A Thousand Days

by Arthur M. Schlesinger

  Kennedy played a more direct role in filling the top positions in the Treasury. H. H. Fowler, a Washington lawyer with long government experience and a Democrat, came in as Under Secretary. The two vital tax posts—the Assistant Secretary for Taxation and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue—were assigned to scholars who had advised the Kennedy staff on tax matters during the campaign, Stanley Surrey of the Harvard Law School and Mortimer M. Caplin of the University of Virginia Law School. James A. Reed, another Kennedy friend from PT-boat days, became Assistant Secretary for Law Enforcement. For the critical Under Secretaryship for Monetary Affairs, Paul Samuelson and a number of economists had proposed Robert V. Roosa, a brilliant young economist from the New York Federal Reserve Bank. Samuelson, indeed, praised Roosa so extravagantly that the President-elect, who at that time was still looking for a Secretary, finally said, “Well, if this fellow is so good, why don’t we give him the top job?” “You can’t do that,” Samuelson said. “He is too young.” Kennedy, noting that Roosa was only a year younger than himself, was considerably entertained. Later, when Dillon mentioned to Kennedy one day the lack of senior economists in the Treasury (most had left in the Eisenhower years), Kennedy suggested that he ask Seymour Harris to serve as economic adviser. Harris, with his versatility, his resourcefulness on policy matters, his deep commitment to the Kennedy program and his imperturbable good humor, played an invaluable role both in mobilizing economic advice for the Treasury and in tranquilizing relations between the Treasury and the Council of Economic Advisers.

  And so, one after another, the departments began to acquire their new leaders. Robert Kennedy assembled a crack group from law schools and law offices to man the Department of Justice. Udall similarly worked out his own appointments for Interior. Hodges and Klotz produced the list for Commerce. Goldberg and Ribicoff consulted closely with Ralph Dungan in staffing Labor and Health, Education and Welfare. As the day of inauguration drew near, the Kennedy administration was beginning to take shape.

  2. DRAFTING THE PROGRAM

  While Kennedy was choosing the members of his administration, he was engaged in still another, and quite separate, effort to chart the main directions of policy. For this purpose, he set up a series of task forces in both domestic and foreign affairs.

  The task force idea was hardly new in the Kennedy operation; Ted Sorensen had experimented with one variation or another in the pre-convention period. But the post-election task forces began with Stevenson’s July proposal for a foreign policy report to be submitted early in the interregnum. A week after he told Stevenson to go ahead, Kennedy asked Stuart Symington to head a task force on the organization of the defense establishment; its members were Clark Clifford, Tom Finletter, Roswell Gilpatric, Fowler Hamilton and Marx Leva, all lawyers with defense experience. Up to this point, the Kennedy task forces seemed, in part at least, exercises in the propitiation of defeated rivals for the Democratic nomination. Then at the end of August he announced a committee to deal with national security policy; its chief members were Paul Nitze, David Bruce and Gilpatric, and it included no prominent politician. The Nitze and Stevenson assignments appeared to overlap, which somewhat irritated Stevenson. But Kennedy, in the mood of F.D.R., did not intend to confer on anyone exclusive rights to advise and perceived positive values in competition. So he placated Stevenson and looked forward to receiving both reports.

  Before the election, Kennedy appointed four more task forces—on natural resources, wheat, cotton and the use of the agricultural surplus abroad. Meanwhile, Stevenson found himself more involved in the campaign than he had expected—he ended by delivering eighty-four speeches—and he therefore asked George Ball to work with him on his report. Eventually Ball prepared a first draft, discussed it with Fulbright, Bowles, Bruce and Finletter and brought it out to Libertyville the weekend before the election, where Stevenson put it into final shape. On November 14, John Sharon delivered the report to Kennedy in Palm Beach.

  The report revolved in the main around Europe and reflected to a considerable degree Ball’s preoccupations with NATO and with Atlantic trade policies. “The document has infirmities in emphasis, is uneven in treatment, and I apologize for its length,” Stevenson wrote in a typically self-deprecatory cover letter. He thought there was too much detail on sharing the nuclear deterrent and not enough on disarmament and east-west negotiations, too much on strengthening the Atlantic Community and not enough on the problems of the underdeveloped world.

  Yet, within its limits, it was an exceedingly able statement. Part I listed questions requiring immediate attention—the gold drain, the postponement of the discussions of the NATO deterrent, new initiatives in disarmament, assurances on Berlin, support of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Part II proposed long-term policies in the field of trade, economic development, NATO nuclear cooperation and arms control. Of particular interest was Ball’s idea for a comprehensive economic bill which would combine new aid proposals with the delegation to the President of five-year authority to reduce tariffs by 50 per cent across the board. Appendixes dealt with the problems of China, sub-Saharan Africa and the organization of the State Department. The memorandum concluded by recommending the formation of further task forces to deal with Latin America and Africa.

  When Sharon handed Kennedy the document over the breakfast table at Palm Beach, he suggested that the President-elect might want to look first at the immediate recommendations. Kennedy promptly read Part I, throwing questions at Sharon as he turned the pages: How many presidential appointments would he have in State? Would Stevenson prepare a list of people whom he thought qualified for key positions? How should the proposed peace or disarmament agency be set up? Were there Republicans who might be considered as head of this agency? (“He said,” Sharon later reported to Stevenson, “that when one mentions the names of Rockefeller, Dillon and McCloy one has about exhausted the supply of ‘good Republicans’ and asked if we would come up with additional Republican names”) What was the OECD doing—that is the kind of thing he had not been able to keep up with during the campaign? What about Cuba? How effective was the embargo? Would there be any chance of a ‘rapprochement’ with Castro after January 20 (Sharon noted that he asked this “rather rhetorically”)? What about the problem of State Department allowances for ambassadors? When he finished Part I, Kennedy closed the volume and said, “Very good. Terrific. This is excellent. Just what I needed.” Sharon then mentioned the recommendation for additional task forces, but Kennedy made no comment.

  In the next few days, Ball and Sharon prepared answers to Kennedy’s supplementary questions. In the meantime, the President-elect received the Nitze report on national security policy. This report provided an incisive analysis of the case for a more diversified defense posture. It then offered useful discussions of the relationship between defense policy and disarmament and of the balance-of-payments problem before concluding with some sketchy paragraphs on foreign policy. Actually the Stevenson and Nitze reports overlapped a good deal less than Stevenson may have feared or Nitze hoped. In any case, the two reports evidently convinced the President-elect that the task force approach would help in the interregnum. He told Sorensen to mobilize a broad range of domestic policy task forces, and on November 18 dictated a letter to Sharon proposing a list of further task forces for foreign policy.

  He began with Latin America, saying that he wanted by early 1961 to have new proposals

  dramatic enough to catch the imagination of the people there. I would recommend appropriations called for by the authorization of last summer, $500 million [to carry out the Bogotá Agreement] but that is hardly enough. What special steps could we take in the winter of 1961 or what recommendations could we make that would create an atmosphere of sympathy for Latin America? Who should chair the task force—what about Berle?

  As for Africa:

  We should set up a similar task force. . . . What special proposals should we make in the winter of ’61 in regard to raising th
e educational level, the fight against disease and improving the available food supply?

  In addition:

  We should make a study of the State Department personnel in the field—how many speak the language; what steps can we take to improve that; the length of tenure of the Department personnel in overseas assignments—is it long enough; whether the Ambassador should be given greater or lesser control over the various personnel and missions in his country—a related analysis on the general competence and usefulness of the military aides in foreign service. We ought also to consider how to get more Negroes into the Foreign Service.

  We should study the whole USIA effort . . . How does our effort in this field compare with the Communist effort—Chinese as well as Russian—also Cairo’s?

  We should have a study of allowances for overseas personnel, not only in Foreign Service but for our other overseas personnel. How do our allowances compare with the British, French and Russian?

  We should set up a task force on the distribution of our agricultural surpluses abroad. . . . How much more should be bilateral . . . multilateral? How can we put more through the United Nations—maybe Hubert Humphrey could set up a task force on this.

  We should prepare to set up an Arms Research Institute and should get this in definite form so that we can send it to the Congress early in the year. . . .

  Each of these reports should not merely isolate the problems and suggest generalized solutions, but should incorporate particular suggestions which can be implemented by legislative action. These reports should be completed by the end of December if possible.

  He concluded by saying that he was sending copies of this letter to Nitze, Bowles and Rostow. “I think it would be helpful if you four could communicate and arrange for the organization of these groups. I will rely on you, John, to be in touch with everyone.”

  This letter expressed Kennedy’s preliminary thoughts, and in the end he did not send it (by accident, however, a copy went to Bowles). On reflection he evidently decided that a four-headed directorate was too much. Instead, he called Sharon on November 23 and told him to set up task forces for Latin America, Africa, USIA and foreign economic policy. When Sharon asked him whether he wished these task forces to be coordinated with Nitze, Kennedy said emphatically, “No. There is no need to do that.” He repeated this two days later, observing that, since Bowles had received a copy of the letter, he might head up one or two of the task forces, but “there is no need to work with Nitze.” This was not that he liked Nitze less but that he liked a variety of advice more.

  Almost immediately a new problem arose. Kennedy’s senatorial staff was fighting an inevitable rearguard action against the horde of outsiders to whom their principal was suddenly yielding so much time and confidence. The staff regarded the Ball-Sharon operation with particular mistrust as a device to gain Stevenson a bridgehead in the midst of the Kennedy camp. Moreover, Sorensen undoubtedly felt that in the interests of order all the task force reports ought to clear through a single point. He therefore gave his own task force directive a broad interpretation and moved into foreign policy. As a result, when Sharon started phoning people for the Latin American and African task forces, he discovered that Sorensen and Goodwin had already signed them up. Fearing duplication and embarrassment, Ball and Sharon suspended their activity.

  But, if Sorensen wanted to screen the task forces and their reports in the interests of order, Kennedy wanted the reports without screening in the interests of self-protection. When he learned of the situation, he said to Sharon, “I told Ted to turn all this over to you, that he was far too busy to take on this additional responsibility. I will see Ted this afternoon and clear this up with him. You are the one who has charge of these task forces.” As soon as he had the word, Sorensen gracefully called Sharon and arranged to turn over all the foreign policy groups except three which were already at work—Latin America, India and the overseas food program.

  The task forces now shot forward in all directions. In addition to the seven set up during the campaign, nineteen more were at work by mid-December—eleven in foreign policy and eight in domestic policy. Three further domestic policy groups were added in January. Sharon and Sorensen recruited what they regarded as the best talent in the country—Roosa, Samuelson, Robert Triffin and E. M. Bernstein on balance of payments; Galbraith, Rostow, Robert Nathan, Max Millikan, Harlan Cleveland on foreign economic policy; Berle and Lincoln Gordon on Latin America; Samuelson, Seymour Harris and Walter Heller on the domestic economy; James M. Landis on regulatory agencies; Paul Douglas on area redevelopment; Wilbur J. Cohen on social welfare; and many others. The task force members volunteered their services; the expenses of the Ball-Sharon operation were met by a grant from the Edgar Stem Foundation, while the Sorensen operation was paid for by the Democratic National Committee. By inauguration twenty-four of the twenty-nine groups had turned in their reports.

  Kennedy did not read every word of every report, but he looked at them all and studied some with care. Though he sent most along to the cabinet or agency head who would become responsible after January 20, he clearly considered the task force effort as above all a service for himself. Thus, when he appointed Rusk, he had Sorensen pass on word to Sharon that “although he had designated a Secretary of State, those working on the foreign policy task forces were to understand that they had been commissioned by the President-elect and that their reports and recommendations were to be channeled directly to him for consultation with the Secretary of State.”

  The documents varied in length and quality—the ones on Africa, foreign economic policy and regulatory agencies, for example, were small books; but, in sum, they represented an extraordinary canvass of vital issues by some of the nation’s best specialists. The task force effort also equipped Kennedy with an instrument which he could use on special occasions during the transition; thus Ball and Sharon prepared the briefing papers which helped Kennedy to dazzle Eisenhower during their December meeting. It exposed him to people whom he might want in his administration and whom he had not met in the campaign (or had met perhaps only helping his opponents in the primaries); thus Ball and Gilpatric might not have come to his favorable attention if it had not been for the task forces. It encouraged his old staff to accept the necessity of enlarging his circle of advisers. It gave the men of the New Frontier an opportunity to work together in hammering out new policies. Out of the task force experience there came—for the President-elect and for those close to him—a freshened sense of programs, of priorities and of people.

  3. PREPARING FOR THE DAY

  So the transition proceeded, with Kennedy presiding benignly over this diversity of activities and making sure that every thread was securely in his own hands. His second child, John, Jr., had been born at the end of November. The birth was difficult, and Jacqueline was making a slow recovery. This meant that she had to stay in Palm Beach, and it meant too that the President-elect spent as much time as he could there in the days between the election and the inauguration. The time passed placidly in Florida, punctuated by visitations from political dignitaries, press conferences (with Caroline teetering into the room in her mother’s shoes), meetings with the new cabinet members and with the staff, swimming and golf.

  The placidity was not complete. One Sunday morning in December, a man named Richard P. Pavlick parked his car in front of the Kennedy house to wait for the President-elect to drive to mass. He had loaded the car with seven sticks of dynamite, and his idea was to ram the Kennedy automobile and pull the switch that would set off the explosion. A letter later found on him said, “I believe that the Kennedys bought the Presidency and the Whitehouse and until he really became President it was my intention to remove him in the only way it was available to me.” As Kennedy prepared to leave his house, Jacqueline and Caroline came to the door with him to say goodbye. Pavlick suddenly thought that he did not wish to kill him in front of his wife or children and decided instead to try again later. Though the Secret Service had recei
ved word from New Hampshire that Pavlick was uttering threats against the President-elect, they did not know until the following Wednesday that he had actually gone to Palm Beach. They immediately searched the town and the next day took him into custody.

  On January 9, Kennedy came to Cambridge to address the Massachusetts Legislature and attend a meeting of the Harvard Board of Overseers. After luncheon he set up headquarters in my house on Irving Street. It was a gray, chilly day, but a good many spectators stood outside to catch a glimpse of the President-elect. He received a stream of visitors through the afternoon. McGeorge Bundy rode over on his bicycle to complete the arrangements which would bring him to the White House as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Abram Chayes agreed to go to Washington as Legal Adviser to the State Department. Jerome B. Wiesner discussed his assignment as Science Adviser. The task force on tax policy, with Stanley Surrey and Mortimer Caplin among its members, submitted its recommendations. In the middle of the afternoon, the President-elect decided he could wait no longer to select a chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Bundy promptly got Glenn Seaborg, Chancellor of the University of California, on the telephone, and Kennedy offered him the job.