The Ethics of Cryonics
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Of course, to say that inequalities already exist does not imply that new sources of inequality should be taken lightly. On the contrary, since we know all too well that economic disparity is linked to differences in lifespan and overall well-being, we understand that they need to be taken very seriously. However, the point is that inequality is not per se a sufficient argument against the introduction of a new technology: morally, the problem is not that the technology will increase current inequalities, but that inequalities exist in the first place. The solution is not to eliminate technologies, but to address those socioeconomic circumstances by virtue of which the new technology would exacerbate inequalities. Besides, both in the case of IVF and in the case of cryonics, it seems that economic inequalities do not affect the access to these technologies in particular ways. As we said, IVF is largely subsidized with public money, making it accessible to middle and lower classes at the expense of taxpayers. For what cryonics is concerned, meanwhile, insurances provide a means to make it accessible to the middle class, albeit while still excluding the very poor. Over time, if more people sign up for cryonics, it is possible that costs will go down—eventually making it cheap enough for large parts of the population to afford it.
In this first chapter, we have analysed some possible objections to cryonics, starting from the most common objections to new technologies in general. We have seen how new technologies are often opposed because they are perceived as unnatural or against God’s will or because they appear to be unusual or even “yucky”. Arguments based on this kind of objections are often best explained by a status quo bias. Over time, as these technologies are utilized by more and more people, they stop being considered as a novelty and as unnatural, weird, against nature, and, ultimately, immoral.
We have also discussed concerns for the consequences that a new technology could have on the individual and on society at large. For instance, the uncertainty about the possible side effects of cryonics is sometimes considered a strong enough reason to reject cryonics on a prudential basis. As we have seen, this objection has some force, but it is doubtful that it is strong enough to undermine the cryonics project. Another concern is based on the fact that, when new technologies are introduced, they are usually quite expensive, hence accessible only to the rich. Poor people who would not have access to cryonics would be doomed to stay dead forever, experiencing yet another disadvantage; we have seen how this objection, too, is misplaced.
In the next chapter, we will focus on ethical issues that pertain to cryonics specifically. Thereafter, in Part II, we will tackle objections to cryonics understood as a step towards indefinite life extension.
References
Alcor. (n.d.). About cryonics. Retrieved February 13, 2018, from http://www.alcor.org/AboutCryonics/index.html
Andersen, A. N., Gianaroli, L., Felberbaum, R., de Mouzon, J., Nygren, K. G., & European IVF-monitoring programme (EIM), European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE). (2005). Assisted reproductive technology in Europe 2001. Results generated from European registers by ESHRE. Human Reproduction, 20(5), 1158–1176. https://doi.org/10.1093/humrep/deh755
Chalmers, D. J. (1997). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory (Rev. ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
De Wolf, A. (2015). Cryonics: Using low temperatures to care for the critically ill. In A. De Wolf & S. W. Bridge (Eds.), Preserving minds, saving lives: The best cryonics writings from the Alcor Life Extension Foundation (pp. 18–22). Scottsdale, Arizona: Alcor Life Extension Foundation.
Ettinger, R. C. W. (1962). The prospect of immortality. Ann Arbor: Ria University Press.
Horsey, K. (2006, May 29). “Twins” born 16 years apart. BioNews. Retrieved from http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_12734.asp
Kass, L. R. (2001). Why we should ban human cloning now. Preventing a brave new world. New Republic, 224(21), 30–39.
Koch, C., & Tononi, G. (2008). Can machines be conscious? IEEE Spectrum, 45(6), 55–59. https://doi.org/10.1109/MSPEC.2008.4531463Crossref
McMahan, J. (1995). The metaphysics of brain death. Bioethics, 9(2), 91–126. Retrieved from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11653058Crossref
Mercer, C. (2017). Resurrection of the body and cryonics. Religions, 8(5), 96. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel8050096Crossref
Mill, J. S. (2009). Three essays on religion. Broadview Press. (Original work published 1874).
Minerva, F., & Sandberg, A. (2015). Cryopreservation of embryos and fetuses as a future option for family planning purposes. Journal of Evolution and Technology/WTA, 25, 17–30. Retrieved from http://jetpress.org/v25.1/minerva.htm
Nicolia, A., Manzo, A., Veronesi, F., & Rosellini, D. (2014). An overview of the last 10 years of genetically engineered crop safety research. Critical Reviews in Biotechnology, 34(1), 77–88. https://doi.org/10.3109/07388551.2013.823595Crossref
Pattinson, S. D., & Caulfield, T. (2004). Variations and voids: The regulation of human cloning around the world. BMC Medical Ethics, 5, E9. https://doi.org/10.1186/1472-6939-5-9
Sade, R. M. (2011). Brain death, cardiac death, and the dead donor rule. Journal of the South Carolina Medical Association, 107(4), 146–149. Retrieved from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22057747
Singer, P., & Wells, D. (1983). In vitro fertilisation: The major issues. Journal of Medical Ethics, 9(4), 192–199. Retrieved from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/6668584Crossref
Topping, A. (2016, November 20). Cryonics debate: “Many scientists are afraid to hurt their careers.” The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/nov/20/cryonics-debate-science-freezing-human-bodies
Younge, N., Goldstein, R. F., Bann, C. M., Hintz, S. R., Patel, R. M., Smith, P. B., … Cotten, C. M. (2017). Survival and neurodevelopmental outcomes among periviable infants. The New England Journal of Medicine, 376(7), 617–628. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1605566Crossref
Footnotes
1Mike Perry reports that John Hunter, a renowned physiologist and surgeon, in 1776 attempted to freeze a fish with the idea that the process might be reversible.
2For a discussion of a wider range of issues within cryonics, I highly recommend De Wolf and Bridge’s edited volume of selected articles from Cryonics Magazine, entitled Preserving Minds, Saving Lives (Alcor Life Extension Foundation, 2015) as well as the official websites of Alcor (http://www.alcor.org/) and the Cryonics Institute (http://www.cryonics.org/).
3The topic of consciousness is very complex and cannot be adequately discussed here. For a comprehensive overview, see, for example, Chalmers (1997).
4Indeed, even though artificial intelligence currently lacks consciousness (widely considered a defining quality of humans), experts are discussing the possibility that machines may one day have the capacity for consciousness, and might therefore come to resemble humans in important respects. For more information, see, for example, Koch and Tononi (2008).
5This is not an issue for all religions. For instance, according to Islam, the soul enters the body only 120 days after conception. Moreover, the Catholic Church originally shared the Aristotelian view that ensoulment happens at 40 days for male embryos and 80 days for females.
6For an analysis of this issue, see, for example, Mercer (2017).
© The Author(s) 2018
Francesca MinervaThe Ethics of Cryonicshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78599-8_2
2. Resuming Life
Francesca Minerva1
(1)Philosophy and Moral Sciences, University of Ghent, Ghent, Vlaams Brabant, Belgium
Abstract
Most objections to cryonics deal with either the unlikelihood that cryonics will succeed in reviving people or the claim that the enterprise as a whole would be undesirable (whether due to high co
st or some potential implications). This chapter starts with an analysis of arguments based on the wastefulness of cryonics, as compared with other costly enterprises, focusing on a comparison between cryonics and various investments that could extend the lifespan of a large number of people for many years. Other common objections to cryonics are based on the assumption that the future will not present socio-economic circumstances that would be favourable to the revival of cryosuspended individuals; hence cryonicists would never be revived by future people. Finally, different possible scenarios in which the cryonicist could be revived are considered, ending with a discussion about the possibility that life for a revived cryonicist would not be good enough to justify their investing in cryonics arrangements today.
Keywords
CryonicsCryopreservationNeuropreservationMedical ethicsBioethics
Objections to Cryonics
In the previous chapter, we began to draw a conceptual map of the cryonics debate by considering some of the most common arguments voiced against new technologies in general. In this second chapter, we will zoom in on arguments and objections that are specific to cryonics.
The first half of the chapter will explore objections based on the supposed wastefulness of cryonics, as compared with other costly enterprises. One valuable resource that cryonicists would be wasting is their own organs: by choosing to store their bodies in liquid nitrogen after being declared dead, cryonicists would waste valuable organs that could be used to save people who need an organ transplant to survive. Moreover, cryonics is far from cheap, and cryonicists could be wasting significant amounts of money. Instead of spending thousands of dollars on a small chance to save their own life, the cryonicist could, for instance, donate it to a charity that would use it to save several lives.
Both of these objections are based on the idea that if one were faced with the choice of either (A) investing in a small chance of personally living far beyond the average lifespan, or (B) investing in the much higher odds of helping others reach an average lifespan and a decent life quality, it would be morally wrong to choose (B).
In the second half of the chapter, we will explore objections based on potential issues with the revival part of the process, starting with the assumption that future generations will only be interested in reviving the cryopreserved under ideal (and not very probable) socio-economic circumstances. It may be that future resource scarcity will have a negative impact on developing the technology needed to revive the cryopreserved. Conversely, if technology and living standards continue to improve at a steady pace well into the future, generations might even enhance themselves to a point where they are so different from today’s Homo sapiens as to lose all interest in reviving the cryopreserved.
Moving on, we will discuss the possibility that life for a revived cryonicist would simply not be good enough to justify their investing in cryonics arrangements today. It could be, for instance, that cryopreservation turns out to have a catastrophic impact on the body, making survival after cryonics extremely painful and therefore undesirable. And even if the process itself turned out to be harmless, it may be that old-fashioned humans would struggle with the psychosocial implications of suddenly finding themselves alone in the far future.
We will now look at each of these objections in turn.
Waste of Resources
Waste of Organs for Transplants
Cryonicists are often accused of being selfish, because by choosing to be cryopreserved, they end up “wasting” organs that could be used for transplants. Hospitals are always in need of healthy organs, and harvesting and transplanting them from newly deceased people, rather than locking them down in indefinite cryosuspension, could save several lives per donor. Of course, not all bodies can be used for transplants—there is, after all, no sense in asking a cryonicist who is dying of multiple organ failure to donate their organs—but we can agree that cryonics probably does reduce the total number of potential organs available for transplanting.
One practical solution to this problem would be to preserve one’s brain only, whilst leaving the body behind for organ harvesting. This option, called neuropreservation , is offered by some cryonics providers (among them Alcor, Oregon Cryonics, and Kriorus). Since, as we have seen in the previous chapter, what is crucial for future revival is that the information stored in the brain remains recoverable, it makes sense to focus on cryopreserving the brain only. Neuropreservation does seem to be the more altruistic option; not only does it not interfere with organ donation, but it is also significantly cheaper than full-body cryonics. Since, as we will see in the next section, one of the common objections to cryonics is that the money spent on cryonics could instead be donated to more effective causes, saving money on cryonics can be considered a less selfish option.
Neuropreservation, in addition to being considerably less expensive than full-body cryopreservation, is also seen as a preferred option for more practical reasons. For instance, in the case of an emergency requiring evacuation of cryonics patients from a facility, neuropatients could be moved faster, more easily, and with less chance of damage than whole-body patients. In the future, it may even become possible to grow an entire body from scratch. If so, it might even be easier to just “create” a new (perhaps even enhanced) body in a lab and connect it to the brain of the neuropatients, rather than modify the body of a patient whose entire body was cryopreserved. The new body could also be made to incorporate features attractive to the owner but not present in the original.
Even if we set aside such speculation, there are good reasons for today’s cryonicists to choose neuropreservation over whole-body cryonics. According to the cryonics provider Alcor, new and improved cryonics technologies are often available to neuropatients earlier than to whole-body patients, and it is easier to ensure that cryoprotectants are optimally absorbed by the brain’s tissues when only the brain is stored.
However, neuropreservation poses difficulties that can easily be avoided by whole-body preservation. With neuropreservation, the connection between nerves in the brain and the muscles they move is lost. Although it is possible in principle to rebuild these connections, or at least a large part of them, the problem is easily avoided if one chooses whole-body cryonics. Over the past few years, there has been some debate over the feasibility of a brain transplant (or whole-body transplant, depending on one’s view) (Telegraph Video, 2016). This kind of surgery has never been attempted on living humans so far, but at least one renowned neurosurgeon has vowed to solve the problem within a few years (Canavero, 2013). Most doctors are very sceptical, however, arguing that the surgery is too complex to become feasible in such a short amount of time. A success in this area would lend more confidence to the idea that a neuropreserved brain could be connected to a new body.
Alternatively, some cryonicists think that it may in the future become possible to upload information stored in the brain to a computer, enabling one to live without the need for a vulnerable biological body.1 In such a hypothetical future world, people could even choose to upload their consciousness to a virtual universe. Science fiction has produced numerous depictions over the years of what such worlds may look like; one famous recent example is the simulated world of San Junipero from the eponymous episode of the BBC series Black Mirror. Inhabitants of this computer-simulated world can live as brain uploads forever, thereby defeating human mortality. Although such an option would almost certainly require far more advanced technology than what is required for transplanting a brain into a new body or reviving an old body, it may, nevertheless, be feasible.
But regardless of the future of virtual reality and the possibility of creating a real San Junipero at some point in the future, it seems that someone opting for neuropreservation could still donate most of their organs, in which case the objection based on organ waste would only apply to whole-body cryonicists. But as we will now see, this does not mean that whole-body cryonics can automatically be cast aside as morally impermissible.
Organ donat
ion is rightly considered a generous choice, but it is not obvious that cryonics should be considered immoral solely on the basis that it would reduce the number of potential organs available for transplants. It seems that the argument’s strength is inversely proportional to the degree of confidence one assigns to the possibility that cryonics will work. If cryonics has zero chance of working, then of course whole-body cryonics is a certain waste of organs. With a non-negligible chance, however, any organs in the cryopreserved body might be used again by the person who originally “owned” them. If one has a high degree of confidence that cryonics will succeed (as a cryonicist might), the perspective shifts. Blaming the cryonicist for not donating their organs would then be similar to blaming a person with cancer for not choosing euthanasia before all their organs are attacked by metastasis and no longer suitable for donation. A person diagnosed with a condition that will almost certainly kill them in little over a year could give up on that one year of life to donate his or her organs and thereby save the life of other people. But even if this might be the most altruistic choice for a person in such a situation, it does not necessarily mean that any other choice would make them blameworthy. Indeed, most people would agree that one extra year of life, especially when one knows it will be their last, is extremely valuable. Sacrificing the last year of one’s life in order to donate their organs may be the most generous choice to make, but it is also supererogatory.