The Eleventh Day: The Full Story of 9/11 and Osama bin Laden
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104 KSM resisted/new candidate: KSM SUBST, MFR 04019351, 12/10–11/03, CF
105 well-to-do: BG, 3/3/02, WP, 9/10/02
106 back and forth: Statement of Robert Mueller, JI, 9/26/02, Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, 12, WP, 9/10/02
107 Hanjour license: MFR 04021445, 1/13 & 1/25/04, CF, copies of license documents, “Airman Records—Hanjour,” B45, T5, CF
108 pretending: WP, 9/10/02, BG, 3/3/02
109 “frail”: FBI 302 of [name redacted], 9/18/01, “FBI 302s of Interest,” B17, T7, CF
110 “quiet”: MFR 04017517, 1/7/04, CF
111 “mouse”: McDermott, 204
112 drink/pray: MFR 04017518, 1/5/04, CF
113 in tears: CR, 520n55
114 Afghanistan at 17: Report, JI, 135, Staff Statement 16, CO
115 Atef sent KSM/KSM dispatched/thought: KSM SUBST
116 Hanjour to U.S./Hazmi/flight school: Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, CO, 19–, Statement of Robert Mueller, JI, 9/26/02, CR, 226
117 school owner/“No”: WP, 10/21/01, 9/10/02, Newsday, 9/23/01
118 “content”/“warrior”: The Times (London), 9/20/01; “ ’Orwah”: Fouda & Fielding, 111.
119 computer/“I went”: transcript of int. Ann Greaves, Four Corners: A Mission to Die For, 10/18/01, www.abc.net.au, ints. Mark Mikart; Cole: Katz, 269–, Miller & Stone, 226–, Wright, 319–, Graham with Nussbaum, 59–, Fox News, 1/13/09
120 OBL deny/praise: ABC News, 3/1/00
121 A destroyer: Time, 9/24/01, Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, 229, Wright, 333
122 “With small”: Newsweek, 9/24/01.
123 “To those”: Clinton address, 10/18/00, http://usinfo.org
124 “Let’s hope”: NYT, 10/13/01
125 “What’s it gonna”: Richard Clarke, 224
126 “major”: State of the Union address in WP, 1/27/00
127 “not satisfactory”: CR, 187, Report, JI, 301. National Security Adviser Berger dated this memo as February 2000. Without giving a clear source, the 9/11 Commission dated it as early March (Report, JI, 301, CR 187, 505n99)
128 Predator: Staff Statement 7, CO, CR, 506n118, 513n238
129 negotiations: CounterPunch, 1/16/08, 9/9/09, 11/1/04, Reuters, 6/4/04
130 U.N. resolution: Resolution 1333, 12/19/00, http://avalon.law.yale.edu
131 Tenet warned: Tenet, 128.
132 Pakistani told FBI: Statement of Eleanor Hill, 9/18/02, JI, NBC News, 7/26/04, Sunday Times (London), 2/13/05. The Pakistani was Niaz Kahn, a former waiter from Oldham, near Manchester in the U.K., who apparently became involved in terrorism not because of his ideals but because he needed money. Two men he met in the U.K., he said, encouraged him to go to a camp in Pakistan, where he was given instruction in “conventional” hijackings, not suicide operations. He was eventually flown by a roundabout route to New York, but evaded the contact waiting for him and went to the FBI. Kahn’s story was first reported publicly in late 2004 (NBC News, 7/26/04, Vanity Fair, 11/04, transcript, int. Niaz Khan, 5/18/04, in collection of Jean-Charles Brisard).
133 Italian police/“studying”: int. Bruno Megale, Bergen, OBL I Know, 281, Miller & Stone, 274–. A U.S. Justice Department official was quoted after 9/11 as saying that a “small cadre of U.S. intelligence experts might have been privy to the Italian surveillance material.” On the other hand, other press reporting suggests that the surveillance of the two Yemenis was “not translated by Italian police” until May 2002 (LAT, 5/29/02, Chicago Tribune, 10/8/02).
134 Olympics: Sydney Morning Herald, 9/20/01. In October, the Defense Department held a tabletop exercise simulating the crash of an airliner into the courtyard of the Pentagon. Critics have cited this as an indication that the Pentagon received early intelligence of terrorist plans to target the building with an airplane. On the evidence, however, the exercise may simply have been designed to ensure readiness for any possible sort of plane crash into the Pentagon—which is close to Reagan National Airport (“Contingency Planning Pentagon MASCAL Exercise,” 11/3/00, www.dcmilitary.com, UPI, 4/22/04).
135 FBI/FAA downplayed: In April 2000, an FAA advisory issued to airlines and airports had stated that U.S. airliners could be targeted but that hijacking was “more probable outside the United States.” The advisory would not have been replaced as of September 11, 2001 (Staff Report, “The Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security,” 8/26/04, CF, 59)
136 “do not suggest”: Statement of Eleanor Hill, 9/18/02, JI, Report, JI, 104–
137 “imprudent”: Report, JI, 334.
138 “Americans would”: CR, 198
139 Clinton authorized: Tenet, 135
140 Cheney/Powell/Rice: Testimony of Sandy Berger, 3/24/04, CO, Time, 8/12/02, DeYoung, 344
141 “As I briefed”: Richard Clarke, 229
142 “sitting”/“cognizant”: Rice int., www.whitehouse.gov, 3/24/04, Testimony, 4/8/04, CO
143 did not know: Richard Clarke, 31
144 “not an amateur”: ibid., 328
145 Commission/“on American”: Phase III Report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, U.S. Commission on National Security, 2/15/01, viii, 6, Tenet, 16, Columbia Journalism Review, Nov/Dec 2001
146 pressed to see: Hurley to Gorelick, 4/5/04, “Commissioner Prep for Rice,” B7, T3, CF
147 “did not remember”: CR, 199, Ben-Veniste, 302–
148 OBL biggest/“listened”: Clinton, 935–.
CHAPTER 26
1 “We are not”: George W. Bush, Inaugural Address, 1/20/01, www.bartleby.com, Time, 1/20/01
2 “empty rhetoric”: WP, 1/20/02
3 “They ridiculed”: int. of Clinton for Fox News, 9/24/06
4 “What we did”: “Report: Rice Challenges Clinton on Osama,” http://wcbstv.com, 9/26/06
5 “I’m tired”: CR, 202 & see Testimony of Condoleezza Rice, 4/8/04, CO, CR, 510n185, int. of Stephen Hadley, 60 Minutes, CBS, 3/21/04
6 “just solve”: “Transcript: Clarke Praised Bush Team in 02,” Fox News, 3/24/04.
7 nothing effective done: As Rice recalled it, it was in May that the President told her he was tired of swatting at flies. Clarke said Bush’s directive came to him in March. Bush did write to President Musharraf in February 2001, emphasizing that bin Laden was a threat to the United States that “must be addressed.” Though he urged Musharraf to use his influence with the Taliban over bin Laden, the approach proved unproductive. So were further Bush administration contacts with the Pakistanis later in the year (Rice/Clarke: CR, 510n185; Musharraf: CR, 207).
8 memo/“not some narrow”/“multiple”: Clarke to Rice & attachments, 1/25/01, www2.gwu.edu. The memorandum and the December 2000 “Strategy” document have been released, with some redactions. The September 1998 “Political-Military Plan DELENDA” [a reference to the vow to destroy Carthage, in the days of ancient Rome] has not been released (Clarke to Rice, 1/25/01, & Tab A, released to National Security Archive, www2.gwu.edu, CR, 120, Richard Clarke, 197–).
9 Cole linked al Qaeda: FBI IG
10 “No al Qaeda plan”: WP, 3/22/04
11 no recommendations: Testimony of Condoleezza Rice, 4/8/04, CO
12 “Having served”: int. Eleanor Hill
13 no longer member/instead report: CR, 200, 509n169, Clarke, 230
14 no retaliation for Cole: CR, 201–
15 “tit-for-tat”: Testimony of Condoleezza Rice, 4/8/04, CO & see Ben-Veniste, 304–
16 “ancient history”: MFR 04018415, 12/16/03, CF
17 deputies not meet/April: CR, 203, Richard Clarke, 231
18 Wolfowitz/tetchy: Richard Clarke, 231
19 “We are going”: Benjamin & Simon, 336.
20 “to be paying”: “Big Media Networks Ignore Gorelick Role, Highlight Bremer Rebuke of Bush Team,” 4/30/04, citing Bremer int. for CBS News, 2/26/01, www.freerepublic.com, LAT, 4/30/04. Three years later, by which time he had become U.S. adm
inistrator in occupied Iraq, Bremer would attempt to backtrack and say his 2001 comment had been “unfair” to Bush, that his speech had reflected frustration that none of the National Commission’s recommendations had been implemented by either the Clinton or the new Bush administration. (AP, 5/2/04)
21 “The highest”: DCI’s Worldwide Threat Briefing, 2/7/01, www.cia.gov; Le Monde scoop: “11 Septembre 2001: Les Français en savaient long,” Le Monde, 4/16/07.
22 passed on to CIA: The DGSE document, one of more than three hundred pages leaked, is dated January 5, 2001, and numbered 00007/CT. Its heading reads: “Note de Synthèse—Projet de Détournement d’Avion par des Islamistes Radicaux,” and it draws on information passed on by the intelligence service of Uzbekistan. The overall dossier leaked is entitled “Oussama bin Laden” and dated 9/13/01. The authors have seen the entire dossier. The celebrated French fortnightly, Le Canard Enchaîné, reporting on the material as early as October 2001, stated that “most” of the reports on bin Laden had been shared with the CIA and the FBI. Le Monde, in its major story of April 19, 2007, reported as a fact that the January 5 report was passed to the CIA. Le Monde quoted former senior DGSE official Pierre-Antoine Lorenzi as saying that such information would have been passed to the Agency as a matter of routine. Alain Chouet, former head of the Security Intelligence department, took the same view when interviewed by the authors (attachment, James to Zelikow, 4/14/04, “Motley Submission,” B10, T2, CF).
23 FAA 50 summaries/no action: Staff Report, “The Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security,” CO, Farmer, 96–, New York Observer, 6/20/04
24 met Tenet almost daily: Tenet, 137
25 40 PDBs: CR, 254.
26 Atta January trip: Staff Statement 16, CO. Atta flew to and back from Europe via Madrid, leaving on January 4 and returning on January 10. There is evidence suggesting he was in Berlin during that period, and the Commission Report states that his purpose in going was to see Binalshibh in Germany. It has been suggested that Madrid was more than a stopover en route to Germany, that at one point in the round-trip from the States Atta paused to meet a contact in Spain. An al Qaeda cell was active in Spain at the time. An allegation that Atta made another trip to Europe in April, during which he met with an Iraqi official in Prague, will be covered in Ch. 34 and related notes (trip: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 23–, “Hijackers Timeline [redacted], 11/14/03, INTELWIRE; Binalshibh: CR, 227, 243 Staff Statement 16, CO; contact/cell: Der Spiegel, 10/27/03, CR, 530n145; Prague: CR,228).
27 Shehhi Morocco: Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, CO, 26–, 215n95
28 Jarrah reentered/Aysel to U.S./Key West/tourist: Aysel Sengün statement to Bundeskriminalamt, 9/15/01, authors’ collection, Hijackers Timeline [redacted], 11/14/03, INTELWIRE, Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, CO, 21–.
29 Atta hurdle/Shehhi referred/“I thought”: Staff Report, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, CO, 22–, FBI int. [name redacted], Primary Inspector for Atta on 1/10/01, 11/27/01, “Inspector Interviews, AA11” B49, T5, CF & see “The Immigration & Naturalization Service’s Contacts with Two September 11 Terrorists,” Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 5/20/02. In early May, Atta and two companions—one of whom was probably Jarrah—would go to the Miami Immigration Office to try to get the visa of one of the trio extended to eight months. The inspector not only declined that request but shortened Atta’s own permitted stay to six months. Atta left without making a fuss. The second of his companions, the inspector came to suspect after 9/11, had been Adnan Shukrijumah. Shukrijumah, believed to have been an al Qaeda operative reporting to bin Laden, had as of this writing long been on the FBI’s Most Wanted List. Though born in Saudi Arabia, he was entitled to live in the United States—his family had moved to Florida in the mid-1990s, but left the country shortly before 9/11. Shukrijumah’s late father, an imam, had once served at the al-Farooq mosque in Brooklyn, the hub for jihadi recruiting during the anti-Soviet war. A further alleged Shukrijumah link to the events surrounding 9/11 is reported elsewhere in this edition. See index. (INS visit: [name redacted] Immigration Inspector to Mr. Garofano, 10/23/01, appointment list for May 2, 2001, follow-up interviews, Miami District Office, INS, 4/16/02, & MFR of [name redacted] Customs & Border Protection, 3/25/04, “Inspector Interviews,” B49, T5, CF, Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 30–; Shukrijumah: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 216n114, 256n138, CNN, 8/6/10, NY Daily News, 8/6/10, “Father Knows Terrorism Best,” 10/27/03, www.frontpagemag.com, Newsweek, 4/7/04, NYT, 9/3/06.)
30 Atta/Shehhi turned up/rented/asked: Hijackers Timeline [redacted], 11/14/03, INTELWIRE, Counterterrrorism to All Field Offices, 9/15/01, FBI 265A-NY-280350, Serial 2268, released under FOIA to Mike Williams of www.911myths.com, FBI memorandum, PENTTBOM, Summary of captioned investigation as of 11/4/01, 11/5/01, authors’ collection, AP, 10/19/01, WP, 12/16/01.
31 optional targets: KSM SUBST. Separately, there was to be much reference to a claim by Johnelle Bryant, a loan officer for the Department of Agriculture in Homestead, Florida, that Atta came to her office to inquire about a loan to buy a plane for conversion into a crop duster. When told he did not qualify, she said, he made threats, spoke of the destruction of U.S. monuments, and praised bin Laden. Bryant dated the incident as having occurred between late April and mid-May 2000. So far as is known, however, Atta did not arrive in the United States until June 3, 2000 (Timeline Pertaining to Hijackers in Florida, “Timelines 9/11, 2 of 2,” B20, T7, CF, ABC News, 6/6/02, Edward Epstein, “The Terror Crop Dusters,” www.edwardjayepstein.com, but see Miller & Stone, 268–).
32 Hanjour certificate: Hani Hanjour, AA Flight 77, FBI summary 03096, 4/19/02, www.scribd.com, Counterterrrorism to All Field Offices, 9/15/01, FBI 265A-NY-280350, Serial 2268, released under FOIA to Mike Williams of www.911myths.com, FBI 302 of int. FNU Milton, 4/12/02, INTELWIRE, CR, 226–
33 Sporty’s video: Hijackers’ Timeline [redacted], 11/14/03, INTELWIRE
34 Grand Canyon: Nawaf al-Hazmi, AA Flight 77, FBI summary 03177, 4/19/02, www.scribd.com
35 greet muscle: Bamford, Shadow Factory, 50, Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 29–.
36 new arrivals/“The Hour”: CR, 231, BG, 3/3/02, 3/4/02. The thirteen were: Satam al-Suqami, Wail al-Shehri, Waleed al-Shehri, Abdul Aziz al-Omari, Ahmed al-Ghamdi, Hamza al-Ghamdi, Mohand al-Shehri, Majed Moqed, Salem al-Hazmi, Saeed al-Ghamdi, Ahmad al-Haznawi, and Ahmed al-Nami—all Saudis—and Fayez Banihammad, from the UAE. Also in the muscle group on 9/11 would be Hamzi and Mihdhar (the latter having arrived back in the United States as of early July). The group included two pairs of brothers, Nawaf and Salem al-Hazmi and Wail and Waleed al-Shehri—though Mohand al-Shehri was unrelated. The three Ghamdis appear to have been not close relatives but merely members of the large Ghamdi tribe. Saudi press reports noted that in Saudi Arabia “the names al Ghamdi and al Shehri are as common as the name Smith in the United States” (CR, 231, 237, Arab News, 9/18/01, 9/20/01, 9/22/01, BG, 3/3/02).
37 OBL picked: CR, 235
38 5′7″: ibid., 231
39 martyr: ibid., 234
40 visa easy/Express: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 32–, 111–, CR, 235
41 “teater”/“Wasantwn”: Nonimmigrant Visa Application of Wail al-Shehri, Joel Mowbray, “Visas for Terrorists,” National Review, archived at www.webcitation.org
42 “did not think”: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 125, MFR 04016462, 12/5/03, CF
43 sky marshals: CR, 236
44 butcher/“to muddy”/told Dubai: KSM SUBST.
45 travel pairs/“businessman”/tourists/unsatisfactory: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 29–, Janice Kephart, “The Complete Immigration Story of 9/11 Hijacker Satam al Suqami,” 9/10, www.cis.org. The authors refer here to documentation that was inadequate on its face, but passed muster at Immigration or Customs control. Four of the muscle hijackers, meanwhile, had markers in
their passports later understood to have been signs of tampering associated with al Qaeda (Staff Report, 9/11 Terrorist Travel, 29, 33, 34).
46 prior arrangement: KSM SUBST
47 flew DC/NY: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 29–
48 Atta/Hazmi/money: CR, 237
49 videos/“We left”: Guardian (U.K.), 4/16/02, Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 2006, 133, CR 235, 525n104. The first hijacker videotape was released in April 2002 (Guardian [U.K.], 4/16/02).
50 Massoud/“If President Bush”: Roy Gutman, How We Missed the Story, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2008, 246–; Steve Coll, “Ahmad Shah Massoud Links with CIA,” 2/23/04, www.rawa.org, WP, 1/19 & 20/02
51 “gained limited”: Defense Intelligence Agency, cable, “IIR [redacted]/The Assassination of Massoud Related to 11 September 2001 Attack,” 11/21/01, as released to the National Security Archive, www.gwu.edu, Schroen, 95–
52 “was sending”: Tenet, 156
53 Cairo/“We knew”: NYT, 6/4/02
54 “something big was coming”: MFR 03009296, 11/3/03, MFR 04017179, 10/3/03
55 Freeh/Ashcroft/denied: Newsweek, 5/27/02
56 briefing documents/“public profile”: Staff Statement 10, CO, Shenon, 151–. The exception is the PDB of August 6, which is covered later in this chapter
57 triumphalist speeches: Bergen, OBL I Know, 293–, Orange County Weekly, 9/7/02
58 “They send”: The Australian, 12/21/07, The Age (Melbourne), 12/21/07
59 “All the people”: Guardian (U.K.), 11/28/02
60 Mihdhar/“I will make”: Bamford, Shadow Factory, 64
61 “the success”: CR, 251
62 “It’s time”: Fouda & Fielding, 166.
63 Taliban asked: CR, 251. The Taliban appear to have been concerned not only about U.S. reprisals, but also as to what bin Laden should target. Taliban leader Mullah Omar reportedly favored attacking Jews—not necessarily the United States. Emails found later on the terrorist computer obtained by Wall Street Journal reporter Cullison show there was also dissension amongst the terrorists as to whether to give bin Laden full support at this time. “Going on,” one writer complained, “is like fighting ghosts and windmills” (CR, 250–, WSJ, 7/2/02).