All the Best, George Bush: My Life in Letters and Other Writings
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I got the Mission together the other day and told them that we are reacting. If somebody blows up a bomb there are protests and then we get on the ball with host country problems. Somebody says something against us in the economic field and we react then. It is essential that we sit down and plan where we want to be a year from now or five years from now and then try to implement it. The financial problems still have me bugged. I met with Phil Klutznick, an Adlai Stevenson man, and he gave me some good advice. Don’t knuckle in. Don’t make concessions to the Russians. If you do, they’ll only consider it a sign of weakness and take that as a point of departure. We are facing a major financial crisis, and I think Klutznick is right. We have to be absolutely firm. I am convinced if we are not, we cannot get support from our Congress so we might as well start from that realistic point.
Private—I worry about the family situation. The boys are in good shape. Jebby is going to need some help I am sure. He is a free and independent spirit and I don’t want him to get totally out of touch with the family. He doesn’t want to be. But I am just worried with our strange hectic life and Jeb going back to Texas this summer that we may lose touch with him. The other boys seem to be in good shape. Jeb will be staying with George and this is good. George will be a good influence on him. Jebby is a deep sensitive kid with lots of compassion and love in his heart, but I worry that he might take on some crazy idea. He has not so far nor is there a sign of it but it just plagues me a little bit.
May 11, 1971
Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Washington, DC 20500
Dear Al:
The subject of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos is not in front of the U.N., but it permeates the corridors and is all around us. I am wondering if anyone at the NSC has ever drawn up a paper that shows the things we have offered and the rejections we have received. I have in mind things like: 1. Stop the bombing, 2. Cease-fire, 3. Statements of prisoner release, 4. Withdraw if they withdraw. There is little understanding at the U.N. on these things, and I would like to have a definitive paper showing the history of our offers—offers which have not been accepted.
The reason I am writing you is that Dr. Kissinger has mentioned to me on several occasions that we have done all the things many of the severest critics have suggested in the past. It would be useful for me to study any information like this which you might have and then be sure that our own top people that are dealing with ambassadors across the street are fully versed in all of this, No rush. Thanks a lot.
Yours very truly,
George Bush
May 20, 1971
We have just about completed a series of dinners at the Waldorf. The dinners have been pretty good. We tried to keep the men and women from going off into separate rooms at the end of the dinner. We tried to keep it informal. At the last one Bryce Harlow18 attended and gave a marvelous talk about the “real President Nixon.” He was very articulate, very able and did an excellent job. Charlotte Reid19 sang and she was most attractive. I am confident that these ambassadors find this kind of evening an improvement over just sitting around yakking and smoking cigars . . .
The President has seemed rather tense to me lately at the Cabinet meetings. We talked about the youth and I could see that he was concerned about some of the outrageous youth statements. He talked about the demonstrators. We just had the veterans demonstration. He was concerned of course about how they were behaving. I think he would like to be a lot tougher, but I think he is conscious of public opinion and wants to appear to be concerned. I think his own gut reaction is to crack down on these people. I must say I concur with him on that.
There have been a lot of rumors around. On the CBS morning program they asked about whether I would serve as Vice President. These questions are designed strictly to put one on the spot. They are impossible to answer. I did call up the Republican State Chairman in Texas, George Willeford, and told him under no conditions would I be a candidate for governor. It’s funny how quickly one gets out of touch with the political scene there. I have a good strong feeling for Texas but I really don’t have much judgment on exactly what’s happening there. . . .
I attended Dad’s 76th birthday in Greenwich. All five of us were there and all the in-laws were there except Bar. It was a very touching occasion. I think how lucky we are as a family to feel so very, very close. I look around at our friends and there are very few that have this same closeness in their families during these peculiar times.20 I am hoping our children will have it but there is no way one can guarantee how these things work. . . .
June 3, 1971
His Excellency Mr. Yakov Aleksandrovich Malik
Permanent Representative of the USSR to the United Nations
New York, New York 10021
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
I have your letter of May 31. I cannot help but note that it follows the May 18 article in the Soviet Government newspaper Izvestiya accusing me of “trembling with delight” at the sight of damages caused by the Jewish Defense League.
I will continue to fight against the illegal harassment of Soviet officials in New York, but I will also continue to speak out in the United Nations, as well as to responsible groups of American citizens, whenever I believe your Government’s record demands criticism. In this connection, I would note that were I to protest every time you or a member of your delegation made a statement “unfriendly” to the United States, I would have little time left for other work.
I have noted your statement that the right to enter or leave a country is purely an internal matter. This is, as you know, at variance with the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, which states, “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”
Respectfully,
George Bush
June 12, 1971
On the eleventh I had a very interesting luncheon with Yakov Malik up at his apartment. I am told this is rather unusual. . . .
Vodka before, vodka during, wine during, offer of cognac after, long philosophical discussion about what the people in Russia thought about us and what the people in our country thought about them. He repeated all the cold war rhetoric—that we were imperialists. He told me one interesting thing when I questioned him about the fact that in the elections in the Soviet Union there was no opposition. “Yes, but you don’t have to vote for the man, thus you can register your disapproval.” I told him that would never get by in a country like ours with open press. He keeps accusing the press in our country of being Zionist-controlled. Then he made this interesting point. He himself as ambassador has to sit in a commune-like gathering in his own Mission while they all criticize him, and during those meetings he is not the ambassador. He is just one more person. I told him it didn’t seem likely to me that they would give him the full treatment of criticism but he assured me that they did. His deputy kept nodding all the while. . . . We talked about the Vietnam war, and I reassured him we want no territory there. He jumped on me about the aggression. We talked about the Middle East. I talked about Hungary and Czechoslovakia. He did not want to talk about the budget. He did not want to talk about the Secretary General’s succession. He was in a very likable, expansive mood, and yet he could be very tough and doctrinaire. I am sure in the next Four Power meeting he will act totally cold and tough, but these contacts must be kept up. . . .
The battle is on for the succession of Secretary General. I went over and had a very frank discussion with [U Thant], laying it on the line, telling him that I did not want to be going around his back talking about succession unless he made clear to me that he did want to move out. He seemed to appreciate this frankness, although I was later told that the inscrutable [eastern] way is to be not quite so direct. This was passed along to me by Ambassador Shahi of Pakistan. . . . I find U Thant fascinating. He is obviously against us on the war and things like this, but I must say he impresses me. He is a
man totally dedicated to peace. He is a philosopher and not an administrator. The U.N. desperately needs administration at this critical point, but U Thant cannot, will not, does not want to provide it.
I am increasingly concerned about the overlay of inefficiency that I am told exists there. Everyone knows it, but nobody does much about it. . . .
Another incident—Teddy Kennedy made a speech on the floor of the Senate during the week of June 4 in which he said that Nixon wanted to prolong the end of the war until 1972 for political purposes to help get re-elected. To me this was one of the crassest, cruelest statements I had ever heard. When I gave a speech to the Andover Chamber of Commerce with a good press conference beforehand, I denounced the statement as cruel and mean. I can understand debate on the war, but I cannot understand somebody making a statement like that and yet the press let Teddy get away with it. They simply don’t jump him out as they would somebody else. It was irresponsibility at its worst, and yet he wasn’t damaged a bit by it, I am sure. . . .
I’m continually besieged by host country problems—Yugoslavian ambassador’s daughter robbed, coat slashed with a razor—another ambassador’s car stolen—harassment of the Soviet ambassador by the Jewish Defense League. One darn thing after another. We have been working closely with the White House trying to get more done in the way of protection for missions in New York. Something may happen on this. . . .
Nixon-Cox wedding—We were very pleased to be included. The Cabinet had assigned seats as did a few family friends. The rest of the people were all seated wherever there was a chair in the Rose Garden. It rained and the ceremony was held in between rain and clouds. They got away with it, and it was a terrifically beautiful occasion. The President looked happy. . . .
I talked with Billy Graham at the wedding, who said there were lots and lots of young people coming to his crusades. He really felt a change coming about in the country away from the wild stuff, away from the outrages of the dissent. I hope like heck he is right. . . .
The U.N. job is an interesting job. People are “rooting for you”—Democrats, Republicans, all people. Some, because of the illustrious predecessors, have an inflated idea about what the job is. My assessment at this point is that the job is broad, interesting, fantastic but that it is not as “important” as some think because we have less policy input at this point than I would like to see it have. I am still convinced that the way to get that is to earn it, not go down and demand it as Goldberg did. I’ll never get over Goldberg telling me how he planted phone calls. People come in and hand him a note that the President is calling. Goldberg gets up and leaves and of course the President wouldn’t be calling. I think the problem was that some of the ambassadors might have thought the President was calling, but most people that followed the U.S. Mission knew he wasn’t. . . .
I watched Agnew at the Cabinet meetings with some interest. He speaks his piece and to me makes sense. I have respect for Agnew. He cannot help but get on the press. Even at the Cabinet meetings he’ll mention media etc. but his point of view, where he is positioned on the issues, all is pretty darn sensible. It’s almost as though nobody listens to him, but he is always very forthright, speaks his mind, doesn’t claim too much time, and then shuts up. He is much more impressive in this kind of gathering than he is ever given credit for publicly. . . .
About this time I jotted down the following notes for a speech about my new job:
Every day I go to work I have that inner exhilarating feeling that comes from having the challenge of working for peace.
Sure the vehicle has problems but is that reason to give up—Must we because of obvious difficulties give up, turn back—
The answer, perhaps idealistic is a reassuring “No”—
We must be critics—constructive critics—if the U.N. is to fulfill its potential.
But let’s not be hand wringing, carping critics
TELEGRAM
Action:
SEC-STATE
SUBJ:
Protest by SOV PERM REP Malik
Following ad appeared page 68 NY times June 22 under Merchandise Offerings:
Going Out of Business
Must sell all office furn. Desks, file cabinets, chairs, office machines. No reasonable offer refused. 1st come first serve. Mr. Malik UN 1-4900.
I received a strong telephone protest from AMB Malik June 23 regarding . . . the advertisement placed in NY Times re selling of Malik’s furniture.
Publisher [Arthur] Sulzberger had called Malik to apologize.
I called Sulzberger who explained that advertisements of very small amounts are not checked out as to authenticity. Sulzberger instituting new policy at TIMES to try to take care of problem.
I expressed profound regret to Malik. Advised him of our efforts to battle extremism. He was firm and upset.
Bush
June 27, 1971
The New York Times disclosed some classified documents. My own feeling is that there will not be much damage to the national security from the release of these documents by themselves. The great problem lies in the damage to the national security if the concept ever gets around that each individual can indeed be his own judge as to what should be classified and what should not be. The press is a very liberal press. People are trying to make a hero out of Ellsberg. It will be interesting to see how the trial comes out if he is given one.21
Hypothetical question—Suppose a citizen had given these documents to the Soviet Union directly and it had been found out that he had so conducted himself. What would be the reaction of the American people? What price should he have been asked to pay?
Ellsberg did not do this. What he did do was not very different though. He gave to the New York Times, they published them and of course the Russians have them. The difference is not so easy to see. . . .
[Undated diary entry]
Cabinet meeting of June 29 was a most unusual one. There were no other people in the room except the Cabinet people themselves and Haldeman. The President was tremendously upset about leaks in government. I have never seen him more forceful or more fired-up. He talked about the people in the woodwork who are trying to get the Administration, the people who use their own judgment as to what to leak all in an effort to unseat the President. He seemed firm. The President said that Haldeman would be policing these leaks and not to try to go around Haldeman for he had the full authority of the President.
The point is very well taken. How can a Presidential decision be made if “it is tried in the press” beforehand. Leaks representing the points of view of the newspapers are often encouraged and to the degree the President does not have maximum flexibility his hands are tied. . . .
President Nixon surprised everyone when he announced in July he would visit China in the near future. It was a historic step, and he deserves much credit for opening this long-closed door. I was strongly in favor of the new policy but immediately saw that we would face a real battle in the United Nations in terms of China’s representation.
July 19, 1971
Nixon-China visit—The China announcement came with an amazing surprise value particularly in light of the Pentagon papers dispute. At this dictation the U.N. community is very much in favor of it. At this moment I don’t know what our China policy in the U.N. will turn out to be, but all the U.N. people feel that the ball game is over, Peking is in and Taiwan is out. Kosciusko Morizet22 came up for the weekend in Maine, and we had a long talk about his views on all of this. He thought it was a very good move, that the Russians would be climbing the walls and that it would make for a much more realistic world. I was with Vinci23 and Carlos Ortiz De Rozas of Argentina when the announcement was made. They were both elated. They both kept emphasizing what this would do to the Russians. They have got to make clear to the Russians we do not plan to make capital against them with this. This was a brilliant move.
The Cabinet Meeting—the President emphasized over and over again the need for security. He discussed nothing with the Cabinet abou
t policy, gave no indication about whether Vietnam was involved, gave no hint about what the U.N. policy would be. He simply asked for as little speculation as possible due to the sensitivity of the Chinese on this point. In a matter like this it is better not to know so that you don’t inadvertently foul up these very difficult negotiations. . . .
General observations—Watching these cabinet meetings and seeing how little decision making goes on there, there is a certain luxury in being out of Washington. You are not under the intense political pressure or fire all the time and yet there is a certain degree of access by being a member of the Cabinet. I am convinced that very little decision-making is done at cabinet meetings. It’s usually information, giving instructions, etc. I have not yet sorted out what route should be taken in order to have a real input on decisions, but I am clear it is not through the bureaucracy in the State Department and it is not through the Cabinet meetings themselves. I think it is probably direct personal contact with the Secretary of State and direct personal contact with NSC and Kissinger, mainly Kissinger. Of course in some crisis it would be the President himself. The whole concept though of instructions needs review and work just as the whole classification system in the government needs work. Instructions can really come from so low down as to be meaningless or as to be out of touch with the President in terms of philosophy. Of course too many darn documents are classified. . . .
August 12, 1971
. . . I have great respect for Bill Rogers. He is easy to work with, to talk to. I know he finds it hard to battle the State Department bureaucracy at times. He never fails to return a phone call, and I am feeling closer and closer to him. The battle between the White House and the State Department is very clear. . . . There is a cross fire there that it would be well to avoid getting caught in. I’m not sure it’s all together possible. . . .