The Complete Works of Aristotle

by Barnes, Jonathan, Aristotle

  [20] 17 · As to power, here too it may fairly be said that the type of character it produces is mostly obvious enough. Some elements in this type it shares with the wealthy type, others are better. Those in power are more ambitious and more manly in character than the wealthy, because they aspire to do the great deeds that their [25] power permits them to do. Responsibility makes them more serious: they have to keep paying attention to the duties their position involves. They are dignified rather than arrogant, for the respect in which they are held inspires them with dignity and therefore with moderation—dignity being a mild and becoming form of arrogance. If they wrong others, they wrong them not on a small but on a great scale.

  [30] Good fortune in certain of its branches produces the types of character belonging to the conditions just described, since these conditions are in fact more or less the kinds of good fortune that are regarded as most important. It may be added that good fortune leads us to gain all we can in the way of family happiness and [1391b1] bodily advantages. It does indeed make men more supercilious and more reckless; but there is one excellent quality that goes with it—piety, and respect for the divine power, in which they believe because of events which are really the result of chance.

  This account of the types of character that correspond to differences of age or fortune may end here; for to arrive at the opposite types to those described, namely, [5] those of the poor, the unfortunate, and the powerless, we have only to ask what the opposite qualities are.

  18 · [[The use of persuasive speech is to lead to decisions. (When we know a thing, and have decided about it, there is no further use in speaking about it.) This is so even if one is addressing a single person and urging him to do or not to do [10] something, as when we advise a man about his conduct or try to change his views: the single person is as much your judge as if he were one of many; we may say, without qualification, that anyone is your judge whom you have to persuade. Nor does it matter whether we are arguing against an actual opponent or against a mere proposition; in the latter case we still have to use speech and overthrow the opposing arguments, and we attack these as we should attack an actual opponent. Our [15] principle holds good of epideictic speeches also; the audience for whom such a speech is put together is treated as the judge of it. Nevertheless, the only sort of person who can strictly be called a judge is the man who decides the issue in some matter of public controversy; for the issue concerns the facts under dispute or subject to deliberation.]]18 In the section on political oratory an account has already [20] been given of the types of character that mark the different constitutions.

  The manner and means of investing speeches with moral character may now be regarded as fully set forth.

  Each of the main divisions of oratory has, we have seen, its own distinct goal. With regard to each division, we have noted the accepted views and propositions upon which we may base our arguments—for deliberative, for epideictic, and for [25] forensic speaking. We have further determined completely by what means speeches may be invested with the required character. We are now to proceed to discuss the arguments common to all oratory. All orators are bound to use the topic of the possible and impossible; and to try to show that a thing has happened, or will happen [30] in the future. Again, the topic of size is common to all oratory; all of us have to argue that things are bigger or smaller than they seem, whether we are making deliberative speeches, speeches of eulogy or attack, or prosecuting or defending in [1392a1] the law-courts. Having analysed these subjects, we will try to say what we can about the general principles of arguing by enthymeme and example, by the addition of which we may hope to complete the project with which we set out. Of the above-mentioned commonplaces, that concerned with amplification is—as has been [5] already said—most appropriate to epideictic speeches; that concerned with the past, to forensic speeches, where the required decision is always about the past; that concerned with possibility and the future, to deliberative speeches.

  19 · Let us first speak of the possible and impossible. It would seem to be the case that if it is possible for one of a pair of contraries to be or happen, then it is possible for the other: e.g. if a man can be cured, he can also fall ill; for any two [10] contraries are equally possible, in so far as they are contraries. That if of two similar things one is possible, so is the other. That if the harder of two things is possible, so is the easier. That if a thing can come into existence in a good and beautiful form, then [15] it can come into existence generally; thus a house can exist more easily than a beautiful house. That if the beginning of a thing can occur, so can the end; for nothing impossible occurs or begins to occur; thus the commensurability of the diagonal of a square with its side neither occurs nor can begin to occur. That if the [20] end is possible, so is the beginning; for all things that occur have a beginning. That if that which is posterior in essence or in order of generation can come into being, so can that which is prior: thus if a man can come into being, so can a boy, since the boy comes first in order of generation; and if a boy can, so can a man, for the man also is first. That those things are possible of which the love or desire is natural; for [25] no one, as a rule, loves or desires impossibilities. That things which are the object of any kind of science or art are possible and exist or come into existence. That anything is possible the first step in whose production depends on men or things which we can compel or persuade to produce it, by our greater strength, our control of them, or our friendship with them. That where the parts are possible, the whole is [30] possible; and where the whole is possible, the parts are usually possible. For if the slit in front, the toe-piece, and the upper leather can be made, then shoes can be made; and if shoes, then also the front slit and the toe-piece. That if a whole genus is [1392b1] a thing that can occur, so can the species; and if the species can occur, so can the genus: thus, if a sailing vessel can be made, so also can a trireme; and if a trireme, then a sailing vessel also. That if one of two things whose existence depends on each [5] other is possible, so is the other; for instance, if double, then half, and if half, then double. That if a thing can be produced without art or preparation, it can be produced still more certainly by the careful application of art to it. Hence Agathon has said:

  To some things we by art must needs attain,

  Others by destiny or luck we gain.19

  [10] That if anything is possible to inferior, weaker, and stupider people, it is more so for their opposites; thus Isocrates said that it would be a strange thing if he could not discover a thing that Euthynus had found out. As for impossibility, we can clearly get what we want by taking the contraries of the arguments stated above.

  [15] Questions of past fact may be looked at in the following ways. First, that if the less likely of two things has occurred, the more likely must have occurred also. That if one thing that usually follows another has happened, then that other thing has happened; that, for instance, if a man has forgotten a thing, he has also once learnt it. That if a man had the power and the wish to do a thing, he has done it; for every [20] one does do whatever he wants to do whenever he can do it, there being nothing to stop him. That, further, he has done the thing in question either if he intended it and nothing external prevented him; or if he had the power to do it and was angry at the time; or if he had the power to do it and his heart was set upon it—for people, as a rule do what they long to do, if they can; bad people through lack of self-control; good people, because their hearts are set upon good things. Again, that if a thing was going to happen, it has happened; if a man was going to do something, he has [25] done it, for it is likely that the intention was carried out. That if one thing has happened which naturally happens before another or with a view to it, the other has happened; for instance, if it has lightened, it has also thundered; and if an action has been attempted, it has been done. That if one thing has happened which naturally happens after another, or with a view to which that other happens, then that other (that which happens first, or happens with a view to this t
hing) has also happened; thus, if it has thundered it has also lightened, and if an action has been done it has [30] been attempted. Of all these sequences some are inevitable and some merely usual. The arguments for the non-occurrence of anything can obviously be found by considering the opposites of those that have been mentioned.

  How questions of future fact should be argued is clear from the same [1393a1] considerations: that a thing will be done if there is both the power and the wish to do it; or if along with the power to do it there is a craving for the result, or anger, or calculation, prompting it. That the thing will be done, in these cases,20 if the man is actually setting about it, or even if he means to do it later—for usually what we mean to do happens rather than what we do not mean to do. That a thing will [5] happen if another thing which naturally happens before it has already happened; thus, if it is clouding over, it is likely to rain. That if the means to an end have occurred, then the end is likely to occur; thus, if there is a foundation, there will be a house.

  For arguments about the greatness and smallness of things, the greater and the lesser, and generally great things and small, what we have already said will show [10] the line to take. In discussing deliberative oratory we have spoken about the relative greatness of various goods, and about the greater and lesser in general. Since therefore in each type of oratory the object under discussion is some kind of good—whether it is utility, nobleness, or justice—it is clear that every orator must obtain the materials of amplification through these channels. To go further than [15] this, and try to establish abstract laws of greatness and superiority, is to argue without an object; in practical life, particular facts count more than generalizations.

  Enough has now been said about these questions of possibility and the reverse, of past or future fact, and of the relative greatness or smallness of things. [20]

  20 · The special forms of oratorical argument having now been discussed, we have next to treat of those which are common to all kinds of oratory. These are of two main kinds, example and enthymeme; for a maxim is part of an enthymeme. [25]

  We will first treat of argument by example, for it has the nature of induction, which is the foundation of reasoning. This form of argument has two varieties; one consisting in the mention of actual past facts, the other in the invention of facts by the speaker. Of the latter, again, there are two varieties, the illustrative parallel and [30] the fable (e.g. the fables of Aesop, or those from Libya). As an instance of the mention of actual facts, take the following. The speaker may argue thus: ‘We must prepare for war against the king of Persia and not let him subdue Egypt. For Darius of old did not cross the Aegean until he had seized Egypt; but once he had seized it, he did cross. And Xerxes, again, did not attack us until he had seized Egypt; but [1393b1] once he had seized it, he did cross. If therefore the present king seizes Egypt, he also will cross, and therefore we must not let him’.

  The illustrative parallel is the sort of argument Socrates used: e.g. ‘Public [5] officials ought not to be selected by lot. That is like using the lot to select athletes, instead of choosing those who are fit for the contest; or using the lot to select a steersman from among a ship’s crew, as if we ought to take the man on whom the lot falls, and not the man who knows most about it’.

  Instances of the fable are that of Stesichorus about Phalaris, and that of Aesop [10] in defence of the popular leader. When the people of Himera had made Phalaris military dictator, and were going to give him a bodyguard, Stesichorus wound up a long talk by telling them the fable of the horse who had a field all to himself. Presently there came a stag and began to spoil his pasturage. The horse, wishing to [15] revenge himself on the stag, asked a man if he could help him to do so. The man said, ‘Yes, if you will let me bridle you and get on to your back with javelins in my hand’. The horse agreed, and the man mounted; but instead of getting his revenge on the stag, the horse found himself the slave of the man. ‘You too’, said [20] Stesichorus, ‘take care lest, in your desire for revenge on your enemies, you meet the same fate as the horse. By making Phalaris military dictator, you have already let yourselves be bridled. If you let him get on to your backs by giving him a bodyguard, from that moment you will be his slaves’.

  Aesop, defending before the assembly at Samos a popular leader who was being tried for his life, told this story: A fox, in crossing a river, was swept into a hole [25] in the rocks; and, not being able to get out, suffered miseries for a long time through the swarms of fleas that fastened on her. A hedgehog, while roaming around, noticed the fox; and feeling sorry for her asked if he might remove the fleas. But the fox declined the offer; and when the hedgehog asked why, she replied, ‘These fleas [30] are by this time full of me and not sucking much blood; if you take them away, others will come with fresh appetites and drink up all the blood I have left’. ‘So, men of Samos’, said Aesop, ‘my client will do you no further harm; he is wealthy already. [1394a1] But if you put him to death, others will come along who are not rich, and their peculations will empty your treasury completely’.

  Fables are suitable for addresses to popular assemblies; and they have one advantage—they are comparatively easy to invent, whereas it is hard to find parallels among actual past events. You will in fact frame them just as you frame [5] illustrative parallels: all you require is the power of thinking out your analogy, a power developed by intellectual training. But while it is easier to supply parallels by inventing fables, it is more valuable for the political speaker to supply them by quoting what has actually happened, since in most respects the future will be like what the past has been.

  Where we are unable to argue by enthymeme, we must try to demonstrate our [10] point by this method of example, and to convince our hearers thereby. If we can argue by enthymeme, we should use our examples as subsequent supplementary evidence. They should not precede the enthymemes: that will give the argument an inductive air, which only rarely suits the conditions of speech-making. If they follow the enthymemes, they have the effect of witnesses giving evidence, and this always tells. For the same reason, if you put your examples first you must give a large [15] number of them; if you put them last, a single one is sufficient; even a single witness will serve if he is a good one. It has now been stated how many varieties of argument by example there are, and how and when they are to be employed.

  21 · We now turn to the use of maxims, in order to see upon what subjects and occasions, and for what kind of speaker, they will appropriately form part of a [20] speech. This will appear most clearly when we have defined a maxim. It is a statement; not about a particular fact, such as the character of Iphicrates, but of a general kind; nor is it about any and every subject—e.g. ‘straight is the contrary of curved’ is not a maxim—but only about questions of practical conduct, courses of [25] conduct to be chosen or avoided. Now an enthymeme is a deduction dealing with such practical subjects. It is therefore roughly true that the premisses or conclusions of enthymemes, considered apart from the rest of the argument, are maxims: e.g.

  Never should any man whose wits are sound

  Have his sons taught more wisdom than their fellows. [30]

  Here we have a maxim; add the reason or explanation, and the whole thing is an enthymeme; thus—

  It makes them idle; and therewith they earn

  III-will and jealousy throughout the city.21

  Again, [1394b1]

  There is no man in all things prosperous,22

  and

  There is no man among us all is free,

  are maxims; but the latter, taken with what follows it, is an enthymeme— [5]

  For all are slaves of money or of chance.23

  From this definition of a maxim it follows that there are four kinds of maxims. In the first place, the maxim may or may not have a supplement. Proof is needed where the statement is paradoxical or disputable; no supplement is wanted where the [10] statement contains nothing paradoxical, either because the view expressed is already a known truth, e.g.
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  Chiefest of blessings is health for a man, as it seemeth to me,24

  this being the general opinion; or because, as soon as the view is stated, it is clear at [15] a glance, e.g.

  No love is true save that which loves for ever.25

  Of the maxims that do have a supplement attached, some are part of an enthymeme, e.g.

  Never should any man whose wits are sound,

  Others have the essential character of enthymemes, but are not stated as parts of enthymemes; these latter are reckoned the best; they are those in which the reason [20] for the view expressed is simply implied, e.g.

  O mortal man, nurse not immortal wrath.26

  To say ‘it is not right to nurse immortal wrath’ is a maxim; the added words ‘O mortal man’ give the reason. Similarly, with the words

  [25] Mortal creatures ought to cherish mortal, not immortal thoughts.27

  What has been said has shown us how many kinds of maxim there are, and to what subjects the various kinds are appropriate. They must not be given without supplement if they express disputed or paradoxical views: we must, in that case, either put the supplement first and make a maxim of the conclusion, e.g. you might [30] say, ‘For my part, since both unpopularity and idleness are undesirable, I hold that it is better not to be educated’; or you may say this first, and then add the previous clause. Where a statement, without being paradoxical, is not obviously true, the reason should be added as concisely as possible. In such cases both laconic and [1395a1] enigmatic sayings are suitable: thus one might say what Stesichorus said to the Locrians, ‘Insolence is better avoided, lest the cicadas chirp on the ground’.