From Gaza to Jerusalem

by Stuart Hadaway

  It had been an impressively well-organised raid. The lines of approach and retreat had been carefully selected, the time of day when the British were likely to be the most relaxed chosen, and the covering fire for the retreat well laid down. However, the British retaliatory attack less than a week later would take trench raiding in Palestine to an entirely new level.

  In truth, it was not strictly a retaliatory attack, as this operation had been in planning for several days before the Ottoman raid, but revenge certainly became a motivation. The scheme was the idea of Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Kearsey DSO, of the 1/5th King’s Own Scottish Borderers (KOSB), part of the 155th Brigade. He had noticed how isolated one of the Ottoman forward positions, known as the Sea Post, was. As the name suggested, this was at the extreme end of the Ottoman line, right on the Mediterranean coast (although a smaller position – Beach Post – sat a short way behind and to the west of it, almost on the waterline). With the enthusiastic approval and support of his brigade and divisional commanders, Kearsey built a replica of the Sea Post behind British lines, based on aerial photographs. Even before the Ottoman raid opposite Umbrella Hill, he had teams of men training across this full-size mock-up. His plan was thoroughly tested, modified where necessary, and approved. It went ahead after dusk on 11 June, and was a model trench raid.

  For some days previously, British artillery had been using high explosives and shrapnel to cut holes in the Ottoman wire by day, while sporadic machine-gun bursts discouraged them from repairing them at night. At 5 p.m. on 11 June, a brief barrage of seventy-seven shells was fired at the gaps. After dark, a British patrol set out to check the holes, and sweep no-man’s-land for Ottoman patrols. At 8.20 p.m. they reported all clear, and the two main assault parties set out under the overall command of Lieutenant Turner. These two forces, under Lieutenants McGeorge and Mackinnon, each consisted of fifteen riflemen (some armed also with axes, in case of unexpected obstacles) and two bombing parties totalling another fourteen men. These crept out and took up position about 200m (220yds) from the Sea Post. At 8.54 p.m. another brief barrage, just two minutes in duration, struck the wire, allowing the two raiding parties to dash forward another 100m (110yds). There followed a two-minute gap, and then another two-minute barrage fell upon the post itself. At the same time, diversionary actions opened further east along the brigade’s lines. Careful monitoring had revealed that the Ottoman night-time distress signal was three red flares, and a spot in the 1/5th RSF trenches had been chosen from where such a signal could be launched which, when seen from the main Ottoman observation posts on Ali Muntar, would appear to have come from their Umbrella Hill positions. Sure enough, believing that their post there was under attack, Ottoman artillery immediately began shelling the area ahead of Umbrella Hill. This barrage would cost the Royal Scots three men killed and one wounded, but it also kept Ottoman attention on the wrong area of their line. At the same time, slightly further east, the 1/5th Highland Light Infantry began to pull ropes which were attached to dummies that they had seeded across no-man’s-land. The figures lurched up and down in the light of further flares, drawing more fire and attention.

  With the situation suitably muddied, if not utterly chaotic, the barrage lifted from the Sea Post and resumed 200m (220yds) beyond to the north and the east, blocking any possible Ottoman attempts to counter-attack from those sides. This work was supported by the 155th Machine Gun Company, who would fire some 10,600 rounds across no-man’s-land to suppress enemy movement. The raiding parties of the 1/5th KOSB rushed in to the Sea Post. The bombardment had pushed most of the defenders underground, and the dozen that remained where killed or wounded in a brutal flurry of bayonets and axe-blows.* Even as the Scots poured in, Lieutenant H. Burt led a supporting bombing party on, around the Sea Post and astride the four communications trenches that ran back towards the main Ottoman lines. In these, they pulled down the parapets to create trench-blocks, over which they could lob their bombs, and which they vigorously defended against the few Ottoman soldiers willing to risk running through the blockading barrages. In one trench, an attempt by some of the Sea Post garrison to retreat led to the bombing party being attacked from both sides, but they drove both sets of attackers off. Meanwhile a reserve assault party moved up ready to back up either of the main assault parties, as did a support party ready to give covering fire. Supporting parties of signallers, more bombers, and extra axemen also moved forward, while a reserve party readied itself in the British lines in case of disaster.

  With the Sea Post isolated and occupied, the main task of destruction began. As the raiders had gone in, the support party (under Captain J.B. Penman, also in overall command of the raid) followed across no-man’s-land. They included a booty party who began searching for enemy papers, weapons and equipment, while two demolition parties also arrived and began to destroy the Post systematically. Many Ottoman soldiers were found to have taken shelter in deep dug-outs. Those that could be were enticed out and taken prisoner; those who could not where buried as the dug-outs were blown. The trenches and barbed wire entanglements were also destroyed where possible, and mines were laid in the wire above the main post* and on the trench-blocks in the communications trenches. Happy that the work was complete, Penman blew the recall signal on his whistle, and, covered by the supports and reserves, the bombers, raiders and demolition men withdrew to their own trenches. Meanwhile, a beach party (with their own beach party reserve), had attacked the Beach Post, and now withdrew as well.

  The raid had taken just fifteen minutes from the lifting of the second barrage to the recovery of the last raider into their own trenches, where a tot of rum awaited every man. Just one of the raiders had been wounded, accidentally injuring his own foot with an axe, while 60–100 Ottomans were estimated as killed. Regrettably, an over-enthusiastic bomber had blown up the headquarters dug-out before it could be searched, but at least they had brought back a dozen prisoners for questioning, while a Lewis gun that had fallen into Ottoman hands during the 1st Battle of Gaza, and which was being used by them in the Post, was also brought back. Including the enlarged Regiment Aid Post established near the scene, but not the men of the supporting nine artillery batteries, the machine-gunners, or the several battalions involved in decoy operations, the raid had involved over 370 officers and men (all of whom had been issued a white arm band for ready identification at night; after all, the Ottomans also wore khaki uniforms). (See Appendix C.) Captain Penman and Lieutenant Mackinnon were awarded the Military Cross, and Privates A. Paul and J. Dickson the Military Medal. Several others were mentioned in despatches.214

  Such raids became a regular occurrence, although few were so successful for such light casualties. In between this activity, the men in the front lines and rear areas settled down to trench warfare. Their experiences could vary greatly depending on where they were. Depending on the location and orientation of their trenches, dug-outs, or even their camps, which tended to be tucked away in wadis and ravines where possible to protect them from air observation and attack, they could be stifling heat-traps or breezy areas of shade. All of them were dust-blown, and sand storms could make life a misery. The worst where the khamsin, the furnace-like blasts of hot air that swept up across the Sinai, and could last for several days. Even on the best of days the heat could be oppressive, making any form of work uncomfortable or even dangerous. Thomas Minshall, 10th King’s Shropshire Light Infantry, recalled:

  We were working at full pressure trenching and wiring in the burning sun, the hot winds parched the men’s lips until some were overcome with the heat and had to be carried to our position. To see big strong men crying like little children for water, ‘precious water,’ was terrible.215

  And that was only in late April, before the start of the summer.

  Throughout, soldiers were plagued by flies and other wildlife. Fleas and lice were rife and an unavoidable fact of life, despite the efforts of ‘delousing’ units which steamed clothing to kill off the unwelcome guests while the soldier
s themselves were scrubbed down. Scorpions were common, as were giant centipedes (up to a foot long), and even tarantula spiders. Care had to be taken in putting on boots and clothes in case such creatures had decided to shelter in them, and likewise when laying out blankets for sleep. Just as much care would be needed on awakening, in case any had decided to take advantage of the sleeping soldier’s body-warmth at night. These three poisonous creatures in particular were favourites for capture, and pitting them into fights against one another to much excitement and betting. Other common local insects, such as dung-beetles, were largely left unmolested.

  To support the men in their efforts, water continued to be pumped in from Egypt via the pipeline across the Sinai, although this system was rapidly proving inadequate. Local sources were developed – existing wells expanded and new wells dug – but it was slow work, and water was generally scarce. The official ration was a gallon (4.5 litres) per man per day. Of this, the majority, five pints, went to the cookhouse for the preparation of meals and the steady supply of tea that the army required. This left two pints for drinking – generally issued one before dawn and one after dusk, with drinking water in daylight hours discouraged – and just one pint for personal hygiene. This was the seldom-met ideal, and even when it was delivered it left very little room for waste. Lieutenant James Mackie of the 2/4th Somerset Light Infantry had served in India before his battalion was posted to Palestine, and so was no stranger to hot climates, but even so he found that:

  The great difficulty up here is to get water. It all has to be brought up on camels & all ranks are allowed one gallon per day for all purposes. This has to do everything – washing drinking – cooking etc. We don’t waste very much I can assure. We use about a pint every morning to wash, shave & clean our teeth in & then this water is used by our batmen to wash socks etc in before it is thrown away. We can’t afford water to wash our plates in but sand makes a very good substitute & you can get them just as clean by rubbing them with sand as by washing them in water. As a matter of fact they don’t want much cleaning for we clean them fairly well with bread before we finish our meals for even a drop of gravy is too valuable to waste.216

  Inevitably, when supplies ran short hygiene tended to lose out first. Sickness spread through the army, with diphtheria and scarlet fever far from unknown, and stomach and heat-or sun-related illness common. By far the most common complaint was septic sores. Trooper Victor Godrich of the QOWH recalled:

  Every man in the fighting forces was covered in septic sores on their hands, faces and legs – all in bandages. My own hands did not properly heal until the cold weather in December … If one’s hand was accidentally knocked against a saddle, a large piece of skin came off. The result was an open sore that would not heal. The swarms of flies settling on the sore did not improve matters, so we had to use bandages for self-preservation.217

  So prevalent were these that Godrich recalls a sick-parade by his entire regiment to have their sores examined: ‘The first line were “bad” cases, wrecks etc. The second line “fairly bad” and the rear rank “not so bad.”’218 So many were afflicted that the vast majority had no choice but remain on duty, with only the very worst cases being sent back for treatment in hospitals. Meanwhile, rest camps were established along the coast so that units could be rotated, spending at least some time in the cooler, healthier climate on the shore, and taking advantage of the sea for frequent bathing. A few lucky men even managed to obtain short trips back to Egypt, although leave to home – be it the UK, Australia or New Zealand – remained a distant fantasy.

  Back in Cairo, General Murray and his staffs were just as active, fighting their own paper war with London. Pressure was still being put on the EEF to take offensive action, despite Murray’s constant, and correct, insistence that nothing could be done with the resources he had available. The two battles outside Gaza had proved that he did not have the strength in either artillery or infantry to break through the Ottoman lines, and indeed the situation was now made worse by battle casualties. Slowly, the situation began to be rectified. Artillery began to arrive from the UK and Salonika, enough to at least allow the 74th (Yeomanry) Division to enter the line as a combat formation. Other units also arrived from Salonika. The 60th Division began to transfer across in mid June, while the 7th and 8th Mounted Brigades began to arrive later in the month, allowing a complete restructuring of the cavalry from two divisions into three. The A&NZ Mounted Division, under Major General Edward Chaytor, now consisted of the 1st and 2nd ALH Brigades and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade; the Australian Mounted Division was formed under Major General Henry Hodgson, with the 3rd and 4th ALH Brigades and the 5th Mounted Brigade; and the Yeomanry Division was formed under Major General George Barrow, with the 6th, 8th and 22nd Mounted Brigades, while the 7th Mounted Brigade remained independent and reported directly to HQ Eastern Force. Meanwhile various garrison units from Egypt, Aden and India began to be gathered to create a new infantry division, the 75th, under Major General Philip Palin. This initially consisted of three brigades, but each of three battalions as opposed to the usual four, and it was without artillery. To make this formation possible, the garrison of the Suez Canal was stripped back to almost nothing.219

  At the same time, two more exotic units also arrived in Palestine. Italy and, particularly, France both had interests in the region and sent contingents to represent them in the field, giving them a direct involvement in the campaign and thus a larger say in any post-war settlements. The French were determined the acquire Syria, and their detachment arrived in late May and consisted of the 5/115th Territorial Regiment and the 7/1st and 9/2nd Algerian Tiralleurs, with supporting artillery, cavalry, engineers and medical units, under Colonel de Piépape. The Italians meanwhile had expressed an interest in acquiring parts of the Smyrna coastline of Anatolia, but the British War Cabinet made it clear that any such claim had to be backed by a commitment of troops to the theatre. It was hinted that the Italians may like to make up the one or more infantry division that Murray was still appealing for, especially as the Cabinet felt that Italy was not pulling its weight in the war effort as whole. Instead of an infantry division, though, a contingent of 500 men was sent, under Colonel Francesco d’Agostino. (Later, in September, the possibility was raised of the EEF acquiring a brigade of Chinese troops, although nothing came of this.)220

  The newly arrived or formed divisions – 60th and 75th – immediately began to undertake training to acclimatise themselves to desert operations. The 75th Division, gathered from scattered units, also needed to drill and train itself into acting as a coherent formation, as did its constituent brigades. It was hard work for all. W.N. Hendry of the 2/14th London Regiment (London Scottish) was immediately sent with his unit to a desert camp:

  Here we stayed for some weeks, training all the time, with exercises, drills and skirmishes in the mornings. We laid down in the sweltering heat all afternoon, or sometimes walked the three miles to a canteen … It was a very rare occasion when meals were really plentiful.221

  This latter issue was also rapidly becoming a problem. While Murray was at last beginning to receive the troops that he needed to break the Gaza–Beersheba line, he also had to supply them. The army was still being fed by the single-track railway across the desert, which was running at thirteen trains a day. Six of these were needed for the maintenance of the railway itself or for hospital trains, leaving just seven trains for bring up supplies for the fighting forces. Once the two new divisions entered the line, the demand for supplies would increase dramatically, and while it was confidently predicted that these trains could provide enough food, fodder and stores to supply five infantry and three cavalry divisions, there would soon be six infantry divisions with the Eastern Force. Some small slack was available on the line, enough perhaps for three more trains a day, which should have proven sufficient to supply an extra two divisions, but running such a tight service left very little room for stockpiling or safety margin in case of disruption. The water
situation was even worse. By May the pipeline was pumping 600,000 gallons (2.7 million litres) of water out of Egypt every day, yet just 36,500 gallons (166,000 litres) was reaching the end of the pipeline in Palestine. The rest was being used to keep the rear areas, including the railway itself, the Egyptian Labour Corps and support troops supplied. Thankfully, good sources of water were being developed at Shellal and Khan Yunis to make up the deficit, but it was still a tight margin. Murray requested permission to double the railway immediately, and to expand the water system, but permission for neither project was forthcoming from London.222

  Despite such inconsistent support from the War Office, who were still pressuring action on the Palestine front, Murray and his staff proceeded with their plans to renew the offensive after the summer had passed. By late May, the thinking was to split Eastern Force into two separate army corps in order to act across a wider front, and there was a loose plan to unleash one of the corps against the line at or just west of Beersheba, turning the inland flank of the Ottomans before rolling up their line, and then advancing north.223 This option had briefly been discussed during the advance on Gaza at the start of the year, but was now being revisited, perhaps not least because of the success that the mounted divisions had enjoyed on that flank when raiding the Ottoman railway earlier in the month. Indeed, the two primary officers behind developing the plan were Sir Philip Chetwode and his chief-of-staff, Sir Guy Dawnay, who had overseen the raid. However, although troops were now forthcoming in sufficient numbers, the situation regarding artillery, aeroplanes, and logistics were still seriously wanting. Murray was still grappling with these issues when he received a telegram on 11 June informing him that he was being relieved of command. He would remain on only for as long as it took for his replacement, General Sir Edmund Allenby, to arrive.