremely limited at this point.

  Our own situation was excellent. In the southern part of our sector, the British were racing toward Highway 8, with by now only scattered resistance, and the 1st INF was also in a pursuit, after having cracked through the Iraqi defense the night before and early that morning. Our biggest remaining future fights were going to be in the north, with what remained of the Hammurabi in Objective Raleigh. I figured that with the distance to Raleigh, that fight would take place late the next morning, 28 February, somewhere west of the Rumaila oil fields, and it would be over before the evening--very much like the Medina fight with 1st AD. Thus, I figured that by 1800 the next day, our double envelopment would be complete, and 1st CAV and the 1st INF would have accomplished their linkup somewhere north of Safwan on Highway 8, and we would have trapped the remainder of the Iraqi forces in our sector. By that time, we would have run out of both room to maneuver and Iraqi units to attack.

  From there we could always continue north toward Basra, but that would take intervention and new orders from Third Army, and we had none. Nor did we have any new orders for finishing the current fight other than the ones we were trying to execute--i.e., our own double envelopment.

  By then, I'd had VII Corps attacking for almost four days straight. Soon we would be at the limit of soldier and leader endurance. But we were not there yet.

  I left the TAC and went outside to smoke a cigar.

  When I returned at around 2130, Stan had been talking to John Landry at the main. There was talk of a cease
-fire in the morning.

  Total surprise. It was the second of the two great surprises of the war for me personally. The other was the order to attack early. Both were friendly actions. No warning order, no questions, no real evidence from the battlefield.

  Cease-fire! "Who the hell's idea is that?" I wanted to know.

  I called John Yeosock right away, and John confirmed the news. "There's talk about a possible 'cessation of offensive operations' effective tomorrow," he told me. "Nothing's definite yet," he added. "But in the light of that development, don't do operations that will unnecessarily cost any more casualties."

  I repeated that our situation was a combination of pursuit and hasty attack. Another twenty-four hours or so would finish it. "Why now? Why not give us tomorrow? We have them where we want them. There is less and less organized resistance, but we are not done yet."

  John agreed. "I already told the CINC we needed another day," he told me. "But I'll try to get all this clarified." Meanwhile, he directed us to put out a warning order for a possible cessation of offensive operations in the morning.