The Liri Valley

by Mark Zuehlke

  10

  IT IS STIFF FIGHTING

  In the early afternoon of May 15, Allied traffic rather than the Germans most impeded 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade’s relief of 8th Indian Division’s 19th Infantry Brigade. The original plan had called for the brigade’s trucks to cross the Gari River on various bridges and then advance along the “Speedway” to the front lines. The Speedway was an old railroad bed, long stripped of rails and ties and so named because it followed an almost perfectly straight course with virtually no grade change and was bordered on either side by high embankments that provided excellent cover.1 When it was discovered that this route was currently being used by a thousand trucks from the Corps Expéditionnaire Français, Brigadier Dan Spry was told his battalions would have to march forward on foot. Hasty protestations got that order rescinded and a series of secondary tracks was reserved for 1 CIB’s use.2

  To accelerate the crossing, 1st Field Company of the Royal Canadian Engineers began frantically deploying an eighty-foot Bailey bridge across the river. Although work started at 1430 hours, the many mines dug into the riverbanks and approaches hampered the operation. Clearing the mines was stressful, but so too was the grim task of removing dozens of badly decomposed dead Americans from the bridge’s approaches. Still, at 1600 hours, Quebec Bridge was open for traffic and engineers from XIII Corps shortly launched another bridge for Canadian use.3 As the trucks loaded with Canadian infantry approached the bridges, the riverfront was screened by smoke created by generator teams and artillery shoots to prevent the Germans’ realizing that I Canadian Corps was joining the offensive. Providing armoured support to the brigade was 142nd Regiment, Royal Armoured Corps.4

  Incredible congestion slowed the column to a crawl and sometimes left it gridlocked altogether. It seemed every vehicle in the Eighth and Fifth armies jockeyed for position on the few available roads. Despite the increasing number of bridges erected across the Gari River, there were still too few to meet demand. The many German minefields further channelled traffic into a restricted number of lanes. Riding in a Jeep, Lieutenant Colonel Ian Johnston led the 48th Highlanders of Canada Regiment’s column. Just across the Gari, he came upon the Jeep from Major George Rennison’s reconnaissance party. It had been blown cleanly in half, the two sections cast up onto the verges. Johnston determined that the explosion had occurred when Rennison’s driver had tried to turn around and inadvertently rolled the front wheels off the narrow track. Still, as a safety measure, he deployed pioneers ahead of the column to sweep the road for mines. Johnston was saddened to learn the identities of the two officers killed in the Jeep explosion. Both Rennison and Lieutenant David Dickie were 48th Highlanders who had been seconded to divisional staff.5

  That evening, the regiments finally arrived at their forward assembly areas, dismounted, and marched on foot to positions immediately to the rear of 19th Indian Infantry Brigade’s front lines. The Royal Canadian Regiment was digging in at 1830 hours, the rest of the brigade in place by 2200 hours.6 On reporting to 8th Indian Division’s Major General Dudley Russell, Spry was told that, in the morning, offensive action would continue across a divisional front, rather than, as earlier planned, the RCR carring out a battalion-wide offensive independent of the rest of the division. Obviously, Russell thought the Germans opposing the division were ripe for pushing back on a far broader front than originally envisioned. Spry decided he would deploy the RCR with its left flank braced against the Liri River and the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment on the right, based around Pignataro, with 21st Indian Brigade on its right flank. The 48th Highlanders would be in reserve.7

  “The morale of our own troops,” noted Lieutenant Gordon Potts, the RCR Intelligence Officer, “was particularly high. . . . All ranks were imbued with the desire to close with the enemy and had complete confidence in their own arms and supporting arms and had gone through several exercises in the area of Lucera with ‘B’ Squadron 142 Suffolk Tank Regiment.”8

  While 1 CIB’s journey forward kept somewhat to schedule, such was not the case for 1st Canadian Infantry Division’s headquarters unit or 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade. The divisional headquarters’ convoy left a position north of the Volturno River area. Because of heavy traffic on Highway 6, the column followed a long arcing route using secondary roads that finally linked up to the highway about thirty miles east of Cassino. The divisional war diarist, Captain S.P. Lachance, wrote at day’s end that the column was three hours behind schedule when, at 1730 hours, the British Provost Officer controlling entry onto Highway 6 gave permission to use the road. “You’ve a clear road now; the route is signed, and your people are watching for you,” he said.

  The column set off, Lachance wrote, “smoothly up Highway 6, were waved smoothly past Mignano junction, and would probably have moved smoothly into Cassino if the [officer] leading the convoy had not begun to recognize, with some trepidation, the topography of the fighting front. So the convoy turned itself laboriously around in a mercifully opportune field, and finally got back to the Mignano junction, where the correct turn was taken and the Speedway entered on. HQ signs were seen a few hundred yards up this route, and — we had almost lost hope — we had arrived. Why signs were not up at the Mignano junction remains a mystery. Camp and Provost attest to having put them there during the morning. So somebody for his own reasons must have taken them down.”9

  Divisional headquarters’ first task was to arrange for 3 CIB to close on the Gari River so that it could move into the front lines the following night. The brigade was waiting in the Vairano area for transport. Soon after setting up in the new headquarters area adjacent to the Speedway, divisional staff received a report from a Royal Army Service Corps corporal commanding three platoons of XIII Corps’s General Transport Company. The corporal said his transports had just finished dumping 1 CIB forward and was “supposed to get on to some other job, but could not remember just what.” Lachance wrote that, “We were busy and could not take care of him at the time, but promised to find out from Corps and cautioned him to stand by.” An hour later, Lachance learned that the corporal’s transport was supposed to fetch 3 CIB. “All search for the little corporal was without avail; he had taken our neglect to heart, and gone away, taking his three platoons with him. So only by Corps managing to borrow another three platoons from XIII Corps (not without mutual recriminations) were we finally able to get this brigade up.”10

  At 0700 hours on May 16, about 100 men in ‘D’ Company of the Royal Canadian Regiment walked through the front line of 19th Indian Infantry Brigade and advanced warily up a narrow dirt track bordering the Liri River. While the river itself wound through a series of oxbows in this sector, the road carved a slow, straight curve across the Cassino-Pignataro lateral road’s southern extension and on to Pontecorvo six miles westward. This town was situated immediately behind the Hitler Line, and was believed to be strongly fortified.

  RCR commander Lieutenant Colonel Bill Mathers’s plan for the day was simple. ‘D’ Company would lead with ‘B’ Company in train immediately behind, then ‘A’ Company, followed by his tactical headquarters, and ‘C’ Company after that. Travelling up the centre of the road in single file and well back from the leading troops was ‘B’ Squadron of 142 Suffolk Tank Regiment.11 The single-file formation Mathers used was designed for speed, as most of the men and the Shermans could stick to the road rather than beating a path through the fairly rugged countryside, which was a mixture of oak groves, vineyards, and wheat fields. No serious opposition was expected. Eighth Army intelligence staff thought the Germans must be withdrawing into the defensive works of the Hitler Line. Their reasoning was entirely logical, for the German right flank south of the Liri River to the coast had collapsed in the face of heavy fighting during the past two days. San Giorgio a Liri, a little village bordering the foothills of the Aurunci Mountains, had fallen to the Corps Expéditionnaire Français on May 14.

  The village was approximately one mile west of the RCR start point and the Première Div
ision de Marche d’Infanterie had jumped off from its shot-up buildings on May 15 and was making good progress along the southern bank of the Liri River.12 The 71st and 94th Infantry divisions, tasked with defending the line facing the French divisions, having suffered heavy casualties were reeling back in disarray, unable to slow the French long enough to form a coherent line.13 Every principle of military strategy mandated that a general withdrawal to the Hitler Line must be under way. The RCR should face only light rear-guard opposition.

  In two hours, ‘D’ Company marched freely west from the start point to the Pignataro–San Giorgio a Liri road (the extension of the Cassino–Pignataro lateral road). Then, just as the company crossed the road, heavy machine-gun and mortar positions dug in on a facing low hill opened fire. The company commander reacted by sending the leading platoon to flank the position but it was stopped when six men, including the platoon’s lieutenant, were wounded. When another ‘D’ Company platoon tried outflanking the German gunners from the opposite side, it was pinned down. Mathers decided he had best reorganize and work out a more considered attack.

  The low hill where the Germans were dug in was identified as Point 59 on the regiment’s tactical map. ‘D’ Company dug in where it had come under fire and ‘B’ Company took up an adjacent position on its right flank. ‘A’ Company set up immediately behind ‘D’ Company, while ‘C’ Company remained as the battalion reserve. Mortars and antitank guns were brought up and dug in among the infantrymen. Because of the continuing heavy fire, the companies were not all set up in their positions until about 1300 hours. By then, Mathers had hammered out his plan of attack in consultation with Major Easton, commander of ‘B’ Squadron of the Suffolk Tanks, and Captain Dick Dillon, commander of ‘A’ Company, which was to carry out the main assault on Point 59. Since the tanks needed time to get organized, the attack was set for 1700 hours.14 The RCR were to have advanced to the southern bank of the Forme d’ Aquino, a narrow stream that passed through the village of Aquino and then followed a southeasterly course to join the Liri River about one-third of the way between Pignataro and the Hitler Line. That was a distance of about three miles; they had covered less than a mile of that before being stopped at Point 59. The prospects for any further advance on May 16, other than possibly taking the hill, were few.

  By the time the RCR ran into trouble, the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment was closing on Pignataro with the objective of passing through the 8th Indian Division troops and advancing on a line to the north of the RCR. Lieutenant Colonel Don Cameron, only recently promoted to command, had been advised that his regiment should expect to meet light resistance almost immediately after it passed through Pignataro. As the regiment entered the village, it found that, despite reports to the contrary, the Germans were still in possession of some of the rubble heaps that had once been houses and that the Indian troops were rooting them out in fierce fighting. A stonk of mortar fire struck ‘A’ Company. Two men were killed and two wounded.

  Deciding that he needed to know what the Germans had out front of Pignataro, Cameron sent Intelligence Officer Lieutenant J.J. Nayler to consult with the Indian battalion commander. Nayler garnered little information. The Indian battalion had been too busy taking Pignataro to patrol west of the village. Cameron sent ‘A’ Company past Pignataro with simple instructions to just “exploit and try to contact the enemy.”15 The rest of the regiment followed. About 600 yards past Pignataro, ‘A’ Company literally bumped into the Germans at a narrow little crossroads. A short, fierce firefight ensued. The regiment was also coming under heavy mortar fire and several self-propelled guns were lurking threateningly behind the German lines. Cameron ordered his other companies to sidestep left and then south to bypass this determined concentration, and after four or five hours of heavy fighting was able to force the Germans to withdraw by chipping away at their right flank.16 As the Germans retreated, they were forced to move across open ground and the Hasty P’s called in artillery that, the regiment’s war diarist reported, “did much damage.” The regiment also bagged seven prisoners, who were identified as soldiers from 576th Grenadier Regiment. At dusk, the regiment had advanced a mere 1,000 yards beyond the village, but its casualties had been extremely light and nobody had been killed, so the troops considered the day’s effort sufficient.17

  RCR’s ‘A’ Company attacked Point 59 at 1700 hours, with No. 8 Platoon commanded by Lieutenant Jack Morgan on the left and No. 7 Platoon under Lieutenant Geoff Wright on the right. No. 9 Platoon remained in reserve. With the tankers battering the hill with .75-millimetre high explosives, the two attacking platoons charged up the gradual slope. When the Canadians reached the crest, the Germans retired and about fifty surrendered. Approximately the same number had been killed or wounded. ‘A’ Company was soon receiving heavy machine-gun, mortar, and self-propelled gunfire from a position on its left near the Liri River.18 Morgan’s more exposed platoon was particularly hard hit. When the lieutenant charged one of the machine guns, he was cut down and killed. Lance Corporal R.E. Deadman stood defiantly in the open, braced a 2-inch mortar on his hip and, ignoring the punishing recoil, hammered one self-propelled gun with repeated rounds until he knocked it out.

  When ‘C’ Company attempted to reinforce ‘A’ Company, it was pinned down by heavy fire. Mathers ordered ‘A’ Company to withdraw from Point 59. As the men fell back, Private S. Johnston covered the withdrawal with measured bursts from his Bren gun and then scurried to join the rest of the company at its start position. The RCR had lost twelve dead and about twenty wounded. Even the companies back of the firefight had not escaped unscathed. ‘D’ Company lost one of its bravest, most aggressive men, on Point 59 — Sergeant R.J. Boone, who had joined the regiment in 1939. Also killed was Lieutenant H.D. Irving.19 Wright was awarded a Military Cross and Deadman the Military Medal.20 German shelling of the RCR position continued and several more casualties resulted. A six-pounder antitank gun and an ammunition truck bringing up supplies were both destroyed by direct hits. Mathers decided his men should dig in where they were rather than attempt to move up on the hill, which appeared still unoccupied by the enemy.

  Both the RCR and Hasty P’s sent out patrols to establish contact with each other and to determine how wide a gap existed between them. A small Hasty P patrol reported to the RCR that they had seen about 200 Germans falling back from Point 59.21 An attempt to establish links with the French across the Liri River was forced back when the RCR patrol stumbled into a minefield. Two of the men were killed and the patrol leader, Lance Corporal Scott, was wounded.

  The disposition of German forces in the area remained so uncertain that Lieutenant D.L. Lawrence, assigned as the RCR liaison officer to 1 CIB headquarters, drove his Jeep directly into a German machine-gun position while trying to reach the Hasty P’s position. He was killed.22 A short time after dusk, the 48th Highlanders of Canada’s padre, Captain Stewart East, was searching for his battalion aboard an ambulance Jeep driven by Private Eddie Harrison. Stretcher-bearer Private Frank Murphy was also aboard. After bumping across country, the party found the road running up to Pontecorvo, but there was no sign of any Canadians and the padre wondered if they were too far west. Dismounting and going ahead on foot, East found a dead RCR officer sitting behind the wheel of a Jeep. The bullet holes in the man’s body were still oozing blood. The padre realized he was behind enemy lines; otherwise the corpse would have been removed to a collection point.

  Fetching the rest of his party, East and Murphy loaded the dead officer onto a stretcher and into the Jeep. Murphy made space for the body by sitting on the Jeep’s hood and Harrison started turning around to head back toward the Canadian lines. Suddenly Murphy shouted, “Mines!” The Jeep was in the middle of a cluster of Teller antitank mines. After working their way slowly around these the party crept down the road at a pace that allowed Murphy to spot the detonators of other mines. After driving about half a mile, East’s group suddenly came across the leading platoons of the Highlanders’ ‘B’ C
ompany, which had been ordered forward to plug the gap between the RCR and the Hasty P’s. One of these platoons, seeking to contact the Hasty P’s on the right, startled a machine-gunner from that regiment. The man ripped off a burst and Lieutenant Jock Mayne fell dead. That morning a letter had informed Mayne that he was the father of a baby girl born on April 22.23

  Although resistance had been unexpectedly strong, the two leading battalions had been sluggish, a point noted by General Sir Oliver Leese. He informed Burns that the debut of I Canadian Corps in the Liri Valley battle had been inauspicious. Burns duly fired off a note to Vokes. Leese, Burns wrote, “is disappointed that no greater progress was made in the face of quite light opposition and is very urgent that a determined advance should be made tomorrow.

  “The French have progressed very quickly as far as Esperia and your left flank is therefore quite secure. The weight of the enemy’s reserves have been put in against 78 Division who are attacking tomorrow in conjunction with the Poles. According to the Army commander’s information there is little immediately facing you to the west.

  “Your task for tomorrow, the 17th, is to advance towards the Hitler Line and it is most important that you send your brigades forward with great determination.”24

  The French were about three miles further west than the Canadians, so it was true that 1 CIB’s left flank was secure. To the north, British 78th Division had cracked through the Gustav Line immediately south of Cassino. The division’s 12th Brigade was on the verge of severing Highway 6 west of the town, which would cut off the paratroopers defending Cassino. In the morning, the 78th would drive toward Aquino and Piedmonte, in an attempt to outflank Monte Cassino, II Polish Corps would assault the Abbey, and the 78th’s 10th Infantry Brigade would clear the town of Cassino.25 These attacks should, Leese thought, so stretch German reserves that the Canadians would face only an easily swept-aside screening force.