November 1916

by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

  And where did the Council of Ministers stand in the midst of this furor? Above all, what was its attitude toward the Duma? Forgetting all serious work on legislative projects, that body was taking a loftier tone. Its ambition to seize power was more and more glaringly obvious. The regime was no longer under siege, it was the object of a frontal assault.

  Goremykin: Give the Duma a short run on condition it passes the draft law on category 2 militia, then dissolve it.

  Krivoshein agreed completely. Stop them as soon as possible! When we convened it we were thinking of a short session, say until early August. Even mid-August is unacceptable. The Duma hinders us from introducing extraordinary measures under Article 87. We must explain to our well-wishers among the deputies, and to those who are at least capable of talking to the “hated bureaucracy,” the impossibility in wartime conditions of making do with normal legislative procedures.

  The call-up of category 2 militia was yet another tyrannical excess on the part of GHQ: without considering the nation’s strength, or the needs of the economy, the Grand Duke had demanded millions more men under arms (or not even under arms, since there was a shortage of rifles). The government was understandably reluctant to mobilize the militia. But if it had to be done …

  Shcherbatov: It is absolutely essential to put the law on the militia through the State Duma. The results of the draft are poorer all the time. The police cannot cope with the mass of draft evaders. Men hide in the forests and in unharvested fields. Given the present mood of the people, I’m afraid that without the Duma’s sanction we won’t get a single man. Agitators are at work full blast, with enormous funds from some source or other at their disposal.

  Grigorovich (Navy Minister): We know what the source is—Germany.

  Shcherbatov: I am bound to point out that this agitation is taking on a more and more frankly defeatist character. Its direct effect is surrender en masse to the enemy.

  Samarin (Procurator of the Holy Synod): A host of gray greatcoats are running wild on the home front. Can’t some more useful role be found for them in the battle zone?

  Krivoshein: My civilian eye is affronted by this multitude of loafers in gray greatcoats in our cities, our villages, along the railway lines, and over the whole face of Russia. Why strip the population of its last working hands when all we need to do is take hold of this horde of vagabonds and put them in the trenches? However, this comes under the heading of military matters outside the competence of the Council of Ministers.

  Polivanov, whose exasperated sarcasm defied all restraints, informed them—eyes flashing, jaw jutting—that the situation at the front, with GHQ in control, was one of complete disarray in total defeat:

  I place my hopes on Russia’s insurmountable expanses, on Russia’s impassable mud, and on the mercy of St. Nicholas of Myra.

  Kharitonov (State Control): Meanwhile our triumphal progress through the Caucasus continues uninterrupted. What exactly are we shoving in there for—if you’ll excuse the expression?

  Polivanov: Everybody knows that—to create a Greater Armenia. The gathering of the Armenian lands is the great ambition of Countess Vorontsova-Dashkova

  (wife of the vice-regent of the Caucasus)

  But perhaps the most destructive consequence of our defeat in the West was the flood tide of refugees. The waters had risen, and no governmental or public body could channel and control them.

  Krivoshein: Of all the grievous consequences of the war this is the most unexpected, the most dangerous, and the most intractable. And the really awful thing about it is that it is not caused by real need or by a spontaneous popular impulse. It is deliberately contrived by our wise strategists to deter the enemy. Sickness, suffering, and poverty are spreading all over Russia, and the people’s curses go with them. The hungry and the ragged are sowing panic everywhere. They advance in serried ranks, trampling the crops, ruining the meadows and forests, leaving what is virtually a desert behind them. Even the rear echelons of the army have been stripped of their last reserve of provisions. I imagine that the Germans contemplate the results with some satisfaction and are glad to be relieved of concern for the population. This second great migration of the peoples, organized by GHQ, will drag Russia to revolution and ruin.

  In the war of 1812 compact armies maneuvered over limited areas and the number of refugees was not so huge. Now, copying the tactics of that war and applying them along an unbroken front, the generals were laying waste whole provinces, uprooting millions from their ancestral homes, never pausing to think how to deal with horses and cattle in the railway age. At least 120,000 freight cars were in use simply to provide living space for refugees.

  The all-powerful Yanushkevich was nonetheless so inconspicuous in the shadow of the Grand Duke that he might still have stayed put had he not extended this measure of forcible resettlement in the inner provinces to all Jews, at the same time accusing them one and all of sympathizing with the enemy and of spying. Yanushkevich dreaded being blamed for the enormous retreat—and had the unfortunate idea of shifting the blame for military failures onto the Jews. And although his measures were all countersigned by the Grand Duke, the inner provinces unambiguously identified Yanushkevich as the culprit. In the outside world Russia as a whole was considered culpable. Outrage in the West was instantaneous. The allied governments stated emphatically that failure to make peace with the Jews would affect Russia adversely.

  This question was discussed as a matter of great urgency in early August at several meetings of the Russian cabinet: everywhere in the West (and by domestic banks also) the credits Russia needed to carry on the war had been cut off, all the sources of funds without which Russia could not continue for a week had been closed. This was true above all of the United States, which had become warring Europe’s banker.

  Shcherbatov: Our efforts to make GHQ see reason are meeting with no success. All of us, individually and collectively, have spoken, written, pleaded, complained. But the all-powerful Yanushkevich does not feel bound by considerations of the interest of the state as a whole. Hundreds of thousands of Jews are moving eastward from the theater of war, and it is impossible to distribute this whole mass within the limits of the Pale of Settlement. Local governors report that everything is full over and above capacity, and that furthermore they cannot answer for the safety of the new settlers when passions are running high and soldiers returning from the front engage in anti-Semitic agitation. This makes it necessary for us to settle evacuated Jews outside the Pale, if only temporarily. The boundary is being overstepped already. The leaders of Russian Jewry are urgently demanding that it be put on a basis of law. In the heat of discussion I have been told to my face that revolutionary feeling is growing uncontrollably among the Jewish masses. People abroad are also beginning to lose patience, and their requests are beginning to sound almost like ultimata: “If you expect to be given money to carry on the war you should …” We must temporarily suspend the rules on the Pale of Settlement. We must do something to facilitate the rehabilitation of the Jewish people, who have been blackened by rumors of treason. And we must make haste, so as not to be left behind by events.

  Krivoshein: The Minister of Finance, who is presently being torn limb from limb by the State Duma, asks for some action on the Jewish question of a demonstrative character. He was visited the other day by Kamenka, Baron Ginsburg, and Varshavsky, to inform him of the general indignation in their community. The gist of what they said was: “Give, and we will give in return.” There is a knife at our throats, and no two ways about it. While they are still asking politely we can set conditions: If we make major changes to the Pale of Settlement, you can give us financial support and use your influence on all the newspapers and journals dependent on Jewish capital (which means almost the whole press) to change its revolutionary tone.

  Sazonov: Our allies are also dependent on Jewish capital, and will answer our requests with instructions to make our peace with the Jews.

  Shcherbatov: We’re caught in a v
icious circle. We’re helpless, and without them we can’t raise a kopeck.

  Goremykin: The Jews may have residence rights only in cities. We must protect the rural areas.

  Shcherbatov: And we have a convincing argument for doing so: the village is more and more inclined to pogroms. We have to protect the Jews from that, since the rural police is almost nonexistent.

  Krivoshein: The Jews themselves understand that very well. They feel no attraction to the villages. Their interests are entirely bound up with the urban centers.

  Sazonov: I know from a reliable source that even the omnipotent Leopold Rothschild does not venture outside the towns.

  Rukhlov: All Russia is suffering the hardships of war, yet the Jews are the first to be given relief. It confirms the saying that if you have money everything is for sale. There is no doubt that the underlying reasons for our action will be generally recognized. Forget the Jewish bankers. What impression will it make on the army and the Russian people at large? Let’s hope that there will not be an explosion of indignation, with bloody disasters for the Jews themselves. The way the question is put has taken me by surprise, and I find it difficult to answer with an easy conscience.

  Samarin: I fully understand this feeling of spiritual protest. I too find it painful to agree to an action which will have tremendous consequences, and which Russians will have to pay for in the future. But such is the combination of circumstances that we have to make the sacrifice.

  Polivanov: As the minister with responsibility for the Cossack territories, I am obliged to state that the right of unrestricted residence for the Jews can hardly be applicable even to the towns in those areas. An exception must be made for Cossack urban centers in the interest of the Jews themselves. Historically, Cossacks and Jews have never been able to live at peace with one another, and their encounters have always ended unhappily. Nor should we lose sight of the fact that it is mainly Cossack units that are carrying out General Yanushkevich’s orders to save the Russian army from Jewish sedition.

  The following day, 19 August, the ministers met again, and the secret session began with further discussion of the same subject. Goremykin reported that he had informed the Emperor of the ministers’ views, and that His Majesty had approved in principle the abolition of residence restrictions on the Jews as far as towns were concerned. (Something he did not agree to in 1906, when Stolypin pressed him to do it. Necessity is a great persuader. In that retreat in the summer of 1915 Russia was reminded that with the three partitions of Poland she had bitten off more than she could chew.)

  Krivoshein: The interests of the economy have long called for the involvement of as many entrepreneurs as possible. The transfer of Jewish businesses from the western border areas will stimulate the development of industry and bring new life to other localities. The Jews will shake the sleeping kingdom and give a healthy shock to Russian businessmen who have grown idle under a protectionist system. There are in fact quite a few Jews already in some of the oldest and most Russian towns—most of them, however, are rich Jews.

  Rukhlov: My heart and mind protest against the fact that the first effect of our military setbacks is concessions to the Jews. There has been talk here of financial and military considerations which favor this gesture. But we have only to recall the role of the Jews in the events of 1905, and the percentage of persons of Jewish origin among those who carry on revolutionary propaganda or belong to underground organizations. I categorically refuse to add my signature. But I do not feel entitled to declare my disagreement openly and so shift the burden of such a crucial decision onto our Russian Tsar.

  Shcherbatov: Sergei Vasilievich is, of course, profoundly correct when he points to the destructive influence of Jewry. But what else can we do, with the knife at our throats? When the money is in Jewish hands …

  Bark: It is not we who have created this crisis, but those with whom we pleaded in vain to refrain from aggravating the Jewish problem with the aid of Cossack whips. Foreign markets are now closed to us, and we shall not get a single kopeck there. I have received broad hints that we shall not get out of these difficulties until we make demonstrative moves on the Jewish question. As Minister of Finance, I see no other way out. The days of Minin and Pozharsky have seemingly gone, never to return.

  Krivoshein: I too usually identify the Russian revolutionary movement with the Jews, but shall nonetheless sign the act granting concessions. Let us make haste. We cannot wage war on Germany and on the Jews simultaneously. That is beyond the powers even of such a mighty country as Russia, although General Yanushkevich is of another opinion.

  The discussion had come to an end, and they began considering procedure.

  Goremykin: In present conditions we cannot set off a debate on the Jewish question in the Duma. It could take a dangerous turn and serve to exacerbate ethnic strife. There is no assurance that the bill would get through. And a lengthy legislative process would rob the measure of the required demonstrative effect and of its graciousness.

  Kharitonov: Take my word for it, nobody will let out a squeak about proper legislative procedures and there will be no protests. Not only the Kadets and those further to the left but the Octobrists too will feel duty-bound to welcome the act. Interpellations and protests are out of the question.

  Bark: The French Rothschilds sincerely desire to help the Allies defeat Germany. And Kitchener has said several times that one of the important conditions of success in this war is relaxation of restrictions on Jews in Russia. Our decision today will have an extremely favorable effect on our finances.

  This, however, did not happen. Indeed, still in August, the Allies demanded that, for a start, one-quarter of Russia’s gold reserves should be sent to England and America to guarantee payment for arms purchases.

  Kharitonov: So our kind allies hold a knife to our throat and put the squeeze on us—give us your gold or you won’t get a thing. God bless them, I’m sure, but that is no way for decent people to behave.

  Krivoshein: Even Shingarev disapproves of the way London and Paris are acting. They are thrilled by the heroic efforts we are making to save the Allied fronts at the cost of Russian defeats and the millions of casualties Russia is suffering, but when it comes to money they squeeze us harder than any usurer. And America takes advantage of the situation to get fat on Europe’s misfortunes.

  Shakhovskoy: So we have been given an ultimatum by our allies?

  Bark: Yes. If we refuse to send the gold abroad the Americans will demand payment in gold for every single rifle.

  They then considered conditions to put before influential Jewish groups: that they should try to make the Jewish masses put an end to revolutionary agitation and should also help to change the attitudes of the press.

  Meanwhile, another shock awaited the ministers at their 19 August session. Until that moment General Polivanov had taken little part in the exchange of views. He had sat sunk in gloom, and a habitual twitch of the head and one shoulder had become more pronounced. Then Goremykin asked him to report on the situation in the theater of war. (Sukhomlinov had never treated them to such reports, because he was never adequately briefed himself.) Polivanov readily obliged. His colleagues had previously observed that the gloomier and more hopeless his reports were (and he always exaggerated), the more complacent, not to say happier, he looked. He might have been reporting the destruction of the enemy. On this occasion too he drew a picture of total collapse.

  We can expect an irremediable catastrophe at any minute. The army is no longer withdrawing, it is on the run. The least little rumor of the enemy’s approach causes panic and the flight of whole regiments. Our salvation for the time being is the artillery. But we have hardly any shells. GHQ has lost its head completely, it gives contradictory orders, and swings from one extreme to the other. The whole organism of GHQ is rotten with the psychology of defeat. It sees no way out except by the ill-famed strategy of luring the enemy deep into the interior.

  No way out! On any consideration the High Command
had to be changed if Russia was to be saved! The whole Council of Ministers must beg the Emperor to reorganize GHQ!

  Ah, but Polivanov had something even worse in store for his colleagues:

  However awful what is going on at the front may be, Russia is threatened by something much more frightening. I will deliberately break my oath of military secrecy and my promise to remain silent for the time being. His Majesty informed me this morning of his decision to dismiss the Grand Duke and take over the Supreme Command himself.

  This created a sensation among the ministers! They all started talking at once, across each other, so that it was impossible to make out what any single one was saying.

  It is extraordinary. You might suppose that they were sick to death of the highhanded GHQ, of the mad-headed Grand Duke, of the intriguer Yanushkevich. You might suppose that once the Emperor assumed the Supreme Command the existing Rules for the Administration of the Army in the Field would finally come into their own, with no need to change anything. But no! Nothing could have come as such a shock to the ministers as this news.

  Polivanov: Knowing how sensitive and how stubborn the Emperor is when he makes decisions of a personal nature, I tried in the most cautious way possible to dissuade him. In the present state of our forces we have no hope at all even of limited success, let alone of halting the victorious progress of the Germans. I did not feel that I had the right to disguise the possible consequences for the internal life of the country if troops commanded by the Tsar in person should fail to stop the enemy’s advance. The impression it would make on the country if the Tsar personally had to order the evacuation of Petrograd or Moscow does not bear thinking about. His Majesty replied that he had weighed all the possibilities and that his decision was irrevocable.