Ike and McCarthy

by David A. Nichols

  Stalin died on March 5. The president issued a one-sentence statement offering “official condolences to the Government of the U.S.S.R. on the death of Generalissimo Joseph Stalin, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union.” That afternoon, Under Secretary of State Smith told committee that he and Bohlen had been “sitting up with a sick friend” and that Stalin’s illness had cost them “a lot of sleep the last two nights.”24

  Stalin’s death did not alter the situation with respect to Bohlen’s nomination. On March 10, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—after approving six other diplomatic appointments—rejected Secretary Dulles’s plea for quick action on the Bohlen nomination. Expecting to testify, Bohlen was kept waiting for an hour and a half outside the hearing room. Nevertheless, Eisenhower resolved to “fight it out.”25

  RUMORS

  Chip Bohlen had never undergone an FBI investigation. Rumors bubbled up about his personal life that reflected the homophobia of the period. When the rumors surfaced—eagerly disseminated by Joe McCarthy—FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover ordered an inquiry. The columnist Drew Pearson recorded in his diary that, on March 5, FBI agents visited him and “asked whether Bohlen was a homo and then quoted me as having once said he was.” Pearson, who did not particularly like Bohlen, told the agents that he had “never had the slightest suspicion or thought along this line.”26

  However, a week later Dulles fretted to Sherman Adams that the Bohlen nomination was “on very shaky grounds” due to “moral” allegations. Alexander Wiley, the senior Republican senator from Wisconsin and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, stated that the nomination hinged on efforts “to cut through rumor and get at the facts.”27

  On Monday, March 16, Dulles engaged in a flurry of phone calls, trying to assess the status of the Bohlen nomination. Dulles told Eisenhower about “certain rumors afloat,” and the president urged him to check with State Department counselor Douglas MacArthur II, who had worked closely with Bohlen. MacArthur found the allegations “incredible” and was confident that Bohlen, a married man, had “a normal family life.” Eisenhower never wavered; he “had not the slightest intention of withdrawing Bohlen’s name,” and he ordered that the secretary should so inform Senator Taft. Dulles called Taft and informed him that the president “was determined to stand behind the Bohlen nomination.”28

  Finally, Dulles called Bohlen, who was quarantined at home with the measles, to assure him that there was “no weakening of the President’s determination to stand by his nomination.” He wanted to be certain that Bohlen would not withdraw, “because that would leave the President in an embarrassing position.” Bohlen assured Dulles that he had no such intention, “none whatever.”29

  Dulles did not address the issue that had caused him and the president to pin down Bohlen on staying the course: Bohlen’s brother-in-law, Charles Thayer, was about to be dismissed from the State Department. Thayer, the US consul general in Munich, had been repeatedly investigated concerning unproven accusations of communist leanings and homosexuality. Nevertheless, J. Edgar Hoover and McCarthy had targeted him for removal as a security risk. The case was putting serious strains on the Bohlen family. It was evident that the price of Bohlen’s confirmation would be the resignation of Thayer. Dulles ultimately admitted to Bohlen that the Thayer situation had been the reason for his phone call.30

  McCarthy, sensing a loss of momentum in his effort to keep the Bohlen rumor mill going, escalated his attack on Dulles. In a speech on the Senate floor, he declared that “our Secretary of State is completely misinformed on Bohlen’s usefulness as an expert on Communism.” The containment policy, supported by Bohlen, had “delivered millions of free men and women to serfdom and death.” The senator thundered, “We want no part of this ‘Chip’ off the old block of Yalta.” He asserted that Eisenhower would surely withdraw the nomination if he saw the “entire file” the FBI had on Bohlen—implying again that he himself had reviewed its contents.31

  On March 18, Dulles called Bohlen into his office to plan their hearing strategy before the Foreign Relations Committee. He suggested that Bohlen downplay his advisory role at Yalta and depict himself as primarily an interpreter; Bohlen retorted that he was unwilling to play the “village idiot.” Dulles asked once more, “Is there anything in your past that might be damaging?” Bohlen replied, “No.” Dulles called Sherman Adams and, in effect, communicated to the president that he had become convinced beyond any doubt that “there was nothing to the [homosexuality] story after discussing it with Bohlen.”32

  Later that day, Dulles and Bohlen departed for Capitol Hill. Dulles decreed that they go in separate cars, leading Bohlen to wonder if he “would have the courage to stand up to the McCarthyites.” Bohlen’s fears were unfounded; Dulles was brilliantly persuasive. In a three-hour closed-door session, he discredited the rumors about Bohlen’s personal life and effectively made the case for his experience and expertise. He still argued that the ambassador to Moscow was not in a policy-making position, whereas Bohlen, in his present position as a State Department counselor, was. Though that assertion bordered on absurdity, it provided protective cover for pro-Bohlen senators. The next day Arthur Krock endorsed the fiction that the Soviet ambassador “is not by function a policy maker.” Foreign policy, he wrote, was the province “of the President and two or three of his ministers.”33

  Based on the secretary of state’s virtuoso performance, the Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously that day—15 to 0—to approve Charles Bohlen as the next ambassador to the Soviet Union. At Eisenhower’s news conference on March 19, the momentum for Bohlen’s nomination was evident; still, reporters asked the president to comment on McCarthy’s assertion that “it was a serious mistake for you not to withdraw the Bohlen nomination.” Eisenhower responded that he had “a full report” from the secretary of state. He continued, “I have considered Mr. Bohlen a man to be thoroughly trained in State Department functions and practices, familiar with Russia . . . and he seemed to me to be a very fine appointment.”34

  Once the Senate committee approved Bohlen, the State Department accepted Charles Thayer’s resignation. Thayer’s cover story was that he was resigning to resume his writing career. On March 21, Secretary Dulles called his brother, Allen, the CIA director, to tell him that Bohlen understood “about the Charlie [Thayer] situation and that it is no longer a real difficulty as far as he is concerned.”35

  THE MCLEOD PROBLEM

  Back in February, in an attempt to appease McCarthy, Dulles had appointed a new security officer. His choice was Scott McLeod, a former FBI agent and aide to Republican Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, a known McCarthy admirer. McLeod quickly fulfilled his role; in his first three weeks on the job, he dismissed twenty-one State Department employees who were alleged to be homosexual.36

  However, just when the Eisenhower team thought they had the obstacles to Charles Bohlen’s nomination under control, rumors surfaced—almost certainly spread by the McCarthy camp—that McLeod had doubts about Bohlen’s fitness for office. Dulles, based on his own review of the FBI summary report on Bohlen, had overruled McLeod’s doubts. In response, McLeod committed two major indiscretions. First, he went over Dulles’s head to White House congressional liaison Jerry Persons. Sherman Adams discussed that contact with Eisenhower and called Dulles, who angrily declared that McLeod “needed straightening out.” However, if his aide resigned now, Dulles feared it “would probably cause a floor fight on Friday when the nomination comes before the full Senate.” Adams responded that he and the president did “not propose to let that happen” and urged Dulles to reach an accommodation with his security officer. However, in conversation, Dulles found McLeod, “very stubborn” and, to his further discomfort, he learned that McCarthy had threatened to subpoena the security officer for a televised hearing.37

  On March 20, McLeod’s second indiscretion surfaced. Reading his morning paper, Dulles felt as if he had been slapped in the face; McLeod had apparently leaked his dissent over B
ohlen to McCarthy and the press. Dulles angrily grumbled to Adams and Jim Hagerty that McLeod “is obviously in close touch with McCarthy.” Adams urged Dulles to talk once more with McLeod; Eisenhower personally called the secretary to say he would back whatever he decided to do. However, after more discussion with Ike, Adams called Dulles back, warning him to “remember relations on the Hill [and] the explosion that could come.” Nevertheless, he stated that if McLeod “does not come clean you cannot keep him.”38

  By the time Dulles confronted the wayward aide, his anger had abated. McLeod was embarrassed and repentant. As Dulles later explained to Adams, McLeod had unwittingly intersected McCarthy’s grapevine. He had discussed his doubts with his former boss, Senator Bridges, who mentioned the concern on a ride to the airport with Senator Herman Welker of Idaho, who spent the evening with McCarthy. McCarthy then gave the story to the papers, once again leaving the clear impression that he had seen the full FBI file on Bohlen.39

  Dulles informed McLeod that the president had authorized him to demand his resignation, but he offered him “a fresh start”—in effect, probation. McLeod provided a written apology, thanking the secretary for his “patience and understanding.” Dulles warned McLeod that, as security officer, he could not “testify before a Congressional Committee” without authorization from the president or the secretary. Then he spirited his troublesome aide out of the city to an undisclosed location, leaving McCarthy’s staff frustrated over attempts to deliver a subpoena.40

  At his March 20 news conference, Secretary Dulles, with Senator Wiley at his side, denied that he had “summarily overridden” McLeod’s judgment—McCarthy’s charge—on Bohlen’s security clearance, nor had he misrepresented the facts in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “I did not find in the Federal Bureau of Investigation reports in summary, any facts indicating that Mr. Bohlen might be a security or loyalty risk,” he said. He maintained that there was “no disagreement” between him and McLeod and the aide would continue in his job. He reminded the reporters that the day before, President Eisenhower had defended the Bohlen appointment, knew about every item in the Bohlen file, and did not intend to withdraw the nomination.

  McCarthy challenged Dulles, saying “From all the information we have, any statement that both Dulles and McLeod agree on Bohlen would appear to be untrue.” He again proclaimed, “I know what’s in Bohlen’s file.” The FBI file, the senator said, included sixteen closely typed pages of “what could be termed derogatory information.”41

  THE FBI REPORT MUDDLE

  With the McLeod matter put to rest, the Bohlen controversy migrated to the question “Who may see the FBI report?” Senator Taft proposed that one or two senators from the Foreign Relations Committee be delegated to review the report. On March 21, Attorney General Brownell informed Dulles that he had been unable to persuade the reluctant J. Edgar Hoover “to change his mind about having some senator look at the Bohlen File.” In addition, Senator Wiley was now insisting that one of the two senators be a Democrat, a proposition Brownell heatedly opposed. Brownell cautioned Eisenhower that Taft’s solution would “open up Pandora’s box to certain senators”—obviously McCarthy. That argument persuaded Eisenhower to delay a decision on whether to insist the senators be given access to the file.42

  Meanwhile, on the Senate floor, the debate grew rancorous. On March 23, Republican senators led what New York Times columnist William S. White called “the first general and determined counterattack ever made on [McCarthy] within his own party in the Senate.” The senator was accused of abusing both Secretary Dulles and the president. Taft defended his proposal to have the Foreign Relations Committee designate two members to review the FBI report on Bohlen. He maintained that more broadly exposing a file filled with gossip could damage Bohlen’s reputation and “destroy the F.B.I.”43

  Eisenhower made his final decision the morning of March 24. Dulles called Taft to say that the president “would overrule Brownell if necessary, making it plain that this was a special case.” The president wanted assurances that the sources of the FBI’s information would not be compromised. Dulles phoned Attorney General Brownell: “We are agreed that we must do something to clear this situation up. The rumors have become so thick that unless someone on the floor of the Senate is in position to dissipate them the situation will be very serious.” The attorney general acquiesced, and Dulles sent Wiley a formal letter stating that two senators had been approved to review “the summary of the FBI report regarding Mr. Bohlen.” The committee then selected Taft and Democratic Senator John Sparkman of Alabama.44

  However, Dulles’s words “the summary” triggered a whole new brouhaha. What would the two senators get to see—a “summary” of the FBI report or the “raw material”? Unable to reach the attorney general, Dulles, in Taft’s presence, phoned J. Edgar Hoover to inform him that the senators wanted to see the “raw files, as well as the summary.” Hoover was adamant: “The raw material file is never made available to anyone.” Dulles put Taft on the phone; he quoted McCarthy’s claim on the Senate floor that “he had seen the entire file,” an assertion the FBI director denied. Hoover said he would provide the raw file only if the attorney general ordered him to do so. Having lost the previous arguments, Brownell drew the line and supported Hoover, maintaining that it was “really a protection to the senators if they did not see the material.” They should, he said, “take Hoover’s word that it was a complete summary.” Reluctantly, Taft accepted the decision; he and Sparkman would review only the summary.45

  On March 24 at 5:45 p.m., after reviewing the FBI document, Taft and Sparkman emerged from the secretary of state’s office. Pressed by a flood of questions, the senators commented to reporters that they had found the summary “unusually complete.” Taft described it as “25 pages, single spaced” and “very long and detailed.” They confirmed that Dulles’s testimony before the committee had been “a very fine statement of the summary.”46

  On March 25, McCarthy rose on the Senate floor to deliver his final tirade in opposition to Bohlen’s appointment. Decrying “two black decades,” he declared that “history will write large the names of those who sold out this country at the diplomatic tables at home and abroad.” He called the Bohlen nomination “a grave and inexcusable mistake on the part of our Secretary of State” and accused Bohlen of playing “directly into the hands of international Communism” in a “government of, by and for Communists, crooks and cronies.” He sneered at Dulles’s suggestion that Bohlen, rather than being a policy maker at Yalta and Potsdam, “was only an interpreter.” McCarthy let Ike off the hook; the president, he said, “burdened with work and pressed for time,” had not had the chance “to study the complete record of Bohlen.”47

  The Senate debate that followed was described by The New York Times as “bitter.” Taft sparred with McCarthy, insisting that the FBI summary had nothing in it “reflecting on the loyalty of Mr. Bohlen in any way”; he had found no evidence that Bohlen was “a bad security risk,” a veiled reference to the homosexuality rumors. Sparkman confirmed that view, saying he had found no evidence of “anything wrong with the character, integrity or honesty of Mr. Bohlen.” “So,” Taft concluded, “I myself came to the conclusion that Mr. Bohlen was a completely good security risk in every respect, and I am glad so to report to the Senate of the United States.”48

  TOWARD CONFIRMATION

  Eisenhower’s March 26 press conference was sandwiched in between that final Senate debate and the confirmation vote, scheduled for the twenty-seventh. Asked again whether Mr. Bohlen was his “personal choice” for ambassador to Moscow, he delivered a ringing endorsement. “I have known Mr. Bohlen for some years,” he said. “I was once, at least, a guest in his home, and with his very charming family. I have played golf with him. I have listened to his philosophy. So far as I can see, he is the best qualified man for that post that I could find. That is the reason his name was sent to the Senate and the reason it stays there, because I believe
, still, that he is the best qualified man we could find today.”

  A reporter asked what the president thought McCarthy’s “objectives have been in the Bohlen case, as affecting your appointment?” “I am not going to talk about Senator McCarthy,” he snapped—a rare occasion when he mentioned the name. However, he warned that congressional investigations could be pursued “to the point that you are damaging from within what you are trying to protect from without.” McCarthy commented only mildly on the president’s support of Bohlen, saying “I am sure he is very serious when he says Bohlen is the best man. But it so happens that I differ with him.” He admitted that he had “no remote hope of success” in derailing the nomination.49

  The next day, the Senate voted 74 to 13 to confirm Charles Bohlen as ambassador to the Soviet Union. The negative votes included eleven Republicans, while thirty-nine Democrats supported the nomination. Secretary Dulles called Senator Taft to thank him; Taft is alleged to have grumbled in response, “No more Bohlens.” McCarthy was unrepentant, mocking the president’s statement about Bohlen being the “best man” for the job: “I hope that those of us who felt he was the worst man for the job will be proven wrong.”50

  Eisenhower had won an important strategic victory over McCarthy. He had not permitted the senator’s fearmongering to dictate an appointment of great importance. When the outcome became apparent, Ike discussed McCarthy’s motivations with Sherman Adams and his deputy, Bernard Shanley. He commented that “the only thing” McCarthy wanted “was headlines” and he did not care how he got them. Ike declared, “McCarthy has the bug to run for the presidency in 1956.” Slapping his knee, Ike thundered, “The only reason I would consider running again would be to run against him.” Shanley “let out a whoop,” whereupon the taciturn Adams glared at his aide as if he were “completely out of order”—“which,” Shanley conceded, “I was.”51