The Complete Works of Aristotle

by Barnes, Jonathan, Aristotle

  Further, it is proper not to neglect these considerations, especially with a view to that at which all inquiry should be directed, viz. the causes that enable us to share in the good and noble life—if any one finds it invidious to call it the blessed [10] life—and with a view to the hope we may have of attaining each good. For if the good life consists in what is due to fortune or nature, it would be something that many cannot hope for, since its acquisition is not in their power, nor attainable by their care or activity; but if it depends on the individual and his personal acts being [15] of a certain character, then the supreme good would be both more general and more divine, more general because more would be able to possess it, more divine because happiness would then be the prize offered to those who make themselves and their acts of a certain character.

  [20] 4 · Most of the doubts and difficulties raised will become clear, if we define well what we ought to think happiness to be, whether it consists merely in having a soul of a certain character—as some of the sages and older writers thought—or whether the man must indeed be of a certain character, but it is even more [25] necessary that his acts should be of a certain character.

  Now if we make a division of the kinds of life, some do not even pretend to this sort of well-being, being only pursued for the sake of what is necessary, e.g. those concerned with vulgar arts, or with commercial or servile occupations—by vulgar I [30] mean arts pursued only with a view to reputation, by servile those which are sedentary and wage-earning, by commercial those connected with selling in markets and selling in shops. But there are also three goods directed to a happy employment of life, those which we have above called the three greatest of human [35] goods, excellence, wisdom, and pleasure. We thus see that there are three lives which all those choose who have power, viz. the lives of the political man, the [1215b1] philosopher, the voluptuary; for of these the philosopher intends to occupy himself with wisdom and contemplation of truth, the political man with noble acts (i.e. those springing from excellence), the voluptuary with bodily pleasures. Therefore [5] each calls a different person happy, as was indeed said before. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae being asked, ‘Who was the happiest of men’? answered, ‘None of those you suppose, but one who would appear a strange being to you’, because he saw that [10] the questioner thought it impossible for one not great and beautiful or rich to deserve the epithet ‘happy’, while he himself perhaps thought that the man who lived painlessly and pure of injustice or else engaged in some divine contemplation was really, as far as a man may be, blessed.

  [15] 5 · About many other things it is difficult to judge well, but most difficult about that on which judgement seems to all easiest and the knowledge of it in the power of any man—viz. what of all that is found in living is desirable, and what, if attained, would satisfy our desire. For there are many consequences of life that [20] make men fling away life, such as disease, excessive pain, storms, so that it is clear that, if one were given the power of choice, not to be born at all would, as far at least as these reasons go, have been desirable. Further, the life we lead as children is not desirable,1 for no one in his senses would consent to return again to this. Further, [25] many incidents involving neither pleasure nor pain or involving pleasure but not of a noble kind are such that, as far as they are concerned, non-existence is preferable to life. And generally, if one were to bring together all that all men do and experience but not willingly because not for its own sake, and were to add to this an existence of [30] infinite duration, one would none the more on account of these experiences choose existence rather than non-existence. But further, neither for the pleasure of eating or that of sex, if all the other pleasures were removed that knowing or seeing or any other sense provides men with, would any man value existence, unless he were [35] utterly servile, for it is clear that to the man making this choice there would be no difference between being born a brute and a man; at any rate the ox in Egypt, which they reverence as Apis, in most of such matters has more power than many [1216a1] monarchs. We may say the same of the pleasure of sleeping. For what is the difference between sleeping an unbroken sleep from one’s first day to one’s last, say for a thousand or any number of years, and living the life of a plant? Plants at any [5] rate seem to possess this sort of existence, and similarly children; for children, too, continue having their nature from their first coming into being in their mother’s womb, but sleep the entire time. It is clear then from these considerations that men, though they look, fail to see what is well-being, what is the good in life. [10]

  And so they tell us that Anaxagoras answered a man who was raising problems of this sort and asking why one should choose rather to be born than not by saying ‘for the sake of viewing the heavens and the whole order of the universe’. He, then, thought the choice of life for the sake of some sort of knowledge to be precious; but [15] those who felicitate Sardanapallus or Smindyrides the Sybarite or any other of those who live the voluptuary’s life, these seem all to place happiness in the feeling of pleasure. But others would rather choose excellent deeds than wisdom or sensual [20] pleasures; at any rate some choose these not only for the sake of reputation, but even when they are not going to win credit by them; but most ‘political’ men are not truly so called; they are not in truth ‘political’, for the ‘political’ man is one who chooses [25] noble acts for their own sake, while most take up the ‘political’ life for the sake of money and greed.

  From what has been said, then, it is clear that all connect happiness with one or other of three lives, the ‘political’, the philosophic, and the voluptuary’s. Now among these the nature and quality and sources of the pleasure of the body and [30] sensual enjoyment are clear, so that we have not to inquire what such pleasures are, but whether they tend to happiness or not and how they tend, and whether—supposing it right to attach to the noble life certain pleasures—it is right to attach these, or whether some other sort of participation in these is a necessity, but the [35] pleasures through which men rightly think the happy man to live pleasantly and not merely painlessly are different.

  But about these let us inquire later. First let us consider excellence and wisdom, the nature of each, and whether they are parts of the good life either in themselves or through the actions that arise from them, since all—or at least all important thinkers—connect happiness with these. [1216b1]

  Socrates, then, the elder, thought the knowledge of excellence to be the end, and used to inquire what is justice, what bravery and each of the parts of virtue; and [5] his conduct was reasonable, for he thought all the excellences to be kinds of knowledge, so that to know justice and to be just came simultaneously; for the moment that we have learned geometry or building we are builders and geometers. Therefore he inquired what excellence is, not how or from what it arises. This is [10] correct with regard to theoretical knowledge, for there is no other part of astronomy or physics or geometry except knowing and contemplating the nature of the things which are the subjects of those sciences; though nothing prevents them from being [15] in an incidental way useful to us for much that we cannot do without. But the end of the productive sciences is different from science and knowledge, e.g. health from medical science, law and order (or something of the sort) from political science. [20] Now to know anything that is noble is itself noble; but regarding excellence, at least, not to know what it is, but to know out of what it arises is most precious. For we do not wish to know what bravery is but to be brave, nor what justice is but to be just, just as we wish to be in health rather than to know what being in health is, and to [25] have our body in good condition rather than to know what good condition is.

  6 · About all these matters we must try to get conviction by arguments, using the phenomena as evidence and illustration. It would be best that all men should clearly concur with what we are going to say, but if that is unattainable, then that [30] all should in some way at least concur. And this if converted they will do, for every man has some contribution to make to the truth,
and with this as a starting-point we must give some sort of proof about these matters. For by advancing from true but obscure judgements he will arrive at clear ones, always exchanging the usual [35] confused statement for more real knowledge. Now in every inquiry there is a difference between philosophic and unphilosophic argument; therefore we should not think even in political philosophy that the sort of consideration which not only makes the nature of the thing evident but also its cause is superfluous; for such consideration is in every inquiry the truly philosophic method. But this needs much [1217a1] caution. For there are some who, through thinking it to be the mark of a philosopher to make no arbitrary statement but always to give a reason, often unawares give reasons foreign to the subject and idle—this they do sometimes from ignorance, [5] sometimes because they are charlatans—by which reasons even men experienced and able to act are trapped by those who neither have nor are capable of having practical and constructive intelligence. And this happens to them from want of culture; for inability in regard to each matter to distinguish reasonings appropriate [10] to the subject from those foreign to it is want of culture. And it is well to criticize separately the explanation and the conclusion both because of what has just been said, viz. that one should attend not merely to what is inferred by argument, but often attend more to the phenomena—whereas now when men are unable to see a flaw in the argument they are compelled to believe what has been said—and [15] because often that which seems to have been shown by argument is true indeed but not for the cause which the argument assigns; for one may prove truth by means of falsehood, as is clear from the Analytics.

  7 · After these further preliminary remarks let us start on our discourse from what we have called the first confused judgements, and then2 seek to discover a [20] clear judgement about the nature of happiness. Now this is admitted to be the greatest and best of human goods—we say human, for there might perhaps be a happiness peculiar to some superior being, e.g. a god; for of the other animals, which [25] are inferior in their nature to men, none have a right to the epithet ‘happy’; for no horse, bird, or fish is happy, nor anything the name of which does not imply some share of a divine element in its nature; but in virtue of some other sort of participation in good things some have a better existence, some a worse.

  But we must see later that this is so. At present we say that of goods some are [30] within the range of human action, some not; and this we say because some things—and therefore also some good things—are incapable of change, yet these are perhaps as to their nature the best. Some things, again, are within the range of action, but only to beings superior to us. But since ‘within the range of action’ is an [35] ambiguous phrase—for both that for the sake of which we act and the things we do for its sake have to do with practice and thus we put among things within the range of action both health and wealth and the acts done for the sake of these ends, i.e. health-giving conduct and money-bringing conduct—it is clear that we must regard happiness as the best of what is within the range of action for man.

  8 · We must then examine what is the best, and in how many senses we use [1217b1] the word. The answer is principally contained in three views. For men say that the good per se is the best of all things, the good per se being that whose property is to be the original good and the cause by its presence in other things of their being good; [5] both of which attributes belong to the Idea of good (I mean by ‘both’ that of being the original good and also the cause of other things being good by its presence in them); for good is predicated of this Idea most truly (other things being good by participation in and likeness to this); and this is the original good, for the [10] destruction of that which is participated in involves also the destruction of that which participates in the Idea, and is named from its participation in it. But this is the relation of the first to the later, so that the Idea of good is the good per se; for this is also (they say) separable from what participates in it, like all other Ideas. [15]

  The discussion, however, of this view belongs necessarily to another inquiry and a more abstract one, for arguments that are at once destructive and general belong to no other science. But if we must speak briefly about these matters, we say first that it is to speak abstractly and idly to assert that there is an Idea whether of [20] good or of anything whatever—this has been considered in many ways both in our popular and in our philosophic discussions. Next, however much there are Ideas and in particular an Idea of good, they are perhaps useless with a view to a good life and [25] to action. For the good has many senses, as numerous as those of being. For being, as we have divided it in other works, signifies now what a thing is, now quality, now quantity, now time, and again some of it consists in being changed and in changing; and the good is found in each of these modes, in substance as mind and God, in [30] quality as justice, in quantity as moderation, in time as opportunity, while as examples of it in change, we have that which teaches and that which is being taught. As then being is not one in all that we have just mentioned, so neither is good; nor is there one science either of being or of the good; not even things named good in the [35] same category are the objects of a single science, e.g. opportunity or moderation; but one science studies one kind of opportunity or moderation, and another another: e.g. opportunity and moderation in regard to food are studied by medicine and gymnastics, in military matters by the art of strategy, and similarly with other sorts [1218a1] of action, so that it can hardly be the province of one science to study the good per se.

  Further, in things having an earlier and a later, there is no common element beyond, and, further, separable from, them, for then there would be something prior to the first; for the common and separable element would be prior, because with its [5] destruction the first would be destroyed as well; e.g. if the double is the first of the multiples, then the universal multiple cannot be separable, for it would be prior to the double3 . . . if the common element turns out to be the Idea, as it would be if one [10] made the common element separable: for if justice is good, and so also is bravery, there is then, they say, a good per se. for which they add ‘per se’ to the general definition; but what could this mean except that it is eternal and separable? But what is white for many days is no whiter than that which is white for a single day; so the good will not be more good by being eternal. Hence the common good is not [15] identical with the Idea, for the common good belongs to all.

  But we should show the nature of the good per se in the opposite way to that now used. For now from what is not agreed to possess the good they demonstrate the things admitted to be good, e.g. from numbers they demonstrate that justice and health are goods, for they are arrangements and numbers, and it is assumed that [20] goodness is a property of numbers and units because unity is the good itself. But they ought, from what are admitted to be goods, e.g. health, strength, and temperance, to demonstrate that beauty is present even more in the changeless; for all these things are order and rest; but if so, then the changeless is still more beautiful, for it has these attributes still more. And it is a bold way to demonstrate [25] that unity is the good per se to say that numbers have desire; for no one says distinctly how they desire, but the saying is altogether too unqualified. And how can one suppose that there is desire where there is no life? One should consider seriously about this and not assume without reasons what it is not easy to believe even with [30] reasons. And to say that all existing things desire some one good is not true; for each seeks its own special good, the eye vision, the body health, and so on.

  There are then these difficulties in the way of there being a good per se; [35] further, it would be useless to political philosophy, which, like all others, has its particular good, e.g. as gymnastic has good bodily condition.

  [Further, there is the argument written in the discourse—that the Idea itself of good is useful to no art or to all arts in the same way. Further, it is not practicable.]4 And similarly neither is good as a universal either the good per se (for it might [1218b1] belong even t
o a small good) or practicable; for medicine does not consider how to procure an attribute that may be an attribute of anything, but how to procure health; and so each of the other arts. But ‘good’ is ambiguous, and there is in it a [5] noble part, and part is practicable but the rest not so. The sort of good that is practicable is an object aimed at, but not the good in things unchanging.

  It is clear, then, that neither the Idea of good nor the good as universal is the good per se that we are actually seeking; for the one is unchanging and not practical, and the other though changing is still not practical. But the object aimed at as end is best, and the cause of all that comes under it, and first of all goods. This [10] then would be the good per se, the end of all human action. And this would be what comes under the master-art of all, which is politics, economics, and wisdom; for these mental habits differ from all others by their being of this nature; whether they [15] differ from one another must be stated later. And that the end is the cause of all that comes under it, the method of teaching shows; for the teacher first defines the end and thence shows of each of the other things that it is good; for the end aimed at is the cause. E.g. since to be in health is so and so, so and so must needs be what conduces to it; the health-giving is the efficient cause of health and yet5 only of its [20] actual existence; it is not the cause of health being good. Further, no one demonstrates that health is good (unless he is a sophist and no doctor, but one who produces deceptive arguments from inappropriate considerations), any more than any other principle.

  We must now consider, making a fresh start, in how many senses the good as [25] the end of man, the best in the field of action, is the best of all, since this is best.

  BOOK II

  1 · After this let us start from a new beginning and speak about what follows from it. All goods are either outside or in the soul, and of these those in the soul are more desirable; this distinction we make even in our popular discussions. For wisdom, excellence, and pleasure are in the soul, and some or all of these seem to all [35] to be the end. But of the contents of the soul some are states or faculties, others activities and movements.