From Gaza to Jerusalem

by Stuart Hadaway

  Notes

  * This consisted of the 2/4th Royal West Kents (‘The Dirty Half Hundreds’), the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars, and the 15th Heavy Battery Royal Garrison Artillery.

  * Welch/Welsh: Both the Royal Welsh Fusiliers and the Welsh Regiment traditionally spelled their titles ‘Welch’. However, at the time of the First World War, the official British Army policy was to use the spelling ‘Welsh’, and so it is used here. Both regiments had the spelling officially changed to ‘Welch’ in 1920, as a token of thanks from the king for their sterling service during the war.

  18 Murray to Robertson 10 December 1916. Murray called Palestine by the technically correct name of ‘southern Syria’. Reproduced in MacMunn & Falls Vol. 1 p. 259

  19 See correspondence in MacMunn & Falls Vol. 1 pp. 258–61

  20 MacMunn & Falls Vol. 1 pp. 272–3

  21 Dudley Ward 74th Yeomanry Division

  22 Conner p. 104

  23 MacMunn & Falls Vol. 1 p. 279

  24 Nogales Four Years p. 255

  25 MacMunn & Falls Vol. 1 pp. 276–7

  26 Bowyer pp. 84–8

  27 MacMunn & Falls Vol. 1 p. 287

  28 Sheffy British Military Intelligence pp. 208–14; Dawnay IWM 10403 Letter to wife, 8 March 1917

  29 Anglesey p. 93

  30 53rd Division Report

  31 MacMunn & Falls Vol. 1 p. 287

  32 MacMunn & Falls Vol. 1 p. 284

  33 Dudley Ward 53rd Division p. 77

  34 Dudley Ward 53rd Division pp. 77–9

  35 Desert Column Report, WO95/4471

  36 Desert Column Report, WO95/4471

  37 Dudley Ward 53rd Division, pp. 83–5

  38 Livingstone IWM 13560

  39 A reference to ‘The Battle of Lungtungpen’, in which British troops strip naked to cross a river and attack the enemy. ‘C’ QOWH p. 88

  40 Eastern Force Report

  41 MacMunn & Falls Vol. 1 pp. 295–6.

  42 War Diary of 1/5th RWF, quoted in Dudley RWF p. 126

  43 MacMunn & Falls Vol. 1 pp. 295–6

  44 Dudley Ward 53rd Division pp. 88–9

  45 Nogales Four Years pp. 246–7

  46 MacMunn & Falls Vol. 1 p. 321

  47 ‘C’ p. 89

  48 MacMunn & Falls Vol. 1 p. 278

  3

  FIRST BATTLE OF

  GAZA: DISASTER

  THE ORDER TO send some of his mounted troops into Gaza from the north and east took an hour to reach General Chauvel. Even then, making the proper adjustments in the line took time. Piquets and patrols needed to be called in and each squadron and regiment concentrated. Each unit then needed to remain in position until other troops arrived to take their place. Chauvel moved his headquarters, too, to be in a better location to supervise the movements of both divisions. It was not until 3.15 p.m. that Chauvel could gather his senior commanders to issue his orders, and so it was 4 p.m. before the attack began.49

  The 2nd ALH Brigade advanced from the north, from the coast down the Gaza–Jebaliye road; the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade advanced from that road across country into the north-east outskirts of the city; and the 22nd Mounted Brigade struck from the east, towards the ridge north of Clay Hill. The 3rd ALH Brigade, from the Imperial Mounted Division, was also given over to the attack, although it was late joining and would soon be called away.

  The cavalry advanced fast towards the northern and eastern outskirts of the city. The horses were taken as far as possible, and this additional speed helped take some of the Ottoman defenders by surprise, including a complete field ambulance unit taken captive by the Wellington Mounted Rifles.50 In most places the ride took them right up to the cactus hedges (often described as like the ‘prickly pear’ variety) that here, as in the south, marked the boundaries of the intricate clusters of private gardens and allotments that ran in a broad band around the outskirts. These hedges were thinly held by the Ottomans, who took full advantage of the cacti and the physical protection they provided, as well as the limits they placed on visibility. Trooper Ion Idriess of the Australian Light Horse described the fight for the hedgerows:

  The colonel threw up his hand – we reined up our horses with their noses rearing from the pear – we jumped off – all along the hedge from tiny holes were squirting rifle-puffs, in other places the pear was spitting at us as the Turks standing behind simply fired through the juicy leaves. The horse-holders grabbed the horses while each man slashed with his bayonet to cut a hole through those cactus walls. The colonel was firing with his revolver at the juice spots bursting through the leaves … Then came the fiercest individual excitement – man after man tore through the cactus to be met by the bayonets of the Turks … It was just berserk slaughter … The Turkish battalion simply melted away; it was all over in minutes.51

  On the left flank of Idriess’s unit, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade had a slightly clearer run, although they also faced the fire of two 77mm Krupps field guns. The Wellington Mounted Rifles stormed these, and Sergeant Clunie recorded that:

  We fixed bayonets and got to them and some of them stood up to it too, but they never had a hope. We were too good for them. We got the guns and some of our chaps turned them round, backed them up again. Port sighted them through the barrel onto a house where a lot of Turks had gone in and then they stuck a shell in and let go and by joves [sic] they created some dust. They tore the house down, and burst in another one and what Turks were not killed came out and surrendered. It was good sport. Then we got some more that were in a trench a few yards further on.52

  While the A&NZ Mounted Division were pressing further into Gaza, the Imperial Mounted Division was feeling the pressure of the Ottoman relief columns. While the changes in position were taking place, the Ottoman column from Jemmame attacked the weakened outposts on Hill 405, about 2.4km (1.5 miles) east of Beit Durdis, reaching the crest at around 5.15 p.m. This gave them a hole in the outer cordon that could be exploited to attack either south or north-west, hitting the other over-extended cavalry piquets in the flanks and rolling them up piecemeal. Thankfully, the Ottomans now paused, seemingly to bring up their artillery. This gave Hodgson the chance to frantically rearrange his defences. The 6th Mounted Brigade were called up, although they were watering their horses which created some delays. Brigadier General Royston brought his 3rd ALH Brigade back from the attack on Gaza to shore up the line to the north-west of Hill 405, while the Nottinghamshire and Berkshire Batteries, Royal Horse Artillery (RHA) also came up. Together, the two brigades and two batteries enfiladed the hill, and stopped any further advance, although the Berkshire Battery was itself badly mauled by Ottoman artillery.53 While two of his brigades were concentrated on stopping the enemy at Hill 405, contact with his third brigade, the 5th Mounted, to the south had been lost. The protective cordon around Gaza was now crumbling fast.

  At nightfall, about 6 p.m., the situation looked grim to Chetwode and Dobell. The infantry had a toe-hold in the south-east of the city, which seemed secure enough, although they would need to be reinforced and resupplied overnight. The flank of that position was a worry, though, as at present it hung in the air, with a gap of 3–5km (2–3 miles) between the right flank of 53rd Division and the left flank of 54th Division. Some rearrangement would be needed there. To begin that process, Dobell had already (at around 5.40 p.m.) ordered 54th Division to start pulling back from Sheikh Abbas to a line running roughly along the Burjabye Ridge.54 Their left flank would then lie about a mile north of Mansura, still leaving a gap between the divisions, but it was hoped the 53rd Division would be able to fill this.

  The major question was what to do with the cavalry. The Imperial Mounted Division, with a fighting strength of around 3,000 troopers, was facing known columns of enemy infantry and artillery numbering 10,000 or more men (not including the clear indications that the 53rd (OT) Infantry Division was also heading south) spread over a 24km front. Inside the city was the other cavalry division, also spread out over a large area and now facin
g the prospect of fighting at night in an urban environment. Both divisions were supported by only light artillery and relatively small numbers of machine guns – although a few armoured car companies provided valuable localised weight of fire – and had to be short on ammunition and water. Some water sources had been found and exploited, so that many (but not all) units had watered their horses, but this information was not made clear further up the chain of command. Instead, Dobell and Chetwode were under the impression that none of the horses had been watered since the day before. Understandably, and prudently, they decided not to risk two entire divisions of cavalry in such precarious circumstances, and at 6.10 p.m. Chetwode ordered Chauvel to gather his men and fall back to the Wadi Ghazze.55

  Chauvel, and his officers and men, were shocked by what they saw as being ordered to withdraw while on the brink of victory. However, Chauvel set about organising his forces. The Imperial Mounted Division was ordered to remain in place, concentrated at Beit Durdis, until the even more scattered A&NZ Mounted Division could be gathered and marched south. This took considerable time and effort, perhaps giving credence to the idea that they were dangerously scattered and strung out. The 7th ALH Regiment, who would have the furthest to ride anyway, being on the coast north of Gaza, had to retreat some 6.5km (4 miles) just to reach their horses.56 It was not until 2 a.m. on 27 March that the last Australian units passed Beit Durdis, and the withdrawal of the Imperial Mounted Division could begin. The retreat was unopposed, as the various Ottoman forces halted at dusk and dug in for the night, but just before dawn, at 5.30 a.m., the 3rd ALH Brigade was attacked as it crossed the Gaza–Beersheba road. The timely arrival of the 7th Light Car Patrol helped to push the Ottomans back, and covered the extraction of the brigade.57 By just after dawn, the last of the cavalry had reached the Wadi Ghazze, after some twenty-eight hours of hard marching and fighting.

  While the withdrawal of the cavalry went fairly smoothly, the reorganisation of the infantry was nothing short of a fiasco. At about 5.40 p.m., Dobell had ordered the 54th Division to pull back from its flanking position around Sheikh Abbas to a line along the Burjabye Ridge, about 3.2km (2 miles) closer to the 53rd Division.58 The left end of their line would now sit just north of Mansura, or about 1.5km south of the positions at Green Hill and Ali Muntar. The fighting around those hills was still going on, and the situation was, to use Dobell’s own word, ‘obscure’ as dusk fell.59 Only later did it become clear that these key positions had fallen. To help secure the new line, at around 7 p.m. Chetwode ordered Dallas to extend his right flank to meet the 54th Division’s left, closing a dangerous gap in the line. It was clearly his intention to keep the two infantry divisions in position overnight, ready to resume the offensive the following day. Unfortunately, in a continuation of the communications problems that had been plaguing the army all day, this plan would go horribly wrong.

  To begin with, no one had told Dallas, commanding 53rd Division, of the change in position of the 54th Division; although the message should have been copied to his headquarters it does not seem to have been. He assumed that the left flank of that unit was still around 6.5km (4 miles) away at Sheikh Abbas. To close such a large gap, he would have no choice but to pull south, abandoning all of the day’s hard-gained ground. He immediately protested the new orders and requested reinforcements to close the gap, but Chetwode remained adamant. Even during the course of what must have been a robust telephone conversation, neither general realised that the other was acting under a misunderstanding.60 With great reluctance, Dallas ordered his division to begin pulling back.

  On the front lines, this decision was naturally met with resentment and disbelief. The bulk of the units in the division had marched most of the night and fought all day, and taken heavy losses to achieve their objectives. Now they were being asked to give up all of their gains. Only with some difficulty was order restored; units had become mixed together, and casualties among officers and non-commissioned officers created problems. Eventually battalions began to re-form and by 10.30 p.m. Dallas’s division was beginning to fall back from the captured Ottoman trenches. He informed Chetwode of his actions, even naming Sheikh Abbas as the point to be reached, but still the confusion went unnoticed.61

  It was not until 11 p.m. that the ‘fog of war’ began to lift sufficiently from the EF headquarters to allow a proper appreciation of the situation. It was now realised just how successful the 53rd Division had been in terms of achieving its objectives, albeit at great loss. At the same time, radio intercepts were brought to Dobell’s attention, showing messages between the German commander in Gaza, Major Tiller, and Kress von Kressenstein. These had been collected through the day by British intelligence section MI1e (Wireless Intelligence) who had access to listening posts in Cyprus and near Cairo (including an aerial on the top of the Great Pyramid at Giza). They were passed to MI1d (Cryptanalysis), who had long since cracked the Ottoman codes. They had then been passed to Murray at Rafah as they were decoded, usually within fifteen minutes of being sent by Tiller, but had somehow failed to be appreciated by the EF or Desert Column.62 The messages were increasingly pessimistic, even panic-stricken late in the evening, as Tiller saw his defences crumbling and his troops’ morale faltering. Had they been available earlier, it is possible that these messages may have encouraged Dobell to take more offensive action, and much has been made of them in this respect. However, it is difficult to see where he could have got fresh troops from at short enough notice to make any serious moves before dusk, or what else could have been done with the resources at his disposal.63

  Dobell’s reaction to the new information coming in was to order Chetwode to tell Dallas to ‘dig in on his present line’ while also withdrawing his right flank to meet the 54th Division.64 Chetwode reasoned that these orders were exactly the same as the ones he had already given Dallas, and did not pass them on. Dallas himself, meanwhile, had discovered at 1 a.m. that elements of the 54th Division were much closer to his old right flank then he had suspected, information that was confirmed by a staff officer from that division. Inexplicably, he made no further attempts to find out what the rest of 54th Division’s positions or orders were at that time. His 159th Brigade reached their new positions at 3.30 a.m. on 27 March, followed by 160th Brigade at 4 a.m. and 161st Brigade at 5 a.m. Only then did he ascertain the exact location of the division he was supposed to be joining with.65 It was at this time that Chetwode was informed of the actual position of the two infantry divisions, and that the scale of the mistake became evident.66

  Chetwode immediately ordered patrols to push forward into the abandoned positions, an order which Dallas passed on. After little or no rest, units from 160th and 161st Brigades began to retrace their steps. They found that the Ottomans had not realised the British mistake, and that the defences were still empty. A company of the 1/7th Essex managed to reoccupy the positions on Ali Muntar and two companies retook Green Hill without resistance. Other battalions were pushed up on either side to complete the line and, as had originally been intended, make contact with the 54th Division. Their reoccupation was just in time, as strong Ottoman patrols began probing the defences just after dawn. These developed into a counter-attack that saw the Essex men pushed off Ali Muntar and parts of Green Hill before rallying and retaking both. However, a second attack at 9.30 a.m., supported by the forces that had attacked the 3rd ALH Brigade at dawn (and which had already taken possession of Sheikh Abbas), proved too much, and the whole of the position along the ridges south-east of Gaza was lost.67

  In the midst of these movements, the command structure was again changed. At 8 a.m., Dallas was informed that he was now back under the direct control of EF instead of Chauvel. Shortly after the final fall of Ali Muntar, 54th Division was placed under Dallas’s command. He was now ordered to shore up a defensive line consisting of both divisions, ready to hold whatever gains were left while the 52nd Division was brought up from the rear.68

  The infantry were now in a dangerous position. The two d
ivisions were almost parallel in a long, thin triangle with their support units, artillery, reserves, and camel and mule transport squeezed into a narrow wedge between them; indeed, the artillery were virtually back to back.69 When Ottoman artillery on Sheikh Abbas began to open fire into this dense mass, the situation quickly became dire. Even if the British had managed to maintain their hold on Ali Muntar, without significant reinforcements to push out to the east and retake Sheikh Abbas it is doubtful if the British position could have held.

  At 11 a.m., Dallas informed Dobell that his position was untenable. Still, there was little that could be done during the day, as any moves to withdraw would be clearly visible to the Ottomans, inviting artillery bombardments and even counter-attacks on the thinning and disordered lines. Only in the late afternoon did the withdrawal begin, with the camels and wheeled transport threading back down to the Wadi. At dusk the artillery followed, and then the infantry at 10 p.m. It took until shortly before dawn for the last British units to reach and cross the Wadi Ghazze.70

  The forces involved were exhausted. They had seen almost non-stop movement and fighting for two full days, and three nights. During the second day the khamsin, the sweltering hot wind that blows up from central Africa, had made conditions almost unbearable. Physical conditions aside, the fact that they had (as they perceived it) taken Gaza and then had their victory snatched from their grasp by the senior staff was crippling to morale. More than 500 men had been killed, nearly 3,000 wounded and over 500 more were still missing, all to achieve nothing. While Murray’s staff would put out figures claiming some 7,000–8,000 Ottoman casualties had been inflicted, few believed such claims. In truth, the Ottomans had suffered only 301 men killed, just over 1,000 wounded, and around 1,000 more missing or captured.71