The Reluctant Taoiseach

by David McCullagh

  The outrage continued at a large public meeting in O’Connell Street on the evening of the following Friday, addressed by all the party leaders. Laithwaite complained that Costello’s speeches “were intemperate in tone and designed to work up feeling through the country … His petulance, his refusal to see the arguments for the other side, his readiness to appeal to prejudice, his disposition to labour a weak point, his anxiety to play on the feelings of his audience, are all, it is said, part of his normal Court manner.”181 One of those in the crowd, the young Fine Gael activist Richie Ryan, was equally biased, if in the other direction. He thought the speech demonstrated Costello’s ability as an orator. He remembered that it “evoked repeated enthusiastic applause but de Valera’s whining voice bored the crowd”.182

  So why was Costello so put out? George Garrett observed that the Taoiseach had claimed repeal of the External Relations Act would improve relations with Britain, and had also predicted a solution to partition. Now he and his colleagues found the “carpet … pulled out from under them”.183 David Johnson asked him privately why the terms of the Ireland Bill had caused such a commotion, when Attlee’s verbal commitment in the House of Commons in October had not. “He treated in an airy manner a declaration of policy by a Prime Minister. He was of course right in saying that a declaration of policy by a Minister is more easily changed than a declaration enshrined in a statute.” But there were other factors at play—Johnson pointed to Costello’s “sense of betrayal” at the British failure to inform him in advance.184 The irony, given his own behaviour over the External Relations Act, is breathtaking.

  Johnson believed another reason for the intemperate language used by Costello and others was the fear that a more restrained approach would leave an opening for those who believed in the use of force. Johnson perceptively observed that this vigorous leadership could “boomerang” after the Taoiseach told him there was a real danger of violence. “What are their followers to say and think if all the brave words used over the last two or three weeks produce nothing tangible?”185 This, of course, was exactly what happened. “Combined with the heady rhetoric of 1948–49, what the Ireland Act … did was convince a number of young men that the only way to make progress against British arrogance and unionist intransigence was through violence.”186

  Far from taking the gun out of Irish politics, Costello’s actions had arguably helped plant the seeds for the Border Campaign of the 1950s. In claiming that the declaration of the Republic would reduce violence, Costello was demonstrating the formative experience of the Civil War. Having lived through that conflict, which was mainly caused by the dispute over constitutional status rather than partition, it was natural for people of his generation to view the demand for “the Republic” as the cause of IRA violence. Now that he had helped close that question, it brought into sharp focus the remaining, and more intractable, issue of the Border.

  In October 1949, at a function in Áras an Uachtaráin, Costello spoke to the British Ambassador about the tensions that had arisen over the Ireland Act. Referring to the “very close and friendly relations that had been maintained at a personal level”, he said his government had no choice but to take the line they had. Had they done otherwise, “there would have been acute internal difficulties”. The situation had now eased, he said, and things were quieter. Ambassador Laithwaite added, however, that “despite this somewhat surprising statement, there was nothing in the remainder of our conversation to suggest the slightest weakening on the part of the Taoiseach on the partition issue”.187

  Costello’s approach to the other main foreign policy challenge in his first administration—the formation of NATO—was also heavily influenced by partition. Just two months after the formation of the Government, heavy hints were received from the Canadians that Ireland would soon be asked what her attitude would be to a regional defence agreement.188 The anticommunism of the Government was not in doubt; but even at this stage Washington anticipated that Dublin might try to link the question of partition to that of defence. The overriding strategic importance of bases in Northern Ireland meant that there was no prospect of American encouragement for a united Ireland. In May, John Hickerson of the State Department wrote to George Garrett in Dublin contrasting British help during the war with Irish neutrality. “We do not propose at this point to take up the battle for Ireland against a valuable friend and partner. Furthermore, if the Dublin Government were to gain control of Northern Ireland, facilities in that area might be denied us in the future.”189

  A CIA assessment in April 1949 noted that denial of Ireland to an enemy was “an inescapable principle of United States security”, because of the danger it could pose to the UK. As an ally, Ireland would be a “positive asset” as a potential site for naval and air bases. Neutrality “would probably be tolerable” because of the availability of bases in Northern Ireland, but the CIA believed Dublin was unlikely to remain neutral “in spite of military weakness and the Partition issue”. And it added that the end of partition would only be conceivable if Ireland joined NATO190—turning Costello and MacBride’s strategy on its head. The significance of Ireland in Washington’s eyes is indicated by a 1950 list of outstanding serious and lesser problems between the United States and Britain—which doesn’t contain a single mention of Ireland.191 MacBride’s strategy—backed by Costello—of seeking concessions on partition in return for joining NATO was thus dead in the water before it had even been tried.

  In December 1948, Garrett was advised by Hickerson that it had been agreed at the Washington Security Talks (involving Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Britain and the US) to invite a number of countries to join the proposed Atlantic Pact if they were willing—Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Ireland and Portugal.192 On 7 January, an aide-memoire from the United States government asked what Ireland’s view would be of an invitation to join the pact. Washington assured the British that they would treat any mention of partition as an indication that “the Irish were not seriously interested in the Pact and that they would not be consulted further about it”.193

  Freddie Boland, Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, told Neil Pritchard of the Commonwealth Relations Office that he was doing his best to keep as many doors open as possible. The Government were bound by many statements ruling out commitments as long as partition existed, but he would “try to get the Éire Government round the table with the other participants. It would in any case be some time before any Éire Government could enter into a Defence Pact entirely without reservation, but participation in the discussions would be a long step in the right direction.” While Ireland would not take on commitments that would automatically involve her in hostilities, Boland suggested she might take on lesser commitments. Rugby observed that even if this did not happen, “we need shed no tears. If and when the Soviet menace becomes immediate, this country will not be able to stand out.”194

  The Irish reply, agreed by Cabinet on 8 February, was more definite than Boland had hoped. While Ireland agreed with the general aim of the proposed treaty, “any military alliance with, or commitment involving military action jointly with, the State that is responsible for the unnatural division of Ireland … would be entirely repugnant and unacceptable to the Irish people”.195 As anticipated, this was taken by the Americans as “an impossible condition as the price for its signing the North Atlantic Treaty … all the signatory powers are agreed that the issue of partition was irrelevant to the organisation and the intention of the Pact”.196

  Professional Irish diplomats disapproved of the Government’s approach. Michael MacWhite privately advised Costello that a mistake had been made. “Had we adhered to the Pact we would be in a position to achieve far more … Outside, nobody will listen to our pleas for the ending of Partition.”197 Boland thought MacBride’s attempt to secure progress on the Border through NATO was “rubbish”, and later received reports that Ireland’s friends in Congress believed the Irish were making fools of themselves. He fell out
with his minister after MacBride implied he had been keeping Dillon informed about opinion in Washington. MacBride backed off when Boland vehemently denied this,198 but their relationship was clearly coming to the end of the road, and shortly afterwards he was transferred to the London Embassy.

  The Government, then, clung to formal neutrality. But this didn’t prevent some secret defence co-operation with the British and Americans, just as had happened during the Second World War. At the end of 1948, the US Legation reported to Washington that a British-sponsored survey of beaches between Dundalk and Dublin was to be carried out, to assess their suitability for landing craft. The survey had been arranged by Sir Reginald Denning, the British GOC in the North, and Liam Archer, the Irish Army Chief of Staff, and cleared with the Minister for Defence, T.F. O’Higgins. In order to avoid “embarrassing questions”, the project was to “be given the largest measure Irish front possible”, with the British to be described as acting in an advisory capacity.199

  There were limited talks with the British about actions in the event of hostilities, under the rather unhelpful title of “War Book matters”. MacBride was concerned about any leak of the talks, which he said would be “very embarrassing”. Boland told the British that the Cabinet was divided on the issue. But he said the British “should be wrong to think that Mr MacBride was the strongest advocate of neutrality. The strongest advocate of neutrality was, in fact, Mr Norton.” Boland added that he had no doubt that if war broke out, Costello, O’Higgins, Dillon and McGilligan would be in favour of implementing whatever understandings were reached with the British.200 Denning and Archer appear to have had reasonably regular meetings to discuss defence—in May 1951 the British general said he had read the Dáil debates on defence and had not been impressed. He said he “failed to understand why we were not making a stronger effort to strengthen our defences” and asked about the extent of communist influence and the dangers of sabotage. Archer replied that communist influence was negligible and that “no fifth column could be said to exist”.201

  But despite such secret moves, Ireland remained to all intents and purposes isolated. A State Department policy statement on Ireland in August 1950 said it was “desirable that Ireland should be integrated into the defense planning of the North Atlantic area … but this cannot be done upon the terms at present advanced by the Irish Government … The Irish Government should concentrate its attention upon better Anglo-Irish relations and should not be allowed to believe that it can play off the United States against Great Britain.”202

  Chafing at this situation, Dillon wrote to Costello in January 1951, strongly urging the signing of a bilateral defence pact with the Americans. He accepted that the policy of not joining NATO while partition lasted was “politically inescapable”, but suggested that since Spain had managed to join the pact, Ireland’s isolation “is more marked and more incongruous in a world situation of Communism versus the Rest”. He suggested that the Americans would welcome having an alternative to Britain as their “Atlantic Pearl Harbour”.203 There was a major problem with this approach—the Americans had never shown the slightest interest in a bilateral defence arrangement with Ireland, despite suggestions by Garrett. In fact, in March 1951, MacBride suggested such an approach directly to Truman, who gave a non-committal answer. MacBride’s meeting with the President was something of a waste of time. He stressed that Ireland wished to join NATO, but “could not do so because of political difficulties which he was sure the President knew about”. Truman brushed the issue aside, saying that while the NATO nations hoped Ireland would join, “outsiders intervening in family issues always suffered and the issue was rarely settled”.204

  Costello appeared to adopt the same line on military alliances, and on partition. Towards the end of 1950, Laithwaite complained that while the Taoiseach was “personally very friendly and approachable, he appears to feel bound from time to time to make speeches … on the Partition issue, which are uncalled for and unhelpful”.205 Questioned about the Government’s policy by an American diplomat, he “‘blew his top’ … and gave … a long lecture, the effect of which was that the policy of the Irish Republic was neutrality and nothing but neutrality”.206

  But there were limits to how belligerent he was prepared to be on the issue. On the same trip to Washington as his unproductive visit to the White House, MacBride compared what Britain was doing in Northern Ireland to what the Soviets were doing in eastern Europe. Liam Cosgrave made a speech criticising these “extravagant statements”; MacBride sent a message to Costello saying the effect of Cosgrave’s speech was “unfortunate” in the United States, and asking the Taoiseach to correct the “false impression” it had created.207 But Costello did nothing, suggesting rather strongly that he agreed with Cosgrave on the matter. In fact, he intimated to Cosgrave that he planned to appoint him rather than MacBride to External Affairs if returned to government (as he did in 1954). According to Cosgrave, “he accepted that the views given by me were realistic”.208

  If Costello had come to see that the “sore thumb” policy of dragging partition into every international arena was counterproductive, he was still stuck with the consequences. As was Ireland. Staying out of NATO may have been a good thing—it certainly was as far as advocates of strict military neutrality were concerned. But it was not the result that Costello and his government aimed for. Their goal had been to use NATO membership as a bargaining chip to secure progress on partition, and by that yardstick the policy was a failure.

  As for the more dramatic decision to repeal the External Relations Act and confirm that Ireland was no longer a member of the Commonwealth, the aim here had been to “take the gun out of Irish politics”, as well as to clear up ambiguities and develop a better relationship with Britain. It certainly didn’t remove violence from politics in Ireland, at least not in the long term. But Costello’s move did clarify Ireland’s status, and arguably helped in the development of a more mature relationship of equals between Dublin and London.

  But the manner of his Canadian announcement, and his repeated complaints about the “slights” he had received before making it, left Costello on the defensive for years afterwards. He was accused of “declaring the Republic” in a fit of temper, without Cabinet authorisation. As we have seen, this is not fair—it was clear that a decision, at least in principle, had been taken to repeal the External Relations Act, and the British and other governments were aware of this. However, Costello did not handle the controversy well.

  In the late 1960s he drew up a memorandum on the subject, which he sent to various people including Archbishop McQuaid and John Hearne, as well as journalists and academics researching the subject. He insisted the memorandum was “in no sense intended as a justification of, or apologia for, the action of the First Inter-party Government, or my own part” in repealing the Act. To justify, or to apologise, would have implied that he had done something wrong. In his own eyes, it all came down to his belief that at his press conference, “there was nothing in honesty and decency open to me but to admit the truth”.209 This approach to international diplomacy is not one that has caught on.

  Chapter 9

  A VERY HAPPY SUCCESS FOR THE CHURCH

  “Dr Browne has had the start of a whole day to make his allegations, and no matter what I do I shall never catch up with him to the end of my public life.”1

  JOHN A. COSTELLO, APRIL 1951

  “That the clash should have come in this particular form and under this Government, with Mr Costello at its head, is a very happy success for the Church.”2

  JOHN CHARLES McQUAID, APRIL 1951

  If the removal of Queen Victoria from her perch outside Leinster House was an early indication of the controversy that would surround the repeal of the External Relations Act, the new Cabinet took an equally symbolic step at its first meeting which presaged the other great controversy that would affect its reputation—the Mother and Child crisis.

  This was to agree a message from Costello to Pope Piu
s XII. The Taoiseach told the Pontiff that he and his colleagues “desire to repose at the feet of Your Holiness the assurance of our filial loyalty and devotion as well as our firm resolve to be guided in all our work by the teachings of Christ and to strive for the attainment of a social order in Ireland based on Christian principles”.3 Costello told his friend Michael MacWhite, the Ambassador to Rome, that he received “a wonderful letter from the Pope signed by his own hand” in reply, adding that “it was worth while for that alone becoming Taoiseach”. He said he had “an intense desire to go to Rome” while in office, “particularly to see the Pope”.4 This did not look like a government likely to cause problems for the Church.

  During the Mother and Child Crisis, Cardinal D’Alton commented that, in contrast to the “unreliable” Browne, the bishops could be thankful “that the Taoiseach is so sound on the matter”.5 Historian Ronan Fanning has written that “it is almost impossible to exaggerate the near-feudal deference of Costello and his Ministers to the Hierarchy in general and to the Archbishop of Dublin in particular”.6 But it is important to recognise that John A. Costello’s deference wasn’t the result of expediency, lack of courage or absence of principle. He sincerely believed that deference and obedience were not only right, but required.

  Even 20 years later, in his “Seven Days” television interview with David Thornley, Costello became extremely exercised on being challenged about his acceptance of the ruling of the bishops. “We believed … that you must have in politics and in statesmanship and in legislation and in the conduct of all affairs of the State the principles of Christianity put into operation and … we were told by an authoritative body in the Catholic Church that a measure if brought into operation would be contrary to morals and the teaching of the Church … I would do the same again, and any other Government would have to do it.”7