The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945 (Modern Library War)

by Toland, John

  The rest of the group was out in the imperial garden, recovering from the smoke and the heat of the argument. Admiral Nagano tapped Togo on the shoulder: “Can’t the Foreign Ministry take over this task and straighten everything out by diplomacy? As far as the Navy is concerned you can settle the problem at your own discretion.”

  Togo was startled. A few minutes earlier this man had been an adversary. Encouraged by such unexpected support, he went back to the meeting more determined than ever. But once the discussion resumed, Nagano was back recommending war. It was another example of the Navy talking peace in private and war in public—to save face and get their share of military appropriations. “Of course, we may lose,” he said, “but if we don’t fight, we’d just have to bow to the United States. If we fight, there’s a chance we can win. If we don’t fight, wouldn’t that be the same as losing the war?”

  Nagano’s words irked Tsukada, who found them cautious and vague. It seemed as if Nagano was set on going to war; why didn’t he speak out, like Sugiyama? “All of us wonder if there isn’t some way to achieve peace,” he said urgently. “But no one is willing to say, ‘Don’t worry, I’ll assume all responsibility even if the war is a long one.’ However, we just can’t maintain the status quo, so there is only one conclusion: we must go to war. I, Tsukada, believe we cannot avoid war. This is the moment. If we don’t go to war now, we’ll have to next year or the year after. This is the moment! The moral spirit of Japan, the Land of the Gods, will shine on our enterprise!” Japan’s drive south would probably help Germany and Italy beat Russia and force China to surrender. The capture of Southeast Asia would be a mighty blow to America’s resources. “We will build an iron wall, and inside it we will crush, one by one, our Asian enemies. We will also crush America and Britain!”

  Tsukada’s urgent call for battle was rebutted from an unlikely source—his own commander. Sugiyama said, “with extreme reluctance,” that he would have to acquiesce to Togo’s proposal to withdraw troops from southern Indochina. The abrupt shift came like an electric shock to all except Sugiyama’s Army colleagues who had heard his concession in private. It was a considerable compromise, one that everyone knew would cause tremendous resentment throughout the ranks of the Army.

  In return the military expected an end to civilian resistance and called for an immediate formal adoption of the deadline proposal. But Finance Minister Kaya refused to be rushed. “I cannot agree to a decision involving the destiny of Japan so suddenly,” he said. He proposed they wait another day “to sleep on it,” and the exhausted conferees filed into the garden at two o’clock in the morning.

  As Kaya started home through the silent city he debated with himself. What if he persisted in opposing war? This would compel Tojo to dissolve the entire Cabinet, and the new one would undoubtedly bow to the militarists. On the other hand, there was still a possibility that the negotiations in Washington could be concluded successfully. Therefore, wouldn’t it be wiser to go along with the proposal? Besides, if war did erupt, who was better equipped as finance minister to prevent inflation? His conclusions were logical but war with America was still unthinkable and he could not bring himself to phone Tojo and give his approval.

  Togo was also debating with himself on the lonely trip home. He had won his fight for Proposal B but he wasn’t sure it would be enough to satisfy America. Perhaps more concessions could be wrung out of the Army if he resigned? After a few hours’ sleep he called on an old friend, Koki Hirota, and asked for his opinion. The former prime minister thought he should stay in office and “work for the success of the negotiations.” A new foreign minister would back the war party. It made sense.

  Togo’s next stop was Tojo’s office. The Prime Minister had shown such reasonableness the day before that it encouraged Togo to ask for support in “persuading those concerned to make further concessions” if Hull reacted favorably to either “A” or “B.”

  Tojo did not disappoint him. He was more than willing to make further compromises if the Americans also came partway, and would soon tell an associate, “I’m praying to the gods that some way we’ll come to an agreement with America.” There was, he felt, a 50-50 chance that “B” would be accepted. Now only Kaya’s resistance remained. All morning Tojo had pressed the Finance Minister by phone for a decision. Worn down by this persistency and unable to ignore the logic of his own arguments, Kaya drove to the Prime Minister’s official residence, and about two o’clock informed General Tojo that he was reluctantly bowing to the majority opinion.

  At last unanimity had been achieved. Now it was Foreign Minister Togo’s well-nigh hopeless task to engineer peace before the deadline. The only chance for success in Washington, he decided, was to send assistance to Ambassador Nomura, who had already made several diplomatic blunders. Months before, the admiral himself had put in a request for Saburo Kurusu, an extremely able diplomat. He had signed the Tripartite Pact for Japan, but he also had strong ties with the United States. His wife was an American, Alice Jay, born of British parents on Washington Square, New York City.

  Kurusu was hesitant but finally accepted the assignment. The difficulty was to get him to Washington as soon as possible and in utmost secrecy. If the war-minded staff officers or ultranationalists learned of the trip, his assassination was likely. A Pan American Clipper was scheduled to leave Hong Kong in forty-eight hours, but it would take several days to make arrangements to spirit Kurusu there by naval plane. The problem was solved by Ambassador Grew, who phoned Maxwell Hamilton, chief of the Far Eastern Affairs Division in Washington. He persuaded Pan American to delay its flight for two days.

  On the afternoon of November 4, Kurusu bade good-bye to Tojo, who said, “The American people are against war, and their supply of rubber and tin is dwindling,” and added that he had thought the chances of Kurusu’s success were 30 percent. In two days he had grown 20 percent more dubious. “Please do your best to reach an agreement.”

  Late that night Kurusu tiptoed into the bedroom and sat on his wife’s bed. “Where are you going?” she asked. “Probably to the United States,” he told her. She wrapped a steamer blanket around him and made him coffee. Since there was “every possibility” he might be assassinated she suggested that their twenty-two-year-old son, an Army aviation engineer, accompany him on the first leg of the journey from Tokyo Station to Yokosuka. The reporters would assume Kurusu was merely seeing his son off on an assignment. Kurusu agreed. As he left he said, “I may never return.”

  The next morning at ten-thirty, thirteen men filed solemnly into the conference room set up for the imperial conference. When the fourteenth man, the Emperor, appeared, the ceremony proceeded according to custom. There was a general feeling of anxiety as General Tojo explained that the September 6 decision had been reconsidered. “As a result of this, we have concluded that we must be prepared to go to war, with the time for military action tentatively set at December 1 [it sounded better than the actual date, midnight of November 30] while at the same time doing our best to solve the problem by diplomacy.”

  Foreign Minister Togo reviewed the diplomatic prospects. There was “little room left to maneuver diplomatically” and the chances of success were “we most deeply regret, dim.”

  General Suzuki reiterated the crucial problem of Japan’s resources. “Briefly, we will have no easy task to fight a long war against Britain, America and the Netherlands, while still at war with China.” However, the chances of victory in the first months were so bright that he felt war was the answer. It would be better than merely “waiting until the enemy applied the pressure.”

  Admiral Nagano called for secrecy of battle plans, since the fate of Japan depended on a decisive victory in the early moments of the war, and Sugiyama advised them to consider the importance of timing. “As far as operations, if the start of hostilities is delayed,” he said, “the armament ratio between Japan and the United States will become increasingly unfavorable to us with the passage of time.” He was fully confident of succe
ss in the early stages. “Nevertheless, we must face the fact that it will probably be a long-drawn-out war.” Even so, he felt Japan could “establish a strategically impregnable position” and thus frustrate the enemy.

  With all the brave talk, an air of growing despair hung over the room; and General Sugiyama himself called for a “stepping up” in diplomacy. In response to a question on the negotiations from Privy Council President Hara, Tojo said the Americans had answered with “flowery words.” “The United States hasn’t conceded a single point; all it does is make strong demands on Japan.” The most serious point of argument was the stationing of troops in China, he said, and as he spoke about that frustrating war, became emotional. “We dispatched a million men at the cost of over one hundred thousand dead and wounded, bereavement of families, four years of hardship, and several tens of billions of yen.” And if the troops were pulled out, China would rise up against Japan. “She would try to take over Manchuria, Korea and Formosa as well!”

  Hara asked how America would react to Proposals A and B. Togo’s answer was that Proposal A would not bring quick results. “I’m afraid we can’t even settle things with Proposal B.” There were only two weeks left to negotiate. “Therefore, I think chances of success are small. As foreign minister I will do my utmost but, I regret to say, I see little hope of success in the negotiations … about a ten percent chance of success.”

  “Forty percent!” said Tojo. He had apparently regained 10 percent of his optimism overnight.

  Hara feared war was inevitable and warned of its racist implications. America, Britain and Germany all were Caucasian. “So I’m afraid that if Japan attacks America she will come to terms with Germany, leaving Japan all alone. We must face the possibility that hatred of the yellow race could shift the hatred now directed against Germany to Japan, and as a result the German-British war would be turned against us.”

  Tojo also sounded a warning—the dangers of a prolonged war with a foe like the United States. “When I think about the increasing American strength in the southwest Pacific, the still-unfinished China Incident, and other things, I see no end to our troubles. We all can talk about gashin-shotan at home, but how many years and months will our people be able to endure it?” His answer implied the affirmative: despite his show of optimism for peace a few minutes earlier, he too agreed that they would have to go to war. “I am afraid we would become a third-class nation in two or three years if we just sat tight.” Morally there were grounds for war, since Britain and America threatened Japan’s very existence. “Also, if we govern occupied areas with justice, the hostile attitude toward us will probably soften. America will be outraged at first but then she’ll come to understand [why we waged war]. Anyway, I will carefully avoid making this a racial war. Do you have anything more to say? If not, I take it the proposals have been approved in their original form.” There were no further comments. This time, unlike the last conference, the Emperor remained silent.

  2.

  Grew understood how frustrated the Japanese leaders were and to what that frustration might lead. Several days before the historic imperial conference of November 5, he had written in his diary: “Japan is obviously preparing a program of war, to be carried out if her alternative program of peace should fail. Resort to the former may come with dramatic and dangerous suddenness.” In this mood he sent Hull an ominous cable once more recommending a reconciliation:

  … IF THESE EFFORTS FAIL, THE AMBASSADOR [Grew] FORESEES A PROBABLE SWING OF THE PENDULUM IN JAPAN ONCE MORE BACK TO THE FORMER JAPANESE POSITION OR EVEN FARTHER. THIS WOULD LEAD TO WHAT HE HAS DESCRIBED AS AN ALL-OUT, DO-OR-DIE ATTEMPT, ACTUALLY RISKING NATIONAL HARA-KIRI, TO MAKE JAPAN IMPERVIOUS TO ECONOMIC EMBARGOES ABROAD RATHER THAN TO YIELD TO FOREIGN PRESSURE. IT IS REALIZED BY OBSERVERS WHO FEEL JAPANESE NATIONAL TEMPER AND PSYCHOLOGY FROM DAY TO DAY THAT, BEYOND PERADVENTURE, THIS CONTINGENCY NOT ONLY IS POSSIBLE BUT IS PROBABLE….

  This wasn’t advocacy of appeasement or a compromise with principles.

  … THE AMBASSADOR’S PURPOSE IS ONLY TO ENSURE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES BECOMING INVOLVED IN WAR WITH JAPAN BECAUSE OF ANY POSSIBLE MISCONCEPTION OF JAPAN’S CAPACITY TO RUSH HEADLONG INTO A SUICIDAL STRUGGLE WITH THE UNITED STATES. WHILE NATIONAL SANITY DICTATES AGAINST SUCH ACTION, JAPANESE SANITY CANNOT BE MEASURED BY AMERICAN STANDARDS OF LOGIC.… ACTION BY JAPAN WHICH MIGHT RENDER UNAVOIDABLE AN ARMED CONFLICT WITH THE UNITED STATES MAY COME WITH DANGEROUS AND DRAMATIC SUDDENNESS.

  He prayed for understanding in Washington. “The trouble with you Anglo-Saxons,” a Japanese friend had told him, “is that you regard and deal with the Japanese as grown-up people, whereas the Japanese are but children and should be treated as children.”

  Grew’s message, however, was as usual ignored in the State Department. Stanley Hornbeck regarded the ambassador as old-fashioned and honorable but gullible. He was too influenced by Dooman, who had lived too long in the Orient to deal with the Japanese objectively; his pro-Japanese sympathy obviously colored every dispatch from Tokyo.

  The MAGIC intercepts had convinced Hornbeck of Japanese duplicity. How could you trust a nation that played the two-faced game of talking peace while preparing for war? Moreover, he was so convinced that Japan was bluffing and would not dare fight America that he advised Hull to ignore Grew’s latest warning.

  Ironically, it was the two military Chiefs—General Marshall and Admiral Stark—who were making a joint appeal to Roosevelt to do nothing that might force a crisis. The defeat of Germany, after all, was the major strategic objective. “If Japan be defeated and Germany remains undefeated, decision will still not have been reached,” they said and warned the President that war with Japan could cripple the Allied struggle against “the most dangerous enemy,” Germany. They wanted no ultimatum issued to the Japanese for three or four months, until the Philippines and Singapore were strengthened.

  Roosevelt began searching for a way that would, as he told Stimson, “give us further time,” but even as he looked, received information that the crisis could not be avoided. It came in an intercepted message from Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Nomura, a long cable containing Proposals A and B, along with secret instructions. The cable was decoded, translated and rushed to Hull. The opening sentence of the instructions gave the impression that the Japanese had given up on the negotiations:

  WELL, THE RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE REACHED THE EDGE, AND OUR PEOPLE ARE LOSING CONFIDENCE IN THE POSSIBILITY OF EVER ADJUSTING THEM.

  Such pessimism was not in the original, for Togo had written:

  STRENUOUS EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE DAY AND NIGHT TO ADJUST JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS, WHICH ARE ON THE VERGE OF RUPTURE.

  The translation of the second paragraph was even more misleading:†

  CONDITIONS BOTH WITHIN AND WITHOUT OUR EMPIRE ARE SO TENSE THAT NO LONGER IS PROCRASTINATION POSSIBLE, YET IN OUR SINCERITY TO MAINTAIN PACIFIC RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, WE HAVE DECIDED AS A RESULT OF THESE DELIBERATIONS, TO GAMBLE ONCE MORE ON THE CONTINUANCE OF THE PARLEYS, BUT THIS IS OUR LAST EFFORT….

  The original was responsible in tone:

  THE SITUATION BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY IS EXTREMELY PRESSING AND WE CANNOT AFFORD ANY PROCRASTINATION. OUT OF THE SINCERE INTENTION TO MAINTAIN PEACEFUL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT CONTINUES THE NEGOTIATIONS AFTER THOROUGH DELIBERATIONS. THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS ARE OUR FINAL EFFORT….

  The translation then stated that unless these proposals succeeded, relations between the two nations would be ruptured.

  … IN FACT, WE GAMBLED THE FATE

  OF OUR LAND ON THE THROW OF THIS DIE.

  Togo’s actual words were:

  … AND THE SECURITY OF THE EMPIRE DEPENDS ON IT.

  Where Hull read—

  … THIS TIME WE ARE SHOWING THE LIMIT OF OUR FRIENDSHIP: THIS TIME WE ARE MAKING OUR LAST POSSIBLE BARGAIN, AND I HOPE THAT WE CAN THUS SETTLE ALL OUR TROUBLES WITH THE UNITED STATES
PEACEABLY,

  Togo had written:

  … NOW THAT WE MAKE THE UTMOST CONCESSION IN THE SPIRIT OF COMPLETE FRIENDLINESS FOR THE SAKE OF PEACEFUL SOLUTION, WE HOPE EARNESTLY THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL, ON ENTERING THE FINAL STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, RECONSIDER THE MATTER AND APPROACH THIS CRISIS IN A PROPER SPIRIT WITH A VIEW TO PRESERVING JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

  Hull got just as inaccurate a version of Togo’s specific instructions regarding Proposal A, as the following excerpts show:

  What Hull Read What Togo Wrote

  THIS PROPOSAL IS OUR REVISED ULTIMATUM. THIS IS OUR PROPOSAL SETTING FORTH WHAT ARE VIRTUALLY OUR FINAL CONCESSIONS.

  (NOTE: SHOULD THE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES QUESTION YOU IN REGARD TO “THE SUITABLE PERIOD [FOR RETAINING JAPANESE TROOPS IN CHINA],” ANSWER VAGUELY THAT SUCH A PERIOD SHOULD ENCOMPASS 25 YEARS.) (NOTE) IN CASE THE UNITED STATES INQUIRES INTO THE LENGTH OF THE NECESSARY DURATION, REPLY IS TO BE MADE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE APPROXIMATE GOAL IS 25 YEARS.

  … IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS SO MUCH OPPOSED TO OUR STATIONING SOLDIERS IN UNDEFINED AREA OUR PURPOSE IS TO SHIFT THE REGIONS OF OCCUPATION AND OUR OFFICIALS, THUS ATTEMPTING TO DISPEL THEIR SUSPICIONS…. IN VIEW OF THE STRONG AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO THE STATIONING FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD, IT IS PROPOSED TO DISMISS HER SUSPICION BY DEFINING THE AREA AND DURATION OF THE STATIONING …

  … WE HAVE HITHERTO COUCHED OUR ANSWERS IN VAGUE TERMS. I WANT YOU IN AS INDECISIVE YET AS PLEASANT LANGUAGE AS POSSIBLE TO EUPHEMIZE AND TRY TO IMPART TO THEM TO THE EFFECT THAT UNLIMITED OCCUPATION DOES NOT MEAN PERPETUAL OCCUPATION … … YOU ARE DIRECTED TO ABIDE, AT THIS MOMENT, BY THE ABSTRACT TERM “NECESSARY DURATION,” AND TO MAKE EFFORTS TO IMPRESS THE UNITED STATES WITH THE FACT THAT THE TROOPS ARE NOT TO BE STATIONED EITHER PERMANENTLY OR FOR ANY DEFINITE PERIOD.