From Gaza to Jerusalem

by Stuart Hadaway

  By 15 August 1917 Allenby was able to place a provisional plan before his corps commanders. By then the importance of Beersheba was recognised, and that town had become the primary objective on the first day of the attack. While XXI Corps demonstrated against Gaza (where an artillery bombardment by the army and from the navy off-shore would have been grasping Ottoman attention for some days), XX Corps and most of the Desert Mounted Corps (DMC) (supplemented by transport vehicles and animals stripped from XXI Corps) would sweep out of the desert to take Beersheba and the wells. While they did so, one division from the DMC and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade would hold the line between the two infantry corps. Apart from that, the plan showed a flexibility that is not usually associated with First World War battle plans. Once Beersheba was captured and the army watered, XX Corps would strike north-west into the enemy positions along the Gaza–Beersheba road, aiming particularly for the strong defences around Hareira and the important railhead and logistics hub at Sharia. However, there was no set timetable for this, and it would rely purely on how long it would take the troops to recover from their necessary desert march to reach Beersheba and the attack, and how long it would take to replenish their water. As XX Corps began to roll up the Ottoman line, the DMC would move around the flank and demonstrate in the Ottoman rear, hoping to induce a panicked retreat from their main line. If this did not happen, then XX Corps would continue on to take the Atawineh defences, by which time it was confidently predicted that casualties and exhaustion would prevent the Corps from continuing offensive operations. Meanwhile, XXI Corps, again at an unspecified date depending on the circumstances, would attack Gaza in earnest, and take the town. They would then push north until they, too, were exhausted, at which point XX Corps should be recovered enough to retake the offensive on the eastern flank. Operations thereafter would have to depend entirely on the state of the troops, the logistical situation, and the actions of the Ottomans.267

  All was supposed to be ready for this attack in just three weeks – by the end of the first week in September – but even as this was stated it seems to have been seen as unrealistic, and merely a spur to instil the right attitude in the officers and men preparing for the attack.268 Certainly, when Allenby telegraphed the plan back to the CIGS in London a week later, he stated his intention of waiting until the full arrival of the 10th (Irish) Division, and until considerable work had been done to improve the light railways and pipelines just behind his own front lines. He assessed that the earliest date possible would be 15 October, and that it may be preferable to wait until the end of the month. The advance on Beersheba would require a series of night marches to try and avoid the preparations being spotted by the Ottomans, and the full moon would come on the night of 26/27 October. The few days either side would be the most favourable for moving large bodies of troops around in the dark.269

  This plan would remain essentially unchanged, except that the DMC would be given a slightly more flexible role, with the additional speed of the cavalry being used, if necessary, to redeploy units quickly to support the infantry along the whole line.

  As can be seen throughout the description of the Ottoman preparations above, the British preparations for renewing their offensive in southern Palestine were well known on the Ottoman side of the lines. The arrival of Allenby, the influx of troops, and the build-up of supplies could not be hidden, and nor could the expansion of the railway system across the Wadi Ghazze, with light railways being laid up to the front lines opposite Gaza and as far east as Shellal, or the development of the springs and wells. The information coming in from direct observation was supported by a range of other intelligence sources, at least some of which were being heavily and deliberately influenced by the British. The secrecy surrounding these operations at the time, the subsequent destruction of records, and the actions and writings of one particular man since the war, have all combined to make this a very difficult area in which to discern the truth. That one man in particular, Major (later Colonel) Richard Meinertzhagen, has done immense damage with his lies and half truths about his own role in the counter-intelligence plan put together by Allenby’s headquarters.

  Meinertzhagen has become an almost legendary figure in intelligence circles, and the historiography of the 3rd Battle of Gaza. He was a professional soldier who had served as an intelligence officer in the East African campaign before being transferred to Palestine. He later published his (heavily doctored) diaries, and became well known in British society, where his ready wit, charisma and ability to tell a ripping yarn made him a popular figure. By talking widely about his role in areas that had been otherwise secret, his word gained a popular acceptance as the truth among his contemporaries, and among the generations of historians since. Although serious questions over the veracity of his claims have been raised for decades, his popular appeal is extremely hard to fight. He is, after all, an excellent story-teller and highly attractive figure as what his class and era would define as a rogue. In a different time, however, and in a lower social class, he would instead be called at best a fantasist, and at worst a fraudster. His only redeeming feature on this score seems to be that he worked only to gain reputation, even notoriety, rather than any financial benefits. He has, however, done history great harm.*

  However, it cannot be questioned that a series of highly successful ‘ruses’ were staged, and that they did have an effect on Ottoman plans. The most famous now (thanks to Meinertzhagen) is the so-called ‘Haversack Ruse’, which has subsequently become a classic template for military intelligence operations. An officer (possibly Meinertzhagen himself, but possibly another intelligence officer, Captain A.C.B. Neale) rode out with a small patrol into no-man’s-land with a carefully prepared haversack. Inside were a large sum in cash, some carefully forged personal letters, a map of the front with unit locations marked on it, and various papers (possibly being used to wrap some sandwiches) from a staff conference discussing the coming attack on Gaza, with its accompanying diversionary attack on Beersheba. They rode until meeting an Ottoman patrol, at which point shots were fired and a retreat made, to induce the Ottomans to follow them. The haversack, soaked in horse blood to feign a wound to the officer, (and in some versions, a rifle) was then dropped by the ‘panicking’ British patrol. The haversack was then picked up, a genuine intelligence coup obtained in incontrovertible circumstances.270 Even the dates of this event are in dispute; Meinertzhagen maintained that it was in October, while Neale gives the date of 12 September. However, in his memoirs, Ottoman staff officer Hüsseyin Hüsnü Emir recalled the captured haversack being brought in for Kress von Kressenstein’s attention in mid September 1917, and that the German was convinced by it (with reservations – Meinertzhagen’s name did appear in the papers, and caused some disbelief as it was considered ‘un-English’).271

  Other deception plans were also put into place. Camps and stores were gathered on Cyprus, supposedly to support a landing somewhere on the northern Syrian coast. This idea had been considered repeatedly through the war, and had recently been rejected again because of the unsustainable amount of shipping that would be needed to keep the landings supplied. Now, the idea did not seem to fool anyone on the Ottoman side, either, although the threat of a landing just behind Gaza was taken seriously, hence the 7th (OT) Infantry Division being held there. Less grand schemes included building a railway line north across the Wadi Ghazze, complete with a dummy station, as if intimating that the army would continue advancing in this direction. At the same time, the building of railways and pipelines further to the east was kept as quiet as possible, and were kept covered with sacking during daylight hours. To further disguise movements, camps were left standing as the massive troop movements needed took place in the weeks before the battle:

  Canteens, cookhouses, horse lines, temporary shelters, in fact anything that would indicate the presence of the army, where left standing to deceive the enemy; while to prevent aircraft observation from detecting any change in areas, incoming troops took ov
er bivouacs vacated by others, and the use of any new ground was strictly forbidden.272

  Rigorous aerial patrolling also sought to keep enemy reconnaissance aircraft away, but inevitably such large-scale preparations were impossible to hide completely. Since August, the railway across the Sinai had been steadily converted into double-track, proceeding at a rate of up to a mile a day. By the end of October, it had reached Bir el Mazar, about halfway along its 140-mile length. Branch lines of the railway had been built out to Qamle, Shellal, Kharm and across the Wadi Ghazze to the east, while smaller railways had been built to fill in various gaps. New pipelines had also been laid to the eastern ends of the front line.273

  Such preparations could not be kept entirely secret. Some were in fact blatant. Major The Lord Hampton of the QOWH recorded how, on 2 October 1917:

  A large number of Officers of the Nth Infantry Division were anxious to examine the country bordering the Wadi Saba, a tributary of the Ghuzze, and more particularly the Turkish trench systems South West of Beersheba. It fell to the lot of my Squadron, among others, to provide protection and act generally in the capacity of Messrs. Cook & Son. It was a curious sight. As far as the eye could see the hills were dotted with Khaki figures carrying large scale maps and getting ever closer to the white chalk lines which marked the enemy’s defences. The Turks sat in rows in or around their trenches and watched the proceedings with considerable interest, but, much to my relief, attempted little retaliation. Some wit observed that they did not shoot because they mistook the operations for a whole scale desertion of the British Army waving white flags in token of surrender.274

  By mid October, according to Hüsnü, the Ottomans knew that something was afoot, that large bodies of troops were on the move, and that at least some of the camps opposite them were empty. However, many of the scraps of information coming to them only confirmed that a large offensive was brewing, without giving any real indication as to where the main attack would fall. Such accurate information as they did have was well mixed in with British disinformation and deception.

  Notes

  * Yildirim is often translated as ‘lightning’, but the word in Turkish also has the connotation of violence and doing harm, so ‘thunderbolt’ is a more apt translation.

  * And not just in the field of military history. Meinertzhagen was also a noted ornithologist, and he put together an impressive collection of specimens in his travels around the world. He was also a regular visitor to the Natural History Museum, where he consulted their collections, and to whom he left his own on his death in 1967. However, investigations since the 1990s have shown that a large number of his own specimens were in fact stolen from the NHM or other collectors, and relabelled as his own with fictitious histories attached to them. Other specimens which were almost certainly his also appear to have had fictitious details as to location and date attached to them. It is costing the NHM large amounts of time and money to unpick truth from fiction in his collection, and forcing much ornithological ‘knowledge’ to be questioned.

  246 Erickson Ottoman Army Efficiency p. 105

  247 Erickson Ordered to Die p. 169

  248 Erickson Ordered to Die p. 169

  249 Flanagan ‘The Reports of Major Serno Part 3’

  250 Von Sanders pp. 175–9

  251 Djemal pp. 185–9

  252 Erickson Ottoman Army Efficiency p. 107

  253 Von Sanders p. 184

  254 Flanagan ‘The Reports of Major Serno Part 3’

  255 Djemal pp. 189–92

  256 Erickson Ordered to Die p. 171; Djemal pp. 192–3

  257 Erickson Ottoman Army Efficiency p. 115

  258 Erickson Ottoman Army Efficiency pp. 103–4

  259 Erickson Ottoman Army Efficiency p. 117

  260 Erickson Ottoman Army Efficiency pp. 115–17; Erickson Ordered to Die pp. 171–2

  261 Falls Vol. 2 p. 35

  262 TNA WO158/611/65

  263 Falls Vol. 2 p. 35

  264 TNA WO95/4368 EEF War Diary September 1917 Enc. 8

  265 TNA WO95/4368 EEF War Diary September 1917 Enc. 58

  266 TNA WO95/4368 EEF War Diary September 1917 Enc. 84

  267 TNA WO95/4368 EEF War Diary September 1917 Enc. 1

  268 TNA WO95/4368 EEF War Diary September 1917 Enc. 1

  269 TNA WO106/725

  270 See: Garfield The Meinertzhagen Mystery, for a full and fascinating discussion of this ‘ruse’

  271 Husnu p. 100

  272 Dalbiac p. 117

  273 Falls Vol. 2 pp. 20–2

  274 QOWH(Y)M Hampton p. 4

  11

  BEERSHEBA

  THE FINAL PREPARATIONS for the attack on Beersheba began in the middle of October 1917. The last branch lines of the railways running east were laid as quickly and as late as possible, while supply dumps and hospitals were also delayed until the last possible moment. On 22 October, Allenby issued his final orders. It had been thought that a week would suffice for moving the divisions involved, but this was extended to ten days. Troops would only move at night, and an average speed of 1mph had to be allowed for, given the difficulties of navigating in the dark across ground that was broken with wadis and nullahs, and offered little in the way of definite landmarks. Some brigade columns ended up using a system of setting up lamps at intervals, between which the troops would march.275 The two cavalry divisions aimed deep into the desert south of Beersheba – the Australian Mounted Division to Khalasa and the A&NZ Mounted Division to Bir Asluj. Both divisions, like the infantry that moved through positions closer to the front lines south-west of Beersheba, moved in stages as brigades, so as not to over-tax the water supplies at any one place. In preparation for the offensive, nine officers and 117 other ranks were left behind by each infantry battalion, to form a cadre to either provide reinforcements, or for the battalion to be reformed around if casualties were catastrophic.276

  Engineers worked hard to develop these water sources as rapidly as possible, and supplemented some of them by connecting them to the pipeline system. The springs at Shellal were connected to the pipeline, so that water came to it all the way from the Sweet Water Canal outside Cairo, while the pipe-head and springs had equipment installed that could fill some 2,000 ‘fanatis’ (large, metal jerrycan-like containers which could be carried, one on each side, by camels) with 25,000 gallons per hour. Supply dumps were also rapidly thrown up. It was intended to place dumps containing everything the army would need for the first week of the offensive as close to the front lines as possible, and along its entire length. XXI Corps, holding the line opposite Gaza, would need these supplies just as desperately as the more isolated Desert Mounted and XX Corps, despite being nearer the railway system. To give the two eastern corps as much support as possible, XXI Corps’ transport was stripped away and sent to their aid, leaving the corps essentially immobile from 8 October. Three motor transport companies totalling some 130–140 vehicles were also brought up from Cairo, despite their limited use in the rough desert terrain,* while 134 of the more useful Holt’s tractors were also used. These heavy caterpillar-tracked vehicles were more adept at crossing rough ground, although they did it slowly and noisily, and were useful for hauling ammunition in bulk.

  Camel companies would form the backbone of the mobile supply system. Some 32,000 were deployed with the EEF. For now, XX Corps had 20,000 of them – 8,000 attached directly to the divisions to carry their own stores when they moved, and 12,000 under the direction of the Corps HQ for forming supply convoys. XXI Corps and the Desert Mounted Corps each had 6,000 camels for their own use, to carry food, water and ammunition.277 Eventually, of the four infantry divisions of XX Corps (10th, 53rd, 60th and 74th), three had three echelons of transport, and the fourth had two, while the Desert Mounted Corps also had three. Each echelon carried a day’s worth of supplies for each division, and the three echelons would, in theory, create a continuous chain of convoys moving between the advancing divisions and their supply dumps.278

  This activity could n
ot and did not go unnoticed, and in the early hours of 27 October the Ottomans pushed out a large reconnaissance west of Beersheba. This operation was actually carried out in considerable force – the 125th (OT) Regiment of the 16th (OT) Division towards the ridge of El Buggar, and elements of the 3rd (OT) Cavalry Division and 27th (OT) Infantry Division slightly to the east.279 It struck against an extended piquet-line of British cavalry provided by the 8th Mounted Brigade, screening the movements of the 53rd (Welsh) Division, and strung out in a line along El Buggar ridge and then across several hills known as Points 720, 630 and 510. The right of the line was held by the 1st County of London (Middlesex) Yeomanry, the left by the 3rd County of London Yeomanry, with the City of London Yeomanry in reserve behind. The line was 19km (12 miles) long, and held by isolated posts of one or two troops (thirty to sixty men) at key points. The advancing Ottoman formations broke over these scattered posts at 4.15 a.m. on 27 October, supported in places with artillery fire. On Point 720 Major Alexander Lafone, commanding ‘B’ Squadron, 1st County of London Yeomanry, had only two of his troops with him, but still managed to hold off several charges by the Ottomans throughout the morning. At 10.10 a.m. he managed to send a final message to his headquarters that: ‘My casualties are heavy. Twelve stretcher-bearers required. I shall hold on to the last as I cannot get my wounded away.’ In fact, he managed to move most of his wounded – which was most of his men – down into trenches behind the crest of the hill, covering their retreat with the remaining three unwounded men. Soon after 11 a.m. another wave of Ottomans attacked and, seeing the hopelessness of the situation, Lafone ordered his remaining men to fall back, apparently stepping out into the open to meet the charge on his own. The post, and Lafone, fell. He would receive a posthumous Victoria Cross for his ‘conspicuous bravery, leadership and self-sacrifice’.280