The Reluctant Taoiseach

by David McCullagh

  MacBride also maintained his interest in foreign affairs, urging Costello in October 1956 to send food and medical supplies to help the people of Hungary “in their heroic struggle for national liberty and religious and political freedom”. He (immodestly) added that he would “willingly place myself at the Government’s disposal” if his services could be of use. After all, he “personally knew” Austrian Foreign Minister Dr Figl and the Hungarian exile leaders.72 The following month he wrote to Liam Cosgrave, in New York for the UN General Assembly, advising him that he had been asked by the Greeks to travel to New York to advise them on Cyprus. He told his successor that he had asked US Ambassador Bill Taft to find out what the State Department’s view was, and suggested rather imperiously that Cosgrave or Freddie Boland “may have an opportunity of putting out some feelers about it too”.73 Cosgrave mordantly observed to Costello that MacBride’s ideas on Cyprus “are quite impracticable and unlikely to appeal to anyone, even Greece … I need hardly say that his presence here would be no assistance … but, if he has decided to come, I suppose there is little we can do about it.”74

  Shortly afterwards, the Government would be wishing MacBride had remained distracted by foreign affairs. In fairness, MacBride must have felt at least a twinge of jealousy at the role being played on the world stage by Cosgrave. This role was made possible by Ireland’s admission, after a 10-year wait, to the United Nations, and will be examined in the next chapter. Like O’Higgins, Cosgrave was one of the successes of this Cabinet, another astute appointment of a young man to an important portfolio.

  The Republic’s admission to the United Nations was viewed with some apprehension north of the Border. In Belfast, Prime Minister Lord Brookeborough felt it was inevitable that the Irish delegation would attempt to raise partition. In that event, the Northern Cabinet felt that the British delegation should include a representative of Northern Ireland to counteract such propaganda.75 This view was understandable given the record of MacBride in Costello’s first government. But Costello, like Cosgrave, was determined not to try to repeat the “sore thumb” policy of MacBride.

  Shortly after the election, the new Taoiseach discussed the North with Vincent MacDowell, who had unsuccessfully contested Dublin South-East for Labour. MacDowell knew what he was talking about. A former IRA activist, he was interned in Belfast Jail during the Second World War, but had since adopted a more peaceful approach—he was later to be a founder member of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (and later still a Green Party councillor in Dun Laoghaire).76 His advice to Costello was simple: do as little as possible. “If the Irish Government plays a waiting game of caution and inactivity, it will be speeding the process of change in the North … openly encourage the maximum amount of economic co-operation and public friendship. At all times strive publicly to reduce the tension and promote goodwill between the Unionists and ourselves, and lower the intensity of feeling on all sides. Avoid flamboyant gestures and inflammatory speeches like the plague. On an unofficial level, they merely irritate, on an official level they provide the badly-needed rallying point for disintegrating Unionist sentiment …” MacDowell pointedly referred to the Chapel Gate election of 1949 as an example of counterproductive campaigning.77

  But other elements had different ideas. Just 10 days after the new government took office, the IRA carried out a daylight arms raid on Gough Barracks in Armagh. Fifteen men, some of them in British Army uniform, got away with nearly 300 rifles and automatic weapons without firing a shot.78 The drift towards violence in the North was accelerated by the actions of Liam Kelly, who, after being expelled from the IRA, founded a breakaway Republican paramilitary group, Saor Uladh, with a political wing, Fianna Uladh. In 1953 he was elected to Stormont for Mid-Tyrone, but his victory speech was judged to be seditious and he was sentenced to six months in prison. However, Seán MacBride had plans for Kelly, and in the summer of 1954, he and the other Clann na Poblachta Oireachtas members nominated him for the Seanad. His address on the ballot paper was given as Crumlin Road Jail. Perhaps as a consequence, he was elected on the first count on the Labour Panel.79

  The publicity attracted by Kelly—and in particular his election to the Seanad—caused disquiet among mainstream Nationalists in the North. Shortly after his election, Cahir Healy wrote to Costello, advancing the old appeal for admission of Northern representatives to the Dáil. In addition to the usual arguments, he now had a new one: if constitutional nationalists were excluded, while Kelly was a senator, “it may well be assumed in the North that the physical force policy is the only one which meets with approval down here”.80

  In advance of Kelly’s expected release from prison in August, Costello was invited by Fianna Uladh to attend the welcome home celebrations in Pomeroy. The Taoiseach politely declined, but expressed his “pleasure that Mr Kelly will shortly regain his freedom and that he will be available to take his place as a member of Seanad Éireann … after the summer recess”.81 The homecoming, addressed by MacBride, degenerated into a riot when the RUC tried to seize Tricolours under the recently introduced Flags and Emblems Act.82 40 people, including nine policemen, were injured.83

  IRA arms raids continued. In October, five soldiers were shot during a raid on a depot in Omagh, leading to what was described as “the most intensive man-hunt ever undertaken in Northern Ireland”.84 The Gardaí reported that this was an official IRA action (as opposed to Liam Kelly’s escapades), with a strong input from the Dublin battalion. The report added that the Dublin IRA had in recent times concentrated on training in “commando” tactics—“it now seems obvious why this kind of training was so dominant”.85 In response, Costello convened a meeting with the Garda Commissioner and the Secretaries of the Departments of Justice and Defence, along with the Tánaiste and the Ministers for Justice and Defence.86

  Costello explained his Northern policy to the Dáil later that month, during a debate on a motion put down by Jack McQuillan calling for the admission of Northern representatives. The result was never in question, as Fianna Fáil joined Fine Gael in opposing the motion. However, Clann na Poblachta and Labour (including Norton and the other ministers) voted in favour. Costello didn’t seem too bothered by the lack of Inter-party unity. Although Fine Gael didn’t allow a free vote, he acknowledged that others might take a different line. “On this matter, I have said that each individual is free to do as he liked.” More important, he said, was his statement of Government policy on partition and the use of force. In this, he passionately defended the elected government’s Constitutional monopoly of force, and argued that coercion of Unionists would not only be wrong, it would be counterproductive. “Let us have a united nation, but let it be a union of free men and not a united nation in which a fifth of the population have been cowed by force or fear and feel themselves enslaved … There are some people who are prepared to die for Ireland; I want to appeal to the youth of Ireland to live and work for Ireland. That is the best contribution they can give to the solution of Partition.”87

  The next day’s Irish Times, which deplored Norton’s vote, strongly praised Costello’s “statesmanlike” speech: “both his own and his party’s prestige has been enhanced as a consequence”88—although it should be remembered that Costello had said similar things before. The Irish Times may have been impressed; the Army Council of the IRA was not. In a statement issued in November, it attacked both Costello and Kelly without naming either. No Republican, it insisted, could give allegiance to either of the states established by the British; by implication, becoming a member of the Seanad was a betrayal. The IRA also dismissed the declaration of a republic. It had done “nothing more than make confusion more confounded, and the glib use of such terms as ‘freedom in this part of Ireland’ has served only to lull the youth of the country into a false sense of national well-being”. By using one of Costello’s favourite phrases, the Army Council made it clear who it was talking about. The statement then went on to promise a “carefully planned and progressive policy of
opposition to the British occupation forces in the Six Counties”, adding that the campaign would be conducted “with charity towards all, with malice towards none”89 (except, presumably, Britain).

  The British Ambassador praised Costello’s “important and forthright attack upon the use of violence by unconstitutional bodies”, but said Labour’s attitude “must be regarded with concern”, even thought the motion in question did not deal directly with the IRA.90 A very different picture was being presented to the Commonwealth Office by Freddie Boland, the Irish Ambassador to London. He told Sir Percival Liesching, Permanent Under Secretary, that while the Labour ministers “had been rather half-hearted in the discussions of anti-IRA policy … the issue had been thrashed out most firmly by the Prime Minister [sic] and others”. He added that the most important part of Costello’s speech had been approved by Cabinet and “was therefore a definite declaration of considered Government policy”. Boland then went on to assert that the Government “meant business” and was determined “to take extremely strong action against the IRA”. Speaking in confidence, he told Liesching that the Gardaí were preparing for a “swoop” designed to forcibly suppress the organisation. “Mr Boland said that when the time came there could be no half-measures. Ordinary judicial processes would have to be suspended and military courts set up and wired camps installed for the detention of several hundreds who would be arrested.” In these circumstances, he argued, it would be counterproductive for Dublin to receive demands from London to take action against the IRA.91

  The British then waited—in vain—for the promised action against the IRA. In mid-December, Boland was summoned back to the CRO to explain. Liesching pointed out that he had been led to believe that action would be taken within weeks, but was obliged to admit that the Irish Ambassador had never actually committed himself to a timescale. Pressed further, Boland indicated that the Government was worried that public opinion would not support drastic action, that there was still some Labour sympathy towards the IRA, and that in any case there had been no further violence since Costello’s Dáil statement. Liesching recorded two impressions—that the Irish Government was anxious to avoid taking extreme measures, and that Boland himself “would prefer to see the more drastic course taken”.92

  In January, Commonwealth Secretary Lord Swinton told his Cabinet colleagues that the Dublin Government “were evidently apprehensive that there would not be a sufficient body of public support in the Republic for drastic action to suppress the IRA”. He raised the apparent change of heart with Boland some days later. The Ambassador “deprecated the notion that his Government had got cold feet or had failed to carry their Labour colleagues with them … the Government had felt they were taking a more statesmanlike course”. Swinton, however, was not convinced. “I have little doubt myself that the Government did get cold feet, that they had trouble inside their Cabinet, and that they felt they were not strong enough to carry out their original intention.”93

  In public, meanwhile, Costello was reiterating his more conciliatory policy towards the North. In an important interview with the Yorkshire Post in January, he expressed his willingness to meet Brookeborough “at any time to discuss matters of common interest”, hoping that such discussions would engender goodwill, preparing the ground for “the ultimate eradication of the root of all evil—Partition”.94 In Brookeborough’s absence his deputy, Brian Maginess, said his government had no objection to discussing matters of common concern—so long as Éire was prepared to accept that partition was “a matter which has been finally determined”.95

  Costello, of course, was not prepared to accept any such thing. In a reply to Maginess, he pointed out that there had been no precondition about accepting partition during discussions on the River Erne, the Great Northern Railway or the Foyle Fisheries. No Irish government could accept such a position, he said, adding for good measure that the only way that partition could be finally determined “will be by its ending”.96 On the surface, the spat strengthened divisions. But, as The Leader perceptively pointed out, Costello’s original statement implied that improved relations would have to precede discussion of partition. This, it suggested, was a welcome change “from policies which tended to stress the main point of disagreement rather than the many points of contact which exist between the divided parts of the whole country”. The magazine also pointed out that Maginess had annoyed the Orange Order (as Minister for Home Affairs he had banned a number of marches through Nationalist areas)—as an aspirant to party leadership he had “seized the opportunity presented by the Taoiseach to demonstrate his ‘Ulster’ patriotism”.97

  In the long run, this stand did Maginess no good—Brookeborough demoted him to Attorney General under pressure from right-wingers. But Costello’s approach arguably laid the groundwork for a friendlier relationship with Belfast. It also encouraged a more conciliatory attitude from Fianna Fáil. In his 1957 Ard Fheis speech, de Valera suggested the best way to solve the problem of partition was to have the closest possible relations with the people of the Six Counties, “and get them to combine with us in matters of common concern”.98 Lemass has—rightly—received much credit for his opening to the North, but he was building on foundations laid by his two predecessors. And, of course, the policy could not succeed until Brookeborough was replaced by Terence O’Neill.

  In April, a group of Six Counties nationalists asked for a meeting with the Taoiseach. Faced with a challenge from Sinn Féin, they were looking for financial support for the Westminster election to be held the following month. Costello told the Secretary to the Government, Maurice Moynihan, that financial support was already being given to the Anti-Partition of Ireland League in Britain, apparently out of the confidential Secret Service vote.99 Before meeting the nationalists, the Taoiseach suggested to MacBride, a trustee of the Mansion House Fund, that the balance in the Fund could be used to help nationalist candidates. But the Clann leader refused, as his party and Kelly’s Fianna Uladh “could not oppose ‘the boys in jail’”.100 Deprived of this potentially useful source of funding, Costello set up a Cabinet committee of himself, Norton, Mulcahy, Everett and Cosgrave to keep the matter under review and take any necessary action.101

  MacBride had managed to scupper the attempt to support non-violent methods in the North—an ominous portent for future Government policy. The American Embassy referred to MacBride’s “affinity for the IRA and his apparent ability to obtain ‘protection’ for the IRA from the Irish Government”. This led the Embassy to believe “that MacBride’s present connection with the IRA may be much more active and direct than is generally believed”.102 This was undoubtedly an overstatement of MacBride’s involvement—the same could not be said of some other members of the Clann. And MacBride remained closely allied to Liam Kelly, the senator whose anti-partition activities were about to escalate.

  Over the summer of 1955, the IRA raided two Army barracks in Britain for arms; British Cabinet Secretary Sir Norman Brook drafted a note “in friendly terms” to Dublin seeking improved police co-operation, arguing that if they wanted Irish co-operation, the letter “must not be too stiff”. Prime Minister Anthony Eden, however, “toughened up” this draft. “I know that we have to take account of Irish feelings, but one day this message may be published, and there are British feelings to be considered too.”103 But the latest IRA activities were once again overshadowed by Liam Kelly’s activities.

  In November 1955, Kelly led members of his Saor Uladh organisation in an attack on Roslea RUC barracks in County Fermanagh. One of the attackers was killed in the raid; his body was brought back across the Border and buried after an inquest held in secret in the middle of the night.104 The Secretary of the Department of Justice said the “police on the spot … adopted an attitude of extreme reserve so that their investigation of the affair might not be hampered … [but] they seem to have carried caution too far …”105 At a by-election meeting in Limerick, Costello indignantly denied that the Government or senior Gardaí had ordered the in
quest to be held in secret. He also pointed out that those who wished to use violence to coerce Unionists into a united Ireland “are repeating the error the British made with us … What kind of unity would be established as the result of unlawful force causing civil war—even if successful?”106 But the bizarre nature of the inquest was only a detail; the real significance of Roslea, according to the Irish Times, was that gunmen believed the Republic was “a place of sanctuary for them … That attitude is based on the obvious unwillingness of the Government to adopt a strong and realistic policy in dealing with illegal organisations … words are not enough …”107

  But words were all the Government was prepared to offer. On 30 November Costello made a major statement in the Dáil on partition and the use of force. The lines of his speech were approved in advance by Cabinet.108 The roots of the violence, he insisted, lay in partition; those who created and sustained partition therefore bore the “primary responsibility” for the existence of violence. But, “in stating where the responsibility for the evil lies, I do not condone the evil itself”. For the use of force was evil, and would lead to civil war with Unionists. The men of violence were guilty of “unpatriotic conduct [which] dishonours the national institutions established with so much difficulty over so many years and challenges the Constitution freely enacted by the people”. If the men of violence did not respond to his appeal, he said, “then the duty of the Government is clear … We are bound to ensure that unlawful activities of a military character shall cease, and we are resolved to use, if necessary, all the powers and forces at our disposal to bring such activities effectively to an end.”109