The Reluctant Taoiseach
Page 31
The British and Americans believed Costello was forced to adopt a robust position on partition as a result of de Valera’s stridency on the issue during a world tour which took in the US, India and Australia.24 This seems to be borne out by Costello’s assertion in a private letter that he believed de Valera “is doing great damage by his Partition speeches but, of course, they serve as the one method by which he can now publicise himself”.25 However, some of those who knew the Taoiseach believed he was “very bitter about the North”, and therefore needed little encouragement to adopt a strong line on partition. Risteárd Mulcahy accompanied Costello on a trip to Donegal, during which their car became stranded on a flooded road near Omagh. They were rescued by the RUC, to whom Costello was “very rude” as a result of his hostility to the regime they represented.26
But while his government pursued a “sore thumb” policy on partition—raising it at every opportunity in every international forum, no matter how inappropriate—it also co-operated with Stormont. The two governments reached agreements resolving difficulties over the Foyle fisheries, the drainage of the Erne, and the financial problems of the Great Northern Railway. At the 1951 Fine Gael Ard Fheis, Costello said these agreements “have given some grounds for the belief that friendly relations can do much to achieve eventual unity more certainly than threats of bloody warfare”.27 In this he was absolutely right. But Northern Unionists were to perceive his government as more likely to break connections than to build them, thanks to the repeal of the External Relations Act.
Unionists were certainly concerned at talk in the summer of 1948 about moves on Irish unity. This talk was given added impetus by the “remarkable” number of visits to Ireland by leading British politicians, including Prime Minister Clement Attlee, Lord Chancellor William Jowitt, and Commonwealth Secretary Philip Noel-Baker.28 In advance of his visit, Jowitt wrote to Costello that his visit to London for the trade talks had left “a host of friends behind you”, and that what had been done “may prove to be the foundation of a happier relationship more advantageous to both of us”.29 MacBride played the main role in pushing discussions with the various visitors, to no apparent avail. However, the contacts led to a sensational story in the London Observer that Attlee was involved in talks to end partition.
When he arrived at the Border the next day, Attlee was presented with a copy of the story, which he hadn’t seen, by the young journalist John Cole. “He took a suck at his pipe, and enquired in his usual staccato tone: ‘Got y’ notebook?’ He then proceeded to dictate a statement of about 400 words, without hesitation or amendment, contradicting the Observer story, point by point.”30 The story was also dismissed by officials at External Affairs, who told the American Minister, George Garrett, that they knew nothing about any talks, and that the story was “journalistic whimsy”. However, Garrett concluded that while it was unlikely that partition was in fact being discussed seriously, “one must not disregard the fact that in recent weeks the attitude of Prime Minister Costello has been one of calm assurance that progress was being made along this line”.31
To return to the question of the State’s constitutional status, we have a perfect indication of Costello’s view in June 1948, thanks to the ever meticulous Nicholas Nolan, Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Taoiseach. He pointed out to his boss, Maurice Moynihan, that various Yearbooks asked them for information on Ireland, including its constitutional status. In January 1947, the then Minister for External Affairs (de Valera) had agreed that the description should be “an independent Republic associated with the States of the British Commonwealth”. But what was the new Taoiseach’s view? It turned out that Costello favoured a different designation: “Ireland is a sovereign, independent, democratic State, associated with the States of the British Commonwealth.”32 These conflicting definitions were utterly consistent with the views each man had taken of the External Relations Act and the Constitution—de Valera believed the Constitution had in effect created a republic; Costello insisted that a republic could not exist while the Act was in force. But if Ireland was not quite a republic, was she a member of the Commonwealth? Costello’s definition suggests not—like de Valera, he said Ireland was merely “associated” with the Commonwealth.
Costello believed that Ireland had left when she stopped attending Commonwealth meetings.33 He put his view on the public record in answering Dáil questions from Captain Peadar Cowan, by then a former member of Clann na Poblachta.34 “The process by which Ireland ceased formally to be a member of that Commonwealth has been one of gradual development … It has ceased to be formally a member, but is associated with the other members …”35 Cowan continued to ask awkward questions—was Ireland a republic? Costello said this question was “purely one of nomenclature” which he wasn’t prepared to discuss. How did Ireland become associated with the Commonwealth? “Matters of history”, according to the Taoiseach, which it would serve no useful purpose to deal with.
Cowan also wanted the Taoiseach to define the precise nature of the association. Precision, of course, was something de Valera had avoided, but Costello was not one for evasions, and on 5 August he gave the Dáil the following definition: “Ireland’s association with the Commonwealth of Nations depends on the factual position. This factual relationship … depends on the reciprocal exchange of concrete benefits in such matters as trade and citizenship rights, the principle of consultation and cooperation in matters of common concern and on the many ties of blood and friendship that exist … Our association with the nations of the Commonwealth is a free association, which, by virtue of its very freedom, could be determined by unilateral action.”36
In other words, Ireland was, in Costello’s opinion, already outside the Commonwealth, although it retained an association with it. That association was governed by practical links, not by legislation, and in particular not by the External Relations Act. However, the Canadian High Commissioner in Dublin was not impressed with Costello’s idea of “association”. “Since he made this statement I have been trying to ascertain what particular association might be said to subsist between Éire and the British nations now that the Commonwealth link has been broken. I have not found any … It takes at least two to form an association and its nature and objects, its mutual rights and obligations, must be ascertained and defined. There may be good reasons why such an association should be formed, but its formation has not yet taken place …”37
So did Ireland enjoy trade and citizenship rights in Britain and the other Commonwealth countries because of her association with the Commonwealth, or was she “associated” with the Commonwealth because she enjoyed trade and citizenship rights? On this point, which of course was crucial to any move to make changes in the formal relationship between Ireland and the Commonwealth, Costello appeared to be slightly confused. In the Dáil debate on the Anglo-Irish trade agreement, he stated that Ireland’s right to preferential treatment in trade with Britain and the other members of the Commonwealth would remain “so long as we are associated with the league of nations known as the British Commonwealth of Nations”.38 But in fact, the Agreement gave Ireland trade advantages which were not specifically dependent on membership of, or even association with, the Commonwealth. The same was true of the British Nationality Act of 1948, which said Irish citizens who were not British subjects would be treated in the same manner as British subjects. Ironically, then, by concluding these agreements the British had already cut the ground out from under the position they would later adopt to try to prevent the repeal of the External Relations Act.
Three developments brought matters to a head in the summer of 1948: repeated difficulties on the question of official toasts; the prospect of an invitation to the Commonwealth Conference in October; and further awkward questions in the Dáil.
The question of after-dinner toasts may seem arcane, but it had a bearing on the developments which led to the repeal of the External Relations Act, and was one of the issues which annoyed Jack Costello when he was in Ca
nada. The point was that the British did not recognise the President of Ireland as a head of state, holding that King George VI was still Head of State of Ireland by virtue of his position as head of the Commonwealth. At a lunch in Downing Street for the Irish delegation to the trade talks, Costello noted that Attlee “proposed one Toast and one Toast only, namely, The King”. The Taoiseach had expected that he would propose the toast to the King, and that Attlee would reciprocate by toasting the President. “That this protocol was not followed by the British Prime Minister was significant as demonstrating the attitude of the British … [and was] a striking confirmation of the views we held as to the confusion and difficulty created in our international relations by the External Relations Act.”39
The British were aware of the Irish sensitivity on this point—Rugby told London that Lord Chancellor Jowitt had been inveigled into proposing a toast to the President of Ireland at a dinner in his honour in Dublin in August. It was the first time he had heard such a toast, and he put the new development down to Irish resentment at what he called “the London contretemps”.40 His Canadian counterpart, William Turgeon, felt it was “part and parcel of the general scheme to substitute the President for the King in Ireland’s External Affairs”.41
While Rugby was inclined to fall in with the new Irish practice, the Commonwealth Relations Office held that it would be impossible to toast the President “without an admission that Éire was in relation to the United Kingdom a foreign country and the President of Éire in the same position as the Head of a foreign State”.42 With Attlee’s approval, the CRO advised the High Commissioner in Canada about the potential difficulties in advance of Costello’s visit, asking him to informally draw the attention of the Canadians to the issue.43 As we shall see below, the resulting confusion over toasts strengthened Costello’s determination to clear away the ambiguities surrounding Ireland’s constitutional status, and was another British contribution to the repeal of the External Relations Act.
The second factor leading to a reappraisal of links with Britain was the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference, to be held in London in October. Ireland had not attended a Conference since the change of government in 1932; the British felt that this might change now that a new administration was in place, particularly given the important role Costello (and McGilligan) had played on the Commonwealth stage. Attlee raised possible Irish attendance with Costello during the trade talks in London in June. However, the British Prime Minister’s roundabout way of raising the subject was obviously a bit too roundabout for the Taoiseach, who did not interpret it as a definite invitation.44 When no response arrived from Dublin, Lord Rugby was asked to raise the matter with MacBride.45
The Clann leader duly submitted a memorandum to Government, arguing that there were matters which they might want to discuss at the Conference—such as partition, eliminating Ireland from the King’s title, and replacing High Commissioners with Ambassadors. However, it would have to be made clear that Ireland was not a member of the Commonwealth—and MacBride concluded that it would be better not to be represented.46 On 19 August the Cabinet agreed that Ireland should not be represented as a member of the Commonwealth, but left open the possibility of attendance “otherwise than as a member of the Commonwealth, for the purpose of discussing any particular subject”, pending the receipt of further information by MacBride.47 As Patrick Lynch pointed out, this wording “suggests that, on the day before the Taoiseach left Dublin for Canada, the government did not consider Ireland a member of the Commonwealth”.48 This did not, though, necessarily imply any immediate repeal of the External Relations Act, which referred to Ireland being “associated” with the Commonwealth.
This Cabinet meeting—which also approved the text of Costello’s speech to the Canadian Bar Association—may have been the one recalled by MacBride in his memoirs. He claimed to have suggested that the time had come to say “straight out that we are not members of the Commonwealth”. He said his suggestion was backed by Dillon and Norton.49 Whether this is an accurate report of the discussion will never be known. But it does appear that, as with the question of toasts, the British query about the conference had pushed Costello’s government towards clarifying Ireland’s position and removing ambiguity.
Curiously, possible Irish attendance at the October conference was still being discussed even after Costello’s Canadian press conference confirming that the External Relations Act was to go and that Ireland was no longer a member of the Commonwealth. On 6 September (the day after the Sunday Independent reported that the Act was to go), Rugby phoned MacBride to see if Ireland would be represented, and if so, by whom.50 On the morning of the seventh (before Costello’s news conference) the two men met to discuss the Conference. Rugby reported that MacBride “stated specifically that the Éire government intended to do away with the External Relations Act”. Despite this, Rugby expected Ireland to be represented at the Conference.51 The government in Dublin took a similar view, deciding that “subject to Ireland’s position in relation to the British Commonwealth being made clear, a representative of Ireland should attend for the purpose of taking part in the discussion of certain items”.52 But after Costello’s Canadian announcement, the British had other ideas. Commonwealth Secretary Philip Noel-Baker told the Irish High Commissioner in London that the meeting was “exclusively one of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, and I don’t see how in these circumstances we could possibly have issued an invitation to your Prime Minister”.53
The third factor pushing the Government towards making a decision was the continuing pressure in the Dáil on the External Relations Act. Following a “pretty stormy debate” on the estimates for the Department of the Taoiseach, Bill Norton suggested that he could take the Adjournment Debate before the Dáil rose for the summer to give the Taoiseach a break. Costello was more than happy to agree. However, “before anybody knew what had happened, the whole thing, the Republic and the External Relations Act and whether we were in or out of the Commonwealth was being debated all round the place”.54
Norton told the Dáil that “it would do our national self-respect good both at home and abroad if we were to proceed without delay to abolish the External Relations Act”. De Valera responded, “You will get no opposition from us.”55 According to Costello’s later account, these exchanges led him to raise the matter with his Government colleagues. “My clear view was that a decision to repeal it should be taken by the government before they might appear to be forced to do so by, for example, the introduction of a private member’s Bill in the Dáil to repeal the Act. I had myself arrived firmly at the conviction that it was nationally desirable that the Act should be repealed.”56
The Government viewed Captain Peadar Cowan as the most likely source of a private member’s bill to repeal the Act. They would no doubt have been surprised to learn that de Valera, the architect of the Act, was presented with a draft Bill to repeal it on the day after the Adjournment Debate. The draft Bill was sent by his former Attorney General, Cearbhall Ó Dálaigh, who said it was more complete than the one he had prepared some time before (i.e. at the end of 1947—see above), and there might be a need for it “if what you say comes to pass”.57 It is not clear if the initiative came from the former Taoiseach or the former Attorney General. What is clear is that if de Valera had introduced this Bill in the Dáil in the autumn, it would have been politically devastating for the Government, seizing the initiative from Costello and his colleagues and possibly provoking a split with Clann na Poblachta.
In any case, according to Costello’s account, he felt it was better for the Government to act before it was forced to, and “an express decision was taken by the government that the External Relations Act should be repealed and the necessary legislation introduced immediately the Dáil reassembled”.58 The only problem with this account is that there is absolutely no evidence in the Government archives to back it up. We saw in the previous chapter that civil servants were excluded from Cabinet meetings at this time, so it is perhaps bel
ievable that a decision would not have been recorded; but as Noël Browne pointed out, it was usual before a decision was taken to prepare a memorandum and circulate it to all other Departments for consideration and observations. This clearly didn’t happen in this instance, which left Costello open to the accusation that his announcement in Canada that the Government was to repeal the Act was taken on a whim and without proper authorisation.
Eithne MacDermott, author of a history of Clann na Poblachta, counted five sources where Costello admitted he wasn’t sure if the decision was properly minuted. These were Brian Farrell’s Chairman or Chief, Ireland Since the Famine by F.S.L. Lyons, an interview with Vincent Browne in The Citizen, the John A. Costello Remembers series in the Irish Times, and Costello’s own memorandum on the repeal of the External Relations Act. To this might be added his “Seven Days” interview with David Thornley. She concludes that “such guilty hints imply that Costello seems to have known perfectly well that this decision was never actually committed to writing”.59 The number of repetitions may appear significant, but probably isn’t—he used his own memorandum as a brief for all of the other interviews, and like the good barrister he was, he stuck to his brief doggedly. Rather than five separate sources, there was one source repeated several times. It may also be significant that in 1959, responding to Fianna Fáil taunts in the Dáil, Costello said that if they looked up the Government records, they “will find there that the decision of the Government to repeal the External Relations Act was taken in August, before I left for Canada at all”.60