The Spy in Moscow Station

by Eric Haseltine

  (C) AS VERY ROUGH ESTIMATE:

  (1) FRONT ELEMENT IS 4 FOOT LONG.

  (2) MIDDLE ELEMENT IS 5 FOOT LONG.

  (3) END ELEMENT IS 6 FOOT LONG.

  (4) ELEMENT SPACING IS 18 INCHES AND 24 INCHES READING FRONT TO BACK.

  12. WHEN CAN WE EXPECT ARRIVAL OF ANALYSIS GROUP? UNLESS SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED OTHERWISE WE WILL UNDERTAKE NO TASK THAT HAS THE SLIGHTEST CHANCE OF CHANGING ANTENNA POSITION OR ORIENTATION OR DAMAGING ELECTRONICS. ALL TECHNICIANS CONCUR THAT WE HAVE SEIZED A DEVICE IN CURRENT OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATION AND RECOMMEND AGAINST ANY MEASURES THAT WOULD ALTER THIS CONFIGURATION.

  MATLOCK

  Four hours later, Matlock got an answer about his earlier suggestion that a protest be lodged.

  WASHINGTON, MAY 27, 1978, 1951Z

  135977. SUBJECT: TECHNICAL PENETRATION PROTEST. REF: MOSCOW 11859.2

  1. THE SECRETARY [of State, Cyrus Vance] MAY 26 ORALLY PROTESTED PENETRATION TO GROMYKO, WHO SAID HE HAD NO INFORMATION BUT WOULD LOOK INTO THE MATTER. WE PLAN TO HOLD OFF ON A FORMAL PROTEST UNTIL YOU HAVE DEVELOPED INFORMATION ON THE SCALE OF THE PENETRATION.

  2. AMBASSADOR TOON CONCURS. [Ambassador Toon was in D.C. for talks then.]

  VANCE

  In the midst of this string of Moscow-D.C. cables, State Department officials met with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in D.C. to discuss the “technical penetration” (that is, the chimney antenna).3 Several passages have been deleted for brevity.

  MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

  Washington, May 29, 1978, 7 p.m.

  SUBJECT

  Intelligence Cases; Jailed Soviets and Embassy Penetration; U.S.-Soviet Relations

  PARTICIPANTS

  U.S.

  Dr. Marshall D. Shulman [special advisor to the secretary of state for Soviet affairs]

  Sherrod McCall, Acting Director, EUR/SOV [European Soviet Group at State]

  U.S.S.R.

  Minister-Counselor Alexander A. Bessmertnykh [senior Soviet diplomat]

  Secretary … then raised the matter of listening devices in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Firyubin3 in Moscow had given the Soviet part of the story and view of the matter, which was quite different from the U.S. assertion of the case.

  [Deleted] Gromyko had promised some information on U.S. acts of the same calibre against the Soviets here in Washington, New York and San Francisco, and Bessmertnykh was instructed to give some brief information on that subject. Reading from a Russian language nonpaper, which he did not hand over, Bessmertnykh said:

  Begin Quote. In the last several years there were found in Soviet installations in the U.S. more than 50 various special electronic devices which were used for listening to conversations held in buildings and over telephones.

  —1977: a special cable was discovered, and a special device, which was connected to the internal telephone system at the country residence of the Ambassador at Pioneer Point.

  —1975: in the building occupied by the Soviet Trade Mission in the U.S., on Connecticut Avenue, several radio transmitters were discovered, designed for listening to conversations in working offices, including the office of the Trade Representative himself. Earlier, several special pre-amplified microphones were found in the former trade office building at 1511 16th Street, N.W. (these were found when the Soviets were moving out of that building).

  —1973 and 1974: in the building of the Soviet Consulate General at San Francisco, there were found several radio transmitters, pre-amplified microphones and two cables used for listening to conversations in the offices and living quarters.

  We informed U.S. authorities and the U.S. side requested no publicity. This is the same way we have proceeded in cases of agents, acting at the specific request of the U.S. side in giving no publicity. End Quote.

  [Two paragraphs deleted]

  [Deleted] We were frankly astonished by the report we had of Firyubin’s remarks to Charge Matlock,5 and Shulman thought Bessmertnykh would be, too. Firyubin had said the Embassy’s actions violated health and fire codes affecting a neighboring Soviet building. This was not true. The chimney was wholly within the U.S. Embassy property and did not touch the Soviet building.

  Shulman showed a copy of a Soviet drawing of the Embassy floor plan and located the chimney for Bessmertnykh to see. Looking up from the drawing, Bessmertnykh grinned and said he understood that, indeed, some protective system had been located in the chimney by the Soviet side. Nothing directed at the Ambassador’s office—something—a protective device on the Soviet side. Gromyko had some more information on this; it was not at all a device to listen into the U.S. building, but maybe to follow what was going out from there.

  Shulman said we had to reject what Firyubin said as being ridiculous. We are taking the matter seriously and considering what to do. The tunnel, which runs for 20 and more feet on our property, was clearly a serious intrusion. We have not wanted to act hastily, and we wanted to have the facts before expressing ourselves. But we would have to express ourselves, and forcefully. We would do so at the proper time.

  Here in the time line of events, the cable traffic between Moscow and Washington resumes with instruction from Cyrus Vance to Matlock on how to proceed with the Soviets.

  WASHINGTON, MAY 31, 1978, 0010Z

  136975. SUBJECT: TECHNICAL PENETRATION: PROTEST. REF: MOSCOW 12011.2

  1. THE CHARGE [Matlock] SHOULD SEEK AN IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENT AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL IN MFA [Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs] AND DELIVER THE FOLLOWING NOTE. CHARGE IS AUTHORIZED IF NECESSARY TO CORRECT THE FACTS IF THEY DO NOT ACCURATELY STATE THE CASE LOCALLY.

  2. BEGIN TEXT. THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA INFORMS THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS THAT THE EMBASSY HAS UNCOVERED A SECRET LISTENING POST AND ELECTRONIC SPYING DEVICES WITHIN ITS CHANCERY BUILDING AND AN UNDERGROUND TUNNEL EXTENDING A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE THROUGH THE EMBASSY’S PROPERTY CONNECTING THIS INSTALLATION WITH A NEIGHBORING SOVIET APARTMENT BUILDING. FOLLOWING DISCOVERY OF THIS INSTALLATION, THE ELECTRONIC CABLES OPERATING THE POST WERE FOUND TO BE ENERGIZED. MOREOVER, SOVIET PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN OBSERVED TO ENTER AND OCCUPY THE TUNNEL FROM THE END CONNECTING TO THE SOVIET APARTMENT BUILDING. THUS THERE CAN BE ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT THAT THIS LISTENING POST HAS BEEN ACTIVELY OPERATED BY THE SOVIET SIDE.

  THE EMBASSY IS INSTRUCTED TO PROTEST THIS CRUDE INTRUSION INTO ITS CHANCERY. IT IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE AND RUNS COUNTER TO EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

  THE EMBASSY DEMANDS IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS THAT THE MINISTRY TAKE IMMEDIATE MEASURES TO PUT AN END TO SUCH INTRUSIONS INTO THE EMBASSY’S DIPLOMATIC PREMISES. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS ACTION REST FULLY WITH THE SOVIET SIDE.

  THE UNITED STATES RESERVES THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO THIS MATTER AND TO TAKE ACTIONS IT DEEMS NECESSARY WHEN IT HAS COMPLETED ITS INVESTIGATION. END TEXT.

  3. THE CHARGE MAY STATE ORALLY THAT THIS EVENT HAS AROUSED A STRONG NEGATIVE REACTION IN WASHINGTON WHERE SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES HAVE ALREADY BECOME A CAUSE OF INCREASING CONCERN. CHARGE SHOULD, IN DELIVERING THE NOTE, ALSO PRESENT PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE EAVESDROPPING EQUIPMENT AND RELATED INSTALLATION.

  4. CHARGE SHOULD STATE ORALLY THAT THE MINISTRY’S NOTE OF MAY 283 IS SO PATENTLY FALSE AND SO ABSURD AS TO BE INSULTING, AND THAT HE IS INSTRUCTED NOT TO REPLY BUT TO ORALLY REJECT IT OUT OF HAND. CHARGE MAY MAKE POINTS AND SHOW DOCUMENTS AS SUGGESTED IN REFTEL, BUT SHOULD AVOID LETTING POINT OF DEMARCHE APPEAR TO BE REPLY TO SOVIET NOTE. POINT SHOULD BE OUR PROTEST OF THEIR INTRUSION INTO AND SPYING ON OUR PROPERTY.

  5. AMBASSADOR TOON CONCURS.

  VANCE

  At this point in the back-and-forth, State in D.C. recorded an account of a meeting between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and his counterpart, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, discussing the chimney antenna.4 Passages have been deleted for brevity.

  MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

  New York, May 31, 1978, 2:40–5:20 p.m.

  SUBJECT


  Vance-Gromyko Private Meeting

  PARTICIPANTS

  U.S.

  Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance

  Mr. Wm. D. Krimer, Interpreter

  USSR

  Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko

  Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

  Penetration [via chimney antenna]

  … Gromyko wanted to inform the Secretary that his people had discovered more than 50 listening devices installed in various Soviet premises in Washington, San Francisco and New York. He would give the Secretary three packages of photographs, together with a list referenced to the photographs, containing a brief description of each. The information sheet was in Russian, but he was sure the Secretary would get it translated. Of course, his people had many more photographs of the same kind in their possession, and they might have made them public long ago if they had wanted to. However, proceeding from a broader approach to Soviet-American relations, they had refrained from doing so, especially since the U.S. side, too, had intimated that it would not like to see matters of this kind made public.

  In addition, Gromyko wanted to draw the Secretary’s attention to the fact that Soviet nationals working in the U.N. General Secretariat had been the targets of numerous approaches by agents of the U.S. side. By Soviet count, at least 200 U.S. citizens in the Secretariat had links to the special services of the United States. He repeated that the Soviet side had many such photographs at its disposal, some of which were quite interesting and “spicy.” They would make quite an exhibit, for which a large hall would be required. As for the two individuals they had discussed, much would depend on the turn of events that this case would take. He noted the Secretary’s statement to the effect that after the trial he would be in a position to see what could be done. The Soviet side would therefore wait and see, and then decide what response might be appropriate.

  The Secretary told Gromyko … there was serious concern over the recent case involving our Chancery in Moscow, a case the Secretary had brought to Gromyko’s attention.3 Our investigation of the circumstances there was continuing, and a matter of particular concern to us was the Soviet tunnel which crossed our property for 20 feet or more. This represented a gross intrusion upon the property of our Chancery, and we were continuing to look into that matter. As he had already indicated, he would be in touch with Gromyko about the two individuals after their trial.

  Gromyko said he would wait and see. As for the incident mentioned by the Secretary, he had already informed him that according to the information Gromyko had received, things appeared in quite a different light. Indeed, what the Secretary had described appeared to distort the facts of the matter. He would ask the Secretary to have someone on the U.S. side take an objective look at these things. After all, neither side was interested in distorting that kind of information. The purposes of the things to which the Secretary had referred were totally different—he would describe them as having a protective nature, among other things aimed at fire prevention. No spying of any kind had been involved there. It would have been primitive indeed in this day and age of electronic equipment to try to dig a tunnel for intelligence purposes. Modern technology simply made such things unnecessary. This was not the immediate post-war period of 1945/47 when the Soviets had discovered a western tunnel on the territory of East Berlin, which had been dug for intelligence purposes. Gromyko concluded this subject on the note of saying he would be in touch with the Secretary and would see what happened.

  Next in the time line of events was an urgent message from Matlock to his boss Toon, who was in the United States for high-level talks with Gromyko and Vance.

  MOSCOW, JUNE 21, 1978, 1423Z

  14313. CINCEUR [commander in chief U.S. European Command] FOR ECJ3 TO BE PASSED URGENTLY TO AMB TOON ONLY. URGENT EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR TOON SCHEDULED TO BE AT EURCOM FLIGHT OPERATIONS. SUBJECT: TECHNICAL PENETRATION—OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES. [Toon was at European Command headquarters.]

  1. AT APPROXIMATELY 1000 THIS MORNING, JACK-HAMMER TYPE NOISES WERE HEARD WHICH EMANATED FROM BEHIND THE WALLS AT THE BASE OF THE CHIMNEY SHAFT IN THE SOVIET CHANGE ROOM. IT WAS SUSPECTED THAT THE OPPOSITION [KGB] WAS ATTEMPTING TO BREAK INTO THE SHAFT FROM THE BASEMENT OF THE BUILDING WHICH ADJOINS THE EMBASSY’S SOUTH WING. CONSEQUENTLY, A PARTIAL DEMOLITION OF THE NORTH WALL OF THE SHAFT FROM WITHIN THE CHANGE ROOM WAS CONDUCTED IN AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE WHAT THE OPPOSITION WAS ATTEMPTING TO DO. NO TECHNICAL PENETRATION WAS DISCOVERED AS A RESULT OF THIS DEMO.

  2. BELOW THE FLOOR OF THE CHANGE ROOM ALONG THE WEST WALL WHICH ADJOINS THE SOVIET BUILDING, THERE IS LOCATED AN APPROXIMATE 12″ × 12″ LIGHT CONCRETE VENTILATION SHAFT WHICH RUNS IN A NORTH-SOUTH DIRECTION. WE BROKE INTO THIS SHAFT AND DISCOVERED A PENETRATION FROM THE BASEMENT OF THE APARTMENT BUILDING WHICH MEASURES APPROXIMATELY 18″ SQUARE. THIS PENETRATION IS NOT THE LOCATION FROM WHERE THE ORIGINAL JACK-HAMMER NOISES CAME FROM. ONCE THE OPPOSITION LEARNED THAT WE WERE AWARE OF THEIR ACTIVITIES ALL JACK-HAMMERING CEASED. [Two and a half lines not declassified.] WE ARE MAINTAINING SURVEILLANCE IN THE CHANGE ROOM.

  3. AT 1445 THE CHARGE [Matlock] AND COUNSELOR FOR ADMINISTRATION WERE CALLED INTO UPDK (THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE AGENCY). THE RESULTS OF THIS MEETING AND POST’S RECOMMENDATIONS ARE BEING TRANSMITTED BY SEPTEL.2

  MATLOCK

  Following this message, State in D.C. got back to Moscow with a status update, along with instructions from Vance to Matlock about what to tell the Soviet MFA.

  WASHINGTON, JUNE 21, 1978, 2344Z

  158602. SUBJECT: TECHNICAL PENETRATION PROTEST. REF: MOSCOW 14311, 14313.2

  1. SECRETARY [Cyrus Vance] RAISED LATEST CHIMNEY DEVELOPMENTS WITH DOBRYNIN [SOVIET ambassador to the United States] JUNE 21 (SEPTEL) [separate telecommunication].3 EMBASSY SHOULD SEEK IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENT AT APPROPRIATE HIGH LEVEL IN MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] AND STATE THAT EMBASSY IS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO PROTEST WHAT CAN ONLY BE VIEWED HERE AS A SERIOUS PROVOCATION AGAINST THE EMBASSY. IN ADDITION TO REITERATING THE FACTS ABOUT THE LOCATION OF THE CHIMNEY, EMBASSY SHOULD POINT OUT THE ABSURDITY OF ANY ATTEMPT TO ASSERT THAT THE CHIMNEY AND TUNNEL HAVE HAD IN RECENT TIMES A FUNCTION, HEATING, VENTILATION, OR WHATEVER, OTHER THAN AS A PENETRATION OF OUR EMBASSY.

  2. EMBASSY SHOULD SAY THAT THE U.S. IS TOTALLY UNABLE TO COMPREHEND WHAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAS IN MIND AND HOPES TO ACCOMPLISH. BUT IF THIS PROVOCATION CONTINUES IT CAN ONLY ADD FURTHER STRAIN TO RELATIONS. THE U.S. HAS NO DESIRE TO SEE THIS HAPPEN. BUT IF THE PROVOCATION CONTINUES, AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT ON THE SOVIET SIDE ARE NOT RESTRAINED, THEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES SHALL REST FULLY WITH THE SOVIET SIDE.

  VANCE

  Matlock did as instructed and reported back the result.

  MOSCOW, JUNE 22, 1978, 1544Z

  14472. SUBJECT: TECHNICAL PENETRATION PROTEST. REF: STATE 158602.2

  1. CHARGE [Matlock] DELIVERED PROTEST, AS OUTLINED IN REFTEL, TO FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO AFTERNOON OF JUNE 22. IN ADDITION TO MAKING POINTS SUGGESTED IN REFTEL, CHARGE REFERRED TO HIS JUNE 21 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR KUZNETSOV3 ON SAME SUBJECT, AND ALSO SHOWED KORNIYENKO OFFICIAL COPY OF SOVIET GROUND PLAN OF EMBASSY BUILDING WHICH CLEARLY INCLUDED CHIMNEY AS PART OF EMBASSY PROPERTY.

  2. KORNIYENKO RESPONDED ALONG FAMILIAR LINES, “MOST DECISIVELY” REJECTING ASSERTION THAT USSR WAS INVOLVED IN ANY SORT OF PROVOCATION AGAINST EMBASSY, AND ARGUING THAT CHIMNEY HAD NO CONNECTION TO EMBASSY AND INDEED WAS AN “ESSENTIAL PART” OF THE HEATING SYSTEM OF THE NEIGHBORING BUILDING. THE OCCUPANTS OF THAT BUILDING DEMAND RESTORATION OF DAMAGE CAUSED BY EMBASSY, AND IF EMBASSY DOES NOT COMPLY THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE THEMSELVES. PERHAPS THE HEATING SYSTEM HAD NOT BEEN USED FOR A WHILE, BUT THE CHIMNEY HAD TO BE USEABLE IN CASE THE FURNACE WERE FIRED UP.

  3. CHARGE SAID HE COULD ONLY REITERATE THE EMBASSY’S PROTEST, STRESS THAT THE FACTS WERE CLEAR AND OUR POSITION WAS FIRM, AND EXPRESS HIS HOPE THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE NOTE OF U.S. POSITION AND AVOID FURTHER EXACERBATION OF SITUATION.

  4. AS REPORTED SEPTEL, THERE
HAS BEEN NO DISCERNIBLE SOVIET ACTIVITY AROUND CHIMNEY TODAY.

  MATLOCK

  During internal State Department discussions, LeChevet grew increasingly concerned that the KGB might remove the chimney antenna and associated electronics before he and Carl could get their hands on them.

  So as soon as a formal protest to Gromyko had been filed, and the Soviet counterprotest had been rejected, LeChevet got the green light from Ambassador Toon (who had recently returned from Moscow) to reenter the shaft and recover the antenna. But with the Russians now on high alert, LeChevet and his team had to proceed carefully, despite the urgency.

  So the first thing LeChevet’s team did was observe the antenna through the access panel they had installed a few days earlier. The antenna had not been touched.

  After some discussion, LeChevet, Bainbridge, and Carl agreed that the heating coils must have failed, or when LeChevet cut the cables he had disconnected the heating coils. In any case, the Russians would be working furiously on an alternate way to recover their prize, or at least to prevent the Americans from getting their hands on it. Perhaps the Soviets might try to access the antenna from the apartment building west of the annex, where the chimney abutted the Soviet-controlled apartment on the fourth floor.

  That afternoon, while exploring the chimney, Bainbridge noticed something new on the far inner wall of the chimney that could be a sign of the KGB’s plan B to recover the antenna: down at the level of the fourth floor, where the west face of the chimney shaft merged with the east wall of the Soviet apartment building, three parallel water stains, each about two inches wide, streaked down the sides of the brick.

  LeChevet and Bainbridge could talk through the observation panel, so when Bainbridge informed him of the new features, LeChevet shouted, “Check out the bricks above the water stains, just below the antenna!”

  Running his hands along the brick wall, Bainbridge felt a change in the texture of the surface and pressed hard on the bricks immediately above the three water stains. The bricks felt spongy, rather than hard. Aiming a light at the bricks while he probed further, Bainbridge said, “I’ll be damned.”